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THE 



VOCABULARY OE PHILOSOPHY. 



" 'Ap^fi Trjs TTuiScvctMS 7] riov dvojxdrwv iTviaKsipii," — Epictelns, 
'• Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum." 

" He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps. 
0! Ibey have lived long in the alms-basket of words." 

Love's Labour's Lost, Act v., Sc. 1. 

" If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very 
much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for." — 
LocJce. 

'• In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other languages, 
there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accus- 
toming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. 
There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be conveyed by the 
history of a word than by the history of a campaign." — Coleridge's Aids to Rejection, 
Aphor. 12. 

" In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic 
truth." — Trench on Study of Words, 12mo., Lond., 1S53. 

"Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's hirasel' an arkiteck — there's nae living for 
new words in this new warld neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such as me." 
— Quoth Meg Dods {St. Ronan's Well, chap; 2). 

"A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise." 

" Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, but 
highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a few 
primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the first 
pair of mankind." — Copleston's Remains, p. 101. 



( ^ 



^-^/6 



THE 

VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL; 

WITH 

QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES; 

FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 

BY 

WILLIAM FLEMING, D. D., 

PROFESSOR OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. 



FROM THE 
SECOND, REVISED AND ENLARGED, LONDON EDITION. 

WITH AN 

INTRODUCTION, CHRONOLOGY OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 

BROUGHT DOWN TO 1860, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX, 

SYNTHETICAL TABLES, AND OTHER ADDITIONS, 



CHAS. P. KRAUTH, D.D. 

TRANSLATOR OF "THOLUCK ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN,' 



SECOND EDITION. 



PHILADELPHIA: 
SMITH, ENGLISH & CO., 

No. 23 NORTH SIXTH ST, 

NEW YORK: SHELDON & CO. BOSTON: GOULD & LINCOLN. 

18 GO, 



^k'^ 



ffe 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 

SMITH, ENGLISH & CO., 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. 



INTRODUCTIO 

BY THE EDITOR. 



It will, we think, be conceded by all who are familiar with 
philosophical writings, that there has never been gathered in 
our language in that department a fund of thought and of in- 
formation which within as small a compass presents more that 
is valuable than we find in the Vocabulary of Philosophy by 
Professor Flenring. Jean Paul tells us that he never took 
up a book, the title of which excited extraordinary anticipa- 
tion, without finding that he was destined to disappointment. 
It may safely be affirmed, on the other band, that where the 
modesty of a title is unfeigned, the book, if it disappoint us at 
all, disappoints us agreeably. Of this class is the Vocabulary 
of Philosophy. It is much more than the title promises, for it 
illustrates the matter of philosophy as well as its terms. It 
gives incidentally a great deal of the history of philosopliy, and 
notices its literature on the leading subjects. It is to a large 
extent made up of the very words of the most distinguished 
philosophical writers, and thus becomes a guide to their opinions 
and to the most important portions of their works. Professor 
Fleming has not laboured single-handed, but has in this way 
drawn into his service, as co-workers, many of the greatest 
1* (v) 



VI INTRODUCTION. 

minds of all lands and of all time. It is true eveiywhere, and 
especially in the philosophical sciences, that the knowledge 
of words is, to a large extent, the knowledge of things. To 
grasp the full meaning of a term, we must ofttimes not only 
have a definition of it, but we must trace its history — and to 
know its history, we must know the views of the men who 
employed it, and the circumstances under which those views 
were formed and expressed; for the history of words is the 
liistory of the world. A Vocabulary with this large aim would 
be in fact a dictionary or Cyclopaedia of subjects and of au- 
thors, A Vocabulary, on the other hand, in the strictest sense, 
would simply give us terms and a definition of them. Professor 
Fleming's book is midway between these classes. It rises as 
far above the second class, as from its comj^actness and the na- 
ture of its design it necessarily comes short of the first. In 
the Preface to the Second Edition, however', a conditional 
promise is given that he may attempt such a work as the first 
would be. We hope that the author may be encouraged to 
carry out his purpose, and that in conjunction with the best 
philosophical thinkers in our language, he may give us what 
is so much needed — a Cyclopsedial Dictionary of the Philoso- 
phical Sciences, and of their literature and history. 

The Editor, at the request of the Publishers, consented to 
make the effort to render the Vocabulary of Philosophy still 
more useful, so far as the very brief time of the passage of the 
work through the press would allow him. To have made addi- 
tions to the text of a living author he would have considered 
an unwarranted liberty; and, apart from this consideration, 
such additions are really not needed, nor would they be con- 
sistent with the plan and purpose of the book, to both which 
compactness is indispensable. To have made the book a large 



INTRODUCTION. VU 

and espensive one would have destroyed one of its distinctive 
aims. 

He directed his main efforts, therefore, to what he considers 
tlie proper functions of an editor, to tlie bringing more com- 
pletely within the reach of the reader the treasures oifered by 
the author. He has aimed at the accomplishment of this end 
in the present case in the following way : 

I. He has thrown into the margin, where the eye readily 
catches them, when they are needed, the citations which, in 
the English edition, encumber and disfigure the text. 

II. He has added a Vocabulary of some of the principal 
terms used by German philosophers. 

III. He has given, from Tennemann's Manual, a Chronolo- 
gical Table of the History of Philosophy, enlarged somewhat 
in its closing part, and brought down to the year 1860 ; and 
with this has been connected a classification, by schools, of the 
latest Grerman philosophers. 

It is in matters connected with Grerman philosophy that 
Professor Fleming seems least at home. He is evidently de- 
pendent upon translators and critics for his knowledge of them ; 
and of translations from the German, especially in this depart- 
ment, we may use the reply which Canova made when Na- 
poleon, as an inducement to the artist to reside in the French 
Capital, proposed to transfer the works of Art from Home to 
Paris : " When you remove all that can be removed, there will 
remain infinitely more than all you have taken away.'' 

IV. The largest measure of labour has been bestowed upon 
the Bibliographical Index. Though this is so arranged as to 
form an Index to the Vocabulary, it has nevertheless an inde- 
pendent value. It gives every name quoted or alluded to in 
the A^ocabulary, and these embrace all the names of the most im- 



Vm INTRODUCTION. 

portance in Philosophy. In the Index, as a general thing, the 
names of the authors are given in full, the dates of their birth 
and death, or of the period in which they flourished are added, 
together with the titles of their works, not only of those cited 
in the Vocabulary, but in many cases of others that are most 
important, with the dates either of their composition or of the 
best editions, and in many cases the dates of both. The re- 
ference is not by the page but by the subject under which they 
are quoted, so that the Index shows the topics of the works 
catalogued, and thus presents a special vocabulary of the terms 
of the leading authors. By turning, for instance, to the arti- 
cles Aristotle, Plato, Hamilton, or Leibnitz, the reader will find 
himself able to examine consecutively the views of those great 
leaders in the World of Philosophical Science. Some of the 
most important philosophical works are destitute of an Index. 
Hamilton's Reid, for example, has none. The Vocabulary, with 
its Bibliographical additions, becomes to some extent an Index 
to such works. In preparing this Index with its Bibliographical 
feature, which, with all its imperfections, is, so far as the Editor 
knows, the only one of its kind, he has sometimes found all 
the sources within his reach, inadequate. It is based first of all 
upon an actual inspection of the works, where this was practi- 
cable. The facilities for this have been furnished by his own 
library, by the Philadelphia Library, and by the bookstores of 
the city. In this department he found the stock of his Pub- 
lishers rich and well selected, and he acknowledges the facilities 
which they kindly gave to his labours by the unrestricted use 
of the whole. There still remained, however, a large number 
of works, for an ability to notice which he is indebted to various 
valuable books of reference. Among these might be mentioned, 
First, the works in which the Bibliography of Philosophy is 



INTRODUCTION. IX 

treated as a part of general Bibliography. The best English, 
American, French, and Grerman Cyclopedias present more or 
less largely such materials. The works in Bibliography, and 
in Literary History, Watt, Brunet, Ebert, Grraesse, Darling, 
also furnish valuable matter. The best general Biographies 
are also necessarily bibliographical, and special attention has 
been given to this department in the admirable vrork edited by 
Hoefer, and now in process of publication by the Didots.^ 

In English and American Bibliography, the Editor has had 
the best works of reference at hand, including the various 
Catalogues to the latest dates. Although all of them have 
been in various degrees necessary in the preparation of the 
Index, yet in a large proportion of cases the work of Mr. AUi- 
bone, as far as it is completed, is, for English and American 
authors, instar omnium, and sometimes much more, for it 
largely embodies matter not before in print. On many names 
it will always remain the primary source of information. Though 
the minute testing, letter by letter, most of all in a specialty 
like that of Philosophy, is one which very few works of a 
general character will at all endure, we have found, to a sur- 
prising extent, in this comprehensive work, what we searched 
it for, and we could not but feel a grateful regret in parting 
company with it in the veiy middle of the vast forest of the 
noblest Literature of the modern World. 

For the French and Grerman Literature he has also had access 
to the best sources.^ 

' Nouvelle BiogT-aphie Generale depuis les temps les plus recules jusqu'a 
nos Jours. 1857. Thirty-one vols, have appeared. 

^ For the French, among others, La France Literaire, with its continuation 
under the title La Litterature Frangaise Contenipornine. 16 vols. 1827 — 1 857. 
Bossange. Bibliographie de la France. 1850 — 1860. Reinwald, Catalogue 
Annuel, 1859-60. For the German, Georgi, Heinsius, Kayser, and thesemi- 
annual Catalogues. 



X INTRODUCTION. 

The works in which the Bibliography of Philosophy is a 
SPECIALTY ai'e comparatively few. Among them may be ei)Li- 
merated the best Dictionaries of Philosophy ; Walch, Krug, 
the Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, and Furtmaier : ^ 
and the Histories of Philosophy, which give its literature, 
among which, as valuable in this aspect, and easy of access, may 
be mentioned Tennemann's Manual and Blakey's History of the 
Philosophy of Mind. The books devoted exclusively to the 
Bibliography of Philosophy are of course very few. The Editor 
would mention those only which he has on his own shelves. 
These are — the Psychological Library of GtRAESSE,^ in which 
he presents in alphabetical order the titles of the most im- 
portant works of ancient and of modern times relating to the 
soul, and to the doctrine of immortality; the Bibliographical 
Manual of German Philosophical Literature from the middle 
of the XVIIIth Century to the present day, by Ersch^ and 
GrEissLER; the Philosophical Literature of Germany, from 
A. D. 1400 to the present time, by Gumposch*; and the Phi- 
losophical Library of Ladrange,^ which is a useful list of the 
best works of this class in French, original and translated. 

y. The final labours of the Editor have been devoted to the 
preparation of the Synthetical Tables which follow this 
Introduction. The utility of these tables will, we think, at 
once strike the reader. The First Part forms a skeleton of the 
Philosophical Sciences ; the Second Part presents an outline of 
their history. It will be perceived that all these additions, 
"which have increased the size of the book by 110 pages, have 

" Philosophisches Real-Lexicon. 4 vols. 8vo. 1853-1855. 
^ Bibliotheca Psyehologica. Leipzig. IS45. 
'■' Bibliographisches Handbuch. Dritte Auflage. Leipz. 1850. 
* Die Philosopb. Literatur der Deutschen. Regensburg, 1851. 
' Librairie Philosopbique. Paris, 1856. 



INTRODUCTION..- XI 

a certain internal unity, and are designed to co-operate in pro- 
ducing a common result. Very far more than in the ratio in 
which they have enlarged the work, the Editor believes, they 
have added to its value as a Manual. The student will find 
such bibliographical aid as he needs in beginning to form an 
acquaintance with philosophical literature. The Vocabulary, 
without undergoing a change in what its author has done, has 
to some extent become a Compendious Dictionai-y of Philoso- 
phy. Its leading articles, as indeed those of any work which 
arranges philosophical matter alphabetically, can, by the aid 
of the first part of the Synthetical Tables, be read in the order 
of nature. The general character and succession of the philo- 
sophical schools of all times are briefly presented in the second 
part. The Chronology of the History of Philosophy used in 
conjunction with the Bibliographical Index will enable tlie 
student, to some extent, to trace, by the aid of the Vocabulary, 
the theories and views of philosophers in the order of time. 
The work might indeed, in its present shape, be used advan- 
tageously, not merely as an indispensable aid in easily reaching 
the meaning of other works, but as a text-book for the syste- 
matic study of the Elements of Philosophy, It is a thread for 
the hand of the student who is entering that labyrinth which, 
beyond all the structures of man, proves the majesty of the 
mind, and the invincible character of some of its limitations. 

It may not be improper here to correct a mistake of Professor 
Fleming, found in the statement under " Psychopannychism," 
that Luther was inclined to the doctrine that the soul slee^js 
between death and the resurrection. Whatever may have been 
the confusion of his views on the world of the dead while he 
was still under the influence of early education, there is no 
satisfactory evidence that lie ever held this error, and bis 



SI! INTRODUCTION. 

niuture judgment against it has been expressed most decidedly 
in his Commentary on G-enesis, the latest, and in many respects 
the best of his longer works. He says in that : " In the in- 
terim (between death' and the resurrection), the soul does not 
sleep, but is awake, and enjoys the vision of angels and of 
God, and has converse with them.'' ^ 
Phii.adelphia, Aug. 10th, 1860. 

' In Geucs. xxv. 321. Interim Anima nou dormku. 



SYNTHETICAL TABLE 



PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.* 



PART FIRST. 

THEORY AND DEFINITIONS. 

I. PHILOSOPHY. 



'7/5 relation to — 

Mythology. 

The Fine Arts. 

The Sciences in general. 

The Mathematical Sciences. 



Its relation to 

The Natural Sciences — the 

different theories of Nature, 
The Science of Language and 

Grammar. 



XL PSYCHOLOGY. 



Its relation to — 

Anthropologj'. 

Ideology. 

Pneumatology. 

1. Faculties. 

2. Capacities. 

3. Modes. 

4. Intelligence, Intellect, In- 

tellection. 
Thought. 



Conscience. 
Consciousness. 
Apperception. 
Sense, or Exterior Percep- 
tion. 
Sensus Communis. 
Common Sense. 
Reason, 
Intuition. 
Contemplation. 



' Ou the basis of the Table Synthetictue of the Dictionnaire des Scieuccs Philoso- 
phiques, tome VI. pp. 1029— 1S32, Paris, 1S52. 



( i^iii ) 



SYNTHETICAL TABLE OP THE 



II. PSYCHOLOGY. {Continued.) 



Reflection. 
Notion. 

Concept, Conception. 
Apprehension. 
Idea. 

Species(Impressa,Expvessa). 
Category. 
Imagination. 
Memory. 
Reminiscence. 
Association of Ideas. 
5. Sensibility, or Sensitivity. 
Impression. 
Sensation. 
Appetite. 
Desire. 

Propension, Inclination 
Affections. 
Passions. 
Antipathy, 



Hatred. 

Love. 

Remorse. 

Faith. 

Enthusiasm. 

Ecstasy. 

6. Activity. 

Instinct. 

Habit, Habitude, 

WilL 

Attention. 

Liberty. 

7. Ego (I). 

8. Person, Peesonalitt. 

9. Soul. 

10. Seat of the Soul, or Sen- 

SORIUM. 

11. Life. 

12. Sleep. 

13. Insanity. 



III. LOGIC. 



Organon. 

Canon (of Epicurus). 
Analytics. 
Dialectics. 
a. Of Trvih in general and its re- 
lation to Thought. 
Criterion of Truth. 
Evidence. 
Certainty'. 
Probability. 
Doubt. 
Assent. 
Judgment. 
Relation. 
Attribute and Subject. 



Quality. 
. Quantity. 
Modality. 
Identity. 
Difference. 

Possible and Impossible. 
Contingent and Necessary. 
Absolute and Relative. 
Objective and Subjective. 
Concrete and Abstract. 
Adequate, Inadequate. 
Immanent and Transcendent. 
A posteriori, A priori. 
Principles. 
Axioms. 



PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. 



XV 



III. LOGIC. (Continued. 



Of the ileans of discovering 
Truth. 

Method. 

Analysis, Synthesis. 

Experience, Observation, 

Comparison. 

Abstraction. 

Generalization. 

Classification. 

Results of Classification : 
Genus. 
Species. 

Induction. 

Analogy. 

Deduction. 

Human Testimony, Autho- 
rity. 

Systena. 

Speculation. 

Science. 
Of the Means of expressing and 
of demonstrating Truth. 

Signs, Language. 

Proposition. 

Prasdicate, Subject. 

Praedicament. 

Copula. 

Comprehension, Extension 
(Logical). 

Affirmation. 

Negation. 

Contradiction. 

Contrai'ies [Propositions) . 

Complex, Simple (Proposi- 
tion). 

Assertory [Proposition). 

Apodictical [Propositions). 

Problematical [Propositions) . 



Problem. 

Lemma. 

Postulate. 

Anticipation. 

Definition. 

Division. 

Distinction. 

Demonstration. 

Argumentation. 

Syllogism. 

Syllogistic Signs. 

Enthymeme. 

Antecedent. 

Consequent. 

Corollary. 

Conclusion. 

Disjunction. 

Disjunctive Argumenl,ov Pro- 
position. 

Dilemma. 

Epicheirema. 

Sorites. 

Argument a fortiori. 

Reduction ad absurdum. 

Argument. 

Argument a pari. Example, 
see Analogy. 
Signs of Error and its Re- 
medy. 

Opinion. 

Hypothesis. 

Prejudice. 

Error. 

Antinomy. 

Paralogism. 

Sophism, Sophistical. 

Amphibology. 

Petitio Principii, Fallacy. 



SYNTHETICAL TABLE OF THE 



IV. ESTHETICS. 



Beautiful. 
Sublime. 
Ideal. 
Taste. 



Genius. 

Imitation. 

Arts (The Fine) 



v. MORALS, ETHICS. 



Goodness. 

Honesty. 

Order. 

Law. 

Autonomy. 

Perfection. 

Duty. 

Imperative (Categorical, 

The). 
Right. 

Merit and Demerit. 
Virtue. 
Vice. 

Cardinal Virtues. 
Ascetic Virtues, Asceticism. 
Abstinence. 
Stoicism. 



Apathy. 

Justice. 

Penalty. 

Philanthropy. 

Charity. 

Self-preservation. 

Suicide. 

Property. 

Family. 

Education. 

State. 

Society. 

Socialism. 

Human Destiny, 

Humanity. 

Progress. 

Perfectibility. 



VI. METAPHYSICS. 



Ontology. 

Being. 

Nihilum, or Nothing. 

Privation. 

Unity. 

Essence. 

Entity. 

Quiddity. 

Substantial Forms. 

Archetypes. 

Noumenon. 



Phenomenon. 

Actual. 

Virtual. 

Cause. 

Causes (Final). 

Caiises (Occasional). 

Abstract. 

Accident. 

Force. 

Entelechy. 

Monad. 



PHILOSOPHICAL SCIEITCES. 



VI. METAPHYSICS. (Contimied.) 

Individuality. Infinite. 

Time. A parte ante. 

Space. A parte post. 

Extension. Spirit. 

Externality or Outness. Matter. 

Motion. Nature. 

Number. Macrocosm. 

Indefinite. Microcosm. 



VII. THEODICY. 



Theology. 

Theosophy. 

Teleology. 

God. 

Demiurge. 

Anima Mundi (Soul of the 

World.) 
Emanation. 
Creation. 



Prescience. 

Providence. 

Evil. 

Chance. 

Necessity. 

Destiny. 

Predestination. 

Immortality. 



PART SECOND. 
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 

FIRST. PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS. 

OF SYSTEMS IN GENERAL. 

Spiritualism. 

Materialism. 

Hylozoism. 

Atomism. 

Atheism. 

Theism 

Deism. 

Anthropomorphisra. 

Ontimism. 



Dogmatism. 

Scepticism, 

Rationalism. 

Empiricism. 

Idealism. 

Sensualism. 

Nominalism. 

Realism. 

Conceptualism. 



SYNTHETICAL TABLE OF THE 



OF SYSTEMS IN GENERAL. {Continued., 

Dualism. Mysticism. 

Pantheism. Quietism. 

Fatalism. Syncretism. 

Metempsychosis. Eclecticism. 



SECOND. PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS, 

I. rillLOSOPHY. ORIENTAL. 



Philosophy of India. 
" " China. 

" " Egypt. 

" " Ciialdea. 

" " Sabeists. 



6. Philosophy of Persians. 

7. " " Phoenicians. 

8. " " Jews. 

9. " " Syrians. 



II. PHILOSOPHY 



1. Mysteries. Esoteric doctrine. 

2. Hymns of Orpheus. Orphic 

Philos. 

3. Homeric Philosophy. 

4. Gnomic " 

5. Sages of Greece. 

6. Ionic School. 

7. ItalicorPy-|g^j^^^j_ 
thagorean J 

8. Eleatic "• 

9. Atomistic " 

10. Sophistic 

11. Socratic 

12. Cynic 

13. Cyreniac 

14. Megaric 

15. Eristic 

16. Elis & Eretria 

17. Platonic " Academy. 

18. Peripatetic " Lyceum. 

19. Pyrrhonic " Scepticism. 
^0. Epicurean 



ILL CHRISTIAN I 
%. Greek Church. 



GREEK. 

21. Stoic School. 

22. New Academy. 

23. Greek Philosophy among the 
Romans. 

a. Political Philosojjhy. 

b. Roman JurisconisuUd. 

c. " Epicurmns. 

d. " Stoics, Pylharjoreana, and 

Cynics. 

e. " Practical Eclecticism, New 

Academy (Cicero). 

24. Decadence of the Greek Phi- 

losophj'. 

a. New Pythayoreans. 

b. Neio Platonists ; Erudite Plato- 

niisls. 

c. Nei'j Peripatetics. 

d. New Sceptics. 

e. Sophists, Rhetoricians, Compilers. 

25. School of Alkxanhria. 

26. Gnosticism. Gnostic School. 



HILOSOPHERS AND CHURCH FATHERS. 
I b. Latin Church. 



PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. 



1. First Epoch. Beginning of 

IXth to end of Xllth Cent. 

2. Second Epoch. Xlllth and 

XlVth Centuries. 
a. Mystics opposed to the Scho- 



IV. ARABI.4N PHILOSOPHY. 

V. SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 

lastic Philos 



(Tauler, Ger- 
son, Petrarch.) 
Third Epoch. Decline and 
fall of the Scholastic Philos. 



VI. PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 



1 . Greek Refugees in Italy. 

2. Men of letters opposed to Scho- 

lasticism (Von Hutten, Lu- 
ther, Melancthon, Erasmus). 

3. Peripatetics. 

4. Platonician? & Pythagoreans. 

5. Stoics. 



6. Sceptic. 

7. Mystic. 

8. Efforts at Reform and Resto- 

ration. 

9. Moralists and Political Phi- 

losophers. 



VIL MODERN PHILOSOPHY. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 
(Bacon, Des Cartes.) 

A. ENGLISH SCHOOL. 



I. Sensualism, school of. 
II. Spiritualism, " 
1. Naturalistic, " 



2. Metaphysicians & theologians. 

3. Moralists, Critics. 
III. Sceptical school. 



B. SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

C. FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 



I. Cartesianism, Cartesian 
school. 

1. Disciples of Des Cartes. 

2. Friends of Des Cartes, and of 

Cartesianism. 

3. Disciples of Des Cartes dis- 

senting from him ; Spino- 
zism. 

4. Adversaries of Des Cartes ; 

theologians. 

5. Sensualistic and Sceptical Ad- 

versaries. 
IT. Sensualistic school of the 
XVIIIth Century. 



1. Ideologists and Physiologists. 

2. Encyclopedists. 

3. Epicureans. Atheists. 

III. Moralists. Political Philoso- 

phers. Economists. 

IV. Adversaries of the Sensualis- 

tic Philosophy of the XVIIIth 
Century. 

1. Isolated adversaries. 

2. Mystics and theologians. 

3. Spiritualistics and Eclectics 

of the XlXth Century. 



TABLE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. 



D. ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

E. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. 

First Epoch from Leibnitz to Kant. 



I. School of Leibnitz and Wolf. 
II. Adversaries of Leibnitz and 
Wolf. 



III. Independent Eclectics. Aca- 

demicians of Berlin. 

IV. Moralists. Political Philoso- 

phers. 



Second Epoch from Kant to our oum time^ 

I. School of Kant. 
a. Dissenters from the School of 
Kant. 
II. School of Fichte. 



in. School of Jacobi. 
IV. School of Schelling and of 
Hegel. 
V. Mystics and Dissidents. 



* See list of German Philosophers, p. 579. 



PREFACE 



THE FIRST EDITION, 



The aim of tbe following work, as its title indicates, is 
humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate illustration 
of the difficult and important topics denoted or suggested by 
the several vocables which are successively explained. All that 
is intended is, to assist the student towards a right understand- 
ing of the language of philosophy, and a right apprehension 
of the questions in discussing which that language has been 
employed. Instead of affixing a positive or precise significa- 
tion to the vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to 
furnish the student with the means of doing so for himself — 
by showing whence they are derived, or of what they are com- 
pounded, and how they have been employed. In like manner, 
the quotations and references have not been selected with the 
view of supporting any particular system of philosopliy, but 
rather with the view of leading to free inquiry, extended read- 
ing, and careful reflection, as the surest means of arriving at 
true and sound conclusions. 

In our Scottish Universities, the study of philosophy is 
entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of years and 
intellect, and in respect of previous preparation and attain- 

(xxi) 



XXU PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

ment, differ widely from one another. To many, a help like 
the present may not be necessary. To others, the Author has 
reason to think it may be useful. Indeed, it was the felt want 
of some such help, in the discharge of professional duty, which 
prompted the attempt to supply it. The labor has been greater 
than the result can indicate or measure. But, should the 
Vocabulary assist the young student by directing him what 
to read, and how to understand what he reads, in philosophy, 
the labourer shall have received the hire for which he wrought. 

The College, Glasgow, 
November, 1856. 



PREFACE 



THE SECOND EDITION. 



The Vocabulary op Philosophy was originally prepared 
for the use of a Class of students who give attendance on a 
lengthened course of Lectures on Moral Philosophy. The 
words and phrases selected for explanation, were chiefly such 
as were actually employed in the Lectures, or such as the 
students were likely to meet with in the course of their read- 
ing. Of the words and phrases of the Grerman Philosophy, 
only such were introduced as had found their way into com- 
mon use. 

The Vocabulary having been found useful, beyond the 
limits for which it was originally intended, a Second Edition 
has speedily been called for. Useful suggestions have sponta- 
neously been made to the Author by persons with whom he 
was previously unacquainted ; and, among othei's, by Mr. Hay- 
wood, the Translator of the Criticism of the Pure Reason. 
Mr. Morell, who was formerly a student at this University, and 
who is now so well known by his valuable contributions to 
Philosophy, had the kindness to go over the contents of the 
Vocabulary, and to furnish a list of such additional words 
and phrases as might be introduced with advantage. The like 

(xxiii) 



XXIV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

good office was rendered by Dr. M'Cosh, the distinguished Pro- 
fessor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast; 
and the Author has done what he could to make this Edition 
move complete and useful. The quotations have, in some in- 
stances, been shortened; and, without much increasing the size 
of the work, many additional words and phrases, from the 
different departments of Philosophy, have been introduced. 

It still retains the name and form of a Vocabulary, in the 
hope that it may prove useful in our higher Academies and 
Colleges. But, should suitable encouragement and co-operation 
be obt-ained, it is in contemplation, by extending the plan and 
enlarging the articles, to claim for the work a higher title, by 
trying to make it instrumental in rendering to Philosophy 
among ourselves, a service similar to what has been rendered 
to Philosophy in France, by the publication of the Dictionnaire 
des Sciences PMlosophiques. 

The College, Glasgow, 
February, 1858. 



THE 

YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



ABDUCTION {ahductio, drtaycoy^, a leading away) is a kind of 
syllogism in which it is plain that the major extreme is con- 
tained in the middle ; but it is not apparent that the middle is 
included in the minor extreme, although this is equally credible 
or more so than the conclusion. From this, therefore, tliat its 
major proposition is plain, it approaches to demonstration ; but 
it is not yet demonstration, since its assumption or minor pro- 
position is not evident. But the assumption is not evident 
because it is not immediate, but requires proof to make the de- 
monstration complete. For example — All whom God absolves 
are free from sin. But God absolves all who are in Christ. 
Therefore all who are in Christ are free from sin. In this 
apagogic syllogism the major proposition is self-evident ; but 
the assumption is not plain till another proposition proving it 
is introduced, namely, God condemns sin in them by the 
mission of his Son. This mode of reasoning is called abduc- 
tion, because it withdraws us from the conclusion to the proof 
of a proposition concealed or not expressed. It is described 
by Aristotle.' 

ABILITY and INABILITY — (Natural and Moral). 

Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of 
being possessed of tht. _-equisite means, and being unrestrained 
in their exercise ; thus we say ability to walk, the power of 
seeing, &c. 

Inability (Nat.) is the opposite of this; as when we say of a 
blind man, he is unable to see ; or when an object is too dis- 
tant, we say we are unable to see it. 

1 Prior. Arwdyt., lib. ii., cap. 25. 
2 B (1) 



H VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

ABILITY — 

Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and 
opportunities which God has given ; as when it is written, "It 
is'a joy to the just to do judgment." 
Inability (Mor,) is the want of a right disposition ; as in those 
of whom it is written, " They have eyes full of adultery, and 
cannot cease from sin." " If there is anything besides want 
of inclination which prevents a man from performing a par- 
ticular act, he is said to be naturally unable to do it. If 
unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to 
be morally unable. That which prevents a man from doing 
as he will, is tiatural inability. That which prevents him from 
doing as he ought, is moral inability." ' 

ABSCISSIO INFINITI is a phrase applied by some logical 
writers to a series of arguments used in any inquiry in which 
we go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain 
classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking 
to ascertain. Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude 
"small-pox;" that is, prove this not to be the patient's dis- 
order; other symptoms, suppose, exclude "scarlatina" &c., 
and so one may proceed by gradually narrowing the range of 
possible suppositions." 2 

ABSOLUTE {dbsolutum, from ab and solvo, to free or loose from) 
signifies what is free from restriction or limit. 

" "We must know what is to be meant by absohde or absolute- 
ness ; whereof I find two main significations. First, absolute 
signifieth perfect, and absoluteness, perfection ; hence we have 
in Latin this expression — Perfectiim est omnibus numeris absol- 
utum. And in our vulgar language we say a thing is absolutely 
good when it is ^e?;/ec% good, '^e^i, absolute signifieth y?-ee 
from tie or bond, which in Greek is a.7(o%i%vjji.lvov ." ^ 

1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a 
man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative. 

2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is ojjposed to 
what exists secundum quid. The soul of man is immortal 
absolutely ; man is immortal only as to his soul. 



' Day, On the Will, pp. 96, 97. 

3 Whately, Log. b. ii., ch. iii., s. 4, and ch. v., s. 1, subs. 7. 

' Knox, Hist, of Reform., Prof. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 6 

ABSOLUTE— 

3. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-existence, 
and is predicable only of the First Cause. 

4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but 
also free from condition. 

Absolute, Unconditioned, Infinite. — " The Absolute, taking its 
etymological sense, may be explained as that which is free 
from all necessary relation ; which exists in and by itself, and 
does not require the prior or simviltaneous existence of any- 
thing else. The Unconditioned, in like manner, is that which 
is subject to no law or condition of being ; which exists, there- 
fore, in and by itself, and does not imply the prior or simul- 
taneous existence of anything else. The Absolute and Uncon- 
ditioned are also identical with the Eeal ; for relation is but a 
phenomenon, implying and depending on the prior existence 
of things related ; while the true Real is unrelated. Such a 
science as metaphysics, which has in all ages been proclaimed 
as the science of the Absolute, the Unconditioned, and the Real, 
according to Kant, must be unattainable by man ; for all know- 
ledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation 
between the subj ect or person conscious, and the obj ect or thing 
of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot 
be Absolute ; for consciousness depends on the laws of the con- 
scious mind, its existence as such implies an act of conscious- 
ness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the Uncon- 
ditioned; for consciousness depends on the laws of the con- 
scious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the Real; 
for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they 
appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves." ' 
" Mr. Calderwood defines the Absolute, which he rightly 
identifies with the Infinite, as ' that which is free from all ne- 
cessary relation:' 'it may exist in relation, provided that re- 
lation be not a necessary condition of its existence. Hence he 
holds that the Absolute may exist in the relation of conscious- 
ness, and in that relation be apprehended, though imperfectly, 
by man. On this theory we have two absolutes : the Absolute 
as it exists oiit of consciousness, and the Absohite as it is known 
in consciousness. Mr. Calderwood rests his theory on the 

* Mansel, Lecture on Philosophy of Kant, p. 25. 



4 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSOLUTE - 

assumption that these two are one. How is this identity to be 
ascertained ? How do I know that the absolute is my absolute? 
I cannot compare them ; for comparison is a relation, and the 
first Absolute exists out of relation. Again, to compare them, 
I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time ; for 
the first Absolute is never in consciousness, and the second is 
never out of it. Again, the Absolute as known is an object of 
consciousness ; and an object of consciousness as such, cannot 
exist, save in relation. But the true Absolute, by its definition, 
can exist out of relation ; therefore the Absolute as known is 
not the true Absolute. Mr. Calderwood's Absolute in conscious- 
ness is only the Relative under a false name." ' 

According to Sir William Hamilton ,2 " The Unconditioned 
denotes the genus of which the Infinite and the Absolute are 
the species." 

As to our knowledge or conception of the Absolute, there 
are difi"erent opinions. 

1. According to Sir William Hamilton, " The mind can 
conceive, and consequently can know^ only the limited, and 
the conditionally limited. The unconditionally unlimited, or 
the Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot 
positively be construed to the mind ; they can be conceived 
at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very 
conditions under which thought itself is realized ; consequently 
the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative — negative of 
the conceivable itself." 

2. According to Kant, the Absolute or Unconditioned is not 
an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative princi- 
ple of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the 
conditioned. 

3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not con- 
ceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with 
the Absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and 
reflection, which are only of the Relative and the Different. 

4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by 
consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and 
plurality. 

Instead of saying that God is Absohde and Infinite, 

' Mansel, Lecture on Philosophy of Kant, p. 38. * Discussions, p. 13. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY O 

ABSOLUTE — 

Krause, and his admirer, Tiberghien,' ascribe to him Sfeit6 
[selbheii) and Totality. Totality or the Infinite manifests 
itself everywhere in nature. Nature is made up of wholes, 
and all these constitute one whole. In S2nrit everything 
manifests itself under the character of spontaneity or sfeite. 
Spirit always is what it is by its own individual efforts. 

AU philosophy aims at a knowledge of the Absolute under 
different phases. In psychology, the fundamental question is, 
have we ideas that are a priori and absolute? — in logic, is 
human knowledge absolute ? — in ethics, is the moral law abso- 
lute rectitude ? — and in metaphysics, what is the ultimate 
ground of all existence or absolute being ?2 — V. Infinite, 
Unconditioned, Real. 
ABSTINENCE [ahs teneo, to hold from or ofi")— "is whereby a 
man refraineth from anything which he may lawfully take.'"* 

Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things which 
nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, 
for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the 'Art£;^ov 
of the precept of Epictetus, 'Avexo^ xai aTisxov ; Sustine ef 
abstine. The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make 
the soul more independent of the body and the things belong- 
ing to the body. — Christian abstinence is founded in humility 
and self-mortification. — V. Asceticism. 
ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION [abstradio, from abs tralio, to 
draw away from. It is also called separatio and resolutio). 

Dobrisch observes that the term abstraction is used some- 
times in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the 
former we are said to abstract the attention from certain 
distinctive features of objects presented [abstrahere \inenterri\ 
a differentiis). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain 
portions of a given concept from the remainder [abstrahere 
differentias) * 
Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart,^ " is the power 
of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart 

^ Essni des Connaissances Humaines, pp. 738, 745. 

"See Edinburgh Review for October, 1829; Sir William Hamilton (^Discussions); 
Tiberghien (Essai des Connaissances Humaines). 
' Elyot, Oovernour, b. iii., c. 16. * Mansel, Prolegom. Log., note, p. 26. 

' Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind, chap. iv. 

2^ 



6 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION— 

from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the 
power which the understanding has of separating the combina- 
tions which are presented to it." Perhaps it may be more 
correctly regarded as a process rather than a power — as & func- 
tion rather than a. faculty. Dr. Reid has called it' "an opera- 
tion of the understanding. It consists in the resolving or ana- 
lyzing a subject (object) into its known attributes, and giving 
a name to each attribute, which shall signify that attribute 
and nothing more." Attributes are not presented to us singly 
in nature, but in the concrete, or growing together, and it is 
by abstraction that we consider them separately. In looking 
at a tree we may perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its 
branches, and its leaves, and its fruit ; or we may contemplate 
any one of these to the exclusion of all the rest ; and when 
we do so it is by the operation of mind which has been called 
abstraction. It implies an exercise of will as well as of under- 
standing ; for there must be the determination and effort to 
fix the energy of the mind on the attribute specially con- 
templated. 

The chemist really separates into their elements those bodies 
which are submitted to his analysis. The psychologist does 
the same thing mentally. Hence abstraction has been dis- 
tinguished as real and mental. But as the object presented to 
the psychologist may be an object of sense or an object of 
thought, the process of abstraction may be either real or 
mental. He may pluck off a branch from a tree, or a leaf 
from a branch, in order to consider the sensation or percep- 
tion which is occasioned in him. And in contemplating 
mind, he may think of its capacity of feeling without think- 
ing of its power of activity, or of the faculty of memory 
apart from any or all of the other faculties with which it is 
allied. 
Abstraction (Logical), "As we have described it," says Mr. 
Thomson,^ "would include three separate acts; first, an act 
oi comparison, which brings several intuitions together; next, 
one of reflection, which seeks for some marks which they all 
possess, and by which they may be combined into one group ; 
and last, one of generalization, which foi'ms the new general 

' Intdl. Powers, essay v.; chap. 3. * Outline, of the Laws of Thought, p. 107. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 7 

ABSTRACTION — 

notion or conception. Kant, however, confines the name ot 
abstraction to the last of the three ; others apply it to the 
second. It is not of much consequence whether we enlarge 
or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the 
various steps of the process. The word mean3 a drawing 
away of the common marks from all the distinctive marks 
which the single objects have." 

"The process," says Dr. Whately,' "by which the mind 
arrives at the notions expressed by ' common' (or in popular 
language, ' general') terms is properly called ' generalization,' 
though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of 
abstraction ; for generalization is one of the purposes to which 
abstraction is applied. When we draw off and contemplate 
separately any part of an object presented to the mind, disre- 
garding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part of it. 
Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his 
mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying 
aside all thought of the colour, form, &c. ; and thus, even 
though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would 
be employing the faculty of abstraction ; but if, in contem- 
plating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain 
points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregard- 
ing the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a 
name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, — i.e., a 
common name, as ' rose ;' or, again, if we give a name to some 
attribute wherein they agree, as ' fragrance,' or ' redness,' we 
are then said to ' generalize.' Abstraction, therefore, does not 
necessarily imply generalization, though generalization implies 
abstraction." In opposition to this, see Thomson.'^ 

"A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. 
Stewart," " might yet have been able to consider its colour 
apart from its other qualities ; and, therefore, there may be 
such a thing as an idea which is at once abstract and particu- 
lar. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a 
variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to 
any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness 

' Log., book i., sect. 6. 

* Outline of the Laws of Thought, part i., sect. 24. 

^ Addenda to vol. i., Phil, of Bum. Mind. 



8 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION — 

in general, which may be called a general abstract idea. The 
words abstract and general, therefore, when applied to ideas, 
are as completely distinct from each other as any two words 
to be found in the language. It is indeed true, that the for- 
mation of every general notion presupposes abstraction, but it 
is surely improper, on this account, to call a general term an 
abstract term, or a general idea an abstract idea." 

Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely ' the practice of 
apptying the expression " abstract name" to all names which 
are the result of abstraction or generalization, and consequently 
to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of 
attributes. He uses the term abstract as opposed to concrete. 
By an abstract name he means the name of an attribute — by 
a concrete name the name of an object. The sea is a concrete 
name. Saltness is an abstract name. Some abstract names 
are general names, such as colour ; but rose-colour, a name 
obtained by abstraction, is not a general name. 

" By abstract terms, which should be carefully distinguished 
from general names, I mean those which do not designate any 
object or event, or any class of objects or events, but an attri- 
bute or quality belonging to them ; and which are capable of 
standing grammatically detached, without being joined to 
other terms : such as, the words roundness, swiftness, length, 
innocence, equity, health, whiteness." ^ 

" When the notion derived from the view taken of any 
object," says Dr. Whately,'' " is expressed with a reference to, 
or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, 
it is expressed by a concrete term, as ' foolish' or ' fool ;' when 
without any such reference, by an abstract term, as ' folly.' " 
And he adds in a note, "It is unfortunate that some writers 
have introduced the fashion of calling all common terms ab- 
stract terms." — V. Term. 

A French philosopher has expressed himself on this point to 
the following effect: — " In every class, genus, or species, there 
are two things which may be conceived distinctly, the objects 
united in the class, and the characters which serve to unite them. 



' Log., Tol. i., 2d edition, p. 35. 

* S. Bailey, Letters on Phil. Human Mind, p. 195. 

2 Log., book il., chap. 5, sect. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. ' 9 

ABSTRACTION — 

Hence it follows, that under every term which represents that 
ideal whole Avhich we call genus, under the term ' bird/ for ex- 
ample, there are two different ideas, — the idea of the number 
of the objects united, and the idea of the common characters ; 
this is what is called the extension and the comprehension of 
general terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the ex- 
tension, and another word to denote the comprehension; as 
' mortals ' and ' mortality.' And this has led some philosophers 
to say that there are general ideas which are concrete and gene- 
ral ideas which are abstract — the latter referring only to the 
qualities which are common, and the former to the qualities 
and to the objects which possess them." 

" The mind," says Mr. Locke,' " makes particular ideas re- 
ceived from particular objects to become general, which is 
done by considering them as they are in the mind such ap- 
pearances, separate from all other existences, and the circum- 
stances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomi- 
tant ideas. This is called ahstraction, Avhereby ideas taken 
from particular beings, become general representatives of all 
of the same kind ; and their names general names, applicable 
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas." ^ 

In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said,^ " I own my- 
self able to abstract ideas, in one sense, as when I consider 
some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with 
which, though they. are united in some object, yet it is possi- 
ble they may really exist without them. But I deny that I 
can abstract one from another, or conceive separately those 
qualities which it is impossible should exist separately ; or 
that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particu- 
lars, as aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation 
of abstraction." 

"It seems to me," says Mr. Hume,^ "not impossible to 
avoid these absurdities and contradictions,^ if it be admitted 
that there are no such things as abstract in general ideas, 
properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality 

• Essay on Hum. Under., book ii., chap. 11, sect. 9. 
' See also book iv., chap. 7, sect. 9. 

3 Principles of Hum. Know., Introd.j sect. 10. 

* Essays, p. 371, n. c. edit., 1758. » See his Essay on Sceptical Philosophy. 



10 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION - 

particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon 
occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certain cir- 
cumstances the idea present to the mind. Thus, when the 
term ' horse ' is pronounced, we immediately figure to our- 
selves the idea of a black or white animal of a particular size 
or figure ; but as that term is also used to be applied to ani- 
mals of other colours, figures, and sizes, their ideas, though 
not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled, 
and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as 
if they were actually present." 

In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume which are 
supported by S. Bailey in Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind, see Dr. 
Eeid.i 

The Rev. Sidney Smith ^ mentions an essay on Abstr-action 
by Dumarsais, and calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's 
Essay. — -V. Common, Concrete, Generalization. 

ABSTEACTIVE (KNOWLEDGE) and INTUITIVE. 

The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into ah- 
siractive and intuitive, or knowledge of simple intelligence and 
knowledge of vision, or immediate beholding. By the former 
mode of knowing, God knows all things possible, whether they 
are actually to happen or not. By the latter He knows things 
future as if they were actually beheld or envisaged by him.^ 

ABSITUD {ab surdo, a reply from a deaf man who has not heard 
what he replies to, or, according to Vossius, that which should 
be heard with deaf ears) properly means that which is logi- 
cally contradictory ; as, a triangle with four sides. What is 
contrary to experience merely cannot be called absurd, for ex- 
perience extends only to facts and laws which we know ; but 
there may be facts and laws which we have not observed and 
do not know, and facts and laws not actually manifested may 
yet be possible. — V. Argument (Indirect). 

ACADEMICS. — " There are some philosophers who have made 
denying their profession, and who have even established on that 
foundation the whole of their philosophy ; and amongst these 
philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, admit- 

» Intell. Poivtrs, essay v., chap. 6. "^ Lectures on Mor. Phil., lect. iii. 

3 Baronius, Metaphys., sect. 12, disput. ii. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 11 

ACADEMICS — 

ting at the same time probability, and these are the New Acad- 
emics ; the others, who are the Pyrrlionisis, have denied even 
this probability, and have maintained that all things are 
equally certain and uncertain." ' 

The Acadeviic school embraces a period of four ages, from 
■ Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three Academies — first, that 
of Plato, 388 B.C. ; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 B.C. ; nevv^, 
that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. To these some 
add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, and a fifth, that of 
Antiochus. But Plato, and his true disciples, Speusippus and 
Xenocrates, should not be classed with these semi-sceptics, 
whose characteristic doctrine was to rivdavov, or the probable.^ 
ACADEMY, — Academus or Hecademus left to the inhabitants of 
Athens a piece of ground for a promenade, Hipparchus, son 
of Piristratus enclosed it with walls, Cimon, son of Miltiades, 
planted it with trees. Plato assembled his disciples in it, 
hence they were called Academics? 

ACATALEPSY (a, privative ; and xatdxtj-^^i, comprehensio, in- 
comprehensibility) is the term employed by Bacon "^ to denote 
the doctrine held by the ancient academics and sceptics that 
human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to pro- 
bability. " Their chief error," says Bacon, " lay in this, that 
they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses ; by doing 
which they tore up the sciences by the root. But the senses, 
though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet can afibrd 
a sufficient basis for real science." Hence he says,*" " We do 
not meditate or propose acatalepsy, but eucatalepsy, for we do 
not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise 
the understanding, but direct it." Arcesilas, chief of the 
second Academ^y, taught that we know nothing with certainty, 
in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics, who taught 
xa.taXri'i^Li, or the possibility of seizing the truth. All Sceptics 
and Pyrrhonians were called Acataleptics. — V. Academics. 

ACCIDENT {accido, to happen) is a modification or quality which 

• Port. Roy. Log., part iv., chap. 1. 

* See Foucher (Dissertatio de Phil. Academ., 12, Paris, 1692); Gerlach (Commentalio 
JExhibens de PrdbabUitate Disptitaiiones, 4to, Goett.) 

' Biograph. Univers. " Adv. of Learning, Moffet's trans., p. 140. 

5 Novum Orgarmm, b. i., aphor. 126. 



12 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ACCIDENT- 

does not essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its con- 
stituent and invariable attributes ; as motion in relation to 
matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is ens 
entis, or ens in alio, while substance was defined to be ens per se. 
" Accident, in its widest technical sense (equivalent to attri- 
bute), is anything that is attributed to another, and can only 
be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense 
it is opposed to substance) ; in its narrower and more properly 
logical sense, it is a predicable which may be present or ab- 
sent, the essence of the species remaining the same ; as for a 
man to be ' walking,' or ' a native of Paris.' Of these two ex- 
amples, the former is what logicians call a separable accident, 
because it may be separated from the individual (e. g., he may 
sit down) ; the latter is an inseparable accident, being not 
separable from the individual {i. e., he who is a native of Paris 
can never be otherwise) ; from the individual, I say, because 
every accident must be separable from the species, else it would 
be a property."' — V. Substance, Phenomenon. 
ACCIDENTAL. — Aristotle^ says, "Suppose that in digging a 
trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that is accident, 
for the one is neither the eifect nor the consequent of the 
other ; and it is not ordinarily that in planting a tree you find 
a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any being, even with 
the circumstances of place and time, but which has no cause 
to determine its being, either actually, or in such a place, that 
thing is an accident. An accident, then, has no cause deter- 
minate, but only fortuitous ; but a fortuitous cause is undeter- 
mined. Accident is also that which exists in an object with- 
out being one of the characters distinctive of its essence ; 
such is the property of a triangle that its three angles are 
equal to two right angles. Such accidents may be eternal ; 
accidents properly so called are not." 

A phenomenon may be constant, inherent in the nature of 
things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the 
diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water ; but 
an accident, according to Aristotle, is that which neither 
occurs necessarily nor ordinarily. — F. Chance. 

1 Whately, Log., book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4. and index. 
- Meiapliys.. lib. iv., cap. SO. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 13 

ACOSMIST (a, priv., and xosftoj, world). — " Spinoza did not deny 
the existence of God ; he denied the existence of the world ; 
he was consequently an acosmist, and not an atheist." * 

"It has of late been a favourite criticism of Spinoza to say 
with Hegel, that his system is not atheism but acosmism ; and 
this is true in a speculative point of view. But if I allow of 
no God distinct from the aggregate of the universe, myself in-- 
eluded, what object have I of worship? Or if, according to 
the later manifestations of Pantheism, the Divine mind is but 
the sum total of every finite consciousness, my own included, 
what religious relation between God and man, is compatible 
with the theory ? And, accordingly, the Pantheism of Hegel has 
found its natural development in the atheism of Feuerbach." * 

ACROAMATICAL (from ax^oiofiM, io hear). — "Aristotle was 
wont to divide his lectures and readings into Acroamatical and 
Exoterical ; some of them contained only choice matter, and 
they were read privately to a select auditory ; others contained 
but ordinary stuff, and were promiscuously, and in public, ex- 
posed to the hearing of all that would." ^ — V. Exoteric. 

" In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley,^ it has been 
shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the acroamatic trea- 
tises of Aristotle differed from the exoteric, not in the ab- 
struseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in 
this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while 
the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular 
thesis." ° 

Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, in 
giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners (rtai'' rixoi, 
according to sound — viva voce instruction), and the Teleioi 
(finished, or thoroughly instructed, from 'tiXo^, an end). 

This corresponds to the difference between the written law 
and the traditions of the elders. 

Plutarch^ and Aulus Gellius'' maintain that the acroamatic 
works had natural philosophy and logic for their subjects, 



' Lewes, Biograph. Hist, of Pliilosoph., p. 1. 

^ Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 279, note. 

^ Hales, Golden Remains (on John xviii. 36). 

* Published in the Encyclop. Metrop. 

5 Mor. and Met. Phil., by Maurice, note, p. 16-5. 

^ In Akxand. ' L. xs., c. 4. 



14 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

ACROAMATICAL — 

whereas the exoteric treated of rhetoric, ethics, and politics. 
Strabo,' Cicero,'' and Ammonius Herm,'' maintain that they 
were distinguished, not by difference of subj ect, but of form ; 
the acroamatic being discourses, the exoteric dialogues. Sim- 
plicius'' thus characterizes the acroamatic in contradistinction 
to the exoteric works, ' ' distinguished by pregnant brevity, 
closeness of thought, and quickness of transitions," from his 
more expanded, more perspicuous, and more popular pro- 
ductions.^ 
ACT, in Metaphysics and in Logic, is opposed to poiver. Power is 
simply a faculty or property of anything, as gravity of bodies. 
Act is the exercise or manifestation of a power or property, 
the realization of a fact, as the falling of a heavy body. We 
cannot conclude from power to act ; a posse ad actum ; but 
from act to power the conclusion is good. Ab actu ad posse 
valet illatio. 

An act is Immanent or Transient. An immanent act has 
no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an 
immanent act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. A tran- 
sient act produces an operation or result out of and beyond 
the agent. The act of writing and of building are transient 
acts — they begin with the agent, but produce results which 
may affect others. 

An act of the will is Elicit or Imperate. An elicit act of 
will is an act produced immediately by the will, and contained 
within it, as velle and nolle, to determine to do or not to do. 
An elicit act of will is either voliti-on, which has reference to 
an end or ultimate object, or election, which has reference to 
means. — V. Volition, Election. 

An imperate act of will is a movement of body or mind 
following on a determination of will, as running after or run- 
ning away, attending or not atteTT^iing. Also an act done by 
others, when we order or forbid them to do, encourage or dis- 
suade, assist or prevent. 
ACTION. — " The word action is properly applied to those exertions 



• L. 13, p. 608. "^ Ad Jtticum., 13, 19. 

" Ad Categor. Aristot. * Ad Categor. in Proem. 

« Buhle ha.? a Commentatio de Libris Arist., Exot. et Acroam., in his edit, of the -works 
of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo., Peux Ponts, 1791, pp. 142, 143. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 15 

ACTION— 

which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be 
made on external objects, or be confined to our mental opera- 
tions. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged in study." ' 

It is by the presence of will and intention that an action is 
distinguished from an event. The intention is one thing ; the 
effect is another ; the two together constitute the action. 
ACTION" and ACT are not synonymous. 1. Act does not neces- 
sarily imply an external result, action does. We may speak 
of repentance as an act, we could not call it an action. 2. An 
act must be individual ; we may speak of a course of action. 
Lastly, act, when qualified, is oftener, though not universally, 
coupled with another substantive: action always by an adjective 
preceding it. We say a kind action, not an act of kindness. 
A kind act might be admissible, though not usual, but an 
action of kindness is not used, though an action of great kind- 
ness might be. Deed is synonymous with act. 

"Act [actum) is a thing done; action [actio] is doing: act, 
therefore, is an incident ; an action, a process or habit ; a vir- 
tuous act ; a course of virtuous action."^ 
Actions, in Morals, are distinguished, according to the manner 
of their being called forth, into spontaneous or instinctive, 
voluntary or reflective, and free or deliberate ; according to 
the faculty from which they proceed, into physical, intellectual, 
and moral ; and according to the nature of the action and 
character of the agent, into right and wrong, virtuous or 
vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy. 

An action is said to be materially riglit, when, without regard 
to the end or the intention of the agent, the action is in 
conformity with some moral law or rule. An action is said to 
be formally right, when the end or the intention of the agent 
is riglit, and the action is not materially wrong. For a man 
to give his goods to feed the poor is materially right, even 
though he should not have charity or brotherly love, but ' 
when he has charity or brotherly love, and throws even a mite 
into the treasury of the poor, the action is formally right, 
although, in efi'ect, it may fall short of that which is only 
materially riglit. 

' Stewart, Outlines, No. 111. ^ Taylor, Synont/ms. 



16 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ACTIVE. — That which causes change is active; that which is 

changed is, passive.^ 
ACTIVITY.— F. Will. 

ACTUAL [qtiod est in adu) is opposed to potential. Before a 
thing is, it has a capacity of becoming. A rough stone is a 
statue potentialhj ; when chiselled, actually. 

" The relation of the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits 
by the relation of the unfinished to the finished work; of the 
unemployed carpenter to the one at work upon his building ; 
of the individual asleep to him awake. Potentially the seed- 
corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is it actually; the poten- 
tial philosopher is he M'ho is not at this moment philosophiz- 
ing ; even before the battle the better general is the potential 
conqueror; in fact everything is potentially which possesses a 
principle of motion, of development, or of change ; and which, 
if unhindered by anything external, will be of itself. Actuality 
or entelechy, on the other hand, indicates the perfect art, the 
end as gained, the cdmpletely actual (the grown-up tree, e. g., 
is the entelechy of the seed-corn), that activity in which the 
act and the completeness of the act fall together, e. g., to see, 
to think where he sees and he has seen, he thinks and he has 
thought (the acting and the completeness of the act), are one 
and the same, while in these activities which involve a beco- 
ming, e.g., to learn, to go, to become well, the two are separated." ^ 
Actual is also' opposed to virtual. The oak is shut up in the 
acorn virtually. 

Actual is also opposed to real. My will, though really ex- 
isting as a faculty, only begins to have an actual existence 
from the time that I will anything. — V. Real, Virtual. 

ACTUS PRIMUS (in scholastic philosophy) — est rei esse, or actus 
quidditativus. 

ACTUS SECUNDUS — est rei operari, or actus entitativus. 

ADAGE [ad agendum apttim) — a practical saying, fit for use, a rule 
of action. "From the Latin adagium, a saying handed down 
from antiquity, comes the English adage, which denotes an 
antique proverb."^ On the disagreement and similitude be- 
tween adagies, apophtliegms, and moral Fvuinat, see Erasmus.* 

» Taylor, Elements of Thought. '^ Schwegler, Hist, of Phil., p. 123. 

" Taylor, Synonyms. . * In the Prolegomena to his Adagia. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 17 

ADJURATION (from ad-juro, to put upon oath). — " Our Saviour, 
-when the high priest adjured liim by the living God, made no 
scruple of replying upon that adjuration." ' 

ADMIRATION. — " We shall find that admiration is as superior 
to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is 
superior to ignorance ; for its appropriate signification is that 
act of the mind by which we discover, approve, and enjoy 
some unusual species of excellence."" 

ADORATION. — To adore (from the Latin ad oro), signifies, to 
carry to the mouth ; as in order to kiss one's hand, the hand 
is carried to the mouth ; but it also includes in this action a 
sense of veneration or worship. " If I beheld the sun when it 
shined, or the moon walking in brightness, and my mouth had 
kissed mxj hand, this also were iniquity." ^ As an act of wor- 
ship, adoration is due only to God. But the form of kissing 
the hand to moi-tals was also used in the East. Pharaoh 
speaking to Joseph says, "According to thy word shall all my 
people kiss "—that is, in token of veneration to your order.^ 

ADSCITITIOUS (from ad-scisco, to seek after), that which is 
added or assumed. " You apply to your hypothesis of an 
adscititious spirit, what he (Philo) says concerning this Ttvtvua, 
ditov, divine spirit or soul, infused into man by God's breath- 
ing." s 

ESTHETICS (atff^j/Ms, perception or feeling). — "That science 
Avhich refers the first principles in the arts to sensation and 
sentiment, as distinguished from mere instruction and 
utility." 

The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the fine 
arts. Various theories have been entertained as to the idea 
of the beautiful, by Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine. In 
modern times, the term cesthetics was first used in a scientific 
sense by A. Baumgarten, a disciple of Christian Wolf. In 
his JEsthetica,^ he considered the idea of the beautiful as 
an indistinct perception or feeling accompanying the moral 
ideas. Mendelsshon and others identified the idea of the 
beautiful with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and Hutche- 

' Clarke, Works, Tol. ii., ser. 125. * Cogan, On the Passions, part i., c. 2. 

^ Job xxxi. 26, 27. ■* Gen. xli. 40, margin. 

» Clarke, LeiUr to Dodwell. » 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 1760-8, 

3* C 



18 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

iESTHETICS — 

son regarded the two ideas as intimately connected. At the 
close of the eighteenth century, cesthetics was scientifically 
developed in Germany by Kant, and has been zealously pro- 
secuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.' — F. Beauty, Ideal 
(Beau). 

AETIOLOGY (aiVta, cause; Xoyoj, discourse), is coming into use, 
by Dr. Whewell and others, to denote that d^ipartment of Phi- 
losophy Avhich inquires into causes. 

AFFECTION. — " There are various principles of action in man 
which have persons for their immediate obj ect, and imply, in 
their very natvire, our being well or ill affected to some person, 
or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall 
call by the general name of affections, Whether they dispose 
us to do good or hurt to others." ^ 

They are usually distinguished into benevolent, as esteem, 
gratitude, friendship ; and malevolent, as hatred, envy, jeal- 
ousy, revenge. 

This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, or 
to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. By Des- 
cartes'' it is employed to denote some degree of love. — V. Love, 
Sensibility. 

AFFINITY is a relation contracted by, or resulting from, mar- 
riage ; in contradistinction to consanguinity, or relation by 
blood. — V. Consanguinity. 

AFFIRMATION (zara^acrtj) is the attributing of one thing to an- 
other, or the admitting simply that something exists. A 
mental affirmation is a judgment ; when expressed it becomes 
a proposition. — V. Judgment, Proposition. 

In Law, affirmation is opposed to oath. There are certain 
separatists, who, from having scruples as to the lawfulness of 
oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn affirmation that 
what they say is tyue ; and if they make a false affirmation 
they are liable to the penalties of perjury. 



• Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult Cours d' Esthetique. par Vb. Da- 
miron, 8to, Paris, 1842 ; The Philosophy of the Beautiful, by John G. MacTicar, D.D., 
Edin., 1855 ; Reid, Intell. Pow., essay viii., ch. 4. 

^ Reid, Act. Pow., essay iii., part ii., chap. 3-6. 

' Traite dti Passions, art. S3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 10 

AFFIEMATION — 

" To affirm is a solitary, to confirm is an assisted assevera- 
tion. A man affirms what he declares solemnly ; he confirms 
what he aids another to prove." ' ^ 

A FORTIORI. — V. Argument (Indirect). 

AGE2fT {ago, to act), one who, that which, acts. "Nor can 
I think that anybody has such an idea of chance as to make 
it an agent, or really existing and acting cause of anything, 
and much less sure of all things." ^ 

AGlfOIOLOGrY (xdyo5 i'^? ayvoiai, the theory of true ignorance), 
is a section of Philosophy intermediate between Bpistomology 
and Ontology. "Absokite Being may be that which we are 
ignorant of. We must, therefore, examine and fix what igno- 
rance is, what we are, and can be ignorant of." ^ 

ALCHEMY or ALCHYMY [al, the article, and a;i;^a, what is 
poured, according to Vossius), is that branch of chemistry 
which proposed to transmute metals into gold, to find the 
panacea or universal remedy, &c.'' — V. Hermetic Philosophy, 

ROSICRUCIAN. 

ALLEGORY {a%\o ayopivsw, to say another thing), says Quin- 
tilian, exhibits one thing in words and another in meaning. 

"An Allegory is a continued metaphor. It consists in repre- 
senting one subject (object) by another analogous to it; the 
subject thus represented is not formally mentioned, but we 
are left to discover it by reflection ; and this furnishes a very 
jjleasant exercise to our faculties. A metaphor explains itself 
by the words which are connected with it in their proper and 
natural meaning. When I say, ' Wallace was a thunderbolt 
of war,' ' In peace Fingal was the gale of spring,' the thunder- 
bolt of war and the gale of spring are sufficiently explained by 
the mention of Wallace and Fingal. But an allegorij may be 
allowed to stand more unconnected with the literal meaning ; 
the interpretation is not so directly pointed out, but is left to 
our own discovery. 

" When the Jewish nation is represented under the notion 
of a vine or a vineyard, as is done in the Psalms and the Pro- 

' Taylor, Synonyms. 

"^ Wollaston, Relig. of Nat, 8, 5. 

' Ferriei", Inst, of Metaphys., p. 48. 

* Louis Figiiier, L'Alchemie et Les Alchemistes, Paris, 1850. 



20 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ALLEGORY — 

phets, you have a fine example of an Allegory." ' — F. Meta- 
phor, Myth. 
AMBITION (from ambio, to go about seeking place or power), 
is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of the pri- 
mary or original desires of human nature.^ 

AMPHIBOLOGY (d|it^i)3oXta, ambiguity), is to- use a proposi- 
tion which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or double 
sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aristotle, 
who distinguishes it from equivocatio, ofnovvfiua, by which 
he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately. — V. 
Fallacy. 

AMPHIBOLY is applied by Kant to that kind of amphibology 
which is natural, and consists in confounding pure notions of 
the understanding with objects of experience, and attributing 
to the one characters and qualities which belong to the other ; 
as when we make identity, which is a notion a priori, a real 
quality of phenomena, or objects which experience makes 
known to us. — V. Antinomy, Proposition. 

ANALOGUE (awxoyoj, proportionate). — "By an Analogue is 
meant an organ in one animal having the same function as a 
different organ in a different animal. The difference between 
Homologue and Analogue may be illustrated by the wing of a 
bird and that of a butterfly ; as the two totally differ in ana- 
tomical structure, they cannot be said to be homologous, but 
they are analogous in function, since they both serve for 
flight." 3 

In Logic a term is analogous whose single signification ap- 
plies with equal propriety to more than one object — as the leg 
of the table, the leg of the animal.* 

ANALOGY (ttvaXoyJa., proportion), has been defined, " The simi- 
larity of ratios or relations." " But in popular language we 
extend the word to resemblances of things as well as rela- 
tions. Employed as an argument, analogy depends upon the 
canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but 
similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the 

• Irving, English Composition, p. 289. 

* See Eeid, Act. Paw., essay iii., part 2, chap. 2; Stewart, Act. Potv., book i., chap. 2, 
sect. 4. 

» M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25. ■• Whately, Log., h. iii„ § 10. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 

ANALOGY — 

points of I'esemblance in the things, and not the points of 
difference." ' 

" Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but 
the similarity, or sameness of two relations. There must be 
more than two things to give rise to two relations ; there must 
be at least three, and in most cases there sn-efour. Thus A 
may be like B, but there is no analogy between A and B : it is 
an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much con- 
fusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C 
has to D, then there is an analogy. If the first relation be 
well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less 
known ; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in 
the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, 
causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us 
of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists 
the mind instead of misleading it."^ 

" Analogy implies a difference in sort, and not merely in 
degree ; and it is the sameness of the end with the difference 
of the means which constitutes analogy. . No one could say 
the lungs of a man were analogous to the lungs of a monkey, 
but any one might say that the gills of a fish and the spira- 
cula of insects are analogous to lungs."" 

Between one man and another, as belonging to the same 
genus, there is identity. Between a flint and a flower, as 
belonging to different genera, there is diversity. Between 
the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or be- 
tween the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, when 
we think wherein they agree, without forgetting wherein they 
differ, there is analogy. 

" When some course of events seems to follow the same 
order with another, so that we may imagine them to be influ- 
enced by similar causes, we say there is an analogy between 
them. And when we infer that a certain event will take place 
in some other case of a similar nature, we are said to reason 
from analogy ; as when we suppose that the stars, like the 
sun, are surrounded with jjlanets, which dei'ive from them 



' Thomson. Outlines of Laws nf Thwaght, p. 363, 1st. edit. 
"^ Coplcstone, Four Discourses, p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821. 
" Coleridge, Physiology nf Life, p. 64. 



22 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANALOGY — 

light and heat. The word analogy is employed with strict 
propriety only in those cases where there is supposed to be 
a sameness in the causes of similar effects. When there is a 
mere similarity in effects or appearances, the word resemblance 
should be used. Resemblances may be well adduced in illus- 
tration of an argument ; but then they should be proposed 
merely as similes, or metaphors, not as analogies.^ 

"The meaning of analogy is resemblance (?), and hence all 
reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be 
termed analogical ; but the word is usually confined to cases 
where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do 
not say that a man reasons from analogy when he infers that a 
stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The cir- 
cumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been 
experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases identical, 
not analogical. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the 
tendency of bodies at the surface of the earch to the centre, 
inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, 
in the first instance, was analogical. 

" By some writers the term has been restricted to the resem- 
blance of relations ; thus knowledge is said to bear the same 
relation to the mind as light to the eye — to enlighten it. But 
although the term is very properly applied to this class of re- 
semblances, I think it is not generally confined to them ; it is 
commonly used Muth more latitude, except, indeed, in mathe- 
matics, when it is employed to designate the identity of 
ratios." ^ 

" As analogy is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two 
things may be connected by analogy, though they have in 
themselves no resemblance ; thus as a sweet taste gratifies the 
palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the 
same word, ' sweet,' is applied to both, though no flavour can 
resemble a sound in itself. To bear this in mind would serve 
to guard us against two very common errors in the interpreta- 
tion of the analogical language of Scripture : — 1. The error of 
supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their 
bearing similar relation to other things ; 2. The still more 



' Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

2 Sam. Bailey, Discourses, p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 

ANALOGY— 

common -error of supposing the analogy to extend farther than 
it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not con- 
sidering in what the analogy in each case consists." ' 

"Analogy is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify 
a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe 
that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality 
of proportion is termed analogy. And although proportion 
strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to 
another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been 
applied to signify every other habitude, and consequently the 
term analogy, all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. 
Hence the schoolmen tell us there is analogy between intellect 
and sight ; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is 
to the body : and that he who governs the state is analogous 
to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically 
styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.^ 
• For the fui'ther clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that 
a twofold analogy is distinguished by the schoolmen, nietaplio- 
rical and proper. Of the first kind there are frequent instances 
in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to 
God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, 
or an ear ; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or 
grieved, every one sees the analogy is merely metaphorical; 
because these parts and passions, taken in the proper sig- 
nification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the 
formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, 
therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that 
event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is 
as truly ascribed to God, as the works wrought by human 
fingers are to man ; and so of the rest. But the case is differ- 
ent when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. 
Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge 
simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, 
in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed 
to God proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the 
infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God 
is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely 

* Whately, 

^ Vide Cajetan, de Nom. Analog., c. iii. 



24 " VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

ANALOGY— 

above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls 
analogia proprie facta.— AnA after the same analogy we must 
understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which 
in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection." ' 
Analogy and Metaphor. — Metaphor, in general, is a substitution 
of the idea or conception of one thing with the term belonging to 
it, to stand for another thing, on account of an appearing simili- 
tude only, without any real resemblance and true correspon- 
dency between the things compared ; as when the Psalmist 
describes the verdure and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing 
and singing. Analogy, in general, is the substituting the idea 
or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, 
on account of a true resemblance and correspondent reality in 
the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aris- 
totle 'laottji -gov ^oydi), an equality or parity of reason, though, 
in strictness and truth, the parity of reasoning is rather built 
on the similitude, and analogy, and consequent to them, than 
"the same thing with them. 

" The ground and foundation of MetapJior consists only in 
an appearing or imaginary resemblance and correspondency ; 
as when God is said to have hands, and eyes, and ears. But 
the foundation of analogy is an actual similitude and a real 
correspondency in the very nature of things ; which lays a 
foundation for a parity of reason even between things different 
in nature and kind ; as when God is said to have knowledge, 
power, and goodness. 

"Meiaplior is altogether ai'bitrary, and the result merely of 
imagination, it is rather a figure of speech than a real simili- 
tude and comparison of things ; and, therefore, is properly of 
consideration in rhetoric and poetry. But analogy being built 
on the very nature of things themselves, is a necessary and 
useful method of conception and reasoning ; and. therefore, of 
consideration in Physics and Metaphysics."^ 

" I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem as- 
sured that all states have the same period of infancy, man- 
hood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels 

* Berkeley, Min. Philosoph., Dialog. 4. 
^ Brown, Divine Analogy, p. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 

ANALOGY — 

of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, 
than supply analogies from whence to reason. The objects 
which are. attempted to be forced into an analogy are not 
found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are phy- 
sical beings — commonwealths are not physical, but moral 
essences." 1 

Many fallacies become current through false metaphorical 
analogies. See an example of false analogy''' in the supposed 
likeness between the decay of vegetables and of living crea- 
tures. 

Analogy and Example. — Analogy is not unfrequently used to 
mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is similarity of 
relations, and in this consists the diiFerence between the argu- 
ment by example and that by analogy, — that in the one we 
argue from mere similarity, from similarity of relations in the 
other. In the one we argue from Pisistratus to Dionysius, 
who resembles him ; in the other, from the relation of induc- 
tion to demonstration, to the corresponding relation of the 
example to the enthymeme? 

Analogy and Experience. — "Experience is not the mere collec- 
tion of observations ; it is the methodical reduction of them to 
their principles . . . Analogy supposes this, but it goes a step 
farther. Experience is mere analysis. Analogy involves also 
a synthesis. It is applied to cases in which some difference 
of circumstances is supposed ; as, for instance, in arguing 
from the formation of particular parts of one class of animals 
to the correspondence in another, the different nature, habits, 
circumstances, of the one class, are considered and allowed 
for, in extending the given observation.* 

In the Schools, what was termed the analogy of faith,^ was 
showing that the truth of one scripture is not repugnant to 
the truth of another, or of the whole. " Analogia vero est, 
cum Veritas unius scripturae ostenditur veritati alterius non 
repugnare." ^ 

In Logic, three modes of reasoning are called analogical. 

' Burke, Letters on Hegicide Peace, b. iv. ' Butler, Analogy, part i., chap. 7. 

" Karslake, Aids to Log., vol. ii., p. 74. * Hampden, Introd. Mor. Phil., lect. v. 

' See Rom. xii. 6. 
^ Thorn. Aquinas, Sumni. Thcolog., pars prima, qusest. i., art. 10. 

4 



26 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANALOGY- . 

1. From effect to cause, or from cause to effect. 2. From 
means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From mere resem- 
'blance or concomitance. Condillac ' has shown how these 
miodes of reasoning all concur to prove that the human beings 
around us, who are formed like ourselves [analogy of resem- 
hlance), who act as we act [analogy of cause), who have the 
same organs [analogy of means), should be in all respects like 
ourselves, and have the same faculties. 
Analogy and Induction. — " There are two requisites in order 
to every analogical argument: 1. That the two or several par- 
ticulars concerned in the argviment should be known to agree 
in some one point ; for otherwise they could not be referable 
to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to 
the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That 
the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circum- 
stances of the particular to which we argue. For herein con- 
sists ilie essential distinction between an analogical and an in- 
ductive argument." ^ 
ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS (di-a 7.iio, ^iv, tC6riy.i, resolutio, 
compositio), or decomposition and recomposition. Objects of 
sense and of thought are presented to us in a complex state, 
but we can only, or at least best, understand what is simple. 
Among the varied objects of a landscape, I behold a tree, I 
separate it from the other objects, I examine separately its 
different parts — trunk, branches, leaves, &c., and then reunit- 
ing them into one whole I form a notion of the tree. The first 
part of this process is analysis, the second is synthesis. If this 
must be done with an individual, it is more necessary with the 
infinitude of objects which surround us, to evolve the one out 
of many, to recall the multitude to unity. We compare objects 
with one another to see wherein they agree ; we next, by a 
synthetical process, infer a general law, or generalize the coin- 
cident qualities, and perform an act of induction which is purely 
a synthetical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, 
from our experience that bodies attract within certain limits, 

' Art. de Baisonner. 

"^ Hampden, Essay on Phil. Evid. of Oliristianity, pp. 60-64. See Locke, On Hum. TTn- 
derstand., "book iv., chap. 16, sect. 12 ; Beattie's Essay on Truth, part i., chap. 2, sect. 7 ; 
Stewart's Elements, vol. ii., chap, i, sect. 4 ; Stewart's Essays, v., c. -3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 

ANALYSIS — 

we infer tRat all bodies gravitate towards each other. The 
antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, the 
consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought to- 
gether by the mental insertion of a third proposition, which is, 
" that nature is uniform." This is not the product of induc- 
tion, but antecedent to all induction. The statement fully ex- 
pressed is, this and that body, which we know, gravitate, but 
nature is uniform ; this and that body represent all bodies — 
all bodies gravitate. It is Irhe mind which connects these things, 
and the process is synthetical. This is the one universal 
method in all philosophy, and different schools have differed 
only in the way of employing it. Method is the following of 
one thing through another. Order is the following of one 
thing after another. Analysis is real, as when a chemist sepa- 
rates two substances. Logical, as when we consider the pro- 
perties 'of the sides and angles of a triangle separately, though 
we cannot think of a triangle without sides and angles. 

For an explanation of the processes of aiiali/sis and synthesis, 
see Stewart.^ 

The instruments of analysis are observation and experiment; 
of synthesis, definition and classification. 

Take down a watch, analysis; put it up, synthesis.'^ 

" Hac analysi licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione col- 
ligere simplices ; ex motibus, vires moventes; et in nniverstim, ex 
effectis causas; ex causique particidaribus ge.nercdes; donee ad 
generalissimas tandem sit deventtim."^ 

Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its ele- 
ments. Objects may be compound, as consisting of several 
distinct parts united, or of several properties equally distinct. 
In the former viex, analysis will divide the object into its 
parts, and present them to us successively, and then the rela- 
tions by which they are united. In the second case, analysis 
will separate the distinct properties, and show the relations of 
every kind which may be between them.'* 

Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of a 



' Elements, part ii., chap. 4. 

" Lord Brougham, Prdimin. Discourse, part i., sect. 7. 

" Newton, Optices, 2(i edit., p. 413. 

* Cardaillac, Eludes Element, torn, i., pp. 8, 9. 



28 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANALYSIS — 

compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be 
analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into 
these and azote.' 

Abstraction is analysis, since it is decomposition, but what 
distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which by 
themselves have no real existence. Classification is synthesis. 
Induction rests upon analysis. Deduction is a synthetical pro- 
cess. Demonstration includes both. 

ANALYTICS (Ta 'Ava'Kviixd) is the title which in the second 
century was given, and which has since continued to be 
applied, to a portion of the Organon or Logic of Aristotle. 
This portion consists of two distinct parts ; the First Ana- 
lytics, which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its diverse 
figures and most simple elements, and the Posterior Ana- 
lytics, which lays down the rules and conditions of demon- 
stration in general. It was in imitation of this title that 
Kant gave the name of TraTiscendental Analytic to that part 
of the Criticism of Pure Reason which reduces the faculty of 
knowing to its elements. 

ANGELOLOGY [a.-fyiXo^, a messenger; Xoyoj, discourse), is the 
doctrine of Angels. — V. Pneumatology. 

ANIMA MITNDI (soul of the world.) — Animism is the doctrine of 
the anima mundi as held by Stahl. The hypothesis of a force, 
immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving to matter 
its form and movement, is coeval with the birth of philosophy. 
Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, but held that 
there was an infinitely perfect being above it. From Pythag- 
oras it passed into the system of Plato, who could not conceive 
how pure spirit, the seat of eternal ideas, could act directly 
upon matter. He thought also that the world would be more 
perfect if endowed with life. The soul of the world was the 
source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The school of 
Alexandria adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized in- 
telligence and Deity as above the anima mundi, which in the 
system of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His 
name ; while Straton of Lampsacus called it nature. The 
hypothesis of the anima mundi was not entertained by the 

• Peemans, Introd. ad Pkilosoph., p. 75, 12nio, LoTan., 1840. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 

ANIMA MUNDI— 

scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of 
Arcliceus, in the systems of Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus^ and 
Van Helmont ; while Henry More recognized a principium 
hylarchicum, and Cudworth aplastic nature, as the universal 
agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organ- 
ization, and the spring of all the movements of matter. About 
the same time, some German divines, as Amos Comenius, and 
John Bayer, attempted to rest a similar opinion on Genesis i. 
2, and maintained that the spirit which moved on the face of 
the waters still gives life to all nature." 

The doctrine of the anima mundi, as held by the Stoics and 
Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism; while according 
to others this soul of the universe is altogether intermediate 
between the Creator and His works.^ 

ANTECEDENT {antecedo, to go before). — "And the antecedent 
shall you fynde as true when you rede over my letter as him- 
self can not say nay, but that the consecusyon is formal."^ 

In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term 
is the antecedent, the second the consequent. Thus in the re- 
lation of causality — the cause is the antecedent, and the efi"ect 
the consequent. 

In Logic, antecedent is the former of two propositions, in a 
species of reasoning, which, without the intervention of any 
middle proposition, leads directly to a fair conclusion ; and 
this conclusion is termed the consequent. Thus, I reflect, 
therefore I exist. I reflect, is the antecedent — therefore I 
exist, is the consequent.* 

Antecedent is that part of a conditional proposition on which 
the other depends.^ 

In Grammar the word to which the relative refers is called 

the antecedent; as, "God whom we worship," — where God is 

the antecedent, to which whom the relative refers. 

ANTHROPOLOGY (aVSpwrtof and %6yoi, the science of man). — • 

Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human 

' Buddeus, Elem. Phil., pars 3, cap. 6, sect. 11, 12, et seq. 

= See Plato, Timceus, 29 D.— 30 c. Schelling, De VAme de Monde, 8vo, Hamb., 1809. 

2 Sir T. Move's Wiyrks, p. 1115. 

* Euler, Letters to a German Princess. ■' » 

6 Whately, Log., b. ii., chap. 4, ^ 6. 

4* ■ 



30 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANTHEOPOLOGY- 

species. According to Dr. Latham,' anthropology determines 
the relations of man to the other mammalia ; ethnology, the 
relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other, 
p. 559. The German philosophers since the time of Kant 
have used it to designate all the sciences which in any point 
of view relate to man — soul and body — individual and species 
— facts of history and phenomena of consciousness — the abso- 
lute rules of morality as well as interests material, and chang- 
ing ; so that works under the general title of antJiropology 
treat of very different topics. 

'^Anthropology is the scien.ce of man in all his natural vari- 
ations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong 
specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and temperaments, 
together with the results which follow immediately from them 
in their application to human life. Under psychology, on the 
other hand, we include nothing but what is common to all 
mankind, and forms an essential part of human nature. The 
one, accordingly, may be termed the science of mental varia- 
bles ; the other, the science of mental constants."^ 

In an anonymous work entitled Anthropologic Abstracted,^ 
AntJiropology is divided into Psychology and Anatomy. 
ANTHROPOMORPHISM (w^pcortoj, man; ^opt>j, form).— "It 
was the opinion of the Anthropomorphites that God had all the 
parts of a man, and that we are, in this sense, made according 
to his image." * 

Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who ascribed 
body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or members to 
Deity is too gross a delusion to call for refutation. It is wit- 
tily exposed by Cicero.* But there is a spiritual anthropo- 
morphism, sometimes also called anthropopathy, which ascribes 
to him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of 
human nature. 

" We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a hu- 
man body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under colour 
that that figure was the most perfect of any." ^ 

' Nat. Hist, of Varieties of Man, Lond., 1830. 

' Morell, Psychologij, pp. 1, 2. ' 8to, Lond., 1655. 

* More, Def. of Cabbala, c. 1. 

' De Nat. Dear., lib. i., cap. 27. 

' Malebranche, Search after Truth, took iii., chap. 9. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. . 31 

ANTHROPOMORPHISM — 

Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God 
is like tlie mind of man. 

" When it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas 
of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be assigned by 
you Anthropomorpkites, than that it is a rational faculty, and 
that such is the nature of Deity." ' 
AlfTICIPATION" {anticipatio, rtpoXrj-^vi), is a term which was 
first used by Epicui-us to denote a general notion which en- 
ables us to conceive beforehand of an object which had not 
yet come under the cognizance of the senses. But these gene- 
ral notions being formed by abstraction from a multitude of * 
particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or 
mere generalizations a posteriori. Buhle'^ gives the following 
account: — "The impressions which objects make on the 
senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognize 
these objects when they present themselves anew, or to com- 
pare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see 
an animal for the first time, the impression made on the senses 
leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see 
the same animal, we refer the impression to the type already 
existing in the mind. This type and the relation of the new 
impression to it, constituted what Epicurus called the antici- 
pation of an idea. It was by this anticipation that we could 
determine the identity, the resemblance or the diS'erence of 
objects actually before us, and those formerly observed." 

The language of Cicero ^ seems to indicate that by Epicurus 
the term rtpoT.j^-^'ts was extended to what is supersensual, and 
included what is now called knowledge a priori. " Qiice est 
enim gens, ant quod genus hominnm, quod non liabeat, sine doc- 
trina, anticipationem quandam Deorum ? quam apellat 7ip6%7;<^iv 
Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, 
sine qua nee intelligi quidquam, nee quceri, nee disputari 
potesi." And according to Diogenes Laertius,* the Stoics 
defined rtp6^>7'4'ts to mean " a natural conception of the uni- 
versal." It would appear, however, that this definition was 

' Dialogues on Nat. Rdig., parts iv., v. 
2 Hist, de la Phil. Mod., torn, i., pp. 87, 88. 
' De Nat. Deor., lib. i., cap. 16. 
■* Lib. vii , sect. 51, 53, 54. 



82 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANTICIPATION — 

not adopted by all. And Sir William Hamilton has said : ^ 
— "It is not to be supposed that the xoival hvoiav, ^vaixai 
rtpo^-/j4'£ts, of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more 
than generalizations a posteriori. Yet this is a mistake, into 
which, among many others, Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen 
in regard to the former."^ 
Anticipation of Nature is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon ^ 
to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to a due 
and gradual generalization, which he called an Interpretation 
of Nature." 

ANTINOMY {avti, against ; j/o^oj, law), the opposition of one law 
or rule to another law or rule. 

" If He once willed adultery should be sinful, all his omni- 
potence will not allow Him to will the allowance that His 
holiest people might, as it were, by His own antinomy or 
counter statute, live unreproved in the same fact as He Him- 
self esteemed it, according to our common explainers."* 

According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction 
which results from the law of reason, when, passing the limits 
of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then, we do 
not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep the limits 
of our faculties, which reach only to phenomena. 

If the world be regarded not as a phenomenon or sum of 
phenomena, but as an absolute thing in itself, the following 
Antinomies or counter-statements, equally capable of being 
supported by arguments, arise : — 

Thesis. I,. Antithesis. 

The world has an origin in time, and The world has no beginning and 
is quoad space shut up in boundaries, no bounds. 

II. 
Every compound substance in the No composite consists of simple 
world consists of simple parts ; and parts ; and there exists nowhat simple 
there is nothing but the simple, or in the world, 
that which is compounded from it. 

* ReicTs Works, note a, p. 77i. 

2 See Manuductio ad Stoicam, Phil., lib. ii., dissert. 11 ; and Leibnitz, Nouveaux Es- 
sais, Pref. See also Kernius, Dissert, in Epinvri 7:p6X>]\ptv, &c., Goett., 1736. 
' Pref. to Nov. Organ. * Milton, Doct. and Disc, of Div., b. ii., c. 8. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 

ANTINOMY — 

in. 

Thesis. Antithesis. 

It is requisite to assume a Free There is no Freedora. Everything 

causality to explain the phenomena in the world happens according to the 

of the world. « laws of nature. 

IV. 

To the world there belongs some- There exists no absolutely necessary 
what which, either as its part or its Being, neither in the world nor out of 
cause, is an absolutely necessary being, the world, as its cavise. 

At the bottom of the two first antinomies lies the absurdity 
of transferring to the world in itself predicates which can bo 
applied only to a world of phenomena. We get rid of the 
difficulty by declaring that both thesis and antithesis are false. 
With regard to the third, an act may be in respect of the 
causality of reason a first beginning, while yet, in respect of 
the sequences of phenomena, it is no more than a subordinate 
commencement, and so be, in the first respect, free ; but in the 
second, as mere phenomenon, fettered by the law of the causal 
nexus. The fourth antinomy is explained in the same man- 
ner ; for when the cause qua phenomenon is contradistin- 
guished from the cause of phenomena, so far forth as this last 
may be a thing in itself, then both propositions may consist 
together.' 

Others think that when the principles are carefully inducted 
and expressed, the contradiction disappears.^ 

ANTIPATHY {avti TtdOoi, feeling against). — "There are many 
ancient and received traditions and observations touching the 
sympathy and antipathy of f)lants ; for that some will thrive 
best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, 
and some worse, which they impute to antipathy."^ 

According to Sylvester Rattray, M. D.,* there is antipathy 
and sympathy not only between plants, but also between 
minerals and animals. 

' Semple, Introd. to Metaphysic of Ethics, p. 95. i 

o M'Cosh, Mefh. of Div. Govern., p. 530, 5th edit. 
» Bacon, Nat. Hist , sect. 479. 

* Aditus Ifovus ad Occultas Sympaihia; et Jnlipaihice causas inveniendas. 12mo, 
Glasg., 1668. 



34 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANTIPATHY— 

A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any 
appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or char- 
acter of some persons at first sight. An involuntary dislike 
or aversion entertained by an ^imate being to some sensible 
object. A man may have an antipathy to particular smells 
or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour red, a horse to 
the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural, others are acquired, 
as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. Some are founded 
on sensation, others on sentiment.' — V. Sympathy. 

A PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST.— These two expres- 
sions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to eter- 
nity ; of which man can only conceive as consisting of two 
parts ; the one without limits in the past, a parte ante ; and 
the other without limits in the future, a parte post. Both are 
predicable of Deity; only the latter of the human soul. — V. 
Eternity. 

APATHY (a, privative; and rtdOos, passion). ^ — The absence of 
passion. " What is called by the Stoics apathy, or dispassion ; 
by the Sceptics indisturbance, a.T'apalitt ; by the Molinists, 
quietism ; by common men, peace of conscience*: seem, all to 
mean but great tranquillity of mind." ^ 

As the passions are the springs of most of our actions, a 
state of apathy has come to signify a sort of moral inertia — ■ 
the absence of all activity or energy. According to the Stoics, 
apathy meant the extinction of the passions by the ascendancy 
of reason. 

" By the perfect apathy which that philosophy (the Stoical) 
prescribes to us, by endeavouring not merely to moderate 
but to eradicate, all our private, partial, and selfish afiec- 
tions, by suffering us to feel for whatever can befall our- 
selves, our friends, our country, not even the sympathetic 
and reduced passions of the imj^artial spectator, — it endea- 
vours to render us altogether indifi'erent and unconcerned 
in the success or miscarriage of everything which nature has 
prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of our 
lives." ^ 

' Locke, On Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8. 

^ Sir W. Temple, Of Gardening. 

3 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, part Tii., sect. 2. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 35 

APATHY- 

" In general, experience will show, that as the wants of 
natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some 
natural disease ; so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much 
supposes or is accompanied with something amiss in the rhoral 
character, in that which is the health of the mind."' 

In lazy apathy let Stoics boast 

Their virtue fix'd; 'tis fix'd as in a frost; 

Contracted all, retiring to the breast ; 

But strength of mind is exercise, not rest." — Pope.'' 

APHORISM, determinate position, from diijjopi^w, to hound, or 
limit; whence onv horizon. "In order to get the full sense 
of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual 
image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines of dif- 
ferent colours round the different counties of England, and 
then cut out each separately, as in the common play-maps 
that children take to pieces and put together, so that each dis- 
trict can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a whole in 
itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and detaching, 
when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of reflection and 
reason, is to aphorise, and the result an aphorism."^ 

A precise, sententious saying; e.g., "It is always safe to 
learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our 
friends." 

Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled 
Aphorisms, containing medical maxims, not treated argumenta- 
tively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law aphorisms 
are also used. 

The three" ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, viz., 
Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given the same 
definition of an aphorism, i. e., "a succinct saying, compre- 
hending a complete statement," or a saying jjoor in expres- 

- Butler, Sermon v. 

* Niemeierus (Job. Bartb.), Dissert, de Stoicorum AndStta. &c. 4to, Helmst, 1679. 
Eecnius, Dispp., libb. 3, AirdBcia Sapientis Stoici. 4to, Copenhag., 1693. 
Fischerus (John Hen.), Diss, de Stoicis a-rtaddas falso suspectis. 4to, Leips., 1716. 
Quadius Disputatio tritum iUud Stoicorum paradoxon ntpi rtji; amiOda; expendens. 
4to, Sedini, 1720. 
Meiners, Melanges, torn, ii., p. 130. ; 

2 Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, Tol. i., p. 16, edit. 1848. 



36 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

APHOEISM — 

sion, but rich in sentiment. The first aphorism of Hippo- 
crates is, "Life is short, and the art is long; the occasion 
fleeting ; experience fallacious, and judgment difficult. The 
physician must not only be prepared to do what is right him- 
self, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and exter- 
nals, co-operate." 

" The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were wont 
to throw their knowledge into aphorisms, or short, scattered, 
unmethodical sentences." ' 

Heraclitus is known by his aphorisms, which are among 
the most brilliant of those 

" Jewels, five words long, 
That on the stretched fore-finger of all time, 
Sparkle for ever." 

Among the most famous are, — War is father of all things, 
i. e., all things are evolved by antagonistic force. No man 
can bathe twice in the same stream, i. e., all things are in 
perpetual flux. 
APODEICTIC, APODEICTICAL [aTtoSiUwixi, to show).— 
" The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore not apo- 
dicticJi, or of evident demonstration." ^ 

This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle.^ He made 
a distinction between propositions which admitted of contra- 
diction or dialectic discussion, and such as were the basis or 
result of demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analo- 
gous distinction between our judgments, and to give the name 
of apodeictic to such as were above all contradiction. 

APOLOGUE (artoxoyoj, fabula), "a novel story, contrived to 
teach some moral truth." — Johnson. 

" It would be a high relief to hear an apologue or fable well 
told, and with such humour as to need no sententious moral 
at the end to make the application." * It is essential to an 
apologue that the circumstances told in it should be fictitious. 

* Nov. Organ., book i., sect. 86. And the Novum Organum itself is written in 
aphorisms. 

* Robinson, Eudoxa, p. 23. 

^ Analyt. Prior., lib. i., cap. 1. 

* Shaftesbury, toI. iii., Miscell. 4, c. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 37 

APOLOGUE — 

The difference between a parable and an apologue is, that the 
former being draAvn from human life requires probability in 
the narration ; whereas the apologue being taken from inani- 
mate things or the inferior animals, is not confined strictly to 
probability. The fables of -^sop are apologues. 

For an admirable instance of the Xoyoj or apologue, see 
Coleridge's Friend, where the case of the seizure of the 
Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form. 
APOLOGY [artoXoyta, a defence made in a court of justice). — 
We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the Apology of Socrates, 
and another with the same title by Plato. The term was 
adopted by the Christian fathers, and applied to their writings 
in defence of Christianity, and in answer to its opponents. 
About the year 125, Quadratus and Aristides presented Apolo- 
gies to the Emperor Hadrian when on a visit to Athens. Ter- 
tuUian addressed his Apologetic to the magistrates of Rome, 
the Emperor Severus being then absent. 
APOPHTHEGM [aTto^etyyo^M, to speak out plainly). — A short 
and pithy speech or saying of some celebrated man ; as that 
of Augustus, Festina lente. 

" In a numerous collection of our Saviour's apophtliegms, 
there is not to be found one example of sophistry." i 

The Lacedgemonians used much this mode of speaking. 
Plutarch has a collection entitled the Apophthegms of Kings 
and Generals, many of which are anecdotes ; and also another 
entitled Laconica. Drusius (Joan. Prof. Heb. Lugd. Bat.) 
published in 1612, a collection of Hebrew and Arabic Apoph- 
thegms. Erasmus has a collection of Apophthegms.^ 

"Of Blackmore's (Sir Richard) attainments in the ancient 
tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, he has 
confounded an apJioristn with an apophthegm."^ 

In Guesses at Truth,* the saying of Demosthenes, "that 
action was the first, second, and third essential of eloquence," 
is called an apophthegm. 

' Paley, Evidences, part ii., c. 2. 
» 12mo, BasU, 1558. 
^ Macaulay, On Addison, p. 11, 
* 2cl series, 1848. 



38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

APPERCEPTION (Self-consciousness). — "By appercepUon he 
(Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which re- 
flects as it were upon itself; by which we are conscious of our 
own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by which we 
can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, and can 
comprehend abstract truths.''^ 

" By apperception the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the act by 
which the mind is. conscious immediately of the representa- 
tive object, and through it, mediately of the remote object 
represented." ^ 

Apperception according to Kant is consciousness of one's 
self, or the simple representation of the I. If a subject 
capable of representations possesses such, it, besides, always 
connects with these representations that it (the subject) has 
them. This second representation, that I, the representing 
subject, has these representations, is called the consciousness 
of myself, or the apperception. This representation is simple, 
and is an efi"ect of the understanding, which thereby connects 
all the diversity of a representation in a single representation, 
or, according to Kant's mode of expression, produces a syn- 
thesis."' 

" The term consciousness denotes a state, apperception an 
act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority of the 
latter is apparent."* 

" Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spon- 
taneous thought, into which volition and reflection, and there- 
fore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intui- 
tion of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name 
apperception, explaining it also as a true inspiration, and hold- 
ing therefore, that inspirations come to man, not by the special 
volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its 
own right, thus constituting a scientific organ of discovery." * 
APPETITE. — " The word appetitus, from which that of appetite 
is derived, is applied by the Romans and the Latinists to de- 
sires in general, whether they primarily relate to the body or 
not, and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification 

' Keid, Intell. Pow., essay ii., c. 15. 

^ Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Wor'ks, note D*, sect 1. 

' Haywood, Critick of Pure Reason, p. 592. 

* Meiklejoho, Criticism, of Pure Reason, note, p. 81. 

* MacVicar, Enquirrj into Human Nature, 8vo, Edin., 1853, p, 219. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 39 

APPETITE — 

is the seeking after whatever may conduce either to gratifica- 
tion or happiness. Thus Cicero observes, ' Motus animoruvi 
duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis ; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio 
in vero exquirendo inaxime versatur; apjyetitus impellit ad agen- 
dum.' By two powers of action being tlius placed in contrast 
with each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is 
obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, 
whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians 
also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word 
appetitus in the same latitude." ' 

In modern use, appetites refer to cor|)oreal wants, each of 
w^hich creates its correspondent desire. But desire proper re- 
fers to mental objects. 

" The word appetite, in common language, often means 
hunger, and sometimes figuratively any strong desire."^ 

As our perceptions are external, which are common to us 
with the brutes ; and internal, which are proper to us as 
rational beings — so appetite is sensitive and rational. The sen- 
sitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible and the 
concupisciple.' 

Appetite and Instinct. — "Appetites have been called instinc- 
tive, because they seek their own gratification without the 
aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are common to 
man with the brute ; but they difi'er at least in one important 
respect from those instincts of the lower animals which are 
usually contrasted with human reason. The objects towards 
which they are directed are prized for their own sake ; they 
are sought as ends, while instinct teaches brutes to do many 
things which are needed only as means for the attainment of 
some ulterior purpose. Thus instinct enables a spider to en- 
trap his prey, while appetite only leads him to devour it when 
in his possession. 

" Instinct is an impulse conceived without instruction, and 
prior to all experience, to perform certain acts, which are not 
needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, which, in 
fact, are often opposed to it, and are useful only as means for 

* Cogan, On the Passions, vol. i., p. 15. 

' Seattle, Mor. Science, part 1., c. 1. 

^ Keid, Act. Povj., essay Jii. ; Stewart, Act. Pow., vol. i., p. 14. 



40 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

APPETITE - 

the accomplishment of some ulterior obj ect ; and this obj ect is 
usually one of pre-eminent utility or necessity, either for the 
preservation of the animal's own life, or for the continuance 
of its species. The former quality separates it from intelli- 
gence, properly so called, which proceeds only by experience 
or instruction ; and the latter is its peculiar trait as distin- 
guished from appetite, which in strictness uses no means at 
all, but looks only to ends." ' 
APPEEHENSIOK" {apprehendo, to lay hold of).— "By the appre- 
Jiensive power, we perceive the species of sensible things, pre- 
sent or absent, a~nd retain them as wax doth the print of a 
seal." 2 

Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but 
also memory or retention, 

"How can he but be moved willingly to serve God, who 
hath an apprehension of God's merciful design to save him!"^ 

" It may be true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro 
slaves are extremely dull of appreliension and slow of under- 
standing."* 

Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the mind 
in which it receives a notion of any obj ect ; and which is ana- 
logous to the perception of the senses. Incomplex apprehen- 
sion regards one object, or several, without any relation being 
perceived between them, as a man, a card, &c. Complex ap- 
prehension regards several objects with such a relation, as a 
man on horseback, a pack of cards, &c.* 

" Ajyprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the 
largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus 
which includes under it, as species, perception proper and 
sensation proper.'"* 
Apprehend and Comprehend. — " We apprehend many truths 
which we do not comprehend. The great mysteries of our 
faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity — we lay 
hold upon it {ad prehendo), we hang upon it, our souls live by 
it ; but we do not take it all in, we do not comprehend it ; for 

• Bowen, Lowell ZccL, 1849, p. 228. 

2 Burton, Anat. of Melanclwly, p. 21. 

" Barrow, Serm. xlii. * Porteus, On Oivilisatimi of Slaves. 

' Wbately, Log., b. ii.. ch. 1, g 1. 

^ Meiklejohn, CriiicUin of Pure Reason, note, p. 127. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 

APPREHENSION— 

it is a necessary attribute of God that He is incompreliensible ; 
if He were not so He would not be God, or the being that 
comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs 
to the idea of God that He may be ' apprehended' though not 
^comprehended' by His reasonable creatures; He has made 
them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to ' appre- 
hend' though not to 'comprehend' Him." ' 

APPROBATION (Moral) includes a judgment of an action as 
right, and a feeling favourable to the agent. The judgment 
precedes and the feeling follows. But in some cases the feel- 
ing predominates; and in others the judgment is more promi- 
nent. Hence some have resolved an exercise of the moral 
faculty into an act of the reason ; while others would refer it 
altogether to the sensibility. But both the judgment and the 
feeling should be taken into account.^ 

A PRIORI and A POSTERIORI. — "There are two general 
ways of reasoning, termed arguments a priori and a, posteriori, 
or according to what is usually styled the synthetic and ana- 
lytic method ; the one lays down some previous, self-evident 
principles ; and in the next place, descends to the several con- 
sequences that may be deduced from them ; the other begins 
with a view of the phenomena themselves, traces them to their 
original, and by developing the properties of these pheno- 
mena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause." ^ 

By an a priori argument a conclusion is drawn from an 
antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order of 
time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By the 
argument a posteriori we reason from what is consequent in 
the order of time to what is antecedent, or from effect to cause. 
An individual may fall under suspicion of murder for two 
reasons : he may have coveted the deceased's property, or he 
may be found with it in his possession ; the former is an cb 
priori, the latter an a posteriori argument against him. 

" Of demonstrations there are two sorts ; demonstrations 
d priori, when we argue from the cause to the effect ; and a 

» Trench, On Study of Words, p. 110, 12mo, Lond., 1851. 

' See Manual of Mor. Phil., p. 102; Reid, Act. Pow., essay v., ch. 7. 

•■' King, Essay on Evil, Pref., p. 9. 

5* . 



42 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

A PRIORI- 

posteriori, when we argue from the effect to the cause. Thus 
when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, eternity, 
necessary existence, and the like, that such perfections can 
reside but in one being, and thence conclude that there can 
be but one supreme God, who is the cause and author of all 
things, and that therefore it is contradictory to this to suppose 
that there can be two necessary independent principles, the 
one the cause of all the good, and the other the cause of all 
the evil that is in the world ; this is an argument a priori. 
Again, when the Manicheans and Paulicians, from what they 
observe in things and facts, from the many natural evils which 
they see in the world, and the many moral wickednesses 
which are committed by men, conclude that there must be 
two different causes or principles from whence each of these 
proceed ; this is arguing a posteriori." ' 

' ' The term a priori, by the influence of Kant and his school, 
is now very generally employed to characterize those elements 
of knowledge which are not obtained d posteriori — are not 
evolved out of factitious generalizations ; but which as native 
to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of ex- 
perience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective 
condition) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. 
Previously to Kant the terms a priori and d posteriori were, 
in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually 
employed — the former to denote a reasoning from cause to 
effect — the latter a reasoning from effect to cause. The term 
a priori came, however, in modern times, to be extended to 
any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions 
which such a notion involved ; hence, for example, the title a 
p>riori bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments 
for the existence of the Deity. The latter of these, in fact, 
starts from experience — from the observed contingency of the 
world, in order to construct the supposed notion on which it 
founds. Clarke's cosmological demonstration called a priori, 
is therefore, so far, properly an argument d posteriori." ^ 

"By knowledge d priori," says Kant,^ "we shall in the 

' Dr. .Tohn Clark, Enquiry into Evil, pp. 31-2. 

Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Wcn-ks, p. 762. 
' Criticism of Pure Reason, Introd., § 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 

A PRIORI— 

sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that 
kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experi- 
ence. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which 
is possible only d, posteriori, that is, through experience. 
Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge 
a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. 
For example, the proposition, 'Every change has a cause,' is 
a proposition d priori, but impure because change is a con- 
ception which can only be derived from experience." 

"We have ordinarily more consideration for the demon- 
stration called propter quid or d priori, than for that which 
we call quia or d posteriori ; because the former proceeds from 
universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while the lat- 
ter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We must never- 
theless see whether we have a right to do this ; since no 
demonstration d priori can have credence, or be received, 
without supposing the demonstration d posteriori, by which it 
must be proved. For how is it, for example, that having to 
prove that man feels, from this proposition, every animal feels 
— how, I say, will you establish the truth of this position, 
should some one hesitate to grant it, except by making induc- 
tion of the individual animals, of whom there is not one that 
does not feel ? " ' 

"If there are any truths which the mind possesses, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of ex- 
perience, they may be called d priori truths, as belonging to 
'\\, prior to all that it acquires from the world around. On the 
other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and ex- 
perience, are called d posteriori truths, because they come to 
the mind after it has become acquainted with external facts. 
How far d priori truths or ideas are possible, is the great cam- 
pus philosopTiorum, the great controverted question of mental 
philosophy." ^ — V. Demonstration. 
ARBOR PORPHYRIANA. — In the third century Porphyry 
wrote EtffaywyjJ, or an Introduction to Logic. He represented 
the five predicables under the form of a tree with its trunk 



' Bernier, Abridgment of Gassendi " De VEntendement," toI. tL, pp. 340-1. 
* Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2d edit., pp. 68-9. 



44 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AEBOE PORPHYEIANA— 

and branches, and hence the name. By the Greek logicians 
it was called the ladder {xn^a^) of Porphyry. A delineation 
of the Arbor Porphyrimia is given by Aquinas.' 
ARCHi^US is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital prin- 
ciple which presides over the growth and continuation of 
living beings. He called it body ; but an astral body, that is 
an emanation from the substance of the stars, which defends 
us against the external agents of destruction till the inevita- 
ble term of life arrives. The hypothesis was extended by 
Van Helmont to the active principle which presides not only 
over every body, but over every particle of organized body, 
to which it gives its proper form. 

The word is used by More ^ as synonymous with form. 
ARCHELOGY (xdyoj nspi -ti^v apx^v) treats of principles, and 
should not be confounded with ArchcEology (^dyoj rt£p' tZiv 
dp;^tti-'«i'), which treats of antiquities or things old.^ — V. Prin- 
ciple. 
ARCHETYPE (ap;^?;, fii'st or chief; and tvrioi, form), a model 
or first form. — "There were other objects of the mind, uni- 
versal, eternal, immutable, which they called intelligible 
ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or un- 
derstanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds 
or souls." * 

" The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an arche- 
typal world which contains intelligibly all that is contained 
sensibly in our world."* 

Cornelius Agrippa gave the name of Archetype to God, eon- 
sidered as the absolute model of all being. 

In. the philosophy of Locke, the archetypes of our ideas are 
the things really existing out of us. " By real ideas, I mean 
such as have a foundation in nature ; such as have a con- 
formity with the real being and existence of things, or with 
their archetypes."^ 

' Opusc. xlviii., tract, ii., cap. 3. 

* Antidote to Atheism, pt. i., c. II. 

^ See Alstedius (J. H.), Scientiarum Omnium EncyclopcBdia. 

* Cudworth, Iniell. Syst., p. 3S7. 

' Bolingbroke, Essay ir., sect. 28. 

6 Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii., c. 30. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPnY. 45 

AECHETYPE— 

" There is truth as well as poetry in the Platonic idea of 
things being formed after original archetypes. But we hold 
that these archetypes are not uncreated, as Plato seems to sup- 
pose ; we maintain that they have no necessary or indepen- 
dent existence, but that they are the product of Divine 
wisdom ; and that we can discover a final cause for their pre- 
valence, not, indeed, in the mere convenience and comfort of 
the animal, but in the aid furnished to those created intelli- 
gences who are expected to contemplate and admire their pre- 
determined forms." ' 

"Apelles paints a head of Jupiter. The statue of Phidias 
was his archetype, if he paints after it from memory, from 
idea. It was his model, if he paints after it in presence of 
the statue. He paints a likeness, if the resemblance is striking. 
If he makes a second painting in imitation of the first, he 
takes a copy."'^ 
.ARCHITECTONICK. — " I understand by an ArchitectomcJc the 
art of systems. As the systematic unity is what first of all 
forms the usual cognition into science, that is, from a mere 
aggregate of it forms a system, so is Architectonick the 
doctrine of the Scientific in our cognition in general, and 
belongs therefore necessarily to the doctrine of Method."'' 
ARGITMEK'T [arguo, from apyoj, clear, manifest — to show, reason, 
or prove), is an explanation of that which is doubtful, by that 
which is known. 

Reasoning (or discourse) expressed in words, is Argument. 
Every argument consists of two parts ; that which is proved ; 
and that hy means ofivhich it is proved. The former is called, 
before it is proved, the question ; when proved the conclusion 
(or inference) ; that which is used to prove it, if stated last (as 
is often done in common discourse), is called the reason, and is 
introduced by "because," or some other causal conjunction; 
e. g., " Caesar deserved death because he was a tyrant, and all 
tyrants deserve death." If the conclusion be stated last 
(which is the strict logical form, to which all reasoning may 
be reduced), then, that which is employed to prove it is called 

* M'Cosh, Meth. of Div. Govern., b. ii., ch. 1, § 4. 

» Taylor, Synonyms. 

' Kant, Critick of Pure Rea&on, by Haywood, p, 624, 



46 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ARGUMENT— 

the premises, and the conclusion is then introduced by some 
illative conjunction, as thei'efore ; e.g., 
"All tyrants deserve death : 
Caesar was a tyrant ; 
Therefore he deserved death." ■ 
The term argiiment in ordinary discourse, has several mean- 
ings. — 1. It is used for the premises in contradistinction to the 
conclusion, e. g., " the conclusion vrhich this argument is in- 
tended to establish is," &c. 2. It denotes what is a course or 
series of arguments, as when it is applied to an entire disser- 
tation. 3. Sometimes a disputation or two trains of argument 
opposed to each other. 4. Lastly, the varioiis forms of stating 
an argument are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of 
argument, as if the same argument were not capable of being 
stated in various ways.'' 

" In technical propriety argument cannot be used for argu- 
mentation, as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle 
term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform 
consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, 
&c. ; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, 
from whom it passed even to the Ramists ; and this is the 
meaning which the exjDression always first and most natu- 
rally suggests to a logician."'' 

In this sense, the discovery of arguments means the dis- 
covery of middle terms. 

Argument (The Indirect). — It is opposed to the Ostensive or 
Direct. Of Indirect arguments several kinds are enumerated 
by logicians. 

Argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the principles of an 
opponent. 

Argumentum ex concess8, a proof derived from some truth 
already admitted. 

Argumentum a fortiori, the proof of a conclusion deduced 
from that of a less probable supposition that depends upon it. 
— Matthew vi. 30, vii. 11. 

Argumentum ad judicium, an appeal to the common sense of 
mankind. 

' Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 3, § 2. s Ibid., Appendix i. 

^ Sir W. Hamilton, discussions, p. 147. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 

Argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to our reverence for 
some respected authority. 

Argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the passions and pre- 
judices of the multitude. 

Argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument founded on the 
ignorance of an adversary. 

Reductio ad absurdum is the proof of a conclusion derived from 
the absurdity of a contrary supposition. These arguments are 
called Indirect, because the conclusion that is established is 
not the absolute and general one in question, but some other 
relative and particular conclusion, vrhich the person is bound 
to admit in order to maintain his consistency. The Reductio 
ad absurdiLm is the form of argument which more particularly 
comes under this denomination. In geometry this mode of 
reasoning is much employed, by w^hich, instead of demon- 
strating what is asserted, everything which contradicts that 
. assertion is shown to be absurd. For, if everything which 
contradicts a proposition is absurd, or unthinkable, the pro- 
position itself must be accepted as true. In other sciences, 
however, which do not depend upon definition, nor proceed by 
demonstration, the supposable and the false find a place be- 
tween what is true and what is absurd. 
ARGUMENTATIOlf is opposed to intuition and consciousness, 
and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price.^ 

Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind where- 
by we infer one proposition from two or more propositions 
premised.^ 

Argumentation must not be confounded with reasoning. 
Reasoning may be natural or artificial ; argumentation is al- 
ways artificial. An advocate reasons and argues ; a Hottentot 
reasons, but does not argue. Reasoning is occupied with ideas 
and their relations, legitimate or illegitimate ; argumentation 
has to do with forms and their regularity or irregularity. One 
reasons often with one's self; you cannot argue but with two. 
A thesis is set down — you attack, I defend it ; you insist, I 
reply ; you deny, I approve ; you distinguish, I destroy your 
distinction; your objections and my replies balance or over- 



■ Review, chap. 5. ' Watts, Log., Introd. 



48 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

ARGUMEITTATION- 

turn one another. Such is argumentation. It supposes that 
there are two sides, and that both agree to the same rules.^ 

" Argumentationis nomine tota disputatio ipsa comprehen- 
ditur, constans ex argumento et argumenti confutatione." ^ 
AKT (Latin ars, from Greek dpsr^, strength or skill ; or from apw, 
to fit, join, or make agree). 

Ars est ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum? 

Ars est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus; quia per precepta 
sua dirigit effectionem seu productionem operis externi sensibilis. 
Differt autem a natura, quod natura operatur in eo in quo est; 
ars vero nunquam operatur in eo in quo est; nisi per accidens, 
puta cum medicus seipsum sanat.* 

Ars est methodus aliquidjuxta regulas determinatas operandi.^ 

Ars est recta ratio factibilium, atque in eo differt a prudentia, 
qu(x est recta ratio agibilium.® 

Docti rationem artis inteUigvnt, indocti voluptatem. — Quint. 
This is the difference, in the fine arts especially, between 
acquired knowledge and natural taste. 

"We speak of art as distinguished from nature; but art 
itself is natural to man. ... If we admit that man is 
susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle of 
progression and a desire of perfection, it appears improper to 
say that he has quitted the state of his nature, when he has 
begun to proceed ; or that he finds a station for which he was 
not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the 
disposition and employs the powers that nature has given. 
The latest efi"orts of human invention are but a continuation 
of certain devices which were practised in the earliest ages of 
the world, and in the rudest state of mankind."'' 

Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be " a proper disposal of 
the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as 
to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind." It 
may be defined more concisely to be the adjustment of means 
to accomplish a desired end? 

• Diet, des Sciences PhUosoph. * Cicero. ' Thomaa Aquinas. 

■* DcrodoD, Phys., p. 21. ' Bouvier. 

' Peemans, Introd. ad Philosorph., p. 31. 

■■ Ferguson, Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, pp. 10-13. 

^ Stewart, WorJcs, vol. ii., p. 36, last edition. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 

ART- 

"A7't has in general preceded science. There were bleach- 
ing, and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper and 
iron, before there was chemistry to 'explain the processes used. 
Men made wine before there was any theory of fermentation ; 
and glass and porcelain were manufactured before the nature 
of alkalies and earths had been determined. The pyramids of 
Nubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculptured slabs of Nine- 
veh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the obelisks and 
temples of India, the cromlechs and druidical circles of coun- 
tries formerly Celtic, all preceded the sciences of mechanics 
and architecture. There was music before there was a science 
of acoustics ; and painting while as yet there was no theory 
of colours and perspective." ^ 

On the other hand Cicero has said,^ " NiMl est enim, quod 
adartemredigi possit, nisi ille prius qui ilia tenet, quorum artem 
instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum 
ars nonduTii sit, ai-tem efficere possit." 

And Mr. Harris* has argued — " If there were no theorems 
of science to guide the operations of art, there would be no 
art ; but if there were no operations of art, there might still 
be theorems of science. Therefore science is prior to art." 

" The principles which art involves, science evolves. The 
truths on which art depends lurk in the artist's mind unde- 
veloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing 
his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated 
propositions. Art in its earlier stages is anterior to science — 
it may afterwards borrow aid from it."'' 

If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, 
the art is called empirical ; but if it be experience reasoned 
upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a 
higher character and becomes a scientific art. 

The difference between art and science is regarded as merely 
verbal by Sir William Hamilton .^ 

" The distinction between science and art is, that a science is 

• » M'Cosb, On Div. Govern., p. 151. 

"> Dti Oraf.ore, i., 41. 

^ Phif. Arrangements, chap. 15. 

■* Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sciences,, vol. ii., pp. 111-2, new edit. 

5 In Edin. Rev., No. 115. On the other side, see Preface of St. Hilaire's translation 
of the Organon, p. 12; Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sciences, part ii., book ii., chap. 8. 
6 E 



50 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AET- 

a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of 
some object matter. An art is a body of precepts with prac- 
tical skill for the completion of some work. A science teaches 
us to know, an art to do ; the former declares that something 
exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence ; 
the latter teaches how something may be produced." ^ 

" The object of science is knowledge ; the objects of art are 
works. In art, truth is a means to an end ; in science it is the 
only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed 
among the sciences."^ 

" Science gives principles, art gives rules. Science is fixed, 
and its object is intellectual; art is contingent, and its object 
sensible."^ 
ASCETICISM [mxYiaii, exercise). — The exercise of severe virtue 
among the Pythagoreans and Stoics was so called. It con- 
sisted in chastity, poverty, watching, fasting, and retirement. 

" The ascetics renounced the business and the pleasures of 
the age ; alijured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, 
chastised the body, mortified their afi"eetions, and embraced 
a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness." ** 

This name may be applied to every system which teaches 
man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason 
and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to 
resist them as much as we can ; and these are not only the 
wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the ima- 
gination, and the mind ; for society, the family, most of the 
sciences and arts of civilization, are proscribed sometimes as 
rigorously as physical pleasiires. The care of the soul and the 
contemplation of the Deity are the only employments. Ascet- 
icism may be distinguished as religions, which is founded on the 
doctrine of expiation, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath 
by voluntary sufi'erings, and pliilosopMcal, which aims at ac- 
complishing the destiny of the soiil, developing its faculties, 
and freeing it from the servitude of sense.^ 

' Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 16, 2d edit, 

* Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sciences, aph. 25. 
' Harris, Dialogue on Art. 

* Gibbon, Hist., c. 37. 

' Diet, des Sciences Phil. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 

ASCETICISM — 

The principle of asceticism is described by Bentham,' aa 
"that principle which approves of actions in proportion as 
they tend to diminish human happiness, and conversely dis- 
approves of them as they tend to augment it.'^ But this is 
not a fair representation of asceticism in any of its forms. 
The only true and rational asceticism is temperance or mode- 
ration in all things. 

ASSEHT {ad sentio—to think the same — to be of the same mind 
or opinion). — " Subscription to articles of religion, though no 
more than a declaration of the subscriber's assent, may pro- 
perly enough be considered in connection with the subject of 
oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpre- 
tation." ^ 

Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a 
proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part 
of judgment ; for if you take away from judgment affirmation 
or denial, nothing remains but a simple conception without 
logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before 
it can be admitted. It is also implied in perception, which 
would otherwise be a mere phenomenon which the mind had 
not accepted as true. Assent isyree when it is not the unavoid- 
able result of evidence, necessary when I cannot withhold it 
without contradicting myself. The Stoics, while they ad- 
mitted that most of our ideas came from without, thought that 
images purely sensible could not be converted into real cog- 
nitions without a spontaneous act of the mind, which is just 
assent, or belief, avyxa-tdBsaii? — V. Belief, CoNSEisfT. 

" Assent of the mind to truth is, in all cases, the work not 
of the understanding, but of the reason. Men are not con- 
vinced by syllogisms ; but when they believe a principle, or 
wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove it."* 

ASSEKTIOU [ad sero, to join to, to declare), in Logic is the 
affirmation or denial of something.^ 

ASSERTORY. — " But whether each of them be according to the 

' Introd. to Prin. of Mm: and Legislation, ch. 2. 

* Paley, Mor. Phil, b. iii., c. 22. 3 Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

* Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 21. » Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 2, § 



52 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ASSERTORY - 

kinds of oaths divided by the schoolmen, one assertory, the 
other 'promissory, to which some add a third, comminatory, is 
to me unknown." ' 

Judgments have also been distinguished into ihe problematic, 
the assertory, and the apodeictic. — V. Judgment, Oath. 
ASSOCIATION {associo, to accompany). — " Ideas that in them- 
selves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's 
minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep 
company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the 
understanding but its associate appears with it." ^ — V. Sug- 
gestion, Train or Thought. 

" If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in the 
mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these thoughts 
return to the mind, some, or all of the others, Avill frequently 
return with it; this is called the association of ideas." ^ 

" By the law of contimiity, the mind, when the chord has 
once been struck, continues, as Hume describes it, to repeat of 
itself the same note again and again, till it finally dies away. 
By association it falls naturally into the same train of consecu- 
tive ideas to which it has been before accvistomed. Imagine a 
glass so constructed that when the face placed before it was 
withdrawn, the image should still continue reflected on it for 
a certain time, becoming fainter and fainter until it finally 
disappeared. This would represent the law of continuity. 
Imagine that when a book and a man had been once placed 
before it together, it should be able, when the book was next. 
])rought alone, to recall the image of the man also. This 
Avould be the law of association. On these two laws depends 
the spontaneous activity of the mind."'' — Sewell.^ 

" The law of association is this, — Tliat empirical ideas which 
often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever 
the one is produced, for the other always to follow."^ 

"I employ the word association to express the efi'ect 



' Fuller, Worthies, Cornwall. 

^ Locke, On Hum. Understand., b. il., c. 33, sect. 5. 

' Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

■* See the use which Butler has made of these in his Analogy, eh. 1 and ch. 6. 

' Christ. Mor., ch. 14. ^ Kant, Anthropolygy, p. 182. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 

ASSOCIATION — 

which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which 
It does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly re- 
calls to the mind, in consequence of early and long continued 
habits." ' 

• "Intelligitur per associationem idearum non qucevis naturalis 
et necessaria earundem conjiuictlo, sed qiice fortuita est, aut 
per consuetudinem vel affectum j^roduciiiir, qua idece, quce 
nullum naturalem inter se Jiabent nexum, ita copulantur, ut 
recurrente una, tota earum catena se conspiciendam intellectui 
prcebeat." * 

" The influence of association upon morals opens an ample 
field of inquiry. It is from this principle that we explain the 
reformation from theft and drunkenness in servants which we 
sometimes see produced by a draught of spirits in which tartar 
emetic had been secretly dissolved. The recollection of the 
pain and sickness excited by the emetic, naturally associates 
itself with the spirits, so as to render them both equally the 
objects of aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that 
we can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the 
golden calf into a powder, and afterwards dissolving it (pro- 
bably by means of hepar sulphuris) in water, and compelling 
the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment for their 
idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in the highest 
degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, could not be 
felt without being associated with the remembrance of this 
disagreeable mixture, and of course being rejected with equal 
abhorrence."^ — V. Combination. 
ASSUMPTION {assumo, to take for granted). — "The unities of 
time and place arise evidently from false assumptions." ■* 

Of enunciations or premises, that which is taken universally 
is called the proposition, that which is less universal and 
comes into the mind secondarily is called the assumption,^ 

» Stewart, Wc»-7cs, vol. ii., p. 449. 

^ Bruckerus, De Ideis. Locke, Essay, book ii., chap. 23; Hume, Essays, essay ili. ; 
Hartley, Observ. on Man ; Raid, Intell. Pow., essay iv. ; Stewart, Elements, vol. ii., oh. 5 ; 
Brown, Lectures, lect. xxxiii. 

" Dr. Rush, Medical Enquiries, vol. ii., Svo, Philadelphia, 1793, p. 42. 

■* Johnson, Proposals for, die, Shakspeare. 

E Trendelenburg. Notce in Arist. 

6* 



54 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 

ASSUMPTION — 

The Assumption is the minor or second prapositim in a 
categorical syllogism. 

ATHEISM (a, priv. ; and ©soj, God). — The doctrine that there is 
no God. 

" We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see 
if we can find any other philosophers who atlieized before 
Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism they 
entertained." ' 

The name Atheist is said to have been first applied to 
Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, who 
explained all things by motion and matter, or the movement 
of material atoms. The other form of atheism in ancient 
times was that of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, who 
accounted for all things by the different transformations of 
the one element of water. Straton of Lampsacus rejected 
the purely mechanical system of Democritus, and ascribed to 
matter a power of organization which gave to all beings their 
forms and faculties. Epicurus was the contemporary of 
Straton, but the follower of Democritus, on whose system he 
grafted the morality which is suited to it. And the material- 
ism of Hobbes and others in modern times has, in like manner, 
led to atheism. 

It is a fine observation of Plato in his Laws — that atheism 
is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error of the 
understanding.^ 

" To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nop 
any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in 
nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any particulars, 
can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at, 
is to be a perfect atheist."^ 

Hi soli sunt ailiei, qui mundum rectoris sapientis consilio 
negant in initio coiistitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore ad- 
ministrari.* 

Atheists are confounded with Pantheists; such as Xeno- 
phanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling among 

» Cudworth, Intell. Syst, p. 111. 

» Leclerc, Hist, des Systemes des Jncien Athees. In Bibliotheque Ghoisie. 
' Shaftesbury, Inquiry Concerning Virtue, book i., part i., sect. 2. 
* Hutchcson, Melaphys., pars 3, e. 1. • 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 

ATHEISM — 

the moderns, who, instead of denying God, absorb everything 
into Him, and are rather Acosmists. 

Atheism has been distinguished from AnUtlieism ; and the 
former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition 
of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This dis- 
tinction is founded on the difference between unhelitf and dis- 
helief,^ and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates 
merely between sceptical and dogmatic atheism? 

" The verdict of the atheist on the doctrine of a God, is only 
that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is 
but an atheist. He is not an antitheist." ^ 
ATOM, ATOMISM (a, priv. ; and ti^vto, to cut, that which cannot 
be cut or divided is an atom). 

" Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the cor- 
poreal world to be made of atoms, yet notwithstanding, held 
an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first prin- 
ciple of activity in it, so in like manner did all other ancient 
atomists generally before Democritus join theology and incor- 
porealism with their atomical physiology."^ 

Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of 
extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which 
he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and to which 
the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of atoms. To 
these atoms he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence 
of which, such as are homogeneous united, whilst the lighter 
were dispersed throughout space. 

The doctrine of atomism did not take its rise in Greece, but 
in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. Kanada, 
the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence 
distinct from the world. But he could not believe matter to 
be infinitely divisible, as in this case a grain of sand would be 
equal to a mountain, both being infinite. Matter consists, 
then, of ultimate indivisible atovis, which are indestructible 
and eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude 
mind or spirit from the universe. Leucippus and Democritus 
did. Epicurus added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius 
gave to it the graces of poetry. 

' Chalmers, A'^at. Thcol., i., 58. "^ Buchanan, Faith in Gnd, vol. i , p. 396. 

Chalmers, ut supra. ^ Cudworth, Intell. Si/st., p. 26. 



56 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or neces- 
sity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has 
attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God.' — V. Molecule. 
ATTENTIOK" {attendo, to stretch towards). 

"When we see, hear, or think of anything, and feel a desire 
to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the object; 
this effort of the mind, produced by the desire of knowledge, 
is called attention."^ 

AUeniion is the voluntary directing of the energy of the 
mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Sir H. 
Holland,' that " The phrase oi direction of consciousness might 
often be advantageously substituted for it." It implies Will 
as distinct from Intelligence and Sensibility. It is the volun- 
t-ary direction of the intelligence and activity. Condillac con- 
founded it with a sensation of which we were passively con- 
scious, all other sensations being as if they were not. Laro- 
miguiere regarded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty 
of the understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But 
we may do an act with attention as well as contemplate an 
object with attention. And we may attend to a feeling as well 
as to a cognition. According to De Tracy,"* it is a state of 
mind rather than a faculty. It is to be acquired and improved 
by habit. We may learn to be attentive as we learn to walk 
and to write. 

According to Dr. Reid,^ "Attention is a voluntary act; it 
requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it ; and it 
may be continued as long as we will ; but consciousness is 
involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every 
thought." 

Attention to external things is observation. Attention to the 
subjects of our own consciousness is rejection. 

Attention and abstraction are the same process, it has been 
said, viewed in diiferent relations. They are the positive and 
negative poles of the same act. The one evolves the other. 
Attention is the abstraction of the mind from all things else, 
and fixing it upon one object ; and abstraction is the fixing the 
mind upon one object to the exclusion of others. 

• Stewart, Act. Pmo., vol. ii., last edit., 369. ^ Taylor, Elements of ThmgM. 

' Mental Physiol., p. 14. • Idcologie, c. 11. » hitell. Pow., essay i., ch. 6. 



A'OCABULAllY OF PHILOSOPHY. 57 

ATTEHTIOH — 

Attention and Thought. — " By thought is here meant the volun- 
tary reproduction in our minds of those states of consciousness, 
• to which, as to his best and most authentic documents, the 
teacher of moral or religious truth refers us. fn attention, 
we keep the mind passive ; in thought, we rouse it into activity. 
In the former, we su1>mit to an impression — we keep the mind 
steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, we seek 
to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or dupli- 
cate of his work. We may learn arithmetic or the elements 
of geometry, by continued attention alone ; but self-knowledge, 
or an insight into the laws and constitution of the human 
mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality, in addi- 
tion to the Q^ovto? attention, requires the QxvQvgj oi thought." '^ 

ATTRIBUTE [attribuo, to apportion, to ascribe), is anything that 
can be predicated of another. 

" Heaven delights 
To pardon erring man ; sweet mercy seems 
Its darling attribute, which limits justice." 

Dryden, All for Love. 

^'Attributes are usually distributed under the three heads of 
quality, quantity, and relation."^ 

In the Schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and 
the accident, were called dialectic attributes ; because, accord- 
ing to Aristotle,^ these were the four points of view in which 
any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed. 

"A predicate, the exact limits of which are not determined, 
cannot be used to define and determine a subject. It may be 
called an attribute, and conveys not the whole nature of the 
subject, but some one quality belonging to it. ' Metals are 
heavy,' 'some snakes are venomous,' are judgments in which 
this kind of predicable occurs.'' 

Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real qualities, 
essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the 
substance of things. "By this word attribute," said Descartes 
(in his letter to Regius), "is meant something which is 

' Coleridge, Aids to Reflection., vol. i., p. 4. 

^ Mill., Log., 2d edit., vol. i., p. 83. 

' Topic, lib. i., c. 6. 

■• Thomson, Outline of Laws of Tliought, 2d edit., p. 161. 



58 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ATTRIBUTE — 

immovable and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as 
that which constitutes it, and which is thus opposed to mode." 
Thus unity, identity, and activity, are attributes of the soul ; 
for I caanot deny them, without, at the same time, denying 
the existence of the soul itself. Sensibility, liberty, and intel- 
ligence, are but faculties. In God there is nothing but attri- 
butes, because in God, everything is absolute, involved in the 
substance and unity of the necessary being. In Deo non pro- 
prie modos aut qualitates, sed attributa tantum dicimus esse.^ 

In man the essential maiic is reason — attribute, capacity of 
learning — mode, actual learning — quality, relatively to another 
more or less learned.^ — V. Quality, Mode. 
ATJTHEITTIC. — "A genuine book is that which was written by 
the person whose name it bears, as the author of it. An 
authentic book is that which relates matters of fact as they 
really happened. A book may be genuine without being 
authentic ; and a book may be authentic without being genuine. 
The books written by Richardson and Fielding are genuine 
books, though the histories of Clarissa and Tom Jones are 
fables. . . . Anson's voyage may be considered as an 
authentic book, it probably containing a true narrative of the 
principal events recorded in it ; but it is not a genuine book, 
having not been written by Walters, to whom it is ascribed, 
but by Robins." 3 

In jurisprudence, those laws or acts are called authentic 
Avhich are promulgated by the proper public officer, and ac- 
companied with the conditions requisite to give them faith and 
force. 

AUTHORITY (The principle of). — " The principle of adopting 
the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference 
to the particular grounds on which the belief may rest."* — 
V. Consent. 

Authority (The argument from). — It is an argument for the 
truth of an opinion that it has been embraced by all men, in 

'■ Descartes, Princip. Philosoph., i., p. 57. 

^ Peemane, Introd. ad Philosoph., p. 6. 

^ Bp. Watson, Apology for the BihU, p. 33. 

* Sir G. C. Lewis, On Authority in Matters of Opinion, p. 6. 



VOCABULAUY Or PHILOSOPHY. 59 

AUTHORITY— 

all ages, and in all nations. Quod semper, iibique, et ah om- 
nibus, are the marks of universality, according to Vincentius 
Lirinensis. " This word is sometimes employed in its primary 
sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, or 
judgment; as when, e.g., we speak of correcting a reading in 
some book on the authority of an ancient MS., or giving a 
statement of some fact on the authority of such and such his- 
torians, &c. In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to 
the Latin auctoritas. It is a claim to deference. 

" Sometimes, again, it is employed as equivalent to potestas, 
power, as when we speak of the authority of a magistrate. 
This is a claim to obedience." ' 

Una in re consentio omnium gentium lex natures putanda 
est.'^ 

Midtum dare solemus ptroesumpiioni omnium hominum: Apud 
nos veritatis argumentum est, aliquid omnibus videri.^ 
AUTOCE,ASY (aitos, self; and xpatlw, to have power). — "The 
Divine will is absolute, it is its own reason, it is both the pro- 
ducer and the ground of all its acts. It moves not by the 
external impulse or inclination of objects, but determines 
itself by an absolute autocrasy."* 

" God extends his dominion even to man's will, that great 
seat of freedom, that with a kind of autocrasy and supremacy 
within itself, commands its own actions, laughs at all compul- 
sion, scorns restraint, and defies the bondage of human laws 
or external obligations."* — V. Autonomy. 
AUTOMATON {aitoixatov, that which moves of itself.) 

Automatic. — "The difference between an animal and an auto- 
matic statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the 
mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped, either 
the mechanism becoming too subtile for oiir discernment, or 
something else beside the known laws of mechanism taking 
place ; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few 
motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism 
throughout." ^ 

Automatic motions are those muscular actions which are 

' Whateiy, Log., Appendix 1. ^ Cicero, 1., Tuscul. 

" Seneca, Epist. cxvii. * South, vol. vii., ser. x, 

5 Soutb, Tol. i., ser. vii, s Paley, Nat. Thiol., c. 3. 



60 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

AITTOMATOlSr— 

not dependent on the mind, and which are either persistent, 
or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and are 
dependent on normal causes seated in the nerves or central 
organs of the nervous system. " Movements influenced simply 
by sensation, and not at all by the will, are automatic, such 
as w^iuking." ' 

Leibnitz^ has said, " anima humana est spiritnale qiioddam 
automaton." In a note on this passage, Bilfinger is quoted as 
saying that automaton is derived from avroj and /itaco or fxa.'tiui, 
to seek or desire. The soul is a being desiring of itself, 
whose changes are desired by itself; whereas the common 
interpretation of the word is self-moving. The soul, in strict 
propriety, may be called self-desiring, or desiring changes of 
itself, as having the principle of change in itself; whereas 
machines are improperly called self-moving, or self-desiring, 
or willing. 

" By the compound word avto^a-tov (oVar avT'6 /j.dt}]v yhti'tai,) 
Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more or less than 
the specific ends or purposes to which her respective opera- 
tions invariably tend."^ Nature operating xara ffv^/3s|8;7x6j, 
and producing effects not in her intention, is called avto/xatov 
or chance, and art operating xata avu^i^r^xoi, and producing 
effects not in her intention, is called tvxt], fortune. Thus, 
chance or fortune cannot have any existence independently of 
intention or design. 
Automatism is one of the theories as to the activity of matter.* 
ATJTOIJOMY (aurdj j'0;uoj, a law^ itself). — In the philosophy of 
Kant, autonomy is ascribed to the reason in all matters of 
morality. The meaning is, that reason is sovereign, and the 
laws which it imposes on the will are universal and absolute. 
Man, as possessed of reason, is his own lawgiver. In this, 
accoi"ding to Kant, consists the true character and the only 
possible proof of liberty. The term lieteronomy is applied by 
him to those laws which are imposed upon us by nature, or 
the violence done to us by our passions and our wants or de- 
sires. V. AUTOCRASY. 

» Morell, Psychology, p. 99. * Tom. i., p. 156. 

^ Nat. Auseult,, lib. il., cap. 6 ; Gillies, Analysis of AristoUi^s Works, chap. 2, note. 

* See Stewart, Act. Pow., vol. ii., pp. S78, 379. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 61 

AUTOTHEISTS (aurdj Osoi). — Aidotheistce qui nulla alia entia 

jjrieter se agnoscunt.^ 
AXIOM (d|ow^a, from d|t6cd, to think worthy), a position of 
worthy or authority. In science, that which is assumed as 
the basis of demonstration. In mathematics, a self-evident 
proposition. 

Diogenes Laertius,^ explains an axiom, according to Chrjr- 
sippus, as meaning a proposition asserting or denying some- 
thing. " It has received the name of axiom, a^im^a,, because 
it is either maintained, a^iov'ta.i, or repudiated." 

" There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name 
of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science." ^ 

" Philosophers give the name of axioms only to self-evident 
truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and 
place, but must be true at all times and in all places."'' 

Mr. Stewart* contends that axioms are elemental truths ne- 
cessary in reasoning, but not truths from which anything can 
be deduced. 

That all axioms are intuitive and self-evident truths, is, ac- 
cording to Mr. Tatham,^ a fundamental mistake into which 
Mr. Locke,'' and others,^ have been betrayed, to the great 
injury of science. All axioms though not intuiiive may, how- 
ever, be properly said to be self-evident; because, in their 
formation, reason judges by single comparisons without the 
help of a third idea or middle term ; so that they are not in- 
debted to any other for their evidence, but have it in them- 
selves ; and though inductively framed, they cannot be syllo- 
gistically proved.^ 

This term was first applied by mathematicians to a certain 
number of propositions which are self-evident, and serve as 
the basis of all their demonstrations. Aristotle'" applied it 
to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all 
science. According to him they were all subordinate to the 



' Lacoudre, Instit Philosoph., torn, ii., p. 120. ^ Life of Zeno, ch. 48. 

" Locke, On Sum. Understand., book iv., ch. 7. 

* Reid, Inidl. Poiu., essaj ii., chap. 20 ; see also Sir William Hamilton's edition of 
Meid, note A, sect. 5. 
5 Elements, part ii., ch. 1. ^ Chart and Scale of Truth, chap. 4. 

■■ Essay, b. iv., chap. 7, g 1. 

^ Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i., b. v., chap. 3, p. 389, and vol. ii., p. 335. 
^ Ibid, chap. 7, sect. 1. "> Analyf. Post., lib. i., chap. 2. 

7 



62 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

AXIOM - 

supreme condition of all demonstration, ' the principle of 
identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of 
axioms, included every kind of general proposition, -vrhether 
of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is 
employed by Bacon,^ who, not satisfied with submitting 
axioms to the test of experience, has distinguished several 
kinds of axioms, some more general than others. The Car- 
tesians, who wished to apply the methods of geometry to phi- 
losophy, have retained the Aristotelian use of the term. 
Kant has consecrated it to denote those principles which are 
the grounds of mathematical science, and which, according to 
him, are judgments absolutely independent of experience, of 
immediate evidence, and which have their origin in the pure 
intuition of time and space. 



BEAUTY. — -"All the objects we call beavitiful agree in two 
things, which seem to concur in our sense of beauty. First, 
When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a 
certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind ; and, se- 
condly. This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion 
or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belong- 
ing to them." ^ 

Beauty is absolute, real, and ideal. The absolutely beautiful 
belongs to Deity. The really beautiful is presented to us in 
the objects of nature and the actions of human life. The 
ideally beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identified the 
heautiful with the good, to xoTkov xai aya66v. But, although 
the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of the true are 
related to each other, they are distinct. There may be truth 
and propriety or proportion in beauty — and there is a beauty 
in what is good or right, and also in what is true. But still 
these ideas are distinct. 

Dr. Hutcheson^ distinguishes beauty inio "absolute; or that 

• Novum Organum, lib. i., aphor. 13, 17, 19, &c. 

* Reid, Intell. Povi., essay viii., chap. 4. 
'^ Inquiry Concerning Beauty, &c. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 63 

BEAUT Y- 

beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison to 
anything external, of which the object is supposed an imita- 
tion or picture ; such as that beauty, perceived from the works 
of nature ; and comparative or relative beauty, which we per- 
ceive in objects, commonly considered as imitations or resem- 
blances of something else." According to Hutcheson,' the 
general foundation or occasion of the ideas of beauty is "uni- 
formity amidst variety." 

Berkeley, in his Alciphron, and Hume, in many parts of 
his works, make utility the foundation oi beauty. But objects 
which are useful are not always beautiful, and objects which 
are beautiful are not always useful. That which is useful is 
useful for some end ; that which is beautiful is beautiful in 
itself, and independent of the pleasure which it gives, or the 
end it may serve. 

On the question whether mental or material objects first 
give us feelings of beauty, see Stewart,'^ Smith," and Alison.'* 

Dr. Price ^ has some remarks on natural beauty. See also 
the article "Beauty" in the Encyclop. Brit., by Lord Jef- 
frey; Kames, Elements of Criticism;^ Burke On the Sublime 
and Beautiful; Knight's Enquiry into Principles of Taste; 
Sir Uvedale Price On the Picturesqiie, with Preface by Sir T. 
D. Lauder, 8vo, Edin., 1842; Stewart's Essays;"^ Crousaz, 
Trait4 de Beau; Andre, Essai stir le Beau. — V. Esthetics, 
Ideal. 
BEII^G (-To wT'cof ov, that which is, existence). 

" First, thou madest things which should have being with- 
out life ; then those which should have life and being; lastly, 
those which have being, life, and reason." ^ 

" This [being), applies to everything which exists in any 
way whether as substance or accident, whether actually or po- 
tentially, whether in the nature of things, or only in our 
notions ; for, even what we call entia rationis, or fictions of our 
minds, such as hippo-centaur, or mountain of gold, have a 



• Inquiry, sect. 2. ^ Act. Pow., Tol. i., p. 279. 

* Theory of Mar. Sent., part iv., chap. 1. ■* Essay on Taste. 
6 In his Review of Principal Questions in Morals, sect. 2. 

" Vol. i., chap. 3. ■■ Part ii. 

' Bishop Hall. Contempl., ■■ The Creation."' 



64 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BEING - 

being ; even negation or privation have an existence ; nay, ac- 
cording to Aristotle,' we can say that nothing has a being. In 
short, vrhenever we can use the substantive verb is, there 
must be some kind of being." ^ 

According to some," we can have no idea of nothing; ac- 
cording to others,'' the knowledge of contraries being one, if 
we know what being is, we know what not being is. 

Being is either substance or accident. 

Substance is either matter or mind. 

Accident is divided by the other categories. — V. Ontology. 
BELISF (that which we live by, or according to, or lief, in Ger- 
man belieben, from lubet, that which pleases). 

" The first great instrument of changing our whole nature, 
is a firm belief, and a perfect assent to, and hearty entertain- 
ment of the promises of the gospel." * 

"Belief, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think 
admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind 
signified by them is perfectly simple, and of its own kind. 
Belief must have an object. For he who believes must be- 
lieve something, and that Avhich he believes is the object of 
his belief. Belief is always expressed in language by a pro- 
position wherein something is afiirmed or denied. Belief 
admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the full- 
est assurance. There are many operations of mind of which 
it is an essential ingredient, as consciousness, j^erception, re- 
membrance. We give the name of evidence to whatever is a 
ground of belief. What this evidence is, is more easily felt 
than described. The common occasions of life lead us to dis- 
tinguish evidence into difi"erent kinds ; such as the evidence 
of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, 
and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature 
to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree 
only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce 
belief in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, 



' Mdaphys., lib. iv., o. 2. * Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book i., chap. 4. 

2 J>ict. des Sciences Pkilosoph., art. " Etre." 

• Smart, Man. of Log., 1849, p. 130. ' Bp. Taylor, vol. i., Ser. xi. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. - 65 

BELIEF - 

which we call certainty, others in various degrees according 
to circumstances." ^ 

" St. Austin accurately says, ' We Icnoio what rests upon 
reason; we believe what rests upon aiitliority.' But reason 
itself mvist rest at last upon authority ; for the original data 
of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted 
by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These 
data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs or trusts. Thus 
it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically 
admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not 
reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to 
surrender the proud Intellige ut credas of Abelard, to content 
ourselves with the humble Crede ut intelligas of Anselm."^ — 
V. Feeling, Knowledge, Opinion. 

See Guizot, Meditations, &c. Quel est le vrai sens du mot 
Foi, p. 135, 8vo, Paris, 1852. 

To believe is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient, 
subjectively ; insufficient, objectively.^ 

" The word believing has been variously and loosely em- 
ployed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness 
which have already their separate and appropriate appella- 
tions. Thus it is sometimes said, ' I believe in my own exist- 
ence and the existence of an external world, I believe in the 
facts of nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my 
own mind,' as well as ' I believe in the testimony of witnesses, 
or in the evidence of historical documents.' " 

" Setting aside this loose application of the term, I propose 
to confine it. First, to the effect on the mind of the premises 
in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named 
contingent reasoning — in a word, the premises of all reasoning, 
but that which is demonstrative ; and. Secondly, to the state of 
holdi7ig true when that state, far from being the effect of any 
p^remises discerned by the mind, is dissociated from all evi- 
dence,""* 

" I propose to restrict the term belief to the assent to propo- 
sitions, and demarcate it from those inferences which are 

* Reid, Inte.ll. Pow., essay ii., chap. 20, and Inquiry, chap. 20, sect. 5. 

* Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note A, sect. 5. 
' Kant, Gi-it. de la Rais. Prat., p. 11. 

* Bailey, Letters on Philosnph. nf Hum. Mind, 8vo, 1851, p. 75. 

7* ■ F 



66 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BELIEF — 

made in the presence of objects and have reference to them. 
I would saj, we believe in the proposition ' Fire burns/ but 
know the fact that the paper about to be thrtist into the flame 
will ignite." ^ 
BEFEVOLENCE {benevolentia, well-wishing). — "When oiu- love 
or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed good-will or 
benevolence."'^ 

Bishop Butler has said,' that "there are as real and the 
same kind of indications in human natvire, that we were made 
for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we 
were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and 
private good." These principles in our nature by which we 
are prompted to seek and to secure our own good are compre- 
hended under the name of self-love, and those which lead us 
to seek the good of others are comprehended under the name 
of benevolence. The term corresponding to this among the 
Greeks was ^u'KavOpcortia, among the writers of the New Testa- 
ment aydrfyj, and among the Romans liumanitas. Under these 
terms are comprehended all those feelings and affections which 
lead us to increase the happiness and alleviate the sufferings 
of others, while the term self-love includes all those principles 
of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good. Ac- 
cording to some philosophers, our own good is the ultimate 
and only proper end of human actions, and when we do good 
to others it is done with a view to our own good. This is 
what is called the selfish philosophy, which in modern times 
has been maintained by Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, 
and others^ The other view, which is stated above in the 
words of Butler, has been strenuously defended by Cumber- 
land, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Reid. 
BLASPHEMY [^"Kdntu,, to hurt). — "■ B%a.6^rifxla properly denotes 
calumny, detraction, reproachful or abusive language, against 
whomsoever it be vented." '' 

As commonly used, it means the wanton and irreverent use 
of language in reference to the Divine Being or to His worship 



* Lewes, Biograph. Hist, of Philosoph., p. 492. 

* Cogan, On the Passions, part i., chap. 2. 
' Sermon i.. On Human Nature. 

* Campbell, On the Gospels, Prelim. Dissert, ix., part ii. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 67 

BLASPHEMY— 

and service.' This is an oflence against the light of nature, 
and was severely condemned by ancient ethical vrriters. 
Among the Jews, hlasplwmy was punished by death (Levit. 
xxiv. 14, 16). And by the laws of many Christian nations 
it has been prohibited under heavy penalties. So late as the 
end of the seventeenth century, a man suffered death at Edin- 
burgh for hlaspliemy ? 

Blasphemy differs from sacrilege, in that the former consists 
in using language, the latter in some overt act. 

BODY. — "The primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as con- 
tradistinguished to spirit, are the cohesion of solid and con- 
sequently separable parts, and a power of communicating 
motion by impulse."^ 

"Body is the external cause to which we ascribe our sen- 
sations." ^ 

Monboddo " distinguishes between matter * and hody, and 
calls hody matter sensible, that is, with those qualities which 
make it perceptible to our senses. This leaves room for under- 
standing what is meant by a spiritual body, ow^ua rtvBVfji.a.T; ixov, 
of which we read 1 Cor. xv. 44. He also calls body, " matter 
with form," in contradistinction to "first matter," Avhich is 
matter without form. 

Body is distinguished as physical, mathematical, and meta- 
physical. Physical body is incomplete or complete. Incomplete 
as in the material part of a living being ; thus man is said to 
consist of body and mind, and life is something different from 
the bodily frame in animals and vegetables. Complete, when 
composed of matter and form, as all natural bodies are. Mathe- 
matical body is the threefold dimensions of length, breadth, 
and thickness. Metaphysical body is body as included under 
the predicament of substance, which it divides with spirit. — 
V. Matter, Mind, Spirit. 

BONUM, when given as one of the transcendental properties of 
being, means that God hath made all things in the best pos- 

* Augustine said, — Jam, valgo blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo 
dicere. 

* See Arnot, Orim. Trials. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understatid., book ii., chap. 23. 

* Mill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 74. ' Ancient Mctapliys., book ii., chap. 1. 



6'8 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BONUM — 

sible manner to answer the wi.sest ends, or that no thing ia 
destitute of its essential properties, which metaphysicians call 
perfections. Perfections are distinguished into absolute and 
relative, the former making the nature to which they belong 
happy, and excluding all imperfection ; the latter belonging 
to inferior natures, and not excluding imperfection, but aiford- 
ing help and relief under its effects.' 
Bonum Morale, or what is good, relatively to man, was distin- 
guished into bomini jucundum, or what is calculated to give 
pleasure, as music ; honum utile, or what is advantageous, as 
wealth ; and honum honestum, or what is right, as temperance. 
These may be separate or conjoined in human actions. 
Bonum Summum — the chief good. — This phrase was employed 
by ancient ethical philosophers to denote that in the prosecu- 
tion and attainment of which the progress, perfection, and 
happiness of human beings consist. The principal opinions 
concerning it are stated by Cicero in his treatise De Finibus. 
See also Augustin, De Summo Bono. 

Tucker, Light of Nature, has a chapter,'^ entitled " Ultimate 
Good," which he says is the right translation of summum 
honum. ■ 

According to Kant, " virtue is not the entire complete good 
as an object of desire to reasonable finite beings ; for, to have 
this character it should be accompanied by happiness, not as 
it appears to the interested eyes of our personality, which we 
conceive as an end of itself, but according to the impartial 
judgment of reason, wl:ich considers virtue in general, in the 
world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue, then, 
together constitute the possession of the sovereign good in an 
individual, but with this condition, that the happiness should 
be exactly proportioned to the morality (this constituting the 
value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of happi- 
ness). The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, 
represents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be 
considered as the supreme good, because there can be no 
condition higher than virtue ; whilst happiness, which is 
unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not of 

' HutcheSoD, MetaphyS; pars 1, cap. 3. 27, of vol. i. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 69 

BOl^UM - ' 

itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally 
good conduct." 
SROCARB. — "I make use of all the hrocardics, or rules of in- 
terpreters ; that is, not only what is established regularly, in 
law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best 
interpreters." ' 

" To the Stoics and not to the Stagyrite, are aa^c to refer the 
first announcement of the brocard — In inielleciu nihil est, quod 
non prius fuerit in sensu."^ 



Ci^NESTHESIS. — F. Sensation, Sensus Communis. 
CAPACITY.- 

" Is it for that such outward ornament 
Was lavished on their sex, that inward gifts 
Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant. 
Capacity not raised to apprehend, 
Or value, what is best 
In choice, but oftest to affect the wrong." 

Milton, Samson Agmiistes. 

" The original power which the mind possesses of being 
taught, we call natural capacity ; and this in some degree is 
common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, 
which some possess above the rest, we call genius. The first 
transition or advances from natural power, we call proficiency ; 
and the end or completion of proficiency we call habit. If such 
habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then 
called science; if it descend from speculation to practice, it is 
then called art; and if such practice be conversant in regulat- 
ing the passions and affections, it is then called moral virtue." ^ 

" From habit, necessarily results power or capacity (in 
Greek biva-mi), which Aristotle has distinguished into two 
kinds. The first is the mere capacity of becoming anytliing. 
The second is the power or faculty of energizing, according to 
the habit when it is formed and acquired ; or, in other words, 

' Jeremy Taylor, Preface to Ductor Dubitaniium. 
2 Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, p. 772. 
' Harris, Philosoph. Arrang., chap. S. 



70 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAPACITY — 

after the thing is become and actually exists, which at first 
was only in the capacity of existing. This, Aristotle illus- 
trates by the example of a child, who is then only a general 
in power [h bwdf^n), that is, has the power of becoming a 
general, but when he has grown up and has become a general, 
then he has the power of the second kind, that is, the power 
of performing the office of a general." ' 

" There are powers which are acquired by vise, exercise, or 
study, which are called habits. There must be something in 
the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to 
acquire habits, and this is commonly called capacity." ^ 

Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction of power as active 
or passive. But capacity is a passive power, or natural recep- 
tivity. A faculty is a power which we are conscious we can 
direct towards an end. A capacity is rather a disposition or 
aptitude to receive certain modifications of our consciousness, 
in receiving which we are passive. But an original capacity, 
though at first passive, may be brought under the influence of 
will and attention, and when so exercised it corresponds to a 
mental power, and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensa- 
tion, we are in the first instance passive, but our capacity of 
receiving sensations may be employed in various ways under 
the direction of will and attention, or personal activity. 

CAKDII^AL (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and 
justice, were so called from cardo, a hinge ; because they were 
the hinges on which other virtues turned. Each one of them 
was a fons et principium, from which other virtues took their 
rise. 

The four cardinal virtues are rather the necessary and es- 
sential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. 
For no one can by itself be manifested as a virtue, without the 
other three.' 

This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It 
is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, 
with this diiference, that ivaiQua or regard to the Deity holds 
the place of prudence or knowledge, which, united to virtue, 

' Mouboddo, Ancient Metaphys., b. i., chap. 4. 

* Reid, Intell. Pow.^ essay i., chap. 1. 

3 Thurot, De VEntcndement, torn. i... p. 162. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 71 

CARDINAL — 

forms true Avisdom. Plato notices temperance, fortitude, and 
prudence, and in connection with or arising out of these, jus- 
tice, which he considered not as the single virtue of giving all 
their due, but as the perfection of human nature and of human 
society. The term justice had been employed in the same 
large sense ^y Pythagoras, and the corresponding term 
righteousness, is used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, 
but all the virtues. The four cardinal virtues are alluded to 
in the Apocrypha, Wisdom, viii. 7. 

The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity ; which 
being added to the cardinal, make the number seven. 

" Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads 
of the family of virtues, give us a division which fails alto- 
gether ; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not 
complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both overlap 
one another, or are undistinguishable ; and also leave parts 
of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all." ^ 

Clodius, De Virtvtibiis qiias Cardinales Appellant, 4to, 
Leips., 1815. Plethon, De Quatnor Virtutibus Cardinalibus, 
8vo, BasL, 1552. 

The cardinal or principal points of the compass are the 
North, South, East, and West. 

The cardinal numbers are one, two, three, &c., in opposition 
to the ordinal, as first, second, third, &c. 
CASUISTIIY is a department of ethics — "the great object of 
which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us how to 
act wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation." ^ 

To casuistry, as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of 
what are called cases of conscience — that is, cases in which 
we are under obligation, but which, from the special circum- 
stances attending, give rise to doubt whether or how far the 
obligation may be relaxed or dissolved — such as the obliga- 
tion to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or extorted by 
force. 

"All that philosophy of right and wrong which has be- 
come famous or infamous under the name of Casuistry, had 



' Whewell, Systemat. Mor., lect. iv. 

* Stewart, Act. Pow., b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4 



72 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CASUISTEY- 

its oi'igin in the distinction between Mortal' and "Venial 

Sin." 2 

CATALEPSY (xara^tj/^tj, catalepsy). — "The speculations of 
Berkeley and Boscovich on the non-existence of matter, and 
of Kant and others on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are 
interested in, for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions 
of cataleptics. The cataleptic apprehends or perceives directly 
the obj ects around her ; but they are the same as when real- 
ized through her senses. She notices no difference ; size, 
form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her now as be- 
fore. In respect again to the future, she sees it, but not in 
the sense of the annihilation of time ; she foresees it ; it is 
the future present to her ; time she measures, present and 
future, with strange precision — strange, yet an approsimation, 
instead of this certainty, would have been more puzzling. 

" So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, and 
the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart from 
which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to suit our 
human and temporary being, but elements of eternal ti'uth." ^ 

How far is the argument in the foregoing passage affected 
by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have sensations 
and perceptions in reference to objects which are not within 
the reach of the senses ? 

The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways : — 
First, by a reductio ad ahsurdum ; second, no single existence 
can effect any change or event, and a change or event of some 
kind there must be, in order to create those sensations or 
states of mind in which consciousness consists. There must, 
therefore, be something in existence foreign to ourselves, for 
no change, in other words, nothing which stands in the rela- 
tion of cause and effect, is conceivable, but what is the result 
of two existences acting upon each other.'* 
CATEGOREMATIC (xatj/yopfw, to predicate). — "A word is so 
called which may by itself be employed as a Term. Adverbs, 

' This subject is fully and clearly discussed by Mr. Jowett. — Epistles of St. Paul, 
vol. ii., pp. 351, 352. 
2 Camhridge Essays, 1856, p. 6. 

* Mayo, Oil Popular Superstitions, p. 125, 8vo, 3d edit., Edln., 1851. 

* See Sir Gilbert Blane on Muscular 3loiion, p. 258, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 73 

CATEGOEEMATIC- 

Propositions, &c., and also Nouns in any other ease besides 
the Nominative, are Syncategorematic, i. e., can only form part 
of a Term." ' 

CATEGOEICAL.— F. Proposition. 

CATEGORY {xatriyo^E^^, to predicate). 

" So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, 
which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions 
against the confusion of definitions and divisions.'"^ 

The categories are the highest classes to which all the objects 
of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can be 
arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy seeks to 
know all things. But it is impossible to know all things 
individually. They are, therefore, arranged in classes, accord- 
ing to properties which are common to them. And when we 
know the definition of a class, we attain to a formal knowledge 
of all the individual objects of knowledge contained in that 
class. Every individual man we cannot know ; but if we know 
the definition of man, we know the nature of man, of which 
every individual of the species participates ; and in this sense 
we may be said to know all men. This attempt to render 
knowledge in some sense universal, has been made in all ages 
of philosophy, and has given rise to the categories which have 
appeared in various forms. They are to be found in the 
philosophy of Eastern nations, as a classification of things and 
of ideas. The categories of the followers of Pythagoras have 
been preserved by Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics. 
Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal, 
and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the 
Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose 
categories are well known. They are ten in number, viz., — 
ovtjta, substance ; Ttoaov, quantity ; nolov, quality ; Ttpoj no, rela- 
tion ; Ttov, place; rtoTfs, time; xsladai,, situation; £;KfHJ, posses- 
sion, or manner of holding ; houIv, action ; and TtdaxH'V, suf- 
fering. The Mnemonic verses which contain them, are : — 

Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos 
Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus era.' 

' Whately, Log-, b. ii., ch. 1, § 3. '^ Bacon, Adv. of Learning, b. ii. 

^ A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil Mar- 

tinus Scriblerus. Calling up the coachKian, he asked him what he had seen at the 

8 



74 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CATEGOHY — 

The categories of Aristotle are both logical and metaphysical, 
and apjDly to things as well as to words. Regarded logically, 
they are reducible to two, substance and attribute. Regarded 
metaphysically, they are reducible to being and accident. The 
Stoics reduced them to four, viz., substance, quality, manner 
of being, and relation. Plotinus attempted a new system. But 
the categories of Aristotle were acquiesced in till the time of 
Bacon, who recommended observation rather than classifica- 
tion. Descartes arranged all things under two great catego' 
gies, the absolute and the relative. In the Port Royal Logic, 
seven categories are established. In more modern times the 
categories of Kant are well known. They are quantity, qual- 
ity, relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, 
and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judg- 
ments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, 
the categories have been successively a classification universal 
of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. And a 
complete theory of classification, or a complete system of cate- 
gories, is still a desideratum.' — V. Predicament, Universal. 

Sir William Hamilton,'' gives a deduction and simplification 
of the categories of Aristotle.^ 

Mr. Mill^ gives the following classification of all nameable 
things : — 

1. Feelings or state of consciousness. 

2. The minds which experience these feelings. 

3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of 
these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby 
they excite them. 

4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and un- 
likenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. 



bear-garden ? The man answered that he had seen two men fight for a prize ; one was 
a fair man, a sergeant in the Gtiards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red 
breeches, the butcher blue ; they fought upon a stage about four o'clocb, and the ser- 
geant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs 
through the predicaments — men (substantia) — two (quantitas) — fair and black (qvalitas) 
— sergeant and butcher (rdatio) — wounded the other (actio et passin)—ight\ng (situs) — 
stage (uhi) — four o'clock (qiiando)—'b\ae and red breeches (habitus). 

• Monboddo, Origin nf Lang., vol. i., p. 520, and Anc-'ent IletapJiys., b. iii., chap. 1. 

" Ilei(Vs Works, p. 687. - ' See also Discussdons, pp. 26, 27, 2d- edit. 

■• Log., I. iii., \\\t. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 75 

CAUSALITY, CATJSATIOIf, CAUSE. 
CAUSE. — 

" lie knew the cause of every maladie, 
Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie." 

Chaucer, Prologue, v. 421. 

" The general idea of cause is, that without which another 
thing called the ejfect, cannot be ; and it is divided by Aris- 
totle, ' into four kinds, known by the name of the material, the 
formal, the efficient, and the final. The first is that of which 
anything is made. Thus brass or marble are the material 
causes of a statue ; earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural 
bodies. T!:he, formal cause is the form, idea, archetype, or pat- 
tern of a thing ; for all these words Aristotle uses to express 
it. Thus the idea of the artist is the formal cause of the 
statue ; and of all natural substances, if we do not suppose 
them the work of chance, the ^ormaZ cause are the ideas of the 
Divine mind ; and this form concurring with the matter, pro- 
duces every work, whether of nature or art. The efficient 
cause is the principle of change or motion which produces the 
thing. In this sense the statuary is the cause of the statue, 
and the God of nature the cause of all the works of nature. 
And lastly, thej^«aZ cause is that for the sake of which any- 
thing is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for 
pleasure or for profit ; and the works of nature are all for 
some good end."^ • 

Aristotle^ says we may distinguish four kinds of causes. 
The first is the form proper to each thing. To ■tl yjy dvat,. 
This is the quidditas of the schoolmen, the causa formalis. 
The second is the matter and the subject. ' H vXyi xai ■fo 
vTioxd^ivov, causa materiaUs. The third is the principle of 
movement which produced the thing. 'A^x'h *^? xw^ffsuf, 
causa efficiens. The fourth is the reason and good of all 
things ; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is 
good. To ov evsxa xai -to ayaOov, causa finalis. The suflicient 
reason of Leibnitz, which he, like Aristotle, thought to be 
essentially good. 

Aristotle* says, " It is possible that one object may combine 
all the kinds of causes. Thus, in a house, the principle of 

' Metaphys., lib. v., cap. 2. ^ Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., b. i.j chap. 4. 

3 In Metaphys,, lib. i., cap. 3. ' Ibid, lib. iii., cap. 2. 



76 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSE - 

movement is the art and the workmen, the^'?mZ cause is the work, 
the matter the earth and stones, and the plan is the ybrwi." * 

In addition to these four causes. Dr. Gillies^ says, "The 
model or exemplar was considered as a cause by the Pythago- 
reans and Platonists ; the former of whom maintained that 
all pei'ceptible things were imitations of 7iumbers; and the 
latter, that they owed their existence to the participation of 
ideas; but wherein either this imitation or this participation 
consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to 
show." 

Seneca,^ explains the common and Platonic divisions of 
causes ; and arraigns both, because he conceived that space, 
time, and motion, ought to be included. 

Sir W. Hamilton^ says, " The exeonplary cause was intro- 
duced by Plato ; and was not adopted by the schoolmen as a 
fifth cause in addition to Aristotle's four." It is noticed by 
Suarez and others. 

According to Derodon,^ material and formal causes are in' 
ternal, and constitute the essence of a thing ; efficient, final, 
and exemplary causes are external, that is, out from or of 
the essence of a thing. The material cause is that, ex quo, 
anything is, or becomes. The formal cause is that, per quod. 
The efficient caiise is that, a quo. The final cause is that, 
pjwpler quod. And the exemplary cause is that, ad cvjus imi- 
tationem res jit. 

When the word cause is used without an adjective, it com- 
monly means, active power, that which produces change, or 
efficient cause. 

Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a caiise thus : — Causam 
esse principium per se injluens esse in aliud. 

Ens quod i?i se continet rationem, cur alterum existat, dicitur 
livjus causa. — Wolfius. 

"A cause is that which, of itself, makes anything begin 
tobe."« 

We conceive of a cause as existing and operating before the 
effect which is produced. But, to the production of an effect, 

' See also Nat. AuscuU, lib. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris, Concerning Art, p. 24. 
" Analysis of Aristotle's Works, chap. 2, note, p. 100. 

' Epist. 66 and 67. ' Reid's Works, p. 690, note. 

^ De PrcEdicam.,\>.lli. ^ Ivotls, Final Causes, 'p. 7 i. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 77 

CAUSE — - ■ 

more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it has been 
said by Mr. Karslake,^ " The catise of a thing is that ante- 
cedent (or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an 
intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself 
a self-determining agent, in reference to self-acting power, 
whose agency it exhibits." And some, instead of the word 
cause, would prefer in many cases to use the word concauses. 
" Though the antecedent is most stviotlj the cmise of a thing 
being, as, e. g., the passage of the moon between the earth and 
the sun is the cause of an eclipse, yet the effect is that which 
commonly presents itself to us as the cause of our Icnoioing it 
to be. Hence, by what seems to us a strange inversion of ca,use 
and effect, effect toas said to be a cause, a causa cognoscendi, 
as distinguished from a causa essendi, the strict cause."''' — V. 
Occasion. 

CAUSALITY and CAUSATION. 

" Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity move 
itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality, but 
the bare essence of the matter, from whence the motion 
comes."" 

" Now, always God's word hath a causation with it. He 
said to him. Sit, that is, he made him sit, or as it is here ex- 
pressed, he made him sit with a mighty power." * 

Causality, in actu primo, is the energy or power in the 
cause^ by which it produces its effect; as heat in the 6.re. 
Causality, in actu secundo, is causation or the operation of 
the power by which the cause is actually producing its effect. 
It is infiexus tile, a quo causa injluit esse in effectum qua; dis- 

* Aids to the. Study of Logic, vol. ii., p. 43. 
a Ibid, vol. ii., p. 38. 

' H. More, Immortality of the Soul, book i., chap. 6. 

* Goodwin, Works, vol. i., part i., p. 406. 

' The idea of the reason is not to be confounded with that of causality. It is a more 
elevated idea, because it applies to all orders of things, while causality extends only ta 
things in time. It is true we speak sometimes of the eternal cause ; but thus the idea 
of cause is synonymous with that of the reason. This idea of the rea.son expresses the 
relation of a being or thins; to what is contained within it ; in other words, the reason 
expresses the rapport du contenant au contenu, or the reason is that whose essence en- 
closes the essence and existence of another thing. We thus arrive at the conception 
of all being contained in God, who is the supremo reason. — Ahrens, Cours de Psychol., 
tom. ii. — F. RE.4S0N. 



78 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

CAUSALITY- 

tinguitur a parte ret, tarn a principio, quam a tennino, sive ah 
effedu ad quern tendit. " The changes of which I am conscious 
in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in 
the external universe, impress me with a conviction that some 
cause must have operated to produce them. There is an intui- 
tive judgment involving the simple idea of causation."'^ 

From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a cause 
is something which not only 2}recedes, but has power to produce 
the effect. And when the effect has been produced, Ave say it 
is in consequence of the power in the cause having operated. 
The belief that every exchange implies a cause, or that every 
change is produced by the operation of some power, is re- 
garded by some as a primitive belief, and has been denomi- 
nated by the phrase, \he'^ principle of causality. Hume, and 
others, however, have contended that we have no proper idea 
of cause as implying power to produce, nor of any necessary 
connection between the operation of this power and the pro- 
duction of the effect. All that we see or know is mere 
succession, antecedent and consequent ; but having seen 
things in this relation, we associate them together, and 
imagining that there is some vinculum or connection between 
them, we call the one the cause, and the other the effect. 
Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this view with the modification 
that it is in cases where the antecedence and consequence is 
invariable^ that we attain to the idea of cause. Experience, 
however, can only testify that the succession of one thing to 



*■ Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, i., chap. 3. 

' Lord Bacon (Nov. Organ., book ii., sect. 14), says, '-There are .some things ultimate 
and incausable." 

' "A cause, in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits, may be said to 
be that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in 
similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a 
similar change." — Brown, Inquiry, p. 13. 

'•Antecedency and subsequency are immaterial to the proper definition of cause and 
effect ; on the contrary, although an object, in order to act as a cause, must be in being 
antecedently to such action; yet when it acts as a cause, its effects are synchrouou3 
with that action and are included in it, which a close inspection into the nature of 
cause will prove. For effects are no more than the new qualities of newly formed 
objects. Each conjunction of bodies (now separately in existence, and of certain de- 
fined qualities), produces upon their union these new natures, whose qualities must 
necessarily be in and with them in the very moment of their formation." — Essay on 
Cause and Effect, 8to, Lond., 1824, p. 50. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 79 

CAUSALITY- 

another has, in so far as it has been observed, been unvaried, 
not that in the nature of things it is invariable. Mr. Locke ^ 
ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to our experience of 
tlie sensible changes wliich one body produces on another, as 
fire upon wax. Our belief in au external world rests partly 
on the principle of causaliiij. Our sensations are referred to 
external objects as their causes. Yet, the idea oiyjower which 
is involved in that of cause, he traces to the consciousness of 
our possessing power in ourselves. This is the view taken of 
the origin of our idea of cause by Dr. Reid.^ " In the strict 
philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the 
relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and de- 
liberate actions ; for I take this notion of a cause to be derived 
from the power I feel in myself to produce certain effects. In 
this sense we say that the Deity is the cause of the uni- 
verse." And at p. 81 he has said, " I see not how mankind 
. could ever have acquired the conception of a cause, or of any 
relation beyond a mere conjunction in time and place between 
it and its effects, if they were not conscious of active exer- 
tions in themselves, by which effects are produced. This 
seems to me to be the origin of the idea, or conception of pro- 
duction." 

By origin, however. Dr. Reid must have meant occasion. 
At least he held that the principle of casuality, or the belief 
that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a natu- 
ral judgment, or a priori conviction, necessary and universal. 
But if the idea of a cause be empirical and grounded on 
experience, it may be difficult to show how a higher origin 
can be claimed for the princijile of causality. Mr. Stewart 
has expressed himself in language equivalent to that of Dr. 
Reid. And Maine de Biran" thinks that the true origin of 
our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of the will, or 
in the consciousness that we are causes, or have in ourselves 
the power of producing change. Having found the idea of 
power Avithin the sphere of consciousness, we, by a process 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chaps. 21 and 26. 
^ Qn-respondence of Dr. Riid, p. 77. 

' NouvclUs Considerat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, 8to, Par., 
1834, pp. 27 I, 290, 363, 402. 



80 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSALITY — 

which he calls natural induction, project this idea into the 
external world, and ascribe power to that which we call cause. 
According to Kant we have the idea of cause, and also the 
belief that every commencing phenomenon implies the ope- 
ration of a cause. But these are merely forms of our under- 
standing, subjective conditions of human thought. In con- 
formity with a pre-existing law of our intelligence, we arrange 
phenomena according to the relation of cause and effect. 
But we know not whether, independently of our form of 
thought, there be any reality corresponding to our idea of 
cause, or of productive power. The view that the idea of 
cause is furnished by the fact of our being conscious of pos- 
sessing power, meets the idealism of Kant, for what greater 
reality can be conceived than a fact of consciousness ? But 
if experience of external phenomena can be accepted as the 
origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of change, and 
if consciousness of internal phenomena can be accepted as 
the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of power 
to produce change, the idea of a necessary and universal con- 
nection between change and the power which produces it, in 
other words, a belief in the principle of causality, can only be 
referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, not 
what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent and 
absolute. 

" Cousin's theory concerning the origin of idea of causality 
is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and the 
change vary in cases of personal agency (though here he is not 
very explicit) , several times repeated ; while the relation be- 
tween them, viz., the strict idea of personal causation, never 
varies, but is necessary ; that the mind abstracts the invariable 
and necessary element from the variable and contingent ele- 
ments of the fact, and thus arrives at the idea of causality." * 
" CAUSATION is not an object of sense. The only experience we 
can have of it is in the consciousness we have of exerting 
some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this 
experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general 
conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a 

' Essay on Causality, By an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 81 



beginning must have a cause. This is to be admitted as a 
first or self-evident principle." ' 

But Locke has said,^ " The idea of the beginning of motion 
we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, 
where Ave ■ find by experience, that barely hy willing it, barely 
by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies 
Avhich were before at rest." 

See Cousin.^ See also un the varioiis theories as to the ori- 
gin of our jvidgment of cavise and effect, Sir Will. Hamilton.'* 
CAUSES (Final, Doctrine of). — When we see means independ- 
ent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, we 
naturally conclude that the ends have been contemplated, and 
the means arranged by an intelligent agent ; and, from the 
nature of the ends and of the means, we infer the character 
or design of the agent. Thus, from the ends answered in 
creation being wise and good, we infer not only the existence 
of an Intelligent Creator, but also that He is a Being of infi- 
nite wisdom and goodness. This is commonly called the 
argument from design or from final causes. It was used by 
Socrates,^ and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. 
But Lord Bacon has said,^ that the inquiry uito final causes is 
sterile. And Descartes maintained that we cannot know the 
designs of God in creating the universe, unless he reveal them 
to us. But Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufiicient 
reason, upheld the doctrine o? final causes, and thought it 
equally applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true 
that in physical science Ave should prosecute our inquiries 
without any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be an- 
swered, and observe the phenomena as they occur, without 
forcing them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is 
against this error that the language of Bacon was directed. 
But when our contemplations of nature reveal to vis innumera- 
ble adjustments and arrangements Avorking out ends that are 
wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have been 
designed by a cause sovereignly wise and good. Notwithstand- 

' Keid, Intell. Pow., essay vi., chap. 6. 

* Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 21, J 4. 

3 CEuvres, Prcm. Ser., torn, i., cours 1817, and Hist, de PMlosoph. Mod., sect. 19. 

* Discussions, App. 1. ' See Xenophon, Memorabilia, 
" Pe Aug. Scient., lib. iii., cap. 5. 

G 



82 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSES — 

ing the doubts as to the logical validity of this argument, 
■which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, and others, it 
continues to be regarded as the most popular and impressive 
mode of proving the being and perfections of God. And the 
validity of it is implied in the universally admitted axiom of 
modern physiology, that there is no organ without its function. 
We say of some things in nature that they are useless. All 
v^^e can truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. 
Everything has an end, to the attainment or accomplishment 
of which it continually tends. This is the form in which the 
doctrine oi final causes was advocated by Aristotle. With 
him it was not so much an argument from design, as an argu- 
ment against chance. But if things do not attain their ends 
by chance it must be by design. Aristotle, it is true, was 
satisfied that ends were answered by tendencies in nature. 
But whence or why these tendencies in nature, but from an 
Intelligent Author of nature ? 

"If we are to judge from the explanations of the principle 
given by Aristotle, the notion of a final cause, as originally 
conceived, did not necessarily imply design. The theological 
sense to which it is now commonly restricted, has been derived 
from the place assigned to it in the scholastic philosophy ; 
though, indeed, the principle had been long before beautifully 
applied by Socrates and by the Stoics to establish the truth of 
a Divine Providence. Whenever, indeed, we observe the 
adjustment of means to an end, we seem irresistibly impelled 
to conclude that the whole is the eiFect of design. The pre- 
sent acceptation, therefore, of the doctrine of final causes, is 
undoubtedly a natural one. Still it is not a necessary con- 
struction of the doctrine. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is 
simply an inquiry into tendencies — an investigation of any 
object or phenomenon, from considering the tpsxa ■tov, the 
reason of it, in something else which follows it, and to which 
it naturally leads. 

"His theory of filial causes is immediately opposed to a 
doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence ; and must be 
regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive asser- 
tion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, between 
thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the same working 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 83 

CATJSES — 

in order to ends, which is commonly regarded as the attribute 
of thought alone. He insisted that there is no reason to 
suppose deliberation necessary in these workings of nature, 
since it is ' as if the art of shipbuilding were in the timber, or 
just as if a person should act as his own physician.'" ' 

"The argument fvom. Jinal causes," says Dr. Reid,^ "when 
reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises: — First, that 
design and intelligence in the cause may, with certainty, be 
inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect. This we may 
call the major proposition of the argument. The second, 
which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact 
the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of 
nature ; and the conclusion is, that the works of fiature are 
the effects of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either 
assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises. '^ 

Hampden, Introcl. to Mor. Phil.;^ Irons, Doctrine of Final 
Causes, 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argument from design is pro- 
secuted by Paley, in Nat. Theol. ; in Bridgewater Treatises ; 
Burnett Prize Essays, &c. 
CAUSES (Occasional, Boctrine of). — This phrase has been em- 
ployed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of 
conimimicating between mind and matter. The soul being a 
thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, 
no intercourse can take place between them- without the inter- 
vention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, therefore, 
who, on the occasion of certain modifications in our minds, 
excites the corresponding movements of body ; and, on the 
occasion of certain changes in our body, awakens the corre- 
sponding feelings in the mind. This theory, which is involved 
in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Male- 
branche, Regis, and Geulinx. Laforge limited the theory to 
involuntary movements, and thus reconciled it in some degree 
to experience and common sense. Malebranche's doctrine is 
commonly called the " vision of all things in God" — who is 
the "light ot all our seeing." 

According to this theory, the admirable structure of the 

' Hampden, Introd. to Mor. Phil., lect. iv,, p. 113, 
* Intdl. Pow., essay yi., chap. 6. 
« Pp. 110-113. 



84 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSES — 

body and its organs is useless ; as a dull mass would have 
answered the purpose equally well. 

CEETAINTY, CEHTITUBE {Certum (from cerno), propria 
idem sit, quod decretum ac proinde firmum. Vossius). 

" This way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas, 
goes a little farther than bare imagination ; and I believe it 
will appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has, 
lies in nothing else." ' 

"Certain, in its primary sense, is applied (according to its 
etymology, from cerno), to the state of a person's mind ; de- 
noting any one's full and complete conviction ; and generally, 
though not always, implying that there is sufficient ground for 
such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymic- 
ally to the truths or events, respecting which this conviction is 
rationally entertained. And uncertain (as well as the sub- 
stantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives) follows 
the same rule. Thus we say, 'It is certain,' &c., meaning 
that we are sure ; whereas the fact may be uncertain and cer- 
tain to different individuals. From not attending to this, the 
words uncertain and contingent have been considered as denot- 
ing some quality in the things themselves — and chance has 
been regarded as a real agent." ^ 

"Certainty is truth brought methodically to the human 
intellect, that is, conducted from j^rinciple to principle, to a 
point which is evident in itself. It is the" relation of truth to 
knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology." ^ 

"In accurate reasoning, the word certain ought never to be 
used as merely synonymous with necessary. Physical events 
we call necessary, because of their depending oujixed causes, 
not on A;noi«» causes; when they depend also on Icnown causes, 
they may be called certaiii. The variations of the weather 
arise from necessary and Jixed causes, but they are proverbially 
uncertain."* 

When we affirm, without anj' doubt, the existence or non- 
existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or falsity of a 
proposition, the state in which our mind is we call certainty — 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iii., chap. 4. 

^ Whately, Log., Appendix 3. ^ Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hii'm,., p. 35. 

' Coplestone, Remains, Svo, Lond., 1854, p. 98. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 85 

CERTAINTY - 

and we say of the object of knowledge that it is evident or 
certain. Accoi'ding to the mode in which it is attained, 
certainty is immediate by sense and intuition, and mediate by 
reasoning and demonstration. According to the grounds on 
which it rests, it is called metapJu/sical, when we firmly adhere 
to truth which cannot be otherwise ; such as the first principles 
of natural law, or the difi'erence between right and wrong. 
Physical, when we adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise, 
according to the laws of nature, but which may be by miracle ; 
as, fire will certainly burn — although it did not burn the 
Hebrew youths (Dan., chap, iii.) Moral, when we adhere to 
truth which is in accordance with the common order of things, 
and the common judgment of men — although it may be other- 
wise without a miracle. 

Moral certainty may amount to the highest degree o? proha- 
hility, and to all practical purposes may be as influential as 
certainty. For it should be observed that probability and 
certainty are two states of mind, and not two modes of the 
reality. The reality is one and the same, but our knowledge 
of it may be probable or certain. Probability has more or 
less of doubt, and admits of degrees. Certainty excludes 
doubt, and admits neither of increase nor diminution. 

Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to know, 
and the result of a communication or relation being established 
between them which is knowledge ; and certain knowledge or 
certainty is the confidence with which the mind reposes in the 
information of its faculties. Self-consciousness reveals with 
certainty the difi'erent states and operations of our own minds. 
The operations of memory may give us certainty as to the 
past. We cannot doubt the reality of what our senses clearlj' 
testify. Reason reveals to us first truths with intuitive cer- 
tainty. And by demonstration we ascend with certainty from 
one truth to another. For to use the words of Thomas Aqui- 
nas,' " Tunc conclusiones pro cerio sciuntur, quando resolvuntiir 
in principia, et ideo, quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur, est 
ex lumine rationis divinitus interi%is indito, quo in nobis loquitur 
Deus, non autem ab Jiomine exterius docente, nisi quatenus con- 

' De Veritate. 



86 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CERTAINTY — 

cliisiones in principia resoJvit, nos docens, ex quo tamen nos cer- 
titudinem non acciperemus, nisi in nobis esset certHudo princi' 
piof'um in quce conclusiones resolvuntur." 

" The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for 
anywhere abroad without our own minds, neither in the 
height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our know- 
ledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all 
theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and 
whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth ; but 
that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be 
clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non- 
entity, and a clear conception is an entity ; and Omnipotence 
itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity." ^ 

" The theories of certitude may be reduced to three classes. 
The_j^?-s^ places the ground of certitude in reason; the second 
in authority ; the third in evidence; including, under that term, 
both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal 
principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in 
forming our judgments in regard to tliem."^ 

" De veritatis criterio /7-ustra laborantur qiiidam : quum non 
clia reperienda sit prceter ipsam rationis facultatem, aid menti 
congenitam intelligendi vim."^ 

Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes and 
the modern sensationalists, have made sense the measure and 
ground of certainty. Descartes and his followers founded it 
on self-consciousness, Gogito ergo sum; while others have 
received as certain only what is homologated by human reason 
in general. But certainty is not the peculiar characteristic of 
knowledge furnished by any one faculty, but is the common 
inheritance of any or all of our intellectual faculties when 
legitimately exercised within their respective spheres. When 
so exercised we cannot but accept the result as true and 
certain. 

But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined to 
accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that know- 
ledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be absolute, 

' Cudworth, Eternal and ItnmitiabU Mor., book iv, chap. 5, 
* Buchanan, Faith in God, Tol. ii., p. 304. 
' HutchesoD, MelaphyS; pars i., cap. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 87 

CEETAINTY- 

or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as they must 
appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely relative, or a 
knowledge of things as they appear to us. Now, it is true 
that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it, objectify the sub- 
jective. Without rising out of human nature to the possession 
of a higher, we cannot sit in judgment on the faculties of that 
nature. But in admitting that our knowledge is relative, we 
are merely saying it is human. It is according to the measure 
of a man. It is attained by human faculties, and must be 
relative, or bear proportion to the faculties by which it is 
attained. In like manner, the knowledge of angels may be 
called angelic, but this is not to call it uncertain. We may 
not know all that can be known of the objects of our know- 
ledge, but still, what we do know, we may know with cer- 
tainty. Human knowledge may admit of increase without 
being liable to be contradicted or overturned. We come to it 
by degrees, but the higher degree of knowledge to which we 
may ultimately attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of 
knowledge. It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground 
and encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and 
reality in things, wtich our faculties are fitted to apprehend. 
Their testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trust- 
worthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an after- 
thought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. He 
who doubts is certain that he doubts. Oinnis qui utnim sit 
Veritas dubitat, in se ipso habet verum, unde non dubitet} 

Etiam qui negat veritatem esse ; concedit veritatem esse ; si 
enim Veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse. Thomas 
Aquin., Sum. Theol. ; Savary, Sur la Certitude, 8vo, Paris, 
1847, — V. Evidence, Criterion, Knowledge. 
CHASTCE. — Aristotle'^ says, "According to some, chance is a 
cause not manifest to human reasoning." Aoxtt fxiv aitla. tj 

" Many things happen, besides what man intends or pur- 
poses ; and also some things happen different fror- what is 
aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, or 
from nature, neither can we say that they are from human 

' Augustin, De vera Religiom. ^ Phys., ii., 4. 



»8 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAl^CE- 

intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, and the 
cause which produces them is called chance. But they have 
all respect to some end intended by nature or by man. So 
that nothing can be more true than what Aristotle' says, that 
if there M'^re no end intended, there could be no chance. 

"A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it ; but, in 
digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his intention, and 
therefore it is said to be by chance. 

" When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and crushes 
him, the destination of nature was only, that the stones of the 
wall being no longer kept together by the cement, should fall 
to the ground, according to their natural movement ; so that 
the crushing of the man was something beside the purpose of 
nature, or rtapa ^volv."'^ 

As to Aristotle's views o^ fortune and chance, see Piccolo- 
mineus.^ 

Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what hap- 
pens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. But 
everything has its own law and its proper cause ; and chance 
merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, nor the 
law according to which a phenomenoii occurs. 

An event or series of events which seems to be the result 
neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of 
a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by chance. 

" It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, 
that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence 
of God ; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature 
and reason, that there is no such thing as chance or acci- 
dent ; it being evident that these words do not signify any- 
thing that is truly an agent or the cause of any event; but 
they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and imme- 
diate cause." ^ 

" If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon chance what 
side may turn up ; and, if we draw a prize in a lottery, we as- 
cribe our success to chance. We do not, however, mean that 

' Phys., lib. ii. 

'^ Monboduo, Ancient Meiaphys., book ii., chap. 20. 

^ Philosoph. de Morihiis, 1583, p. 713. 

* Clarke, vol. i., Sermon xcviii. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 89 

CHAIfCE- 

these eifects were produced by no cause, but only that we are 
ignorant of the cause that produced them." ' 

In what sense we may say there is such a thing as chance, 
and in what sense not, see M'Cosh,^ and Mill, Log? 
CHANCES (Theory of). — "The theory of chances consists in re- 
ducing all events of the same kind to a certain number of cases 
equally possible, that is, such that we are equalhj undecided as 
to their existence ; and in determining the number of these 
cases which are favourable to the event of which the proba- 
bility is sought. The ratio of that number to the number of 
all the possible cases, is the measure of the probability ; which 
is thus a fraction, having for its numerator the number of 
cases favourable to the event, and for its denominator the 
number of all the cases which are possible."'* 
CHARITY [aydjiri), as one of the theological virtues, is a princi- 
ple of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his glory and 
the good of our fellow-men. 

Sometimes it is used as synonymous with brotherly love, or 
that principle of benevolence which leads us to promote, in 
all possible ways, the happiness of others. 

In a more restricted sense it means almsgiving, or relieving 
the wants of others by communication of our means and sub- 
stance. 
CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appetite 
of sex. It includes purity of thought, speech, and behaviour. 
Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversation, as well as 
incontinent conduct, are contrary to the duty of chastity. 
CHOICE. 

" The necessity of continually choosing one of the two, either 
to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with or an argu- 
ment against liberty, but is itself the very essence of liberty." * 

"For the principle of deliberate choice, Aristotle thought 
that the rational and irrational should concur, producing 
" orectic intellect," or "dianoetic appetite," of which he em- 
phatically says, — "And this principle is man."^ 

Mr. Locke says, " The will signifies nothing but a power or 

* Arthur, Discourses, p. 17. " Typical Forms, p. 40. 
' B. iii., chap. 17. 

* Laplace, Essai Phil, sur les Prohabilitcs, 5th edit., p. 7. 

5 Clarke, Demonstraiion, prop. 10. e Catholic Philosophy/, p. 46. 

9* 



90 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

CHOICE — 

ability io prefer or choose.^' And in another passage he says, 
" The -wordi preferring seems best to express the act of volition ; 
yet it does not precisely, for though a man would prefer flying 
to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?" — By Jonathan 
Edwards,' choice and volition are completely identified. But, 
in popular language, clioosing ov preferring may mean — 1. A 
conclusion of the understanding ; as when I say — I prefer or 
choose peaches rather than plums ; i. e., I reckon them a bet- 
ter and safer fruit. 

2. A state of inclination or sensibility ; as, I prefer or choose 
plums rather than pears ; that is, I like them better ; or — 

3. A determination of will ; as, I prefer or choose pears, 
meaning that, with the offer of other fruits, I take this. 

It is only in the latter sense that choice and volition are the 
same.'^ 

"Choice or preference^ in the proper sense, is an act of the 
understanding ; but sometimes it is improperly put for volition, 
or the determination of the will in things where there is no 
judgment or preference; thus, a man who owes me a shilling, 
lays down three or four equally good, and bids me take which 
I choose. I take one without any judgment or belief that 
there is any ground of preference ; this is merely an act of 
will, that is, a volition."' 

" To prefer is an act of the judgment ; and to choose is an 
act of the will. The one describes intellectual, and the other 
practical decision."* 
CHREMATISTICS (arp'j^a, goods), is the science of wealth, or 
as it is more commonly called. Political Economy, or that de- 
partment of social science which treats of the resources of a 
country, and of the best means of increasing them, and of 
diffusing them most beneficially among the inhabitants, re- 
garded ^s individuals, or as constituting a community. 
CIVILITY or COURTEOUSNESS belongs to what have been 
called the lesser moralities. It springs from benevolence or 
brotherly love, and manifests itself by kindness and consider- 
ation in manner and conversation towards others. It is distin- 

• Essay on Freedom of Will, sect. 1. 

* See Tappan, Appeal to Consciousness, ch. 3, sect. 4, 5. 

^ Correspondence of Dr. Reid. p. 79. ^ Taylor. Synonyms. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 91 

CIVILITY— 

guished into iiatural and conventional. It is opposed to rude- 
ness. Dr. Ferguson says civility avoids giving offence by our 
conversation or manner. Politeness seeks to please.' 
CLASSIFICATION (x?i^5tj, classis, from xa%su, to call, a multi- 
tude called together). 

" Montesquieu observed very justly, that in their classifica- 
tion of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity made the 
greatest display of their powers, and even soared above them- 
selves."^ 

"A class consists of several things coming under a common 
description." 3 

" The sorting of a multitude of things into parcels, for the 
sake of knovring them better, and remembering them more 
easily, is classification. When we attempt to classify a multi- 
tude of things, we first observe some respects in which they 
differ from each other ; for we could not classify things that 
are entirely alike ; as, for instance, a bushel of peas ; we then 
separate things that are not alike, and bring together things 
that are similar."^ 

" In every act of classification, two steps must be taken ; 
certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to 
be the^ title to admission into the class, and then all the objects 
that possess them are to be ascertained. When the marks 
selected are really important and connected closely with the 
nature and functions of the thing, the classification is said to 
be natural ; where they are such as do not affect the nature 
of the objects materially, and belong in common to things the 
most different in their main properties, it is artificial." ® 

The condition common to both modes of classification, is to 
comprehend everything and to suppose nothing. But the rules 
for a natural classification are more strict than for an artificial 

* Knox, Essays, No. 95. ^ Burke, On the. French Revolution. 

3 Whately, Log., b. i., § 3. ■• Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

' Abstraction, generalization, and definition, precede classification ; for if we wish to 
reduce to regularitj' the observations we have made, we must compare them, in order 
to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with all possi- 
ble precision. We might classify a library by dividing the books into history and philo- 
sophy. History into ancient and modern; ancient, according to the people to whom it 
referred, and modern into general, particular, and individual, or memoirs. These divi- 
BioDS and subdivisions might be called a classification. 

^ Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2d edit., p. 37T. 



92 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CLASSIFICATIOIf — 

or arbitrary one. We may classify objects arbitrarily in any 
point of view in which we are pleased to regard them. But a 
natural classification can only proceed according to the real 
nature and qualities of the objects. The advantages of cZassi- 
fication are to give a convenient form to our acquirements, 
and to enlarge our knowledge of the relations in which differ- 
ent objects stand to one another. A good classification should 
— 1st, Rest on one principle or analogous principles. 2d, The 
pi-inciple or principles should be of a constant and permanent 
character. 3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artifi- 
cial, it should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly 
and easily apply to all the objects classified. 

The principles on which classification rests are these : — 1st, 
of OeneraUzation ; 2d, of Specification ; and 3d, of Continuity, 
— q. V. 

Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. Gene- 
ralization rests upon the principle, that the same or similar 
causes will produce similar effects.' 
COGNITION {cognosco, to know). — According to Kant, cognition 
[Erkenntniss) is the determined reference of certain repre- 
sentations to an object, that is, that object in the conception 
whereof the diverse of a given intuition is united. Erkennt- 
niss vermogen is the cognition faculty, or the faculty of cog- 
nition. To cognize, is to refer a perception to an object by 
means of a conception. For cognizing, understanding is 
required. A dog knows his master, but he does not cognize 
him. 

Representing something to one's self [vorstellen] is the first 
degree oi cognition; representing to one's self with consciousness 
[wahrneJimen], or perceiving, is the second ; knowing [kenn'en) 
something, or representing to one's self something in comparison 
with other things, as well in respect of identity as difference, is 
the third ; cognizing [erkennen] or knowing something with 
consciousness, the fourth ; understanding [verstanden] cogniz- 
, ing through the understanding by means of the conceptions, or 
conceiving something, the fifth ; cognizing something through 
reason or perspecting [einseJien), the sixth ; and comprehending 
something [hegriefen), that is, cognizing it through reason a, 

' Mill, Log., b. i., chap. 7, § 4 ; M'Cosh, Typical Forms, b. iii., chap. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 93 

COGNITION — 

priori in a degree sufficient for our purpose, the seventh. For 
all our comprehending is only relative, that is, sufficient for a 
certain purpose ; absolateJy we do not comprehend anything.' 

COLLIGATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase employed 
by Dr. Whewell to denote the binding together groups of 
facts by means of some suitable conception. The conception 
must be capable of explanation or definition, not indeed of 
adequate definition, since we shall have to alter our description 
of it from time to time with the advance of knowledge, but 

still capable of a precise and clear explanation 

Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the 
colligation of facts, and may guide us in researches which shall 

end in a more exact colligation As soon as facts 

occur which a conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it 
or replace it by a new one.^ 

COMBIHATIOM and CONNECTIOH of IBEAS are phrases to 
be found in Locke's Essay, ^ in Avhich he treats of what is more 
commonly called Association of Ideas, — q. v. 

COMBINATIOM OF IDEAS. —The phrase Association of Ideas 
seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the 
title to one of the chapters in his Essay on the Human Under- 
standing. But in the body of the chapter he uses the phrase 
combination of ideas. These two phrases have reference to 
the two views which may be taken of the train of thought in 
the mind. In both, under ideas are comprehended all the 
various modes of consciousness. In treating of the association 
of ideas, the inquiry is as to the laws which regulate the suc- 
cession or order according to which one thought follows an- 
other. But, it has been observed, that the various modes of 
consciousness not only succeed in some kind of order, but that 
thej'' incorporate themselves with one another so as to form 
permanent and almost indissoluble combinations. 

"When many impressions or ideas are operating in the 
mind together, there sometimes takes place a process, of a 
similar kind to chemical combination. When impressions 
have been so often experienced in conjunction, that each 

' Haywood, Orit. of Pure Reason, p. 593, ^d edit. 

^ Thomson, Outline nf Laivs of Thought, 2d edit., p. 353, 

^ la book ii., chap. 33. 



94 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



of them calls up readily and instantaneously the ideas of 
the whole group, these ideas sometimes melt and coalesce 
into one another, and appear not several ideas, but one ; 
in the same manner as when the seven prismatic colours 
are presented to the eye in rapid succession, the sensation 
produced is that of white. But, as in this last case, it is cor- 
rect to say, that the seven colours, when they rapidly follow 
one another, generate white, but not that they actually are 
white ; so it appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed by 
the blending together of several simple ones, should, when it 
really appears simple (that is, when the separate elements are 
not consciously distinguishable in it), be said to result from, 
or to be generated by, the simple ideas, not to consist of them. 
Our idea of an orange really consists of the simple ideas of a 
certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste, and smell, &c., 
because we can by interrogating our consciousness, perceive 
all these elements in the idea. But we cannot conceive, in so 
apparently simple a feeling as our perception of the shape of 
an object by the eye, all that multitude of ideas derived from 
other senses, without which, it is well ascertained, that no such 
visual perception would ever have had existence ; nor in our 
idea of extension can we discover these elementary ideas of 
resistance derived from our muscular frame, in which Dr. 
Brown has shown it to be highly probable that the idea origi- 
nates. These, therefore, are cases of mental chemistry, in 
which it is proper to say that the simple ideas generate, rather 
than that they compose the complex ones." ' 

Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a 
fruit knife ; a connection comes to be established in our minds 
between an apple and a fruit knife ; so that when the idea of 
the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear; and 
these two ideas are said to be associated in the way of com- 
hination. 

Or, the same kind of connection may be established between 
two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between 
a feeling and a volition, — between any two or more mental 
movements. 

' Mill, Log., b. vi., ch. 4, § 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 95 

COMBI^ATIOIT — 

In cutting an apple, we may have wounded our finger ; and, 
afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or feeling 
of the wound. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards 
suiFered pain; and, when honey is again presented, there will 
be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it. 

The association, which thus takes place between different 
mental movements, is more than mere juxtaposition of separate 
things. It amounts to a perfect conihinaiion or fusion. And, 
as in matter, compounds have properties which are not mani- 
fested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, 
so it is in mind ; the result of various thoughts and feelings 
being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new princi- 
ple, with properties differing from the separate influence of 
each individual thought and feeling. In this way, many 
secondary unA factitious principles of action are formed. 
COMMON SEUSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree of 
intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common to all 
men. 

" There is a certain degree of sense which is necessary to 
our being subjects of law and government, capable of manag- 
ing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct to others. 
This is called common sense, because it is common to all men 
with whom we can transact business. 

" The same degree of understanding which makes a man 
capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him 
capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters 
that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends." ' 

"It is by the help of an innate power of distipction that we 
recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power 
of composition that we recognize their identities. These 
powers, in some degree, are common to all minds ; and as 
they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which is, of neces- 
sity, either affirmative or negative), they may be said to con- 
stitute what we call common sense." ^ 

COMMON SENSE (The Philosophy of ) is that philosophy which 
accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy within 

* Reid, Intell. Pow., essay Ti., ch. 2. 

* Harris. Philosoph. Arrange., chap. 9. 



96 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

COMMON SENSE— 

their resjoectlve spheres, and rests all human knowledge on 
certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the consti- 
tutive elements or fundamental forms of our rational nature, 
and the regulating principles of our conduct. 

"As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make 
some general distinctions of sound ; and, in like manner, every 
eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use 
of these faculties, by being diffused through all individuals, 
may be called common hearing and common vision, as opposed 
to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists ; so 
fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths or uni- 
versals of so obvious a kind, that eveiy mind or intellect not 
absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly 
fail to recognize them. The recognition of these, or at least 
the ability to recognize them, is called rovj seotvoj, common 
sense, as being a sense common to all except lunatics and 
idiots. 

"Fui'ther, as this power is called xoLvbi vov^, so the several 
propositions which are its proper objects, are called rtpo7i^4-stj, 
or pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. 
It is easy to gather from what has been said that those 
Tipo'Kri'^sii must be general, as being formed by induction; as 
also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all 
insti'uction — hence, therefore, their definition. A pre-con- 
ception is the natural apprehension of what is general or 
universal." ' 

A fundamental maxim of the Stoics was, that there is no- 
thing in the intellect which has not first been in the sense. 
They admitted, however, natural notions, which they called 
anticipations, and artificial notions formed in us by the under- 
standing. They also recognized notions which all men equally 
receive and understand. These cannot be opposed to one 
another ; they form what is called common sense.^ 

"A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by pro- 
gressive argumentation, but by an instinctive and instantaneous 
impulse ; derived neither from education nor from habit, but 
from nature ; acting independently upon our will, whenever 

' Harris, On Happiness, p. 46. 

'^ BouTier, Sist. dc la fJdlosovli., torn, i., p. 149, 8vo, Paris, 1844. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 97 

COMMON SENSE - 

the object is presented, according to an established law; and, 
therefore, not improperly called a sense, and acting in the 
same manner upon all mankind ; and, therefore, properly 
called common sense, the ultimate judge of truth.'" 

"Common sense," says Mons. Jaques,^ "is the unanimous 
sentiment of the whole human race, upon facts and questions 
which all may know and resolve — or, more precisely, it is the 
ensemble (complement) of notions and opinions common to all 
men of all times and places, learned or ignorant, barbarous or 
civilized. Spontaneity, impersonality, and universality, arc 
the characteristics of truths of common sense; and hence 
their truth and certainty. The moral law, human liberty, the 
existence of God, and immortality of the soul, are truths of 
common sense." 

On the nature and validity of the common sense philosophy, 
see Reid's Works by Sir W. Hamilton;^ Oswald, Appeal to 
Common Sense; Beattie, Essay on Trutli, &c. 

COMMON.— F. Term. 

COMPACT {compingo, to bind close), is that by which or to which 
men bind or oblige themselves. It is a mutual agreement 
between two or more persons to do or to refrain from doing 
something. — V. Pact, Contract. 

COMPARISON is the act of carrying the mind from one object 
to another, in order to discover some relation subsisting 
between them. It is a voluntary operation of the mind, and 
thus differs from the perception or intuition of relations, which 
does not always depend upon the will. The result r^ compari- 
son is knowledge, which the intellect apprehends, but the act 
is an exercise of attention voluntarily directing the energy of 
the mind to a class of objects or ideas. The theorems of ma- 
thematics are a series of judgments arrived at by comparison, 
or viewing different quantities and numbers in their relations. 
The result of comparison is a judgment. 

COMPASSION.— F. Sympathy." 

COMPLEX. — " That which consists- of several different things, so 
put together as to form a whole, is called complex. Complex 

' Beattie. Essay on Truth, pp. 36-42. 

^ Mem. de VAcadem., Roy. des Sciences Mor. et Pol., torn, i., p. 349, Paris, 1841. 

!* Appendix, note a. 

10 H 



98 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

COMPLEX - 

things are the subjects of analysis. The analysis of complex 
notions is one of the first and most important esei'cises of the 
understanding." ' 

COMPREHEK'SIOK' means the act of comprehending or fully 
understanding any object or idea. — V. Apprehension. For 
the sense in which it is used by the logicians, Y. Extension. 

COMPUIi'CTIOK' [compungo, to prick or sting), is the pricking 
or uneasy feeling of the conscience on account of something 
wrong being done. "All men are subject more or less to 
compunctions of conscience." — Blair. 

"Stop up th' access and passage to remorse; 
That no compunctious Tisitings of nature 
Shake my fell pxirpose." — 3Iacheth. 

COHCEIVIIfG and APPREHEHDIHG, or UHDEESTAND- 

lUG. — Dr. Reid begins his essay on Conception by saying, 
" Conceiving, imagining, appi'ehending, and understanding, 
having a notion of a thing, are common words vised to express 
that operation of the understanding which the logicians call 
simple apprehension." 

In reference to this it has been remarked by Mr. Mansel,^ 
that ^'conception must be distinguished as well from mere 
imagination, as from a mere understanding of the meaning 
of words." Combinations of attributes logically impossible, 
may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible. There 
is no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase 
bilinear figure, or iron-gold. The language is intelligible, 
though the object is inconceivable. On the other hand, 
though all conception imjalies imagination, yet all imagination 
does not imply conception. To have a conception of a horse, 
I must not only know the meaning of the several attributes 
constituting the definition of the animal, but I must also be 
able to combine these attributes in a representative image, 
that is, to individualize them. This, however, is not mere 
imagination, it is imagination relatively to a concept. I not 
only see, as it were, the image with the mind's eye, but I also 
think of it as a horse, as possessing the attributes of a given 

» Taylor, Elements of Thought. ^ Prolegom. Log., p. 24. 

^ These have been confounded by Aldrich, and Reid, and others. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 99 

coif CEIVIHG — 

concept, aud called by the name expressive of them. But 
mere imagination is possible without any such relation. My 
mind may recall a sensible impression on whose constituent 
features I have never reflected, and relatively to which I have 
never formed a concept or applied a name. Imagination 
would be possible in a being without any power of distin- 
guishing or comparing his presentations ; it is compatible with 
our ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of any presen- 
tations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, 
in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinc- 
tion of this from that. Conception proper thus holds an inter- 
mediate place between the intuitive and symbolical knowledge 
of Leibnitz, being a verification of the latter by reference to 
the former." 

" The words conception, concept, notion, should be limited to 
the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, 
as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leibnitzians 
call this symbolical, in contrast to intuitive knowledge. This 
is the sense in which conceptio and conceptns have been usu- 
ally and correctly employed."^ — V. Knowledge. 
CONCEPT, A, " is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, 
and representing a possible object of intuition."* 

It was used, or conceit as synonymous with it, by the older 
English writers.' 

Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word idea to 
denote the absolute products of the reason, and intuition to 
denote the particular notions which we derive from tue senses, 
have applied the word concept {begriff) to notions which are 
general without being absolute. They say they are of three 
kinds, — 1. Pure concepts, which borrow nothing from experi- 
ence ; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 2. Empirical 
concepts, which are altogether derived from experience ; as the 
notion of colour or pleasure. 3. Mixed concepts, composed of 
elements furnished partly by experience, and partly by the 
pure understanding.* 

« Sir W. Hamilton, Rdd's Works, p. 360, note. '^ Maiisel, Prolegom. Log., p. 60. 

* See Eaynes, Essay on Analytic of Log. Forms, 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 6, 6 ; Sir W. Ham- 
ilton, Reid's WorJcs, p. 393. 

* See Schmid, Bictionnaire XMur servir aux ecrits de Kant. 12mo, Jena, 1798, 



100 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEPT- 

A concept is clear, when its object, as a whole, can be dis- 
tinguished from any other ; it is distinct, when its several con- 
stituent parts can be distinguished from each other. The 
merit of first pointing out these characteristics of the logical 
perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz. ^ 
CONCEPT, CONCEPTION [conceptus, conceptio = to notio or 
notion). — "Conception consists in a conscious act of the under- 
standing, bringing any given object or impression into the 
same class with any number of other objects or impressions, 
by means of some character or characters common to them all. 
Concipiimis, id est, capirmis hoc cum illo — we take hold of 
both at once, we comprehend a thing, when we have learnt to 
comprise it in a known class." ^ 

"Conception is the forming or bringing an image or idea 
into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distftiguished 
from sensation and perception, produced by an object present 
to the senses ; and from irnagination, which is the joining to- 
gether of ideas in new ways ; it is distinguished from memory, 
by not having the feeling of past time connected with the 
idea."^ 

According to Mr. Stewart,^ conception is " that faculty, the 
business of which is to present us with an exact transcript of 
what we have felt or perceived," or that faculty, whose pro- 
vince it is " to enable us to form a notion of our past sensa- 
tions or of the objects of sense which we have formerly per- 
ceived." But what Mr. Stewart would thus assign to the faculty 
of conception belongs to imagi7iation in its reproductive func- 
tion. Hence Sir Will. Hamilton has said,^ " Mr. Stewart has be- 
stowed on the rejaroductive imagination the term conception , 
happily, we do not think ; as, both in grammatical propriety and 
by the older and corrector usage of philosophers, this term (or 
rather the product of this operation, concept) is convertible with 
general notion, or more correctly, notion simply, and in this sense 

' See Meditationts de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. 
^ Coleridge, C^iurch and State, Prelim. Rem., p. 4, 
^ Taylor, Elements of Thought. 
* Elements, vol. i., chap. 3. 
' Discussions, p. 276. 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. . 101 

CONCEPTION — 

is admirably rendered by the htgriff (Avhich is, grasped up) 
of the Germans." 

According to Kant, cognition by conception {hegriff) is a 
mode of cognizing an object, when I have not the same imme- 
diately before me. If I see a tree before me, its immediate 
representation strikes upon the senses, and I have an intuition 
of it ; but if I represent to myself the tree by means of certain 
characteristics, which I seek for in the intuition of it, as, for 
example, the trunk, branches, and leaves, these characteristics 
are termed signs, and the complex of them is termed the 
content of the conception, and aifords a mediate representation 
of the tree. The difference between pure and empirical con- 
ceptions does not concern the origin of either in time, or the 
mode whereby we come to the consciousness thereof, but the 
origin of the same, from the source and content. Hence au 
empirical conception is that which does not only arise by occa- 
sion of experience, but to which experience also furnishes the 
matter. A pure conception is that with which no sensation is 
mixed up. The conception of cause is a pure conception of 
this kind, since I have no sensible object which I would tei-m 
Cause.' 
CONCEPTION .and IMAGINATION.—" Properly and strictly 
to conceive is an act more purely intellectual than imagining, 
proceeding from a faculty superior to those of sense and fancy, 
or imagination, which are limited to corporeal things, and 
those determined, as all particulars must be, to this or that, 
place, time, manner, &c. When as that higher power in man, 
which we may call the mind, can form apprehensions of what 
is not material (viz., of spirits and the affections of bodies 
which fall not under sense), and also can frame general ideas 
or notions, or consider of things in a general way without 
attending to their particular limited circumstances, as when 
we think of length in a road, without observing its determin- 
ate measure." - 

"It is one thing to imagine and another thing to conceive. 
For do we conceive anything more clearly than our thought 

' Haywood, Grit, of Pure Reaso7i, p. 594 ; Bayn«s, Essay on Analyt. of Log. Forms, 
pp. 5, 6. 
* OldCeld, Essay on Reason, p. 11. 
10* 



102 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

CONCEPTION- 

when we think ? And yet it is impossible to imagine a thought, 
or to paint any image of it in the brain." ' 

" The distinction between conception and imagination is real, 
though it be too often oyerlooked and the words taken to be 
synonymous. I can conceive a thing that is impossible, but I 
cannot distinctly imagine a thing that is impossible. I can 
conceive a proposition or a demonstration, but I cannot imagine 
either. I can conceive understanding and will, virtue and vice, 
and other attributes of mind, but I cannot imagine them. In 
like manner, I can distinctly conceive universals, but I cannot 
imagine them."'' 

Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, conception 
with objects of thought. The things which we imagine are 
represented to the mind as individuals, as some particular 
man, or some particular horse. The things of which we con- 
ceive are such as may be denoted by general terms, as man, 
horse. 

" The notions" (or conceptions) which the "mind forms from 
things oifered to it, are either of single objects, as of 'this 
pain, that man, Westminster Abbey;' or of many objects 
taken together, as ' pain, man, abbey.' " Notions of single 
objects are called intuitions, as being such as the mind receives 
when it simply attends to or inspects [intuetiir) the object. 
Notions formed from several objects are called conceptions, as 
being formed by the power which the mind has of taking 
things together [concipere, i. e., capere hoc cum illo). 

"On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, we 
begin to compare them with one another, and with those which 
are already reposited in our memory ; and we discover that 
they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for 
example, which come in our way, however they may differ in 
height, length, position, convenience, duration, have some 
common points; they are all covered buildings, and fit for the 
habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and 
abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general 
notion of a house, that it is a covered building fit for human 
habitation ; and to this notion we attach a particular name, 

' Port Roy. Log., part i., chap. 1. 
^ Reid, Intcll. Pow., essay iv. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 103 

COMCEPTION — 

house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and 
to record its results for use. The general notion so formed we 
call a conception; the common points we observed in the vari- 
~ ous objects are called 7narks or notes; and the process of 
observing them and forming one entire notion from them is 
termed abstraction." ^ 

C02JCEPTI0N and IBEA.— " By conception is meant the simple 
view we have of the objects which are presented to ovir mind ; 
aij when, for instance, we think of the sun, the earth, a tree, a 
circle, a square, thought, being, without forming any determi- 
nate j udgment concerning them ; and the form through which 
wc consider these things is called an idea." — Port. Hoy. Log. 
" The having an idea of a thing is, in common language, 
used in the same sense (as conceiving), chiefly, I think," says 
Dr. Reid, " since Mr. Locke's time." 

" A conception is something derived from observation ; not 
so ideas, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them 
within the range of our experience. Thus ideas are a priori, 
conceptions are a posteriori; and it is only by means of the 
former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, 
taken by itself, falls short of the conception which may be 
described as the synthesis of the fact and the idea. Thus we 
have an idea of the universe, under which its different phe- 
nomena fall into place, and from which they take their mean- 
ing ; we have an idea of God as creator, from which we derive 
the power of conceiving that the impressions produced upon 
our minds, through the senses, result from really existing 
things ; we have an idea, of the soul, which enables us to real- 
ize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, 
conceiving, thinking subject, exists as a substratum of every 
sensation, conception, thought."^ 

" Every conception," says Coleridge,^ " has its sole reality in 
its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or 
of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An 
idea is a power, 8i;j/a;tttj t^ospa, which constitutes its own reality, 

' Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 105, Principles of Necessary and Contin- 
gent Truth, p. 141. 
^ Chretien, Essay on Log. Meth., p. 137. 
^ Notes on English Divines, 12mo, 1853, vol. i., p. 27. 



104 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEPTION — 

and is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the 
things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a 
conception is as necessarily posterior." 

Conception is used to signify — 1. The power ov Jriculti/ of 
conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, " Under the article of 
conception I shall confine myself to that faculty whose province 
it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of 
the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived." 

2. The act or operation of this power or faculty. " Concep- 
tion," says Sir John Stoddart,' "which is derived from con 
and capio, expresses the action by which I take up together a 
portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel 
adapted to contain a certain quantity." 

" Conception is the act by wdiich we comprehend by means 
of a general notion, as distinguished both from the p>erception 
of a, present, and the imagination of an absent individual."'^ 

3. The result of the operation of this power or faculty ; as 
when Dr. Whewell says,^ "our conceptions are that, in the 
mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, a 
square number, a force." 

This last signification, however, is more correctly and con- 
vetiiently given by the word concept, i. e., conceptum, or id 
quod conceptum est. 
CONCEPTITALISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate be- 
tween realism and nominalism, q. v. Have genera and species 
a real independent existence ? The Realist answers that they 
exist independently; that besides individual objects and the 
general notion from them in the mind, there exist certain ideas, 
the pattern after which the single objects are fashioned: and 
that the general notion in our mind is the counterpart of the idea 
without it. The Nominalist says that nothing exists but things, 
and names of things ; and that universals are mere names, 
flatus venti. The Conceptualists assign to universals an exist- 
ence which may be called logical or psychological, that is, in- 
dependent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of the 
thinking subject, in which they are as notions or conceptions.* 

' Univ. Gram., in Encyclop. Metropol. ^ North Brit. Rev., No. 27, p. 45. 

3 Pref. to the Philosoph. of the Induct. Sciences, p. 13. 
* Thomson, Outline of Lavjs of Thought, 2d edit., p. 112. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 105 

CO^CEPTUALISM - 

Di'. Browu, while his views approach those of the Concep- 
tualists, would prefer to call himself a Relationid.^ 

COE'CLUSIOH. — When something is simplj affirmed to be true, 
it is called a proposition ; after it has been found to be true, 
by several reasons or arguments, it is called a conclusion. 
" Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want," this is a 
proposition ; after all the arguments have been mentioned 
which prove this to be true, we say, " therefore sloth and 
prodigality Avill bring a man to want;" this is now the cou' 
elusion? 

That proposition which is inferred from the premises of an 
argument is called the conclusion} 

COHCRETE [concresco, to grow together), is opposed to abstract. 
A concrete notion is the notion of an object as it exists in 
nature, invested with all its qualities. An abstract notion, on 
the contrary, is the notion of some quality or attribute sepa- 
rated from the object to which it belongs, and deprived of all 
the specialities with which experience invests it ; or it may be 
the notion of a substance stripped of all its qualities. In this 
way concrete comes to be synonymous with particular, and 
abstract with general. 

The names of classes are abstract, those of individuals con- 
crete ; and from concrete adjectives are made abstract substan- 
tives. — V. Abstract, Term. 

COMDIGmTY. — F. Merit. 

CONBITIOK" — ( Conditio fere sumitur jyro qualitate qua quid condi, 
id est fieri.— Yossms,. Or it may be from condo, to give along 
with, I. e., something given or going along with a cause). 

A condition is that which is pre-requisite in order that 
something may be, and especially in order that a cause may 
operate. A condition does not operate but by removing some 
impediment, as opening the ejes to see ; or by applying one's 
strength in conjunction with another, when two men are re^ 



' See Physiol, of Hum. Mind, p. 295. Cousin, Introd. Aux Ouvrages Tnedits d' Abe- 
lard, 4to, Par., 1836, p. 181 ; Reid, l-ntell. Pow., essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. Hamilton's 
note, p. 412. 

^2 Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

3 Whately. Log., b. ii., oh. 3, § 1. 



106 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

CONDITIOIf — 

quired to lift or carry a weight, it being a condition of their 
doing so that their strength be exerted at the same time. A 
condition is prior to the production of an effect ; but it does 
not produce it. It is fire that burns ; but, before it burns, it 
is a condition that there be an approximation of the fire to the 
fuel, or the matter that is burned. Where there is no wood 
the fire goeth out. The cause of burning is the element of 
fire, fuel is a con-cause, and the condition is the approxima- 
tion of the one to the other. The impression on the wax is 
the ejfect — the seal is the cause ; the pressure of the one sub- 
stance upon the other, and the softness or fluidity of the wax 
are conditions. 

" By a condition,'" says Mr. Karslake,i " is meant something 
more negative, whereas a cause is regarded as something more 
positive. We seem to think of a condition rather as that 
■ whose absence would have prevented a thing from taking 
place ; of a caii.se, rather as that whose presence produced it. 
Thus we apply, perhaps, the word cause rather to that between 
which and the result we can see a more immediate connection. 
If so, then in this way, also, every cause will be a condition, 
or antecedent, but not every antecedent will be a cause. The 
fact of a city being built of wood will be a condition of its 
being burnt down : some inflammable matter having caught 
fire Avill be the cause." — V. Occasion. 

Condition and Conditioned (Bedingung and Bedingies) are 
correlative conceptions. The condition is the ground which 
must be presupposed ; and what presupposes a condition is 
the conditioned, conditionate, or conditional. 

CONDITIONAL. — F. Proposition, Syllogism. 

CONGE,UITY (from congruo, to come together as cranes do, 
who feed and fly in companies), means the fitness or agreement 
of one thing to another. Congruity to the relations of the 
agent is given by some philosophers as the characteristic of 
all right actions. Thus there is a congruity or fitness in a 
creature worshipping his Creator, in a son honouring his father. 
In this use of the word it belongs to the theory which places- 
virtue in the nature, reason, and fitness of things. — V. Merit. 

'■ Aids to Log., vol. ii., p. 43. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 107 

CONJUGATE. — Words of the same stock or kindred, as wise, to 
be wise, ivisely, are called conjugate or paronymous words. 

COKFOTATIVE, A, or attributive term is one which, when 
applied to some object, is such as to imply in its signification 
some attribute belonging to that object. It connotes, i. e., 
notes along with the object (or implies), something considered 
as inherent therein ; as " The capital of France,'' " The 
founder of Rome." The founding of Rome is, by that appel- 
lation, attributed to the person to whom it is applied. 

A term which merely (denotes an object, without implying 
any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-con- 
notative ; as Paris, Romulus. The latter terms cZenote respec- 
tively the same objects as the former, but do not, like them, 
connote [imply in their signification) any attribute of those 
individuals.' 

COUSAUGUINITY {con sanguis, of the same blood), is defined 
to be, vinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descendentium, the 
relation of persons descended from the same stock or common 
ancestor. It is either lineal or collateral. Lineal consanguinity 
is that which subsists between persons of whom one is de- 
scended in a direct line from the other ; as son, grandson, 
great grandson, &c. Collateral relations agree with the lineal 
in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor ; 
but differ in this, that they do not descend the one from the 
other. John has two sons, who have each a numerous issue ; 
both these issues are lineally descended from John, or their 
common ancestor ; and they are collateral kinsmen to each 

\ other, because all descended from this common ancestor, and 
all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denomi- 
nates them consanguineous. — V. Affinity. 

CONSCIEK^CE {conscientia, joint or double knowledge), means 
knowledge of conduct in reference to the law of right and 
wrong. 

" Conscience is the reason, employed about questions of 
right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of 
approbation and condemnation, which, by the nature of man, 
cling inextricably to his apprehension of right and wrong." ^ 

' Whately, Loff., b. ii., ch. 5, § 1 ; Mill, Log., b. 1., ch. 2, sect. 5. 
= Whewell, Syxt. Mor., lect. vi. 



108 VOCABULARV Oi PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSCIENCE — 

According to some, conscience takes cognizance mereiy oi 
our o^Tn conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said : ' " The 
principle in man by which he approves or disapproves of his 
heart, temper, and actions, is conscience — for this is the strict 
sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in 
more." 

Locke defined conscience to be "our own judgment of the 
rectitude and pravity of our own actions." 

Dr. Rush^ has said: "The moral faculty exercises itself 
upon the actions of others. It approves, even in books, of 
the virtues of a Trajan, and disapproves of the vices of a 
Marius, while conscience confines its operations to our own 
actions." 

"The word 'conscience' does not immediately denote any 
' moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience 
■ supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and pro- 
perly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or 
contrary to its directions."* 

" Conscience coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with 
this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct 
alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by 
which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others." * 

By these writers conscience is represented as being the func- 
tion of the moral faculty in reference to our own conduct, and 
as giving us a consciousness of self-approbation or of self- 
condemnation. 

By a further limitation of the term, conscience has been re- 
garded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise ; and 
by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive in its 
exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having acted 
wrong. 

But of late years, and by the best writers, the term con- 
science, and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty 
of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emo- 



' Sermon i., On Hum. Nature. 

'^ Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty, p. 3. 
^ Smith, Theory of Mor. Sent., pt. vii., sect. 3. 

■* Stewart, Act. Pmv., pt. i., ch. 2. See also Payne, Elements of Mm\ Science, 1846, 
p. 283. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.* 109 

CONSCIENCE — 

tion, have all been applied to that faculty, or combination of 
faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in 
reference to actions, and correspondent feelings of approba- 
tion and disapprobation. This faculty, or combination of 
faculties, IS called into exercise not merely in reference to our 
own conduct, but also in reference to the conduct of others. 
It is not only reflective hxit prospective in jts operations. It is 
antecedent as well as subsequent to action in its exercise ; and 
IS occupied defaciendo as well as de facto} 

In short, conscience constitutes itself a witness of the past 
and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if present 
when they were actually done. It takes cognizance not merely 
of the individual man, but of human nature, and pronounces 
concerning actions as right or wrong, not merely in reference 
to one person, or one time, or one place, but absolutely and 
universally. 

With reference to their views as to the nature of conscience 
and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philoso- 
phers may be arranged in two great schools or sects The 
difference between them rests on the prominence and prece- 
dence which they assign to reason and to feeling in the exer- 
cise of the moral faculty ; and their respective theories may be 
distinctively designated the intellectual theory and the senti- 
mental theory. A brief view of the principal arguments in 
support of each may be found in Hume.^ 
CONSCIOUSNESS {conscientia,]o\xii knowledge, a knowledge of 
one thing m connection or relation with another). 

Sir William Hamilton^ has remarked that " the Greek has 
no word for consciousness;' and that " Tertullian is the only 
ancient who uses the word conscientia in a psychological sense 
corresponding with our cowscio2<5?ie5A'."^ 

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by 

means of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness, that is 

the want or absence of consciousness, denotes the suspension 

ot all our faculties. Consciousness, then, is the state in 

_ ^hich we arewhen all or any of our faculties are in exer- 

• See Reid, Act. Pow., essay iii., pt. iii., ch. 8. 
^ Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, sect 5 
^^Discus^ons, p. no, note. . ^,,y,, ^„.j^^ p ^^^^ 



110 ' VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

CONSCIOUSNESS — 

cise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every mental 
operation." 

The scholastic definition w&s, perceptio qua mens de presenti 
suo statu admonetur. 

"Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind 
has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it 
knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that 
it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of cau- 
sality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is 
■ the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousness." . . . 
" By consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we 
mean the power and act of self-recognition : not if you please, 
the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions ; 
but the mind knowing itself in these." ' 

Mr. Locke has said,^ " It is altogether as intelligible to say 
that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks 
without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. 
They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, say 
that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel 
it ; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking 
consists in being conscious that one thinks \" 

" We not oii\y feel, but we know that we feel ; we not only 
act, but we know that we act ; we not only think, but we know 
that we think ; to think, without knowing that we think, is as 
if we should not think ; and the peculiar quality, the funda- 
mental attribute of thought, is to have a consciousness of itself. 
Consciousness is this interior light which illuminates every- 
thing that takes place in the soul ; consciousness is the ac- 
companiment of all our faculties ; and is, so to speak, their 
echo."' 

On consciousness as the necessary form of thought, see lec- 
ture V. of the same volume. 

That consciousness is not a particular faculty of the mind, 
but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental 
form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a 
special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by 

• Tappan, Doctrine of (he Will hy an Appeal to Consciousness, chap. 2, sect. 1. 

^ Essay on Hum. UTi'ierstand.,'boo\in., ch.l. 

^ Cousin, Hist, of Mod, Philosoph., vol. i., pp. 274-5 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

CONSCIOUSITESS — 

Amadee Jacques,' and also by two American writers, Mr. 
Bowen^ and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with 
the saying of Aristotle, ovx satw aioBriaii; aio^-^tfecoj — there is 
not a feeling of a feeling; and that of the schoolmen — "Non 
sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire — non intellighnus, nisi in- 
telligamits nos intelligere." "No man," said Dr. Reid, "can 
perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives 
it. No man can think, without being conscious that he thinks." 
And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being 
conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without 
thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be con- 
scious of nothing, to have a consciousness which was no C07i- 
sciousness, or consciovsness without an object. ''Annihilate 
the object of any mental operation and you annihilate the 
operation; annihilate the conscious7iess of the object, and you 
annihilate the operation." 

This view of consciousness, as the common condition under 
which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of con- 
sidering these faculties and their operations as so many modi- 
fications of consciousness, has of late been generally adopted ; 
so much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been 
denominated an inquiry into the facts of consciousness. All 
that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending 
to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of 
the phenomena of conscioiisness can be called in question. 
They may be more or less clear — more or less complete ; but 
they either are or are not. 

In the Diet, des Sciences PTiilosopTi.,^ it is maintained that 
consciousness is a separate facility, having self, or the ego, for 
its object. 

Instead of regarding consciousness as the common condition 
or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer Collard 
and Adolphe Garnier among the French, and Reid and Stewart 
among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as 
holding the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, 
having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. 
^^Consciousness," says Dr. Reid,^ "is a word used by philoso- 

* In the Manuel de Philosopliie, Partie Psychologique. 

^ In his 0)'itical Essays, p. 131. ^ Art. " Conscience." 

* Intdl. Pow., essay i., chap. 1 ; see also essay vi., chap. 5. 



112 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSCIOUSNESS - 

phers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of 
our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the 
present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe 
that consciousness is only of things present. To apply con- 
sciousness to things past, which sometimes is done, in popular 
discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory ; and all 
such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical 
discourse. It is likewise to be observed that consciousness is 
only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is 
improper to say, ' I am conscious of the table which is before 
me.' I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am conscious of 
it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of 
the operations of our own minds, is a different power from 
that by which we perceive external objects ; and as these dif- 
ferent powers have different names in our language, and, I 
believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to 
preserve this distinction and never confound things so different 
in their nature." In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of conscious- 
ness properly so called as that consciousness which is distinct 
from the consciousness by which we perceive external objects 
— as if perception was another kind or mode of consciousness. 
Whether all his language be quite consistent with the opinion 
that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our 
becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt 
that by consciousness he meant especially attention to the ope- 
rations of our own minds, or rejlection ; while by observation 
he meant attention to external things. This language has 
been interpreted as favourable to the opinion that consciousness 
is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it 
from reflection except by saying that consciousness accompa- 
nies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It 
is a voluntary act — an energetic attention to the facts oi con- 
sciousness. But consciousness may be either spontaneous or 
reflective. 

" This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the 
mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of 
all its present operations." ' 

' Outlines of Mor. Philosoph., part i., sect. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 113 

COUSCIOUSHESS - 

Mr. Stewart 1 has enumerated consciousness as one of our 
intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory, 
judgment, &c. But consciousness is not confined to the ope- 
ration of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the develop- 
ment of the feelings and the determinations of the will. And 
the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, is not only 
founded on a false analysis, but is an opinion, which if pro- 
secuted to its results would overturn the doctrine of immediate 
knowledge in perception — a doctrine which Stewart and Reid 
upheld as the true and only barrier against the scepticism of 
Hume. " Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, 
I need another power termed consciousness, by which I become 
cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which the 
knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the think- 
ing self, and the plea of common sense against scepticism is 
cut off. .... I am conscious of self and of notself; my 
knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct 
and immediate. On the other hand, to make consciousness a 
peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our 
own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediatecy 
of our knowledge of an external world." ^ 

" We may give consciousness a separate name and place, 
without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other facul- 
ties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it 
m.ore of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever 
the soul is intelligently exercised."^ 
CONSCIOUSNESS and FEELING. — " Feeling and sensation 
are equivalent terms, the one being merely the translation of 
the other ; but feeling and conscioiisness are not equivalent, 
for we are conscious that we feel, but we do not feel that we 
are conscious. Consciousness is involved in all mental opera- 
tions, active or passive ; but these are not therefore kinds or 
parts of consciousness. Life is involved in every operation, 
voluntary or involuntary, of our bodily system ; but move- 
ment or action are not, therefore, a species of life. Conscious- 
ness is mental life." * 

'■ In his Outlines. * Morell, Hist, of Spec. Pkilosoph., vol. ii., p. 13. 

^ M-Cosb, Method of Div. Govern., p. 533, fifth edition. See Fearn, Essay on Con- 
sciousness. 
* Jgonisles.; or, Philosophical Strictures, p. 336. 
11* I 



114 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSENT. — " Believing in the prophets and evangelists with a 
calm and settled faith, vfith that consent of the will, and heart, 
and understanding, which constitutes religious belief, I find 
in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon 
earth." i 

Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the understand- 
ing. Consent arises from the state of the disposition and the 
will. The one accepts what is true ; the other embraces it as 
true and good, and worthy of all acceptation. — V. Assent. 
CONSENT (Argument from Universal). — F. Authority. 

Reid- applies this argument to establish first principles. 
He" uses it against the views of Berkeley and Hume. 

Cicero'* says. Major enim pars eo fere deferri solei quo a na- 
iura deducitur. It is used to prove the existence of the gods. 
De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum, esse necesse 
est. Esse igitur deos, confitendnm est.'' Cotta^ argues i^.gainst 
it. The argument it also used, where we read, Omni autem 
in re, consensio omnium gentium lex 7iaturce putanda est.'' 

Bacon is against this argument.^ 

" These things are to be regarded as first truths, the credit 
of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in 
themselves. As for probable truths, they are such as are ad- 
mitted by all men, or by the generality of men, or by wise 
men ; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the 
generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the 
highest authority." ^ 

Midtum dare solemus pra;sump>tioni omnium Tiominum. Apud 
nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.'^° 
CONSEftUENT. — F. Antecedent, Necessity. 

CONSILIENCE of INDUCTIONS takes place when an induc- 
tion obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induc- 
tion obtained from a different class. This consilience is the 
test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs.^' 

* Southey, Progress of Society, colloquy 2. ^ Intell. Pom., essay i., chap. 2. 

^ Essay ii., chap. 19. ■* De Officiis, lib. i., cap. 41 

' De Nat. Deorum, lib. i, cap. 17. ° Cap. 23. 

' De Nat. Deor., lib. ii., 2; and Tusnd. Qumst., lib. i, 13. 

^ In the preface to his Tnsiauratio Magna, in aphorism 77, and in Cogiiata et Visa. 

' Aristotle, Topic, i, 1. '" Seneca, Epist., CTii., cxvii. 

" Whewell, Philosoph. Induct. Sciences, aphorism 14. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 116 

CONSILIENCE — 

Paley's Horce Paulince, which consists of gathering together 
undesigned coincidences, is an example of the consilience of 
inductions. 

" The law of gravitation may be proved by a consilience of 
inductions." ' 

CONSTITUTIVE (in German, constiiiitiv) , means objectively de- 
termining, or legislating. It is a predicate which expresses 
that something d priori determines how something else must 
be, or is to be. That which is constitutive is opposed to that 
which is regulative — q. v. 

CONTEMPLATION {contemplor), means originally to gaze on 
a shire of the heavens marked out by the augur. ^ " The next 
faculty of the mind {i. e., to perception), whereby it makes a 
further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call re- 
tention, or the keeping of these simple ideas which from sen- 
sation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways ; 
first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some 
time actually in view, which is called contemplation." ^ 

"When an object .of sense or thought has attracted our ad- 
miration or love we dwell upon it ; not so much to know it 
better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is contemplation, 
and diiFers from reflection. The latter seeks knowledge, and 
our intellect is active. In the former, we think we have found 
the knowledge which reflection seeks, and luxuriate in the en- 
joyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated the benefits of con- 
templation, and have directed it exclusively to God, and to the 
cherishing of love to Him. 

CONTINENCE {contineo, to restrain), is the virtue which consists 
in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied 
to men, as chastity is to women. Chastity may be the result 
of natural disposition or temperament — continence carries with 
it the idea of struggle and victory. 

CONTINGENT {contingo, to touch). — " Perhaps the beauty of 
the world requireth that some agents should work without 
deliberation (which his lordship calls necessary agents), and 
some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call 



' Quarterly Rev., vol. xlviii., p. 233. * Taylor, Synonyms. 

^ Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 10. 



116 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTINGEIfT — 

free agents), and that some agents should work, and -pre know 
not hoAV (and their effects we call contingents)." ^ 

" When any event takes place which seems to us to have no 
cause, why it should happen in one way, rather than another, 
it is called a contingent event ; as, for example, the falling of 
a leaf on a certain spot, or the turning up of any particular 
number when the dice are thrown." ^ 

The contingent is that which does not exist necessarily, and 
which we can think as non-existing without contradiction. 
Everything which had a beginning, or will have an end, or 
which changes, is contingent. The necessary, on the contrary, 
is that which we cannot conceive as non-existing — that which 
has always been, which will always be, and which does not 
change its manner of being. 

" Contingent is that which does not happen constantly and 
regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distinguished 
three different opinions ; for either the event happens more 
frequently one way than another, and then it is said to be 
irti to TioXv ; of this kind axe the regular productions of na- 
ture, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it happens more 
rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other extraordi- 
nary productions of nature, and many accidents that happen 
to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and happens as 
often the same way as the other ; or, as they express it in 
Greek, ortdrsp itixfi- ^^ this kind are some things in nature, 
such as the birth of a male or female child ; a good or bad 
day in some climates of the earth ; and many things among 
men, such as good or bad luck at play. All these last-men- 
tioned events are in reality as necessary as the falling of 
heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen constantly 
and uniformly, and as we cannot account for their happen- 
ing sometimes one way and sometimes another, we say they 
are contingent."^ 

The contingent is known empirically — the necessary by the 
reason. There are but two modes of being, the necessary and 
the contingent. But the contingent has degrees : 1. Simple 

' Hobbes, Liberty and Necessity. ^ Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

^Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., vol. i., p. 295. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 117 

C0NTINGE2TT— 

facts which appear aud disappear, or, in the language of the 
Schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties inherent in a 
substance, which constitute its specific character. 3. The 
substance itself considered as a particular and finite existence. 
A thing may be contingent in three ways : — • 

1. JEqualiter, when the thing or its opposite may equally 
be, from the determination of a free will. 

2. JJt plurimum, as when a man is born with five digits, 
though sometimes with more or less. 

3. Raro, as when it happens seldom ; by a necessary agent, 
as when a tile falls on a man's head ; or hy a free agent, as 
when a man cleaving wood wounds the bystander.' 

An event, the opposite of which is possible, is contingent. 
An event, the opposite of which is impossible, is necessary. 
An event is impossible when the opposite of it is necessary. 
An event is p>ossible when the opposite of it is contingent. 

CONTINUITY (Law of).—" The supposition of bodies perfectly 
hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of the 
leading doctrines of Leibnitz, that of the constant maintenance 
of the same quantity of force in the universe, and that of the 
proportionality of forces to the squares of the velocities — he 
found himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining that all 
changes are produced by insensible gradations, so as to render 
it impossible for a body to have its state changed from motion 
to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the 
intermediate states of velocity. From this assur^ption he 
argued with much ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of 
perfectly hard bodies, is impossible ; because, if two of them 
should meet with equal and opposite motions, they would 
necessarily stop at once, in violation of the law of continuity ." ^ 
"I speak," said John Bernouilli,^ "of that immovable and 
perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, 
which may be called the law of continuity, in virtue of which 
everything that is done, is done by degrees infinitely small. 
It seems to»be the dictate of good sense that no change is 
made per saliimi; natura non operatur per saltum; and nothing 

' See Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph. 
' Stewart, Dissert., part ii., p. 275. 
^ Discourse on Motion, 172T. 



118 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTI]^UITY— 

cau pass from one extreme to another without passing through 
all the intermediate degrees.'^ 

The law of continuity, though originally applied to continuHy 
of motion, was extended by Charles Bonnet to continuity of 
being. He held that all the various beings which compose 
the universe, form a scale descending downwards without 
any chasm or saltus, from the Deity to the simplest forms of 
unorganized matter. A similar view had been held by Locke 
and others.' The researches of Cuvier have shown that it 
can only be held with limitations and exceptions, even when 
confined to the comparative anatomy of animals. — Y. Asso- 

CIATIOX. 

CONTE.ACT [contraho, to draw together). — A contract is an 
agreement or pact in which one party comes under obligation 
to do one thing, and the other pai'ty to do some other thing. 
Paley calls it a mutual promise. Contracts originate in the 
insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One wants what 
another has abundance of and to spare ; while the other may 
want something which his neighbour has. Men are drawn 
more closely together by their individual insiifficiency, and 
they enter into an agreement each to give what the other 
needs or desires. 

Contracts being so necessary and important for the welfare 
of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in all coun- 
tries been made the object of positive law. Viewed ethically, 
the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that to fulfil a 
promise. The consideration of contracts, and of the various 
kinds and conditions of them belongs to Jurisprudence. 

While all contracts are pacts, all pacts are not contracts. In 
the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts or 
agreements entered into without any cause or consideration 
antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered 
into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing a evvd%- 
jMyfia, or bargain, or as it may be pojjularly exj^ressed, a quid 
pro quo — in which one party came under obligation to give or 
do something, on account of something being done or given by 
the other party. Agreements of the latter kind were pi'operly 

' Spectator, No. 519. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 119 

CONTEACT - 

contracts, while those of the former Avere called hare pacts. A 
pactum nudum, or bare pact, was so called because it was not 
clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was 
not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law. Nuda 
pactio ohligationem nonfacit. It is the same in the English 
law, in which a contract is defined : " An agreement of two or 
more persons, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not t-o do 
a particular thing," — and the consideration is necessary to the 
validity of the contract. 
CONTRABICTIOK', Principle of {contradico, to speak against). 
— It is usually expressed thus : A thing cannot be and not be 
at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the 
same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied 
of the same subject.' — V. Identity. 

Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic 
and of all Metaphysic. 

Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth and 
reasoning, and added the principle of the sufficient reason — q. v. 

Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments 
of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, as 
he called them, analytic judgments ; as when we say, all body 
has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed in that 
of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judg- 
ment, that it implies no contradiction. But in synthetic 
judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason or the 
testimony of experience, according as they are a vriori or d 
posteriori.^ 

" The law of contradiction vindicates itself. It cannot be 
denied without being assented to, for the person who denies 
it must assume that he is denying it, in other words, he must 
assume that he is saying what he is saying, and he must admit 
that the contrary supposition — to wit, that he is saying what 
he is not saying — involves a contradiction. Thus the law is 
established." ^ 

It has also been called the law of non-contradiction. It is 
one and indivisible, but develops itself in three specific forms, 

^ Pierron and Zevort, Introd. d la Metaphys. d'Aristote, 2 torn., Paris, 1840, 
' Aristot., Metaphys., lib. iii., cap. 3 ; lib. ix., cap. 7 ; lib. x., cap. 5. 
^ Terrier, Inst, of Metaphys., p. 21. 



120 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTRADICTION — 

which have been called the Three Logical Axioms. First, 
" A is A." Second, "A is not Not-A." Third, " Everything 
is either A or Not-A." This last is sometimes called the Law 
of Excluded Middle — g. v. 

The principle of contradiction is the same with the Dictum 
de omni et mdlo — q. v} 
CONTRARIES. — Aristotle 2 says — " There seems to be one and 
the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to 
things contrary." This, by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, 
is thus illustrated : — " Of things contrary thei'e is one science 
and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be some- 
thing beneficial, knows evil at the same time to be something 
pernicious ; and he who is deceived with respect to one of 
these, is deceived also with respect to the other." 

" There is an essential difference between opposite and con- 
trary. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend 
to union either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus 
the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus positive and nega- 
tive electricity, are opposites. Sweet and sour are opposites ; 
sweet and hitter are contraries. The feminine character is 
opposed to the mascidine; but the eff^eminate is, its conlrary."^ 

We should say opposite sides of the street, not coniruiy. 

Aristotle defines contrary, "that which in the same genus 
differs most ;" as in colour, white and black ; in sensation, 
pleasure and pain ; in morals, good and evil. Contraries 
never co-exist, but they may succeed in the same subject. 
They are of two kinds, one admitting a middle term, partici- 
pating at once in the nature of the things opposed. Thus, 
between absolute being and nonentity, there may be contin- 
gent being. In others no middle term is possible. There are 
contraries of which the one belongs necessarily to a subject, or 
is a simple privation, as health and sickness ; light and dark- 
ness ; sight and blindness. Contraries which admit of no 
middle term are contradictories ; and form, when united, a 
contradiction. On this rests all logic. Aristotle wished to 
make virtue a middle term, between two extremes.* 



• See Poste, Foster. Analyt., Appendix a. ^ De Anima, lib. iii., cap. 3. 

^ Coleridge, Church and State, note, p. 18. * Diet, des Scievces Philosoph. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPflY. 121 

CONVERSIOK", in Logic, is the transposition of the subject of a 
proposition into the place of the predicate, and of the predi- 
cate into the place of the subject. The proposition to be con- 
verted is cMled the convertend or exposita, and that into which 
it is converted the converse. Logical conversion is illative, 
that is, the truth of the convertend necessitates the truth of the 
converse. It can only take place when no term is distributed 
in the converse which was undistributed in the convertend. It 
is of three kinds, viz., simple conversion, conversion per acci- 
dens, and conversion by negation or contraposition.^ 

COPULA (The) is that part of a proposition which indicates that 
the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. This is 
sometimes done by inflection ; as when we say. Fire burns ; 
the change from burn to burns showing that we mean to affirm 
the predicate burn of the subject fire. But this function is 
more commonly fulfilled by the word is, when an affirmation 
is intended — is not, when a negation ; or by some other part 
of the verb to be. Sometimes this verb is both copula and pre- 
dicate, e.g., "One of Jacob's sons is not." But the copula, 
merely as such, does not imply real existence, e.g., "A fault- 
less man is a being feigned by the Stoics." ^ 

COSMOGONY {xoa^o^, world; yuyvofiav, to come into being). — 
" It was a most ancient, and, in a manner, universally re- 
ceived tradition among the Pagans, that the cosmogonia, or 
generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos 
(the divine cosjnogonists agreeing therein with the atheistic 
ones) : this tradition having been delivered dowr from Or- 
pheus and Linus (among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, 
and others."" 

The different theories as to the origin of the world may be 
comprehended under three classes ; — 

1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, as 
having existed from eternity. — Aristotle. 

2. Those which represent the matter but not the form of 
the world to be from eternity. — Leucippus, Democritus, Epi- 
curus. 

3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the 
world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause. 

' Whately, Lng., Is. ii., ch. 2, g 4. 

2 IMd., h. ii., ch. 1, § 3. Mill, Log., h. i., ch. 4, g 1. 

3 Cudwortb, Intell. Syst, p. 248. 

12 



122 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPnY. 

COSMOGOHY— 

"Cosmogony treats of the birth, cosmography of the descrip- 
tion, and cosmology of the theory of the world." ' 

COSMOLOGY, Eational— F. Metaphysics. 

CEANIOLOGY. — F. Phrenology. 

CEAHIOSCOPY. — F. Phrenology, Organ, Organology. 

CB,EATIOIf is the act by which God produced out of nothing all 
things that now exist. Unless we deny altogether the exist- 
ence of God, we must either believe in creation or accept one 
or other of the two hypotheses, which may be called theologi- 
cal dualism and pantheism. According to the former, there 
are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. Ac- 
cording to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifesta- 
tions of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in creation 
admits only the existence of one necessary and eternal being, 
who is at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, 
absolutely free and infinitely good. God and the universe are 
essentially distinct. God has self-consciousness, the vmiverse 
has not and cannot have.^ 

CREDULITY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, is 
set down by Dr. Reid as an original principle implanted in us 
by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart of this he 
reckons veracity or a propensity to speak truth and to use 
language so as to convey our real sentiments, to be also an 
original principle of human nature.* 

CRITERION' {xpitripiov, from the Greek verb xptvio, to judge), 
denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It has been 
distinguished into the criterion a quo, per quod, and secundmn 
quod — or the being who judges, as man ; the organ or faculty 
by which he judges, and the ride according to which he 
judges. Unless utter scepticism be maintained, man must be 
admitted capable of knowing what is true. 

" With regard to the criterion,'^ or organ of truth among 
the ancient philosophers, some advocated a simple and others 

' Taylor, Synovyms. 
'^ Did. des Sciences Pliilosoph. 

^ Reid, Inquiry, chap. 6, J 24 ; and also Act. Pow., essay iii., pt. i., chap. 2; Stewart, 
Act. Pow., vol. ii., p. 344; Priestley, Exam., p. 86; Brown, Leot. Ixxxiv. 
'• Says Edw. Poste, M.A., Introd., p. 14, to trans, of Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 123 

CRITERIOH — 

a mixed criterion. The advocates of the former were di- 
vided into Sensationalists or Eationalists, as they advocated 
sense or reason ; the advocates of the hitter advocated both 
sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensation- 
alists ; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists ; 
Plato and Aristotle belonged to the mixed school. Among 
those who advocated reason as a criterion, there was an im- 
portant difference : some advocating the common reason, as 
Heraclitus and Anaxagoras ; others, the scientific reason, or 
the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Par- 
menides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the Re- 
public,'^ Plato prescribes a training calculated to prepare the 
reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle re- 
quires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used 
the word measure, instead of criterion; and Protagoras had 
said, that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle^ 
interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of 
• truth, and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties 
in a healthy and perfect condition. These names, then, can- 
not properly be ranked among the covimon sense philosophers, 
where they are placed by Sir William Hamilton. 

" When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must in- 
clude, besides "the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This is 
the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension of 
truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of these 
instruments, in order to discover their capabilities and right 
use, is Logic. This appears to be the reason why Ai-istotle 
gave the title of Organon to his Logic. So Epicurus called 
his the Canon or Criterion." The controversy on the Criterion 
is to be found at length in Sextus Empiricus.'' 

Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character which 
distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it corresponds 
with the ground of certitude. — V. Certitude. 

CRITICK, CHITICISM, CEITIOTE (German, mtik), is the 
examination of the pure reason, and is called in Germany 
simply the eritick or critik, xat' s^oxrjv. It is the science of 

' 7, sect. 9. 2 Metaphys., x. 2; xi. 6. 

siji/jjoi, lib ii., cap. 5-7. 



124 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CRITICK- 

the pure faculty of reason, or the investigation of that which 
reason is able to know or effect, independently of experience, 
and is opposed to dogmatism. Sir J. Mackintosh terms the 
critical philosophy a self-reviewing philosophy. 

CUMULATIVE (The Argument). — "The proof of a Divine 
agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of 
reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only 
a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls ; but it 
is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. 
An error in stating an example affects only that example. 
The argument is cumulative in the fullest sense of that term. 
The eye proves it without the ear, the ear without the eye. 
The proof in each example is complete ; for when the design 
of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that 
design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest ; no future 
consideration can detract anything from the force of the 
example."^ 

CUSTOM. — "Let custom," says Locke,^ "from the very child- 
hood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and 
what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the 
Deity." 

Custom is the queen of the world. 

"Such precedents are numberless; we draw 
Our right from custom ; custom is a liiw 
As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land." 

Lansdown, Beauty and Law, 

A custom is not necessarily a usage. A cust07n is merely 
that which is often repeated ; a usage must be often repeated 
and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a "new cus- 
tom," but not of a " new usage." Custom had probably the 
same origin as "accost," to come near, and thence to be 
habitual. The root is the Latin costa, the side or rib.^ 

"An aggregate of habits, either successive or contempora- 
neous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words custom, 

' Paley, Nat. I'heoL, chap. 6, 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 33, 17 ; and book i., chap. 4, 16. 
^ See Kames, Ekments of Criticism, chap. 14; Sir G. C. Lewis, On Politics, chap. 20, 
sect. 9. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 125 

CUSTOM - 

usage, or practice.^ When many persons — either a class of 
society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation — 
agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a custom or 
usage to that effect. 

" Custoins may be of two kinds: — First, There may be vol- 
untary customs — customs vrhich are adopted spontaneously by 
the people, and originate from their inde^iendent choice, such 
as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c., pre- 
valent in any country, and most of the items v^'^hich constitute 
the manners of a people. — Secondly/, There are the customs 
which are the result of laws — customs which have grown up in 
consequence of the action of the government upon the people. 
Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid 
down certain rules of procedure, and the advocates pleading 
before the court have observed these rules, such is called the 
established practice of the court. The sum of the habits of 
the successive judges and practitioners constitute the practice 
of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly 
or any other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its 
members.' In churches the equivalent name is rites and cere- 
monies." — V. Habit. 

Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act ; hahit is the 
effect of such repetition : fashion is the custom of numbers ; 
usage is the hahit of numbers. It is a good custom to rise 
early ; this will produce a hahit of so doing ; and the example 
of a distinguished family may do much toward re . iving the 
fashion, if not re-establishing the usage? 

Usage has relation to space, and custom to time ; usage is 
more universal, and custom more ancient ; usage is what many 
people practise, and custom is what people have practised long. 
A vulgar usage; an old custom? 
CYNIC. — After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under 
Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynosarges, one 
of the gymnasia of Athens, — and hence they were called 
Cynics. According to others, the designation comes from xwv, 

' A similar distinction between m.os and consueiudo is made by Macrobius, Saturn. 
iii., 8, commenting on Virgil, ^neid, 6, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that mos is the 
unit, and consuetudo the resulting aggregate. 

^ Taylor, Synonyms. ' Ibid. 41^ 

12* 



126 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CYNIC — 

a dog, because like the dog tliey were destitute of all modesty. 
Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates were the first heads of the 
sect. Zeno, by checking and moderating their doctrines, gave 
birth to the sect of Stoics.^ 



Di^MONIST. — "To believe the governing mind, or minds, not 
absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, 
but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be 
a Dce7nonist."^ 

DATA (the plural of datum — given or granted). — "Those facts 
from which, an inference is drawn, are called data; for ex- 
ample, it has always been found that the inhabitants of tem- 
perate climates have excelled those of very hot or very cold 
climates in stature, strength, and intelligence : these facts are 
the data, from which it is inferred that excellence of body and 
mind depend, in some measure, upon the temperature of the 
climate."" 

DEDUCTION (from deduco, to draw from, to cause to come out 
of), is the mental operation which consists in drawing a par- 
ticular truth from a general principle antecedently known. It 
is opposed to induction, which consists in rising from parti- 
cular truths to the determination of a general principle. Let 
it be proposed to prove that Peter is mortal; I know that 
Peter is a man, and this enables me to say that all men 
are mortal ; from which afiirmation I deduce that Pet«r ia 
mortal. 

The syllogism is the form of deduction. Aristotle* has de- 
fined it to be " an enunciation in wTiich certain assertions 
being made, by their being true, it follows necessarily, that 
another assertion different from the first is true also." 

Before we can deduce a particular truth we^must be in pos- 

' Eichterus, Disscrtalio de Cynicis. Leips., 1701; Diog&nes Xaw^i^, Kb. vi., c. 103. 

" Shaftesbury, Inquiry concerning Virtue, book i., pt. i.7s'e<;t. 2. 

' Taylor, Elements of Thought. t Prior. Analyt, lib. i., cap. 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 127 

DEBTTCTION — 

session of the general truth. This may be acquired intuitioely, 
as every change implies a cause ; or indiictively, as the volume 
of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure. 

Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is demon- 
stration or science. Truths drawn from the latter kind are 
contingent and relative, and admit of correction by increasing 
knowledge. 

The principle of deduction is, that things which agree with 
the same thing agree with one another. The principle of 
induction is, that in the same circumstances, and in the 
same substances, from the same causes the same effects will 
follow. 

The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded 
on deduction, the physical sciences rest on induction.^ 
D.E FACTO and DE JURE. — In some instances the penalty 
attaches to the offender at the instant when the fact is com- 
mitted ; in others, not until he is convicted by law. In the 
former case he is guilty de facto, in the latter dejure. 

De facto is commonly used in the sense oi actually or really, 
and dejure in the sense of riglitfuUy or legally ; as when it is 
said George II. was king of Great Britain de facto; but 
Charles Stuart was king dejure. 
DEFINITION [definio, to mark out limits). — Est defnitio, earum 
rerum, qiice sunt ejus rei propria;, quam definire volumus, hrevis 
et circumscripta qucvdam explication 

" The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a 
proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word." ^ 

Definition signifies "laying down a boundary;" and is used 
in Logic to signify " an expression which explains any term 
so as to sejparate it from everything else, as a boundary sepa- 
rates fields. Logicians distinguish definitions into Nominal 
and Real. 

" Definitions are called nominal, which explain merely the 
meaning of the term; and real, which explain the nature of the 

• For the different views of deduction and induction, see Whewell, Philoscph. of 
Induct. Sciences, "book i., chap. 6; Mill, Loc/., book ii., chap. 5; Quarterly Rev., -vol. 
Ixviii., art. on " Whewell." 

2 Cicero, De Orat., lib. i., c. 42. 

5 Mill, Log., 2d edit., vol. i., p. 182, 



128 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DEFI^ITIO:^— 

thing signified by that term. Logic is concerned with nominal 
definitions alone." ' 

"By a real, in contrast to a verbal or nominal definition, the 
logicians do not intend ' the giving an adequate conception of 
the nature and essence of a thing ;' that is, of a thing con- 
sidered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already 
possessed. By verbal definition is meant the more accurate 
determination of the signification of a ivord; by real the more 
accurate determination of the contents of a notion. The one 
clears up the relation of words to notions; the other oi notions 
to things. The substitution of notional for 7-eal would, perhaps, 
remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term real, the 
aim of a verbal definition being to specify the thought denoted 
by the word, such definition ought to be called notional, on the 
principle on which the definition of a notion is called real; 
for this definition is the exposition of what things are com- 
prehended in a thought."^ 

" In the sense in which nominal and real definitions were 
distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned 
with real, i. e., notional definitions only ; to explain the mean- 
ing of words belongs to dictionaries or grammars."" 

" There is a real distinction between definitions of names 
and what are erroneously called definitions of things ; but it 
is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly 
asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a defini- 
tion, but a postulate. The definition is a mere identical pro- 
position, which gives information onlj^ about the use of lan- 
guage, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of 
fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on 
the other hand, aflBrms a fact which may lead to consequences 
of every degree of importance. It aflarms the real existence 
of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in 
the definition, and this, if true, may be foundation sufficient 
to build a whole fabric of scientific truth."* 

Real definitions are divided into essential and accidental. 



' Whately, Log., b. ii.. ch. 2, J 6. 

*» Sir Will. Hamilton, Beid's Worls, p. 691, note. 

^ Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 189. 

* Mill, Log., p. 197, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 129 

DEFimTION — 

An essential definition states what are regarded as the con- 
stituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined ; 
and an accidental definition (or description) lays down what 
are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties^ 
or accidents, such as causes, eflects, &c. 

"Essential definition is divided into j^ht/sical (natural), and 
logical (metaphysical) ; the physical definition being made by 
an enumeration of such parts as are actually separable ; such 
as are the hull, masts, &c., of a ' ship ;' the root, trunk, 
branches, bark, &c., of a 'tree.' The logical definition consists 
of the genus and difference, which are called by some the 
metaphysical (ideal) parts ; as being not two real parts into 
which an individual object can (as in the former case), be 
actually divided, but only different views taken (notions 
formed) of a class of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet 
would be defined logically, ' an iron ore having attraction for 
iron.' " 1 

Accidental or descr'vptiYe definition may be — 1. Causal; as 
when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for 
his glory. 2. Accidental ; as when he is defined to be animal, 
bipes implume. 3. Genetic; as when the means by which it is 
made are indicated ; as, if a straight line fixed at one end be 
drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle 
will be described. Or, 4. Per opposition ; as, when virtue is 
said to be flying from vice. 

The rules of a good definition are: — 1. That it be adequate. 
If it be too narrow, you explain a part instead of a whole; 
if too extensive, a whole instead of a part. 2. That it be 
clearer (i.e., consist of ideas less complex) than the thing de- 
fined. 3. That it be in just a sufficient number of proper 
words. Metaphorical words are excluded because they are 
indefinite.^ 



' Whately, Loc/., b. ii., ch. 5, § 6. 

'^ Mansel's Aldrich., p. 35. Aristotle, foster. Analyt., lib. ii. ; Topic, lib. vi.; Port 
Rnyal Lng., part i., chap. 12, 13, 14; part ii., chap. 16; Locky, Essay on Hum. Under- 
sfdnd., book iii., c. 3 and 4; Leibnitz, Noveaux Essais, liv. iii., cap. 3 et 4; Reid, 
Account of Aristotle's Logic, chap. 2, sect. 4 ; Tappan, Appeal to Consciousness, chap. 
2,§1 

K 



130 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BEIST [Deus, God). — There are different kinds of deists noticed 
by Dr. Sam. Clarke.' 

1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, 
but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing. 

2. Those who believe in Grod and in Providence, but deny 
moral distinctions and moral government. 

3. Those who believe in God and His moral perfections, but 
deny a future state. 

4. Those who believe in God and His moral government, 
here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes ; but 
doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation. 

Kant has distinguished between atheist and a deist — the 
former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the creator 
and preserver of all things ; the latter believing that the first 
principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is inherent in 
matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena of nature. 
Deism, in this sense, is mere materialism. But deism is gene- 
rally employed to denote a belief in God, without implying a 
belief in revelation. 

" That modern species of infidelity, called deism, or natural 
religion, as contradistinguished from revealed." ^ 

" Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for 
himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination of 
Christian deists, though it implied no less than an absolute 
contradiction in terms." ^ — V. Theist. 

BEMIUUGE (Sj^jittoupyds, Avorkman, architect). — Socrates and 
Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. Plo- 
tinus confounded the demiurge with the soul of the world, and 
represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. The 
Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the supreme 
divinity, and having a separate existence. The difiiculty of 
reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the variable and 
contingent effects observable in the universe, has given rise to 
the hypotheses of a demiurge, and of a plastic nature ; but 
they do not alleviate the difiiculty. This term is applied to 
God, Heb. xi. 10. 



' Worlcs, Tol. ii., p. 12. 

2 Van Mildevt, Bampton Lext., sermon ix. 

3 Ibid., sermon x. See Lelaud, View of Deistical Writers. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 131 

BEMOK" {SaCfiuv). — " The demon kind is of an intermediate nature 
between the divine and human. What is the power and 
virtue, said I, of this intermediate kind of being ? To trans- 
mit and to interpret to the gods, what comes from men ; and 
to men, in like manner, what comes from the gods ; from 
men their petitions and their sacrifices ; from the gods, in 
return, the revelation of their will." • 

Socrates declared that he had a friendly spirit, or Demon, 
who restrained him from imprudence, and revealed to him 
what was true. Plutarch has a Dialogue on the Demon of 
Socrates, and Apuleius also wrote De Deo Socratis. In 
modern times we have Lelut, Du Demon de Socrate? He 
thinks Socrates was subject to hallucinations of sight and 
hearing. 

DEMONSTRATION {demonstro, to point out, to cause to see).— 
In old English writers this word was used to signify the point- 
ing Old the connection between a conclusion and its premises, 
or that of a jjhenomenon with its asserted cause. It now 
denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with 
proof from first principles. To draw out a particular truth 
from a general truth in which it is enclosed, is deduction: from 
a necessary and universal ti-uth to draw consequences which 
necessarily follow, is demonstration. To connect a truth with 
a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or 
realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is 
science, knowledge, certainty. Those general tru^^hs arrived 
at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain 
knowledge. But it is knowledge which is not definite or com- 
plete. It may admit of increase or modification by new dis- 
coveries ; but the knowledge which demonstration gives is fixed 
and unalterable. 

A demonstration is a reasoning consisting of one or more 
arguments, by which some proposition brought into question 
is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition 
assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknow- 
ledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as 
certain. 

Demonstration is direct or indirect. Direct demonstration is 

^ ByAcnh^m, Plato, The Banquet. 3 Paris, 1S36, 1S56. 



132 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DEMONSTEATION — 

descending — Avhen starting from a general truth we come to a 
particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny ; or as- 
cending — when starting from the subject and its attributes, 
we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we 
connect the proposition in question. Both these are deduc- 
tive, because they connect a particular truth with a general 
principle. Indirect demonstration is when we admit hypo- 
thetically a proposition contradictory of that which we Mash 
to demonstrate, and show that this admission leads to absurd- 
ity ; that is, an impossibility or a contradiction. This is, de- 
monstratio per irtipossible, or reductio ad absiirdum. It should 
only be employed when direct demonstration is unattainable. 

" Demonstration was divided by ancient writers into two 
kinds: one kind they called demonstration oti,; the other <?e- 
m,onstration Stor't. 

" The demonstration hi6-ei, or argument from cause to effect, 
is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. 
When, e. g., we argue that at a certain time the tides will be 
unusually high, because of its being the day following the new 
or the full moon, it is because we knoAV that that condition of 
the moon is in some way connected as a cause with an vin- 
usually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, 
therefore, that it will produce what is called spring tide. 

"On the other hand, the demonstration ott, or argument 
from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past 
events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they 
exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies 
of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is 
frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such 
bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as 
their cause." ^ 

The theory of demonstration is to be found in the Organon 
of Aristotle, "since whose time," said Kant, "Logic, as to 
its foundation, has gained nothing." 
DENOMmATION, External — F. Mode. 

DEONTOLOGY [to 8eov, what is due, or binding ; %6yos, dis- 
course). 

' Karslake, Aids to Logic, vol. ii., p. 46, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 133 

DEOlfTOLOGY— 

^^ Deontology, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a 
fitter term than any other which could be found, to represent, 
in the field of morals, the principle of utilitarianism, or that 
which is useful."^ 

" The term deontology expresses moral science, and ex- 
presses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of 
duty, and contains no reference to utility/' ^ 

Deontology involves the being bound or being under obliga- 
tion ; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and which 
utility does not give. 

"The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "E|(,j t'ov 

- hiov-ioi (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding), 

the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, 

and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found 

in any system of philosophy." * 

And Sir "W. Hamilton'' has observed that ethics are well 

denominated deontology. 

* 

DESIGrU" [designo, to mark out). — " The atomic atheists further 
allege, that though there be many things in the world which 
serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that there- 
fore they were made intentionally and designedly for those 
uses."^ 

" What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own 
sake, but with a view to some eS"ect that is to follow, is said to 
be the resalt of design. None but intelligent beings act with 
design; because it requires knowledge of the connection of 
causes and efi"ects, and the power of comparing ideas, to con- 
ceive of some end or object to be produced, and to devise the 
means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we 
see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but 
which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it 
produces, we feel sure that it is the Avork of a being capable 
of thought."^ 

"When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an 
end, we infer design and a designer ; because the only circum- 

' Bentham, Deontology ; or, the Science of Morality, yo\. i., p. 34. 

2 Whewell, Preface to Mackintosh's Prelim. Dissert., p. 20. 

' Stewart, Act. and Mor. Poivcrs, vol. ii., p. 446. * Meid's Works, p. 540, note. 

» Cudworth, InteU. Syst., p. 670. " Taylor, Elements of Thvught. 

13 



134 VOCABULARY OF PHTLOSOPHY. 

DESIGN- 

stances in which we can trace the origination of adaptation, 
are those in which human mind is implicated." ^ 

On the argument for the being of God from the evidences 
of design, or the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, 
see Xenophon, Memorabilia of Socrates,^ Buf&er, Treatise on 
First Truths,^ Reid,*, Stewart,^ Paley,® Bridgewater Treatises ; 
Burnett Prize Essays. — V. Cause (Final). 
BESIEGE. — '^Desire may be defined that uneasy sensation excited 
in the mind by the view or by the contemplation of any de- 
sirable good which is not in our possession, which we are so- 
licitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at 
least possible."' 

According to Dr. Hutcheson,* " desires arise in our mind from 
the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in 
objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the 
agreeable sensation when the object or event is good ; or to 
prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil." 

But, while desires imply intelligence, they are not the mere 
efflux, or product of that intelligence ; and, while the objects 
of our desires are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of 
knowing them, that we desire them ; but, rather, because we 
have a capacity of desiring. There is a tendency, on our 
part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in 
them to give us joleasure, when they are attained. Our desires 
of such ends or objects are natural and primary. Natural, 
but not instinctive, for they imply intelligence ; primary, and 
noi factitious, for they result from the constitution of things, 
and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to expe- 
rience and education. 

It has been maintained, however, that there are no original 
principles in our nature, carrying us towards particular objects, 
but that, in the course of experience, we learn what gives us 
pleasure or pain — what does us good or ill — that we flee from 
the one class of objects, and follow after the other; that 
in this way, likings and dislikings — inclination and aversion, 

• Dove, Theory of Hum. Progression, p. 482. '^Book., chap. 4. 

' Part ii., cbap. 16. ^ Act. Pow., essay Ti., chap. 6. 

s Act. and Mor. Pow., book iii., chap. ii. ' Nat. Theol. 

' Cogan, On Passions, part i., chap. 2, sect. 3. * Fssay on the Passions, sect. L 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 135 

DESIRE— 

spring up within us ; and that all the various passions and 
pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensi- 
bility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of what affects 
that sensibility ; and thus, all our desires may be resolved into 
one general desire of happiness or well-being. 

There is room for difference of opinion as to the nvimber of 
those desires which are original ; but there is little room for 
doubting, that there are some which may be so designated. 
Every being has a nature. Everything is what it is, by having 
such a nature. Man has a nature, and his nature has an end. 
This end is indicated by certain tendencies. He feels incli- 
nation or desire towards certain objects, which are suited to 
his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of 
these objects gives pleasure, the absence of them is a source 
of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous 
effort. In seeking them, he comes to know them better and 
desire them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is gra- 
dually developed, and the development which it may give to 
the desires, should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the 
desires primarily existed, as inherent tendencies in our nature, 
• aiming at their correspondent objects ; spontaneously, it may 
be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and 
strength, by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and 
rational powers. 

DESTINY [destinatum, fixed), is the necessary and unalterable 
connection of events ; of which the heathens made a divine 
power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irresisti- 
ble destiny, against which man strives in vain, pervades the 
whole of Greek tragedy. — V. Fatalism. 

DETERMINISM. — This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton' 
to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the 
ancient doctrine of fatalism. The principle oi t\\Q sufficient 
reason is likewise called by Leibnitz the principle of the 
determining reason. In the Diet, des Sciences Philosoj^h., 
nothing is given under determinism, but a reference made 
to fatalism."^ And fatalism is explained as the doctrine 

'■ Raid's Wwli:s, p. 601, note. 

^ But ia the artirie " Liberie," determinism is applied to the doctrine that motives 
invincibly determine the will, and is opposed to liberty of indifference, which is described 
as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives. 



136 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DETERMINISM — 

which denies liberty to man. — V. Necessity, Fatalism, Li- 
berty. 

DIALECTIC [dialelctik] is the logic of appearance as distinguished 
from universal Logic, or it may be that which teaches us to 
excite appearance or illusion. As logical or formal it treats of 
the sources of error and illusion, and the mode of destroying 
them; as transcendental, it is the exposure of the natural and 
unavoidable illusion that arises from human reason itself, 
which is ever inclined to look upon j^henomena as things in 
themselves, and cognitions a priori, as properties adhering to 
these things, and in such way to form the super-sensible, ac- 
cording to this assumed cognition of things in themselves." ' 

" How to divide and subdivide, and dissect, and analyze a 
topic, so as to be directed to the various roads of argument 
by which it may be approached, investigated, defended, or 
attacked, is the province of dialectic. How to criticise those 
arguments, so as to reject the sophistical, and to allow their 
exact weight to the solid, is the province of Logic. The dia- 
lectician is praised in proportion as his method is exliaiistive ; 
that is, in proportion as it supplies every possible form of argu- 
ment applicable to the matter under discussion. The logician 
is praised in proportion as his method is demoiistrative ; that 
is, in proportion as it determines unanswerably the value of 
every argument applied to the matter under discussion. Dia- 
lectic providoy, and Logic appreciates argumentation; dialectic 
exercises the invention, and Logic the judgment."^ 

DIALECTICS [bia%EXT:wri tix^n)- — "The Greek verb fiiaw'y- 
sa^at, in its widest signification, — 1. Includes the use both of 
reason and speech as proper to man. Hence dialectics may 
*■ mean Logic, as including the right use of reason and language. 
2. It is also used as synonymous with the Latin word disserere, 
to discuss or dispute ; hence, dialectics has been used to denote 
the Logic of probabilities, as opposed to the doctrine of demon- 
stration and scientific induction. 3. It is also used in popular 
language to denote Logic properly so called. But dialectics, 
like science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic. 



' Haywood, Transl. of Kant, p. 
^ Taylor, Synonyms. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHl-. 137 

DIALECTICS — 

Dialectics is handled, anatomized, and its conditions deter- 
mined by Logic ; but, for all that, it is not Logic, any more 
than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable king- 
dom is Botany." ' 

"Xenophon- tells us, that Socrates said, 'That dialectic 
{to Sia'Ksysadav) was SO called because it is an inquiry pursued 
by persons who take counsel together, separating the subj ects 
considered according to their kinds [dtaXsyovtai). He held 
accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such 
a process, and should pursue it with diligence. By this means 
he thought they would become good men, fitted for respon- 
sible offices of command, and truly dialectical' {BiaXixto- 
xcoratouj). And this is, I conceive, the answer to Mr. Grote's 
interrogatory exclamation.^ ' Surely the etymology here given 
by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (ScaXsyso^at), cannot be 
considered as satisfactory.' The two notions, of investigatory 
dialogue and distribution of notions according to their kinds, 
which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, 
among the followers of Socrates, connected in fact ; the dia- 
lectic dialogue was supposed to involve of course the dialectic 
division of the subject.""* 

DIAIfOIOLOGY— F. Noologt. 

DICHOTOMY (6t;toT'0|"'''*) cutting in two, division into two parts, 
logically), is a bimembx-al division. — "Our Saviour said to 
Pilate, ' Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell 
thee V And all things reported are reducible to this dicJio- 
tomie, — 1. The fountain of invention. 2. The channel of 
relation." ^ 

" The divisions of Peter Ramus always consisted of two 
members, one of which was contradictory of the other, as if 
one should divide England into Middlesex." In a note on 
this passage, Sir AVilliam Hamilton says, "There is nothing- 
new in Ramus' Dichotomy by contradiction. It was, in par- 
- ticular, a favourite with Plato."® 

"Every division, however complex, is reducible at each of 

' Poste, Inirod. to Poster. Anatyt, p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850. 
2 Men:., iv. 5, 11. ^ Vol. viii., p. 577- 

* Dr. Whewell, On Plato's Notion of Dialectic, Trans, of Camb. Philosoph. Soc, vol. 
ix., part 4. 
» Fuller, Worthies, Vol. i., c. 23. « Ileid's Works, p. 689. 

1.3* 



138 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

DICHOTOMY— 

its steps to a Dichotomy ; that is, to the division of a class into 
two sub-classes, opposed to each other by conti-adiction. The 
term X, if divisible positively by several terms, of -which Y is 
one, is divisible also by the terms Y and not Y." ^ 
DICTUM DE OMNI ET NULLO may be explained to mean 
"whatever is predicated (i.e., affirmed, or denied) universally 
of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner (viz., 
affirmed, or denied) of anything comprehended in that class." 
— F. Contradiction. 

DICTUM SIMPLICITEE. — When a term or proposition is to 
be understood in its plain and unlimited sense, it is used 5m- 
pliciter ; when with limitation or reference, it is said to be 
used secundum quid — q. v. 

DIFFEEENCE (Sta^opa, differentia). — When tAvo objects are 
compared they may have qualities which are common to both, 
or the one may have qualities which the other has not. The 
first constitutes their resemblance, the second their difference. 
If the qualities constituting their resemblance be essential 
qualities, and the qualities constituting their difference be 
merely accidental, the objects are only said to be distinct ; but 
if the qualities constituting their difference be essential quali- 
ties, then the objects are different.^ One man is distinct from 
another man, or one piece of silver from another ; but a man 
is different from a horse, and gold is different from silver. 
Those aci 'antal differences which distinguish objects whose 
essence is common, belong only to individuals, and are called 
individual or numerical differences. Those differences which 
cause objects to have a different nature, constitute species, and 
are called specific differences. The former are passing and 
variable ; but the latter are permanent and form the objects 
of science, and furnish the grounds of all classification, divi- 
sion, and definition — q. v. 

"Difference or differentia, in Logic, means the formal or 
distinguishing part of the essence of a species." When I say 
that the differentia of a magnet is "its attracting iron," and 
that lis property is "polarity," these are called respectively, a 

' Spalding, Logic, p. 146. 

° Derodon, De Univcrsalihus, seems to use differentia and disUnctio indiscriminately. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 139 

DIFFERENCE — 

specific difference and property; because magnet is (I have sup- 
posed) an injima species [i. e., only a species). When I say 
that the differentia of iron ore is " its containing iron," and its 
property " being attracted by the magnet," these are called 
respectively, a generic difference and property, because "iron 
ore" is a subaltern species or genus; being both the genus of 
magnet, and the species of mineral." ' 

The English word divers expresses difference only, but di- 
verse expresses difference with opposition. The Evangelists 
narrate the same events in "divers manners," but not in 
"diverse manners."'^ — V. Distinction. 

DILEMMA is a syllogism with a conditional premiss, in which 
either the antecedent or consequent is disjunctive. When an 
affirmative is proved, the Dilemma is said to be in the modus 
ponens, and the argument is called constructive ; when a 
negative is proved, the Dilemma is said to be in the modus 
tellens, and the argument is called destructive. Of the con- 
structive dilemma there are two sorts — the simple, which con- 
cludes categorically, and the complex, which has a disjunctive 
conclusion. There is but one sort of the true destructive 
dilemma. 

The dilemma is used to prove the absurdity or falsehood of 
some assertion. A conditional proposition is assumed, the 
antecedent of which is the assertion to be disproved, while 
the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumerating the 
suppositions on which the assertion can be true. Should the 
supposition be rejected, the assertion also must be rejected. 
If A is B, either C is D or E is F. But neither C is D nor E 
is F ; therefore, A is not B. 

This syllogism was called the Syllogismus Cornutus, the two 
members of the consequent being the horns of the dilemma, 
on which the adversary is caught between [bvaXa^^dvitai) 
two difficulties. And it was called dilemma, quasi Sij ?ta^- 
fSavwr ; according to others it was so called from Si-'j, twice, 
and ^rifi/xa, an assumption, because in the major premiss there 



» Whately, Log., book ii., chap. 5, § 4. 

' See Porphyry, Introd. to O.itegor. ; Arist., Top., lib. yii., c. 1, 2. 



140 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BIIEMMA— 

are generally two antecedents, which in the minor become 
two assumptions. 

The hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism, or dilemma, must not 
be confounded with the sophism called dilemma, in which, by 
a fallacy, two contradictories seem to be proved. 

DISCOVERY.— F. Invention. 

DISCUESUS.— "If the mind do not perceive intuitively the con- 
nection betwixt the praedicate and subject, as in the case of 
axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no otherwise 
than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the use of middle 
terms, as they are called, in the language of Aristotle. And 
this application of the middle term, first to one of the terms of 
a proposition, and then to the other, is performed by that ex- 
ercise of the intellect which is very properly called in Greek 
hidvoia., because the intellect in this operation goes betwixt 
the two terms, as it were, and passes from the one to the other. 
In Latin, as there is not the same facility of composition, it is 
expressed by two words, discursus mentis, mens being the 
same thing in Latin as Noiis in Greek ; and the Latin expres- 
sion is rendered into English by discourse of reasoning, or as 
it is commonly called, reasoning." ^ 

"Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of proceeding from 
certain judgments to another founded on them (or the result 
of them.)" 2 

DISJUNCTIVE. — F. Proposition, Syllogism. 

DISPOSITION lybtdeeaii, dispositio), according to Aristotle,' is 
the arrangement of that which has parts, either according to 
place, or to potentiality, or according to species ; for it is 
necessary that there be a certain position, as also the name 
disposition makes manifest." 

As applied to mind, it supposes the relation of its powers and 
principles to one another, and means the resultant bias, or 
tendency to be moved by some of them rather than by others. 
Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a 
constitution and as containing certain primary elements ; and, 
according as these elements are combined and balanced there 



' Monbodflo, Ancient Mdaphys., book v., ch. 4. 
" Whately, Log., book li., ch. 1, J 2. 
^hys., lib. iv., cap. 19, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 14J 

DISPOSITION - 

may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just 
as there are differences of bodily temperaments ; and these dif- 
ferences may give rise to a disposition or bias, in the one case, 
more directly in the other. According as intellect, or sensi- 
tivity, or will, prevails in any individual miud, there will be 
a correspondent bias resulting. 

But it is in reference to original differences in the primary 
desires, that differences of disposition are most observable. 
Any desire, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies 
of the mind to its side ; gives a colour to the whole character 
of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his 
temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular chan- 
nel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the 
result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continu- 
ally within him, which only manifests itself by the direction 
in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.' Dis- 
position is the sum of a man's desires and feelings. 
LISTINCTIOIT (5iai,'p£(jt.j) is wider in signification than differ- 
ence; for all things that are different are also distinct; but all 
things that are distinct are not also different. One drop of 
water does not specifically differ from another ; but they are 
individually distinct. 

Distinction is a kind of alietas or otherness. Those things 
are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. Thus 
Peter, precisely because he is not Paul, is said to be distinct 
from Paul. Union is not opposed to distinction; for things 
may be so united that the one shall not be confounded with 
the other. Thus the soul is united to the body. Indeed Pinion 
implies distinction; it is when two things which are mutually 
distinct become, as it were, one. 

Distinction is real and mental, a parte rei and per intellectum. 
Peal distinction is founded in the nature of the thing, and 
amounts to difference. It is threefold : — 1. Object from object 
— as God from man. 2. Mode from mode — as blue from black. 
3. Mode from thing — as body from motion. Mental distinction 
is made by the mind — as when we distinguish between light 

* "The balance of oiir animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call aman'B 
natural <e»ij5e>-."— Eeid, Act. Pow., essay iii., part ii., ch. 8. 



142 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DISTmCTION - 

and heat, which are naturally united, or between the length 
and breadth of a body. It amounts to abstraction.^ 

" Separation by the touch {dis and tango) makes a distinc- 
tion; by turning apart {dis and verto) makes a diversity ; by 
carrying asunder [dis axiA fero) makes a difference; by affixing 
a mark [dis and crimen) makes a discrimination. Distinction, 
therefore, is applied to delicate variations ; diversity to glaring 
contrasts ; difference to hostile unlikenesses ; and discrimina- 
tion to formal criticism." ^ 
DISTSIBUTIOS" — " is the placing particular things in the places 
or compartments which have already been prepared to receive 
them." ^ 

"In Logic, a term is said to be distributed when it is em- 
ployed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its signifi- 
cates — everything to which it is applicable." ^ 

"A term is said to be 'distributed,' when an assertion is 
made or implied respecting every member of the class which the 
term denotes. Of every universal proposition, therefore, the 
subject is distributed; e. g., all men are mortal; No ratioiial 
being is responsible; Whatsoever things were wrzYfen aforetime 
were written for our learning. When an assertion is made or 
applied respecting some member or members of a class, but 
not necessarily respecting all, the term is said to be ' undis- 
tributed ;' as, for example, the subjects of the following pro- 
positions : — Some men are benevolent ; There are some stand- 
ing here that shall not die ; Not every one that invokes the 
sacred name shall enter into the heavenly kingdom."^ 

" When the whole of either term (in a proposition) is com- 
pared with the other, it is said to be distributed ; when a part 
only is so compared, it is said to be undistributed. In the pro- 
position 'All, A is B,' the term A is distributed; but in the 
proposition ' Some, A is B,' it is undistributed."^ 

The rules for distribution are : — 

1. All universal propositions, and no particular, distribute 
the subject. 

• Bossuet, Log., liv. i.,^. 25 ; Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic, ch. 2, sect. 3. 
3 Taylor, Synonyms. " Taylor, Elements of Thought. 
' Whately, Logic, h. ii., ch. 3, g 2. 

* Kidd, Principles of Reasoning, ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179. 
3 Solly, SylL of Log., p. 47. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 143 

DISTRIBUTION — 

2. All negative,, and no affirmative, the predicate.^ 
"A singular term can never denote anything less than the 
object of which it is a name. A common term may be under- 
stood as denoting all, or fewer than all, of the objects of the 
class. When it denotes all, it is said to be taken universally, 
or to be distributed ; that is, to be spread over the whole class, 
or to be applied to all the objects distributively — not collect- 
ively — to each, not to all together. When it denotes fewer 
than all the objects of the class, it is said to be taken particu- 
larly, or to be tmdistributed." ^ 

DITHEISM. — "As for that fore-mentioned ditheism, or opinion 
of two gods — a good and an evil one, it is evident that its 
original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion 
of the essential goodness of Deity, &c."^ — V. Dualism. 

DIVISIOiN" — "is the separating things of the same kind into 
parcels ; analysis is the separating of things that are of dif- 
ferent kinds ; we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into 
twenty pieces ; we analyze it by separating the bark, the 
wood, and the pith — a division may be made at pleasure, an 
analysis must be made according to the nature of the object."^ 
Division is either division proper or partition. Partition is 
the distribution of some substance into its pai'ts; as of the 
globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. Division 
proper is the distribution of genus and species into what is 
under them ; as when substance is divided into spiritual and 
material. The members which arise from division retain the 
name of their whole ; but not those from partition. 
"Division is the separation of a whole into its parts. 
"But as there are tico kinds of tvholes, there are also two 
kinds of division. There is a ivJiole composed of parts really 
distinct, called in Latin, totum, and whose parts are called 
integral parts. The division of this ivliole is called properly 
partition ; as when we divide a house into its apartments, a 
town into its wards, a kingdom or state into its provinces, man 
into body and soul, the body into its members. The sole rule 

' Wesley, Guide to Syllogism, p. 10. 
2 Spalding, Log., p. 57. 
* Cudworth, InteJl. System, p. 213. 
■* Taylor, Elements of Thought. 



144 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

DIVISION — 

of their division is, to make the enumeration of particulars 
very exact, and that there be nothing wanting to them. 

" The other whole is called, in Latin, omne, and its parts 
subjected or inferior parts, inasmuch as the whole is a common 
term, and its parts are the terms comprising its extension. 
The word animal is a whole of this nature, of which the in- 
feriors, as man and bfeast, which are comprehended under its 
extension, are subjected parts. This division obtains properly 
the name of division, and there are four kinds of division 
which may be noticed. 

" The first is, when we divide the genus by its species ; every 
substance is body or mind, every animal is man or beast. The 
second is, when we divide the genus by its dijferences ; every 
animal is rational or irrational, every number is even or un- 
even. The third is, when we divide a common subject into the 
opposite accidents of which it is susceptible, these being accord- 
ing to its different inferiors, or in relation to different times ; 
as, every star is luminous by itself, or by reflection only ; 
every body is in motion or at rest, &c. The fourth is, that of 
an accident into its different subjects, as division of goods into 
those of mind and body." ^ 

"Division (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several 
things signified by one common name. It is so called from 
its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its 
parts." ^ 

The rules of a good division are : — 

1. Each of the parts, or any, short of all, must contain less 
[i. e., have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 
" Weapon " could not be a division of the term " sword." 2. 
All the parts taken together must be exactly equal to the 
thing divided. In dividing the term " weapon " into " sword," 
" pike," " gun," &c., we must not omit anything of which 
" weapon " can be predicated, nor introduce anything of which 
it cannot. 3. The parts, or members, must be opposed, i. e., 
must not be contained in one another. " Book" must not be 
divided into " Quarto," " French ;" for a French book may be 
a quarto, and a quarto French. It may be added, that a divi- 

' Port Hoy. Log., part ii., chap. 15. ^ Whately, Log., book ii.. ch. 5, §5. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 145 

DIVISION- 

sion should proceed throughout upon the same principle- 
Books may be divided according to size, language, matter, &c., 
all these being so many cross-divisions. 

Aristotle,' Reid.^ — V. Whole, Fallacy. 
DIVORCE {diverto, to separate), is a separation, especially of 
husband and wife. It is used to signify, — 1. Separation of a 
married pair without any right of re-marriage. 2. The like 
separation with that right ; and 3. The declaratory sentence, 
pronouncing a marriage to have been void ab initio — that is, 
never to have existed in law. — Paley^ understands by divorce, 
" the dissolution of the marriage contract by the act and at 
the will of the husband."* 
DOGMATISM (86yfia, from fiozf'w, to think). — " Philosophers," 
said Lord Bacon, " may be divided into two classes, the em- 
pirics and the dogmatists. The empiric, like the ant, is content 
to amass, and then consume his provisions. The dogmatist, 
like the spider, spins webs of which the materials are ex- 
tracted from his own substance, admirable for the delicacy of 
their workmanship, but without solidity or use. The bee 
keeps a middle course — she draws her matter from flowers and 
gardens ; then, by art peculiar to her, she labours and digests 
it. True philosophy does something like this." 

" He who is certain, or presumes to say he knows, is, 
whether he be mistaken or in the right, a dogmatist." * 

Kant defined dogmatism, "the presumption that we are able 
to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to prin- 
ciples which the reason has long had in use, without any 
inquiry into the manner or into the right by which it has 
attained them." ^ 

"By dogmatism we understand, in general, both all pro- 
pounding and all receiving of tenets merely from habit, 
without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the 
authority of others ; in short, the very opposite of critical 
investigation. All assertion for which no proof is offered is 
dogmatical."'' 



' Poster. Analyt., lib. ii., c. 13. * Account of Aristotle's Logic, chap, ii., sect. 2. 

» Mor. Phil., \>. iii., pt. iii., c. 7. * Quarterly Rev., No. 203, p. 256, 

* Shaftesbury, Miscell. Beflfct, Miscell. ii., c. 2. 
" Morell, Elements of Pi-ycliology, p, 236, note. 
■■ Chalybseus. Spex:ul. Philosoph.. p. 4. 

14 ■ L 



146 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DOGMATISM— 

To maintain that man cannot attain to knowledge of the 
truth, is scepticism. To maintain that he can do so only by 
renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and sur- 
rendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior intui- 
tion, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all personal 
existence, is mysticism. Dogmatism is to maintain that know- 
ledge may be attained by the right use of our faculties, each 
within its proper sphere, and employed in a right method. 
This is the natural creed of the human race. Scepticism and 
mysticism are after thoughts. 

Dogmatism, or faith in the results of the due exercise of our 
faculties, is to be commended. But dogmatism in the method 
of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. Instead of 
laying down dogmatically truths which are not proven, we 
should proceed rather by observation and doubt. The scho- 
lastic philosophers did mvich harm by their dogmatic method. 
It is not to be mistaken for the synthetic method. There can 
be no synthesis without a preceding analysis. But they started 
from positions which had not been proved, and deduced con- 
sequences which were of no value. ^ 

There is wisdom as well as wit in the saying that, Dogma- 
tism, is Puppyism come to maturity. 
DOUBT {dubiio, to go two ways). — Man knows some things and 
is ignorant of many things, while he is in doubt as to other 
things. Doubt is that state of mind in which we hesitate as 
to two contradictory conclusions — having no preponderance 
of evidence in favour of either. Philosophical doubt has been 
distinguished as 79rotJi"si'o)iaZ or definitive. Definitive doubt ia 
scepticism. Provisional, or viethodical doiiht is a voluntary 
suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a 
more clear and sure conclusion. This was first given as a rule 
in philosophical method by Descartes, who tells us that he 
began by doubting everything, dischai'ging his mind of all 
preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and triie till 
he had subjected them to a rigorous examination. 

"Doubt Is some degree of belief, along with the conscious- 
ness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute dis- 

' Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 



fceZt'e/" implies knowledge: it is the knowledge that such or such 
a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition without 
any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is credttUty. If 
it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance con- 
cerning it, this is doubt. In proportion as knowledge increases, 
doubt diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens."' — V. 
Certainty, Scepticism. 
I}E>EAMIHG-. — The phenomena of sleep and dreaming, are treated 
by almost all writers on psychology. Dreams very often take 
their rise and character from something in the preceding state 
of body or mind. " Through the multitude of business cometh 
a drearn," said Solomon ; and Aristotle regarded dreams as the 
vibrations of our waking feelings." 

According to these views, dreams, instead of being prospec- 
tive or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The former 
opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and among all 
nations ; and hence, oneiromancy or prophesying by dreaims, 
that is, interpreting them as presages of coming events. 
DUALISM, BITALITY. —"Pythagoras talked, it is said, of an 
immaterial unity, and a material duality, by which he pre- 
tended to signify, perhaps, the first principles of all things, 
the efficieiit and material causes.^ 

Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created and 
is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, equally ne- 
cessary, eternal, and independent. 

Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the Magi, 
who maintained the existence of a good principle and an evil 
principle ; and thus explained the mixed state of things which 
prevails. It would appear, however, according to Zoroaster, 
that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were subordinate to Akerenes, 
or the Supreme Deity ; and that it was only a sect of the Magi 
who held the doctrine of dualism in its naked form. Their 
views were revived in the second century by the Gnostics, and 
in the third century were supported by Manes, whose follow- 
ers were called Manicheans. 

Many of the ancient philosophers regarded the universe as 
constituted by two principles, the one active, the other pas- 

' Taylor, Elements of Thought. ' Eihic, lib. i., cap. 13, 

^ BoUughroke, Hum, Reason, essay ii, 



148 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DUALISM — 

sive, the one mind, the other matter — the one soul, the other 
body. But the supposition of two infinites, or of two first 
causes, is self-contradictory, and is now abandoned. 

The term dualism also finds a place in the theory of percep- 
tion — q. V. 

BURATIOS". — "After some thought has entirely disappeared 
from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief that 
it has been in the mind before ; this is called memory. Memory 
and the consciousness of succession give us the notion signi- 
fied by the word duration." ' 

According to Kant, dtiration or time, and also space, are 
necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of 
bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as occurring 
in time. — V. Time. 

DUTY. — That which we ought to do — that which we are under 
obligation to do. In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the 
same time that it is our duty to do it. There is a complete 
synthesis between rectitude and obligation. Price has used 
oughtness as synonymous with rightness. — V. Obligation. 

Duty and right are relative terms. If it be the duty of one 
party to do some thing, it is the right of some other party to 
expect or exact the doing of it.^ — V. Right, Rectitude. 

DYNAMISM, the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance in- 
volves yb?-ce. — V. Matter. 



ECLECTICISM [ix-Kiy<^, to select, to choose out). — The Alex- 
andrian philosophers, or Neo-Platonicians, who arose at 
Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and 
continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian, 
professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true in 
all systems of philosophy. To their method of philosophizing, 
the name eclecticism was first applied. Clemens Alexandrinus^ 
said, " By philosophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Pla- 
tonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian ; but whatever 

* Locke, Essay mi Hum. Understand., book ii.. chap. 15. 

' See Wordsworth, Ode to Duty. ' Stromm., lib. i., p. 228. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHl. i49 

ECLECTICISM — 

things have been properly said by each of these sects, incul- 
cating justice and devout knovrledge, — this wliole selection I 
call pJiilosojyJiy." Diogenes Laertes ' tell us, that Potamos of 
Alexandria inti-oduced ixT^exTftxrjv aHpssw. But the method 
had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle before, and has been 
followed by many in all ages of philosophy. Leibnitz said 
that truth was more wddely difiused than was commonly 
thought; but it was often burdened and weakened, mutilated 
and corrupted by additions which spoiled it and made it less 
useful. In the philosophy of the ancients, or those who had 
gone before, he thought there w^as perennis qucedam pJiiloso- 
pliia — if it could only be disintricated from error and disin- 
terred from the rubbish which overAvhelmed it. In modern 
times the great advocate of eclecticism is Mons. Cousin. But 
its legitimacy as a mode of philosophizing has been chal- 
lenged. 

"The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of 
Alexandria) says Mr. Maurice,^ "is obvious enough. He did 
not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such ; far less 
did he care for the opinions and conflicts of the schools which 
bore their names ; he found in each hints of precious truths 
of which he desired to avail himself; he would gather the 
' flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles 
he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. Eclecli- 
cism, in this sense, seemed only like another name for catholic 
"wisdom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in 
art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey 
wherever it was to be found ; he would find sweetness in it if 
it Avas hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the 
elaborate architecture of the cells in Avhich it was stored. The 
Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had im- 
parted the skill ; to receive them thankfully w^as an act of 
homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of devotion and 
gratitude, which belonged so remarkably to Clemens — once let 
it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of 
treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious 
chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable in- 
gredients, and the eclectical doctrine would lead to more self- 

' 1, sect 21- 2 jfjgy_ ^-,n^i Mctaphys. Phil, p. 53. 

14- 



150 VOCABULAUY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

ECLECTICISM— 

conceit, ■would be more unreal and heartless than any one 
of the sectarian elements out of T^hich it was fashioned. It 
would want the belief and conviction which dwell, with what- 
ever vinsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. 
Many of the most vital characteristics of the original dogmas 
would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough 
edges and fitting them into each other. In general the super- 
ficialities and formality of each creed would be preserved in 
the new system ; its original and essential characteristics 
sacrificed." 

"In philosophy Cicero was never more than an eclectic, that 
is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very essence 
of the philosophical mind lies in this, that it is constrained by 
an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, necessary prin- 
ciples, and cannot halt until it reaches the living, streaming 
sources of truth ; whereas the eclectic will stop short where he 
likes, at any maxim to which he chooses to ascribe the autho- 
rity of a principle. The philosophical mind must be system- 
atic, ever seeking to behold all things in their connection, as 
parts or members of a great organic whole, and impregnating 
them all with the electric spirit of order ; while the eclectic is 
content if he can string together a number of generalizations. 
A philosopher incorporates and animates : an eclectic heaps 
and ties up. The philosopher combines multiplicity into 
unity ; the eclectic leaves unity straggling about in multi- 
plicity. The former opens the arteries of truth, the latter its 
veins. Cicero's legal habits peer out from under his philoso- 
phical cloak, in his constant appeal to precedent, his ready 
deference to authority. For in law, as in other things, the 
practitioner does not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or 
tertiary principles, taking his stand upon the mounds which 
his predecessors have erected." ' 

See Cousin,^ Jouffroy," and Damiron.'* 
ECOHOMICS [olxoi, a house; vofioi, a law). — Treatises under 
this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero. 



' Second Series of Guesses at Truth, edition 1848, p. 238. 

' Fragmens Philosophiqiies, 8vo, Paris, 1826. 

^ Melanges Philosophiques, 8vo, Paris, 1833. 

* Essai sur VHistoire de la Pkilosophie au dixneuvieme siede, 2 torn., 8yo, Paris, 1834. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 151 

ECONOMICS - 

They seem to have treated of the best means of managing 
and increasing the comforts and resources of a household. 
Only fragments of them remain. But in modern times 
justice or social duty has been distinguished by Henry More 
into ethical, economical, and political. And economics has 
been employed to denote those duties which spring from the 
relations which exist in a family or household. These are the 
duties — 

1. Of husband and wife. 

2. Of parent and child. 

3. Of master and servant. 

ECSTASY {^sxetaavi, standing out), a transport of the soul by 
Avhich it seems as if out of the body. 

" Whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with 
the eyes open, I leave to be examined."' 

This word does not occur in philosophy before the time of 
Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry pre- 
tended to have ecstasies in which they were united to God. 
Among Christian writers, Bonaventura [Itinerarium 3Ientis in 
Deum), Gerson [Theologia Mystica), and Francis de Sales, re- 
commend those contemplations which may lead to ecstasy. 
But there is danger of their leading to delusion, and to con- 
found the visions of a heated imagination with higher and 
nearer views of spiritual things.^ 
EDUCATION [educo, to lead out), means the development of 
the bodily and mental powers. The human being is born and 
lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have a tendency 
to call forth and strengthen his powers of body and mind. 
And this may be called the education of nature. But by edu- 
cation is generally meant the using those means of develop- 
ment which one man or one generation of men may employ 
in favovir of another. These means are chiefly instruction, or 
the communication of knowledge to enlighten and strengthen 
the mind ; and discipline, or the formation of manners and 
habits. Instruction and discipline may be physical or moral, 
that is, may refer to the body or to the mind. Both, when 
employed in all their extent, go to make up education, which 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 19. 
^ Baader, Traiti sur VExtase, 1817. 



152 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EDTJCATIOU — 

is the aid given to assist the development, and advance the 
progress of the human being, as an individual, and as a mem- 
ber of a family, of a community, and a race. 

" The business of education is to educe or bring out that 
vrhich is within, not merely or mainly to insiruci or impose a 
form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufii- 
cient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, 
as well as bodily, from without, through the ministration of 
others ; and hence mbtruction must ever be a chief element of 
educatioxi. Hence too we obtain a criterion to determine what 
sort of instruction is right and beneficial — that which minis- 
ters to education, which tends to bring out, to nourish and cul- 
tivate the faculties of the mind, not that which merely piles a 
mass of information upon them. Moreover, since nature, if 
left to herself, is ever prone to run wild, and since there are 
hurtful and pernicious elements around us, as well as nourish- 
ing and salutary, pruning and sheltering, correcting and pro- 
tecting are also among the principal offices of education." ' 

Milton," Locke,^ Guizot,'' Conseils d'lin Pere sur V Education. 
EFFECT. — That which is produced by the operation of a cause. 

■ — V. Cause. 
EGO (I). — " Supposing it proved that my thoughts and my con- 
sciousness must have a subject, and consequently that I exist, 
how do I know that all that train and succession of thoughts 
which I remember belong to one subject, and that the J of 
this moment is the very individual 7 of yesterday, and of time 
past?" 5 

Sir William Hamilton's note upon this passage is as foUoAvs: 
— " In English, we cannot say the land the not I, so happily 
as the French le moi and le non-moi, or even the German das 
Ich and das niclit Ich. The ambiguity arising from identity 
of sound between the I and the eye, would itself preclude the 
ordinary employment of the former. The ego and the non-ego 
are the best terms we can use ; and as the expressions are 
scientific, it is perhaps no loss that their technical precision is 
guarded by their non-vernacular ity." 

* Second Series, Guesses at Truth, 1848, p. 145. ^ On Education. 

' On Education. * Meditations, 8vo, Paris, 1852. 

s Reid, Inquiry, Introd., sect. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 153 

EGO- 

In another note^ he has added : — " The ego as the subject 
of thought and knowledge, is now commonly styled by phi- 
losophers the subject; and subjective \s a familiar expression 
for what pertains to the mind or thinking principle. In con- 
trast and correlation to these, the terms object and objective are, 
in like manner, now in general use to denote the non-ego, its 
affections and properties, and in general, the really existent as 
opposed to the idealhj knoivn." 
EGOISM, EGOIST. — " Those Cartesians who in the progress of 
their doubts ended in absolute egoism." 

"A few bold thinkers, distinguished by the name of egoists, 
had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to doubt of 
everything but their own existence. According to these, the 
proposition, Cogito ergo sum, is the only truth which can be 
regarded as absolutely certain." ^ 

Dr. Reid^ says, that some of Descartes' disciples who doubted 
of everything but their own existence, and the existence of 
the operations and ideas of their o-wn mind, remained at this 
stage of his system and got the name of egoists. But Sir Wil- 
liam Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says, " He is doubt- 
ful about the existence of this supposed sect of egoists." 

The first sense and aspect of egoism may seem to be selfish- 
ness. But this is contradicted by the following epitaph : — 

In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelm- 
ham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who died 
Nov. 17, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following epitaph : — 
'• MYSELF. 

'• As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself, 
And thus myself said to me, 
Look to thyself, and take care of thyself, 
For nobody cares for thee. 

" So I turned to myself and I answered myself, 
In the self-same reverie, 
Look to myself, or look not to myself. 
The self-same thing will it be." 

ELECTION {eligo, to choose), is an elicit act of will, by which, 
after deliberation of several means to an end proposed by the 

' Reid's Wwks, note B, sect. 1, p. S06. 

* Stewart, Dissert., part ii., p. 161, and p. 175. ' Intell. Pow., essay ii., chap. 8. 



15J VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ELECTION — 

understanding, the will elects one rather than any other. Vo- 
lition has reference to the end, election is of the means. Ac- 
cording to others, no distinction should be taken between 
election and volition ; as to will an end is the same act as to 
choose the means. But an end may be accomplished by dif- 
ferent means — of one or other of which there is election. 

Aristotle^ says, "moral preference, rtpootpstfij, then, relates 
to those things only which may be accomplished by our own 
exertions ; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modi- 
fied by reason ; and conversant not about ends, but about the 
best means by which they may be attained. Volition, on the 
contrary, is conversant only about ends ; which consist, ac- 
cording to some, in real, and according to others, in seeming 
good." 
ELEMENT [aTtoixiiw). — The Stoic definition of an element is, 
" that out of which, as their first principle, things generated 
;r,o made, and into which, as their last remains, they are 
; evolved."' 

"We call that elementary which in a composition cannot be 
divided into heterogeneous parts — thus the elements of sound 
constitute sound, and the last parts into which you divide it — 
parts which you cannot divide into other sounds of a difi'erent 
kind. The last parts into Avhich bodies can be divided — parts 
which cannot be divided into parts of a difi'erent kind, are the 
elements of bodies. The elements of every being are its con- 
stitutive principle."* 

"Ulemenis are ta ewrtupxovta, aiVta — the inherent or inexist- 
ing causes, such as matter and form. There are other causes, 
such as the tribe of efficient causes, which cannot be called 
elements, because they make no part of the substances which 
they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his 
statue ; the painter of his picture. Hence it appears that all 
elements are causes, but not all causes elements."^ And in the 
chap, he says, " In form and matter we place the elements of 
natural substance." 

Materia prima, or matter without form — v%t], was an element 
ready to receive form. This seems to be the use of the word 

' Ethics, book iii., ebap. 3, 4. ^ Diog. Laert., Tii., 176. 

* Arist., MetaphyS; lib. iv., c. 3. * Harris, Philosoph. Arrang., chap. 5, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 155 

ELEMENT— 

as retained in the communion service. Bread and wine are 
elements ready to receive the form of the body and blood of 
Christ. "Like the elements of the material worM, the bases 
of the sacred natures into which they were transformed."' — 
See Doublado's Lettirs. 

" The elementes be those originall thynges unmyxt and un- 
compounde, of whose temperance and myxture all other 
thynges having corporal substance be compact ; of them be 
foure, that is to say, earth, water, ayre, and fyre." ^ 

Element is applied analogically to many things ; as to letters, 
the elements of words; to words the elements of speech; and in 
general to the principles or first truths or rules of any science 
or art. 

ELEMEUTOLOGrY. — F. Methodology. 

ELICIT [elicio, to draw out), is applied to acts of will which are 
produced directly by the will itself, and are contained within 
it; as velle aid nolle. An elicit act of will is either election or 
volition — the latter having reference to ends, and the former 
to means. 

ELIMIHATIOH" [elimino, to throw out), in Mathematics, is the 
process of causing a function to disappear from an equation, 
the solution of which would be embarrassed by its presence 
there. In other writings the correct signification is, "the ex- 
trusion of that wMch is superfluous or irrelevant." Thus, 
Sir W. Hamilton^ says : — " The preparatory step of the dis- 
cussion was, therefore, an elimination of those less precise and 
appropriate significations, which, as they would at best only 
afford a remote genus and difference, were wholly incompe- 
tent for the purpose of a definition." 

It is frequently used in the sense of eliciting, but incor- 
rectly. 

EMAMATION [emano, to flow from). — According to several 
systems of philosophy and religion which have prevailed in the 
Bast, all the beings of which the universe is composed, whether 
body or spirit, have proceeded from, and are parts of, the 
Divine Being or substance. This doctrine of emanation is 



■ Hampclen, On Scholastic Philosophy, lect. vii. 
^ Sir T. Elyot, Casld of HeaUh, b. i. 
=* In Edin. itev., April. 1S33. 



156 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EMANATION — 

to be found in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, and 
Neo-Platonicians. It differs little, if at all, from Pantheism. 
EMINENTLY. — F. Virtual. 

EMOTION {emoveo, to move out), is often used as synonymous 
with feeling. Strictly taken, it means " a state of feeling which, 
while it does not spring directly from an affection of body, 
manifests its existence and character by some sensible effect 
upon the body." 

An emotion differs from a sensation, by its not originating 
in a state of body ; and from a cognition, by its being pleasu- 
rable or painful. 

Emotions, like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. 
Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is 
known and contemplated ; and on the contemplation, springs 
up the appropriate feeling, followed by the characteristic ex- 
pression of countenance, or attitude, or manner. 

In themselves considered, emotions ^ can scarcely be called 
springs of action. They tend rather, while they last, to fix 
attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited 
them. In many instances, however, emotions are succeeded by 
desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken them, 
or to remove ourselves from the presence of such objects. 
When an emotion is thus succeeded by some degree of desire, 
it forms, according to Lord Karnes, a passion, and becomes, 
according to its nature, a powerful and permanent spring of 
action. 

Emotions, then, are awakened through the medium of the 
intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we 
form of the objects to which they refer. 

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sensible 
effects upon the body. 

Emotions, in themselves, and by themselves, lead to quies- 
cence and contemplation, rather than activity. But they com- 
bine with springs of action, and give to them a character and 



• "The feeliugs of beauty, grandeur, and whateTer else is comprehended under the 
name of taste, do not lead to action, but terminate in delightful contemplation, which 
constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, to which, 
in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened," — Mackintosh, Dissert. 
p. 238. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 157 

EMOTION — 

a colouring. What is said to be done from surprise or shame, 
has its proper spring — the surprise or shame being con- 
comitant. ^ 
EMPIRIC, EMPIEICISM— Among the Greek physicians those 
who founded their practice on experience called themselves 
empirics [e/A-rtsopoxou) ; those who relied on theory, metliodisis 
{/xsOodixov) ; and those who held a middle course, dogmatists 
{SoyixatMol). The term empiricism became naturalized in 
England when the writings of Galen and other opponents of 
the empirics were in repute, and hence it was applied generally 
to any ignorant pretender to knowledge. It is now used to 
denote that kind of knowledge which is the result of expe- 
rience. Aristotle applies the terms historical and empirical in 
the same sense. Historical knowledge is the knowledge that 
a thing is. Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of its 
cause, or why it is. The Germans laugh at our phrase philo- 
sophical transactions, and say, " Socrates brought down philo- 
sophy from the clouds — but the English have brought her 
down to the dunghill." 

Empiricism allows nothing to be true nor certain but what 
is given by experience, and rejects all knowledge a priori. 

In antiquity the Ionian school may be said to have been 
sensualist or empirical. The saying of Heraclitus that nothing 
is, but that all things are beginning to be, or are in a continual 
flux, amounts to a denial of the persistence of substance. De- 
mocritus and the atomists, if they admitted the substance of 
atoms, denied the fundamental laws of the human mind. 
And the teaching of Protagoras, that sense is knowledge, and 
man the measure of all things, made all science individual 
and relative. The influence of Plato and Aristotle re-esta- 
blished the foundation of true philosophy, and empiricism was 
regarded as scepticism. 

In the middle ages empiricism was found only among the 
physicians and alchemists, and was not the badge of any school 
of philosophy. 

Emjnricism, as applied to the philosophy of Locke, means 
that he traces all knowledge to experience, i/xjisipia. Expe- 

' See Dr. Chalmers, Sl-^tches of Merit, and Mor. Phil., p. 88. 

15 



158 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

EMPIRIC — 

rience, according to him, included sensation and reflection. 
The French philosophers, Condillac and others, rejected re- 
flection as a distinct source of knowledge ; and their doctrine, 
to distinguish it from that of Locke, is called sensualism. 
Ideology gives nothing to the mind biit sensations remembered 
or generalized, which it calls ideas. But Reid and the common 
sense philosophers, as well as Cousin and the rationalist 
philosophers, hold that the mind has primary beliefs, or 
universal and necessary ideas, which are the ground of all 
experience and knowledge. — V. Experience. 

Empirical or experimental "is an epithet used by Madame 
de Stael and other writers on German philosophy, to distin- 
guish what they call the philosophy of sensation, from that of 
Plato and of Leibnitz. It is, accordingly, generally, if not 
always, employed by them in an unfavourable sense. In this 
country, on the contrary, the experimental or inductive philo- 
sophy of the human mind denotes those speculations concern- 
ing mind, which, rejecting all hypothetical theories, rest solely 
on phenomena for which we have the evidence of conscious- 
ness. It is applied to the philosophy of Reid, and to all that 
is truly valuable in the metaphysical works of Descartes, 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume." ' 

EMULATION {cemidus, striving; from a^t^xa, a strife), is the 
desire of superiority. It is one of those primitive desires 
which manifest themselves in very early years. It prompts, 
when properly directed and regulated, to the most strenuous 
and persevering exertion. Its influence in the carrying for- 
Avard of education is most important. 

ENDS. — Ends are of two kinds, according to Aristotle,^ ivspyeiai, 
operations ; Epya, productions. An t i-fpysia is the end, when 
the object of a man's acting is the pleasure or advantage in 
being so employed, as in music, dancing, contemplation, &c., 
which produce nothing, generally speaking, beyond the plea- 
sure which the act affords. An spyoi' is something which is 
produced beyond the operation or energy ; thus, the shoe is 
the tpyov produced by the fVcpysta of shoe-making." 

This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour aa 

' Stewart, Dissert, pt. ii., p. 146, note- ^ Eth., lib. i., ca^.l. 

' Paul, Analysis of Arist., p. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 

ENDS — 

productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does not 
give a material product. 

An end is that for the sake of vrhich an action is done. 
Hence it has been said to be, principium in intentione ei ter- 
minus in executione. 

When one end has been gained, it may be tlie means of 
gaining some otlier ejid. Hence it is that ends have been 
distinguished, as supreme and ultimate, or subordinate and 
intermediate. That which is souglit for its own sake, is the 
supreme and idtimate end of those actions which are done with 
a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other 
end, is a subordinate and intermediate end. 

Ends as ultimate, are distinguished into the end simpliciter 
vMimus, and ends which are ultimate secundum quid. An end 
which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of 
actions, is called ultimate secundum quid. But that which is 
aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded 
as a means to any other end, is an ultimate end, simply and 
absolutely. 

See Edwards,' Cicero.^ 
ENS is either ens reale or ens rationis. 

Ens Rationis. — That which has no existence but in the idea 

which the mind forms of it ; as a golden mountain. 
Ens S,eale, in philosophical language, is taken late et stricte, and 
is distinguished as ens potentiate, or that which may exist, and 
ens actuate, or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken 
as the concrete of essentia, and signifies what has essence and 
may exist — as a rose in winter. Sometimes as the participle 
of esse, and then it signifies what actually exists. Ens with- 
out intellect is re?, a thing. 
ENTELECHY {svts-Ksx^''<'-> from ivfe-Ksi, perfect ; exitv, to have ; 
and TfXoj, an end ; in Latin perfectihabia). — " In one of the 
books of the Pythagoreans, viz., Ocellus Lucanus, Ilfpt •tov 
Ttdvto^, the word ewrsxsua is used in the same sense. Hence 
it has been thought that this was borrowed from the Pytha- 
goreans."* 

' Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the yPbrld. 

''■ De Finihus Bonorum et Malorum. 

^ Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., h. i., ch. 3, p. 16, note. 



160 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ENTELECHY— 

Cicero' interprets it to mean qiiandam quasi continuatarn 
motioitem et perennem. 

Melancthon^ gives two interpretations of Endelechy, as lie 
writes it. He says that ivhiXixU signifies continuus, and 
£V6f?i,f;^£ttt contimiitas. According to him, Aristotle used it 
as synonymous with ivi^yna. Hence Cicero translated it 
by continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolus blames 
Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning "interior perfec- 
tion," as if it were •to htbs '^eXsiovv. But Melancthon thinks 
Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philosophy of 
Ai-istDtle. 

According to others, sv8i%£xi''0' means continuance, and is 
a totally different word from sptsT^sxitO', which means actu- 
ality.^ 

According to Leibnitz, entelecheia is derived apparently from 
the Greek word which signifies perfect, and therefore the cele- 
brated Hermolaus Barbaras expressed it in Latin, word for 
word, 'bj perfectihahia, for act is the accomplishment of power ; 
and he needed not to have consulted the devil, as he did, they 
say, to tell him this much.'* 

"You may give the name of entelecliies to all simple sub- 
stances or created monads, for they have in them a certain 
perfection (£;tova(t -to ivtsT^si), they have a suflSciency (avr'apxtta) 
which makes them the source of their internal actions, and so 
to say incorporeal automatons."^ He calls a monad an autar- 
chic automaton, or first entclechie — having life and force in 
itself. 

"Eiitelechy is the opposite to potentiality, yet would be ill 
translated by that Avhich we often oppose to potentiality, 
actuality. KZ§oj expresses the substance of each thing viewed 
in repose — its form or constitution ; ivipyna, its substance, 
considered as active and generative ; ivHTJx^''^ seems to be 
the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The effectio of 
Cicero, therefore, represents the most important side of it, but 
not the whole." ^ 



.' Tuscul. Quasi., lib. i., qusest. 1. ^ Opera, torn, xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846. 

" Arist. Metaphys., Bohu's Libi-.. pp. 68, 301 ; Donaldson, New Oratylus, pp. 339-344. 
' Leibnitz, Theodicee, partie i., sect. 87. '' Monadologie, sect. 18. 

" Maurice, Mor. and Metaphys. Phil., note, p. 191. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 

ENTELECHY— 

'Evte-ksxeia ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par consequent ne 
releve que de soi meme, et constitue une unite indivisible.^ 

" L' Entelechie est oppose a la simple puissance, comme la 
forme a la matiere, I'etre au possible. Cost elle qui, par la 
vertu de la fin, constitue I'essence meme des choses, et im- 
prime le mouvement a la matifere aveugle; et c'est en ce sens 
qu' Aristote a pu donner de Fame cette celebre definition, 
qu'elle est I'entelechie ou forme premiere de tout corps naturel 
qui possfede la vie en puissance.'' ^ 

Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an entelecJiy ; a defi- 
nition of which Dr. Reid said he conld make no sense. — V. 
Soul, Actual. 
ENTHUSIASM (o ^£65 h rjjjuv) — "is almost a synonym of genius; 
the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason ; 
and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever 
achieved."" 

The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According 
to its composition it should signify " divine inspiration." But 
it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement or 
exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep medi- 
tations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior, the 
devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, are 
so many dififerent phases of enthusiasm. "According to Plu- 
tarch, there be five kinds of Enthusiasm : — Divinatory, Bac- 
chical (or corybantical). Poetical (under which he compre- 
hends musical also). Martial and Erotical, or Amatorie." * 
ENTHYMEME [h Ovjx^, in the mind), is an irregular syllogism 
in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but kept in 
mind ; as " every animal is a substance, therefore, every man 
is a substance ;" in which the premiss, " man is an animal," 
is suppressed. " This is the vulgar opinion regarding Aris- 
totle's Enthi/nieme, but, as I have shown, not the correct."^ 

' Cousin, note to Transl. of Aristotle's Metaphysics, book xii., p. 212. 

^ Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

' Coleridge, JVbtes on Eng. Div., vol. i., p. 338. 

* A Treatise concerning E^ithusiasm by Meric Casaubon, D. D., chap. 1. Shaftesbury, 
Of Enthusiasm. See also Natural Hist, of Enthusiasm, by Isaac Taylor; Madame de 
Stael, Germany ; Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 19; Moro, Enthur 
siasmus Triumphatus. 

See Edin. Rev., vol. Ivii , p. 221 ; Sir William Hamilton, Reid^s Worlcs, p. 704, note. 
15* M 



162 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPUY, 

ENTHYMEME — 

Aristotle's SijUogism was an inference in matter necessary ; 
tiis Enthymeme was an inference in matter probable.' The 
famous expression of Descartes, Cogito ergo sum, is, as to form, 
an enthymeme. It was not put, however, as a proof of exist- 
ence, but as meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in 
the consciousness of thinking. 

ENTITY {eiititas), in the scholastic j^hilosophy was synonymous 
with essence or form. 

To all individuals of a species there is something in com- 
mon — a nature which transiently invests all, but belongs ex- 
clusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and viewed 
apart from any individual, was what the scholastics called an 
entity. Animals had their entity, which was called animality. 
Men had their entity, which was called humanity. It denoted 
the common nature of the individuals of a species or genus. 
It was the idea or model according to which we conceived of 
them. The question whether there was a reality correspond- 
ing to this idea, divided philosophers into Nominalists and 
Realists — c[. v. 

It is used to denote anything that exists, as an object of 
sense or of thought. — V. Ens. 
ENUNCIATION, in Logic, includes the doctrine of propositions 
— q. V. 

EPICHEIREMA (£rti;i;"ps". to put one's hand to a thing), an 
attempted proof — is a syllogism having the major or minor 
premiss, or both, confirmed by an incidental proposition called 
a Prosyllogism. This proposition, with the premiss it is at- 
tached to, forms an enthymeme. The incidental proposition 
is the expressed jyremiss of the enthymeme, and the premiss it 
is attached to is the conclusion : e. g., — 

All sin is dangerous. 

Covetousness is sin (for it is a transgression of the law), 
therefore, 

It is dangerous. 

The minor premiss is an enthymeme. " Covetousness is a 
transgression of the law ; therefore, it is sin.'^ 

' Bachman, p. 260. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 163 

EPICUREAK'. — A follower of Epicurus, a philosopher, who was 
born 341, b. c. 

" The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato, Aris- 
totle, and Zeno, in making virtue consist in acting in the most 
suitable manner to obtain primary objects of natural desire. 
It differed from all of them in two other respects ; — 1st, in the 
account which it gave of these primary objects of natural 
desire ; and, 2dly, in the account which it gave of the excel- 
lence of virtue, or the reason why that quality ought to be 
esteemed." ' 

EPISTEMOLOGY (xdyoj tij; i7tc(!ifriiA,tji, the science of true know- 
ing) — "the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as Ontology 
is the doctrine or theory of being." ^ 

EPISYLLOQISM. — In a chain of reasoning one of the premisses 
of the main argument may be the conclusion of another argu- 
ment, in that case called a Prosyllogism ; or the conclusion 
of the main argument may be a premiss to a supplementary 
one, which is called an episyllogism. The question is, " Has 
A. B. been poisoned?" and the syllogism is, "A man who 
has taken a large quantity of arsenic has been poisoned, and 
A. B. is found to have done so, therefore, he has been 
poisoned." With the addition of a prosyllogism and an epi- 
syllogism the meaning would run — "A man who has taken 
arsenic has been poisoned ; and A. B. has taken arsenic, for 
tests discover it [ProsyL), therefore, A. B. has been poisoned, 
and, therefore, there cannot be a verdict of death from natural 
causes [Episyll.)." 

EaUANIMITY. — F. Magnanimity. 

EQ,UITY [ertuixsM, or to laov, as distinguished from to vo/a-ixov), 
is described by Aristotle ** as that kind of justice which cor- 
rects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All 
written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and 
must leave particular cases to the discretion of the parties. 
An equitable man will not press the letter of the law in his 
own favour, when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his 
neighbour. The ancients, in measuring rusticated building, 



* Smitb, Theory of Mor. Sent., part vii., sect. 2. See Gassendi, De Vita Moribus et 
Doctrina, Epicuri, 4to, Lyons, 16-17. 

* Ferriex-, Inst, of Metaphys., p. 46, ' Elides, book v., chap. 10. 



164 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EaiTITY — 

in which the stones alternately projected and receded, used 
a leaden rule. Equity, like this leaden rule, bends to the 
specialities of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice 
cannot do so. 

" Equity contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the 
law of nature ; and justice contemplates the mass of rights 
growing out of the law of society. Equity treats of our dues 
as equals; justice treats of our dues as fellow-subjects. The 
purpose of equity is respect for humanity ; the purpose of 
justice is respect for property. Equity withstands oppression ; 
justice withstands injury."' — V. Justice. 

" In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that 
equity which, in human transactions, is founded in natural 
justice, in honesty and right, and which properly arises ex 
cequo et bono. In this sense it answers precisely to the defi- 
nition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in his 
Pandects, ' Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum, 
cuique iribuendi.' And the word jus is used in the same sense 
in the Koman law, when it is declared that jus est ars boni et 
cequi, where it means that we are accustomed to call jurispru- 
dence." This is natural jurisprudence. In this sense equity 
is coincident with it. But Wolfius says, '' Jusium appellatur 
quicquidjit secundum jus perfectum alter ius; cequum vero quod 
secundum imperfectum ." ^ 

EaUIVOCAL or HOMONYMOUS words have different signifi- 
cations, as bull, the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. 
Gallus, in Latin, a cock, or a Frenchman. Canis, a dog, or 
the dog-star. They originate in the multiplicity of things and 
the poverty of language. 

Words signifying different things may be used, — 
First, By accident ; or, second, With intention. 1st, It has 
happened, that Sandwich is the name of a peer — of a town — 
of a cluster of Islands, and of a slice of bread and meat. 2d, 
There are four ways in which a word may come to be used 
equivocally with knowledge or intention : — 

1. On account of the resemblance of the things signified, as 
when a statue or a picture is called a man. 

• Taylor, Synonyms. = Story, Comment, on Equity Jurisp., pp. 1-3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 

EaUIVOCAL — 

2. On account of proportion, as when a point ia called a 
principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in respect 
to number. 

3. On account of common derivation — thus, a medical man, 
a medical bo6k, a medical instrument, are all derived from 
medicine. 

4. On account of common reduction or reference — thus, a 
healthfid xQ.Q(\.\(iinQ, healthful ])\x\sq, healthful herb, all referring 
to human health. 

Some of these are intermediate between equivocal and analo- 
gous terms, particularly No. 4. 

An Equivocal noun, in Logic, has more than one significa- 
tion, each of its significations being equally applicable to 
several objects, as pen, post. " Strictly speaking, there is 
hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded 
as in this sense equivocal; but the title is usually applied only 
in any case when a word is emjiloyed equivocally ; e. g., when 
the middle term is used in different senses in the two pre- 
mises, or where a proposition is liable to be understood in dif- 
■ ferent senses, according to the various meaning of one of its 
terms." ^ 
EdUIVOCATION [veque, voco, to use one word in different 
senses). — " How absolute the knave is ! We m.ust speak by 
the card, or equivocation will undo us." — Hamlet, act v., 
scene 1. 

In morals, to equivocate is to offend against the truth by 
using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the 
intention of its being understood in another — or in either 
sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles gave 
responses of ambiguous meaning. Aio, te, ^acide, Romanos 
vincere posse — may mean either ; " I say that thou, descend- 
ant of jEacus, canst conquer the Romans ;" or, "■ I say that 
the Romans can conquer thee, descendant of .^acus." La- 
tronem Petrum occidisse, may mean, " a robber slew Peter ;" 
or, " Peter slew a robber." 

Edwardum occidere nolite timer-e honian est. The message 
penned by Adam Orleton, Bishop of Hereford, and sent by 

» Whately, Log., b. iii., § 10. 



166 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EaUIVOCATION — 

Q. Isabella to the gaolers of her husband, Edw. II. Being 
written without punctuation, the words might be read two 
ways ; with a comma after timer e, they would mean, " Ed- 
ward, to kill fear not, the deed is good ;" but with it after 
nolite, the meaning would be, "Edward kill not, to fear the 
deed is good." 

Henry Garnet, who, was tried for his participation in the 
Gunpowder Plot, thus expressed himself in a paper dated 
20th March, 1605-6 : — " Concerning equivocation, this is my 
opinion ; in moral affairs, and in the common intercourse 
of life, when the truth is asked among friends, it is not law- 
ful to use equivocation, for that would cause great mischief in 
society — wherefore, in such cases, there is no place for 
equivocation. But in cases where it becomes necessary to an 
individual for his defence, or for avoiding any injustice 
or loss, or for obtaining any important advantage, without 
danger or mischief to any other person, then equivocation is 
lawful." 1 

Dr. Johnson would not allow his servant to say he was not 
at home when he really was. "A servant's strict regard for 
truth," said he, " must be weakened by such a practice. A 
philosopher may know that it is merely a form of denial, but 
few servants are such nice distinguishers. If I accustom a 
servant to tell a lie for me, have I not reason to apprehend 
that he Avill tell many lies for himself f" ^ 

There may be equivocation in sound as well as in sense. 
It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the dig- 
nitaries of the church, if ladies might Icnot on Sunday ? His 
reply was. Ladies may not ; which, in so far as sound goes, is 
equivocal. — V. Keservation. 
EREOE. — Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain 
1 uth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of 
our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.'' 

*' The true," said Bossuet, after Augustine, " is that which 
is, the false is that which is not." To err is to fail of attaining 



• Jardine, Gunpowder Plot, p. 233. 

^ Boswell, Letters, p. 32. 

^ Locke, Essay on Hum. U)iderstand., h. iv., c. 20. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 16T 

ERROE — 

to the true, which we do when we think that to be which ia 
not — or think that not to be which is. Error is not in things 
themselves, but in the mind of him who errs, or judges not 
according to the truth. 

Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, 
are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. "We err by a 
wrong use of them. The causes of error are partly in the 
objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is only 
the true and real which exists, it is only the true and real 
which can reveal itself. But it may not reveal itself fully — 
and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial evidence 
for complete evidence, falls into error. Hence it is, that in 
all error there is some truth. To discover the relation which 
this partial truth bears to the whole truth, is to discover the 
origin of the error. 

The causes in ourselves which lead to error, arise from 
wi'ong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under 
which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, custom, 
authority, and education, may also contribute to lead us into 
error.^ — V. Falsity. 

ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC {tstoesv, within; l'|w, without). 
— " The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the 
other sects, was divided into the exoteric and the esoteric; 
the open, taught to all ; and the secret, taught to a select 
number."^ 

According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and 
Jamblichus, the distinction of esoteric and exoteric among 
the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples — according 
to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, 
being fully admitted into the society, or being merely pos- 
tulants.^ 

Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught 
publicly to all — and other doctrines which he taught only 
to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinc- 

* Bacon, Novum Organum, lib. i. ; Malebranchs, Recherche de la Viriti; Descartes, 
On Method ; Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., b. vi., e. 20. 
^ Warburton, Div. Leg., book ii., note bb. 
^ Rltter, Hist, de Philosophic, torn, i., p. 29S, of French translation. 



168 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ESOTERIC — 

tion of doctrines in the writings of Plato. Aristotle' speaks 
of opinions of Plato which were not written. But it does 
not follow that these were secret — 'Ej- i-otf Xiyoy.ivoii dypa^tj 
Soyftafft)/. They may have been oral. 

Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings 
as exoteric; and others as acroamatic, or esoteric. The former 
treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and 
elementary way ; while the esoteric are more scientific in their 
form and matter.^ — V. Acroamatical. 
ESSENCE {essentia, from essens, the old participle of esse, to be 
— introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero). 

" Sicut ah eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ah eo 
quod est. esse, vocatur essentia." — Augustine.^ 

" Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est." — 
Chauvin.'* 

" Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, 
whereby it is what it is." * 

Mr. Locke distinguishes the real and the nominal essence. 
The nominal essence depends upon the real essence ; thus the 
nominal essence of gold, is that complex idea which the 
word "gold" represents; viz., "a body yellow, heavy, 
malleable, fusible, and fixed ;" but its real essence is the 
constitution of its insensible parts, on which these qualities 
and all its other properties depend, which is wholly vmknown 
to us. 

" Th* essence of things is made up of that common nature 
wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which 
it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we 
speak of the formality or formalis ratio (the formal con- 
sideration) of things; and it is looked upon as being more 
peculiarly the essence of things, though 'tis certain that a 
triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common 
natiire, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive 
and peculiar to it. 



' Pltys-, lib. iv., c. 2. 

^ Kavaisson, Essai siir la Metaphysi'que cVAristoie, torn. i.. c. 1 ; Tucker. Light of 
Nature, vol. il., chap. 2. 

» De Civ., lib. xii., c. 11. '' Lexicon Philnsoph. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iii , chap. 3, .^iect. 15. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 169 

ESSENCE - 

" The essence of a thing most properly and strictly is, what 
does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that 
only is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part 
of the constituent essence; as, in man to be a living creature, 
or to be capable of religion ; his being capable of celestial 
happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, 
or consecutively, not constituently." * 

"Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly 
called its essence. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the essence 
of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that 
the mind is the mind — that a man is himself."^ 

"All those properties or qualities, without which a thing 
could not exist, or without which it would be entirely altered, 
make up what is called the essence of a thing. Three lines 
joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one is removed, what 
remains is no longer a triangle." ^ 

The essential attributes, faciunt esse entia, cause things to 
be what they are. 

The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, 
viz., ovaia. The word vrtoataaii was latterly introduced. By 
Aristotle ovala was applied — 1. To the foi^m, or those qualities 
which constitute the specific nature of every being. 2. To the 
matter, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us — 
the substratum or subject [vTioxiinivov). 3. To the concrete 
or individual being [svvo%ov), constituted by the union of the 
two preceding. 

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be esta- 
blished between essence and substance. Substance was applied 
to the abstract notion of matter — the undetermined subject or 
substratum of all possible forms, t^o vHoxilfiivov ; Essence to 
the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those 
ideas which represent the genus and sjiecies. Descartes'* de- 
fined substance as " that which exists so that it needs nothing 
but itself to exist" — a definition apj^licable to deity only. 
Essence he stripped of its logical signification, and made it 

' Oldfield, Essay on Reason, p. 184. 
^ Ferrier, Inst, of Metaphys., p. 245. 
^ Taylor, Elements of Thovgld. 
* Princip. Pkilosopli., pars. 4, sect. 1. 

16 



170 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ESSENCE— 

the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we per- 
ceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance 
there is one only which deserves the name of essence, and on 
which the others depend as modifications — as extension, in 
matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified essence and 
substance. But extension supposes something extended, and 
thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz essence and 
substance were the same, viz., force or power. 

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real ex- 
istence; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the 
qualities or ideas which should enter into the definition ; as 
when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being- 
three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only 
sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular lan- 
guage essence is used to denote the nature of a thing. 

ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. It 
supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end 
of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of eternity, a 
parte ante, and a parte post. The Scotists maintained that 
eternity is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, 
one from another. The Tliomists held that it is simple dura- 
tion, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is I he 
moving shadow of e^er?u7i/. The common symbol of eternih, '« 
a circle. It may be doubted how far it is competent to the 
human mind to compass in thought the idea of absolute begin- 
ning, or the idea of absolute ending. 

On man's conception of eternity, see an Examination of 
Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time. By Mr. 
Mansel. 

"What is eternity? can aught 
Paint its duration to the thought? 
Tell all the sand the ocean laves, 
Tell all its changes, all its waves, 
Or, tell with more laborious pains, 
The drops its mighty mass contains 
Be this astonishing account 
Augmented with the full amount 
Of all the drops that clouds have shed. 
Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread, 
Through all time's long protracted tour, 
•■ From Adam to the present hour; — 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 171 

ETERNITY- 

still short the sum, nor can it vie 
With the more numerous years that lie 
Embosomed iu eterniti/.- 
Attend, man, with awe divine, 
Por this eternity is thine." — Gibbous. 

ETERNITY (OF GOD). — Dews non est duraiio vel sjMtium, 
sed durat et adest. This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton con- 
tains the germ of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being of 
God. Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. 
The ideas of time and space necessarily force themselves 
upon our minds. We cannot think of them as not existing. 
And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite 
qualities of an infinite substance, that is, of God, necessarily 
existing. 

ETHICS " extend to the investigation of those principles by which 
moral men are governed ; they explore the nature and excel- 
lence of virtue, the nature of moral obligation, on what it is 
founded, and what are the proper motives of practice ; moral- 
ity in the more common acceptation, though not exclusively, 
relates to the practical and obligatory part of ethics. Ethics 
principally regard the theory of morals." ' 

Aristotle^ says that ^flof, which signifies moral virtue, is 
derived from eSoj, custom ; since it is by repeated acts that 
virtue, which is a moral habit, is acquired. Cicero^ says, 
Quia pertinet ad mores, quod tjdos illi vacant, nos earn partem 
philosophice, De moribus, appellare solemus: sed aecet augentem 
linguam Latinam no7ninare Moralem. Ethics is thus made 
synonymous with morals or inoral philosophy — q.v. 

Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the 
moral sciences or natural jurisprudence, maybe divided into — 

1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations, rights, 
and duties, by which men are under obligation towards God, 
themselves, and their fellow-creatures. 

2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by which 
all nations, as constituting the universal society of the human 
race, are bound in their mutual relations to one another. 

3. Public or Political Law, or the science of the relations 
between the difi'erent ranks in society. 

' Cogan, Ethic. TrcoA. on Passions, Inti'od. 

- Eth., lib. 2. De Fato, cap. 1. 



172 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ETHICS — 

4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and duties, 
by "which individuals in civil society are bound, — as commer- 
cial, criminal, judicial, Roman, or modern. 

5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political.' 
ETHNOGRAPHY [eOvos and ypa^-^), and ETHNOLOGY bear 

the same relation almost to one another as geology and geo- 
graphy. While ethnography contents herself with the mere 
description and classification of the races of man, ethnology, or 
the science of races, " investigates the mental and physical 
differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they 
depend ; seeks to deduce from these investigations principles 
of human guidance, in all the important relations of social 
and national existence." 

^'Ethnology treats of the difi'erent races into which the 
human family is subdivided, and indicates the bonds "v^hich 
bind them alL together." ^ 

ETHOLOGY [rfio^, or iOoi, and Xoyoj), is a word coming to be 
used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said that 
Aristotle's Rhetoric is the best ethology extant, meaning 
that it contains the best account of the passions and feel- 
ings of the human heart, and of the means of awakening 
and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or action. 
Mr. Mill* calls ethology the science of the formation of cha- 
racter. 

EUBSMOMISM (svSat^oia'a, happiness), is a term applied by Ger- 
man philosophers to that system of morality which places the 
foundation of virtue in the prodviction of happiness.'' 

This name, or rather Hedonism, may be applied to the sys- 
tem of Chrysippus and Epicurus. 

EURETIC or EURISTIC— F. Ostensiye. 

EVIDENCE [e and video, to see, to make see). — "Evidence sig- 
nifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the 
truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side 
or the other." 5 

• Peemans, Introd. ad P/nlosoph., p. 96. 

^ Donaldson, JVew Cratylus, p. 13. Ethnological Journal, June 1, 184S ; Edin. Rev., 
Oct., 1844. 
^ Log., book vi., chap. 5. * Whewell, Pre/, to Mackintosh's Dissert., p. 20. 

' Blackstone, Comment., b. iii., c. 23. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 173 

EVIDENCE — 

Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the 
light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. 
Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens. 

In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, 
and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of 
the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, 
there is some proportion or relation. The qualities manifest 
themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge ; or 
the thing is made evident — that is, it not only exists, but is 
revealed as existing. 

There are as many kinds of evidence as there are powers or 
faculties by which v>'e attain to truth. But according as truth 
may be attained, more or less directly, evidence is distinguished 
into intuitive and deductive. 

. Intuitive evidence comprehends allj^rs^ truths, or principles 
of common sense, as, " every change implies the operation of 
a cause" — axioms, in science, as, "things equal to the same 
thing are equal to on,e another " — and the evidence of con- 
sciousness, whether by sense, or memory, or thought, as when 
we touch, or remember, or know, or feel anything. Evidence 
of this kind arises directly from the presence or contemplation 
of the object, and gives knowledge without any eifort upon 
our parts. 

Deductive evidence is distinguished as demonstrative and 
probable. 

Demonstrative evidence rests ujDon axioms, or first truths, 
and from which, by ratiocination, we attain to other truths. 
It is scientific, and leads to certainty. It admits not of de- 
grees ; and it is impossible to conceive the contrary of the truth 
which it establishes. 

Probable evidence has reference, not to necessary, but con- 
tingent truth. It admits of degrees, and is derived from 
various sources ; the principal are the following, viz. : — Expe- 
rience, Analogy, and Testimony — q. v.^ 



' Glassford, Essay on Principles of Evidence, 8vo, Edin., 1820 ; Campbell, Philosophy 
of Rhetoric, book i.; Gam bier, On Moral Evidence, 8vo, Lond., 1824; Smedley, Moral 
Evidence, 8vo, Lond., 1850 ; Butler, Analogy, Introd. ; Locke, Essay on Hum. Under- 
stand., book iv., chap. 15. 

16* 



174. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY- 

EVIL is the negation or contrary of good. — " That which hath in 
it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, is 
called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder 
it, is called evil." ^ 

"Everyman calleth that which ^jiZeaseiA, and is delightful 
to himself, good ; and that evil which displeaseih him."^ 

Pleasure is^^ for, or agreeable to, the nature of a sensible 
being, or a natural good; pain is unjit, or is a natural evil. 

" The voluntary ajjplication of this natural good and evil to 
any rational being, or the production of it by a rational being, 
is moral good and evil."^ 

" Metapliysical evil consists simply in imperfection, physical 
evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin."^ 

" Evil does not proceed from ti, principle of evil. Cold does 
not proceed from a principle of coldness, nor darkness from a 
principle of darJcness. Evil is mere privation." ^ 

Evil is not a generation, but a degeneration ; and as Augus- 
tine often expresses it, it has not an efficient, but only a defi- 
cient cause.® 

Metaphysical evil is the absence or defect of powers and 
capacities, and the consequent want of the higher enjoyment 
which might have flowed from the full and perfect possession 
of them. It arises from the necessarily limited nature of all 
created beings. 

Physical evil consists in pain and suffering. It seems to be 
necessary as the contrast and heightener of pleasure or enjoy- 
ment, and is in many ways productive of good. 

Moral evil originates in the will of man, who could not 
have been capable of moral good withovit being liable to moral 
evil, a power to do right being, ex necessitate rei, a power to 
do wrong. 

The question concerning the origin of evil has been answered 
by — 1. The doctrine of pre-existence, or that the evils we are 
here sviffering are the punishments or expiations of moral 
delinquencies in a former state of existence. 2. The doctrine 
of the Manicheans which supposes two co-eternal and inde- 

* Wilkins, Nat. Relig., book i. ^ Hobbes, Sum. Nat, chap. 7. 

* King, Essay on Origin of EvU, translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth 
edit. 

* Leibnitz, On Goodness of God. part 1, sect. 21. = Part 2, sect. 153. 

« De Civ. Dei. 1. 17, c. 7. ^ 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 175 

EVIL- 

pendent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other 
of evil. 3. The doctrine of optimism, or, that evil is part of 
a system conducted, by Almighty power, under the direction 
of infinite Avisdom and goodness.^ ' 

On the origin oi evil, its nature, extent, uses, &c., see Plato, 
Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, Clarke and 
Leilinitz, Bledsoe, Theodicy; Young, Mystery ; King, J. Muller. 
EXAMPLE.— F. Analogy. 

EXGLTJBED MIDDLE. — Principinm cxclnsi medii inter duo 
contradicforia. — " By the principle of ' Contradiction' Ave are 
forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes can both 
be present in the same object; by the principle of ' Excluded 
Middle ' Ave are forbidden to think that both can be absent. 
The first tells us that both differentia* must be compatible 
with the genus : I cannot, for example, divide animal into ani- 
mate and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other 
must be found in every member of the genus ; but in what 
manner this is actually carried out, whether by every existing 
member possessing one of the differentise and none of the 
other, or by some possessing one and some the other, experi- 
ence alone can determine." ^ 

The formula of this principle is — "Everything is either A 
or not A : everything is either a given thing, or something 
Avhich is not that given thing." That there is no mean be- 
tAA^een tAvo contradictory propositions is proved by Aristotle.^ 
" So that if we think a judgment true, we must abandon its 
contradictory ; if false, the contradictoi'y must be accepted."'* 
EXISTENCE {exsisto, to stand out). — " The metaphysicians look 
upon existence as the formal and actual part of a being." ^ 

It has been called the actus entitativus, or that by which 
anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature of 
things. 

Essence pertains to the question, Quid est ? 

Existence pertains to the question. An est f 

' Stewart, Act. and Mor. Pow., b. iii., c. 3, sect. 1. 

^ Mansel, Prolegom., Log., p. 193. 

^ Metaphys., book iii., ch. 7. 

■* Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 295. 

* H. More, Antid. agt. Atheism, app., c. 44. 



176 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXISTENCE — 

Essence formal, combined with essence substantial, gives 
existence ; for existence is essence clothed with form.' 

Existence is the actuality of essence. It is the act by which 
the essences of things are actually \\\ rerum natura — beyond 
their causes. Before things are produced by their causes, 
they are said to be in the objective power of their causes ; but 
when produced they are beyond their causes, and are actually 
in rerum natura — as maggots before they are warmed into life 
by heat of the sun. 

Existentia est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio partium 

sive attributorurn quibus ens constat Existentia 

dicitur quasi rei extra causas et niJiilum sistentia."^ 
Existence and Essence. — Incaute sihi finxerunt quidam, "Es- 
sentias quasdam casque eiernas, fuisse sine existentia ;" si- 
quando autem subnascatur Res istiusmodi idece similis, tunc 
censent existentiam essentioe supervenientem, veram. rem efficere, 
sive ens reale. Atque Jiinc, essentiam et existentiam dixerunt 
essendi principia, sive entis constitidiva. Quicquid vero essen- 
tiam habet veram, eodem tempore liabet existentiam, eodem sensu 
quo liabet essentiam, aut quo est ens, aid aliquid."^ 

"Essence, in relation to God, must involve a necessary exist- 
ence ; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive what lie is, 
without conceiving that he is, and, indeed, cannot but be. The 
name he takes to himself is I am (or, I will be). This is the 
contraction of that larger name, I am what I am (or, I will 
be what I will be), which may seem closely to conjoin God's 
unquestionable necessary existence with his unsearchable, 
boundless essence.'"^ 

EXOTERIC— F. Esoteric. 

EXPEDIENCY (Doctrine of ). — Paley has said, "Whatever is 
expedient is right." — Y. Utilitv (Doctrine of). 

EXPEillENCE [inTiEi^la,, experientia) . — According to Aristotle,* 
from sense comes memory, but from repeated femembrance of 
the same thing we get experience. 

' Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum., p. 739, note. 
^ Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph., 12mo, Lovan, 1840, p. 45. 
^ Hutcheson, Metaphys., p. 4. 

* Oldfield, Essay on Reason, p. 48. See art. " Existence," in French Encycl</pedie, by 
Mons. Turgot. 
^Jnalyt. Poster., ii,, 19. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 177 

EXPERIENCE — 

Wolf used experience as co-extensive with the contents of 
consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, 
as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as all 
that it suffers from without. " Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad 
perceptiones nostras attenti cognoscimus. Solem lucere, cog- 
noscimus ad ea attenti, qnce visu percipimus. Unde experientia 
constare dicitur, quod sol luceat. Similiter ad nosmet ipsos 
attenti cognoscimus, nos non posse assensum prsebere contra- 
dictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere tanquam verum, quod simul 
pluit et non pluit." 

'^Experience, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred 
within a person's own knowledge. Experience, in this sense 
of course, relates to the j^cist alone. Thus it is that a man 
knows by experience what sufferings he has undergone in some 
disease ; or what height the tide reached at a certain time and 
place. More frequently the word is used to denote that judg- 
ment which is derived from experience in the primary sense, by 
reasoning from that in combination with other data. Thus a 
man may assert, on the ground of experience, that he was cured 
of a disorder by such a medicine — that that medicine is gene- 
rally beneficial in that disorder ; that the tide may always be 
expected, under such circumstances, to rise to such a height. 
Strictly speaking, none of these can be known by experience, 
but are conclusions from expeinence. It is in this sense only 
that experience can be applied to the future, or, which comes 
to the same thing, to any general fact ; as, e. g., when it is 
said that we know by experience that water exposed to a cer- 
tain temperature will freeze." ^ 

Mr. Locke ^ has assigned exjjerience as the only and universal 
source of human knowledge. "Whence hath the mind all 
the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer, in 
one word, from experience; in that, all our knowledge is 
founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our obser- 
vation, employed either about external sensible objects, or 
about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and re- 
flected on by ourselve«, is that which supplies our under- 
standing with all the materials of thinking. These are the 

' Philosoph. Rat., sect. 664. 2 Whately, Log., app. i. 

^ Esia'j on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 1. 



178 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXPEEIENCE — 

fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, 
or can naturally have, do spring — that is, sensation and re- 
flection." 

In opposition to this view, according to which all human 
knowledge is a posteriori, or the result of experience, it is con- 
tended that man has knowledge a priori — knowledge which 
experience neither does nor can give, and knowledge without 
which there could be no exj^erience — inasmuch as all the gene- 
ralizations of expei'ience proceed and rest upon it. 

" No accumulation of experiments whatever can hring a general 
law home to the mind of man ; because if we rest upon experi- 
ments, our conclusion can never logically pass beyond the bounds 
of our premises ; we can never infer more than we have proved ; 
and all the past, which we have not seen, and the future, which we 
cannot see, is still left open, in which new experiences may arise 
to overturn the present theory. And yet the child will believe 
at once Mj^on a single^ experiment. Why? Because a hand 
divine has implanted in him the tendency to generalize thus 
rapidly. Because he does it by an instinct, of which he can 
give no account, except that he is so formed by his Maker." ^ 

"We may have seen one circle, and investigated its proper- 
ties, but why, when our individual experience is so circum- 
scribed, do we assume the same relations of all? Simply 
because the understanding has the conviction intuitively that 
similar objects will have similar properties; it does not acquire 
this idea by sensation or custom ; the mind develops it by its 
own intrinsic force — it is a law of our faculties, ultimate and 
universal, from which all reasoning proceeds."'' 

Exp>erience, more especially in physical philosophy, is either 
active or passive, that is, it is constituted by observation and 
experiment. 

"Observationes funt spectando id quod natura per seipsam, 
sponie exhibet. Exp^erimenta fiiint ponendo naturam in eas 
circumsiantias, in quibus debeat agere, et nobis ostendere id 
quod quwrimus." ■* 



' As having Vrnen once burnt by fire. 

^ Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 24. 

» Dr. Mill, Essays, p. 337. 

* BoiicoTich, Note to Stay's Poem. De Sysietnatie. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 17^ 

EXPERIENCE — 

These are more fully explained and characterized in the 
following passage from Sir John Herschel.' 

" The great, and indeed the only ultimate source of our 
knowledge of nature and its laws is experience; by which we 
mean not the experience of one man only, or of one generation, 
but the accumulated experience of all mankind in all ages, 
registered in books, or recorded by tradition. But exper'ience 
may be acquired in two ways : either, first, by noticing facts as 
they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of 
their occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they 
occur ; this is observation : or, secondly, by putting in action, 
causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely 
varying their combinations, and noticing what effects take 
place ; this is experiment. To these two sources we must look 
as the fountains of all natural science. It is not intended, 
however, by thus distinguishing observation from experiment, to 
place them in any kind of contrast. Essentially they are much 
alike, and differ rather in degree than in kind ; so that, pei'haps, 
the terms passive and active observation might better express 
their distinction ; but it is, nevertheless, highly important to 
mark the different states of mind in inquiries carried on by 
their respective aids, as well as their different effects in pro- 
moting the jDrogress of science. In the former, we sit still and 
listen to a tale, told us, perhaps obscurely, piecemeal, and at 
long intervals of time, with our attention more or less awake. 
It is only by after rumination that we gather its full import ; 
and often, when the opportunity is gone by, we have to regret 
that our attention was not more particularly directed to some 
point which, at the time, appeared of little moment, but of 
which we at length appreciate the importance. In the latter, 
on the other hand, we cross-examine our witness, and by 
comparing one part of his eviden'ce with the other, while he is 
yet before us, and reasoning upon it in his presence, are 
enabled to put pointed and searching questions, the answer to 
which may at once enable us to make up our minds. Accord- 
ingly it has been found invariably, that in those departments 
of physics where the phenomena are beyond our control, or 

' On the. Study of Nat. Phil., Lardner's Cyclop., No. xiv., p. 67. 



180 TOCABTJLARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXPEEIEIfCE — 

into which experimental inquiry, from other causes, has not 
been carried, the progress of kno-wledge lias been slow, uncer- 
tain, and irregular ; while in such as admit of experiment, and 
in which mankind have agreed to its adoption, it has been 
rapid, sure, and steady." — V. Analogy. 

EXPEHIMEKfT. — F. Observation. 

EXPERIMENTITM CETJCIS. — A crucial or decisive experi- 
ment in attempting to interpret the laws of nature ; so called, 
by Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out 
roads, because they determine at once between two or more 
possible conclusions. 

Bacon' says, " Crucial instances are of this kind ; when in 
inquiry into any nature the intellect is put into a sort of equi- 
librium, so that it is uncertain to which of two, or sometimes 
more natures, the cause of the nature inquired into ought to 
be attributed or assigned, on account of the frequent and ordi- 
nary concurrence of more natures than one ; the instances of 
the cross show that the union of the one nature with the nature 
sought for is faithful and indissoluble ; while that of the other 
is varied and separable ; whence the question is limited, and 
that first nature received as the cause, and the other sent off 
and rejected." 

Sir G. Blane^ notices that in chemistry a single experiment 
is conclusive, and the epithet experimentum criicis applied ; 
because the crucible derives its name from the figure of the 
cross being stamped upon it. 

A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain number 
of similar effects ; find some effect which the one produces and 
the other does not, and this will point out, as the direction- 
post [crux), at a point where two highways meet, which of 
these causes may have been in operation in any particular 
instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of the Oriental plague 
are common to other diseases ; but when the observer discovers 
the peculiar bubo or boil of the complaint, he has an instantia 
crucis which directs him immediately to its discovery. 

" If all that the senses present to the mind is sensations, 
Berkeley must be right ; but Berkeley assumed this premiss 

' Nov. Org., Tjook ii., sect. 36. => 3Ied. Log., p. 30. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 181 

EXPERIMEIJTirM CRUCIS — 

without any foundation or any proof of it. The size and shape 
of things are presented to us by our senses, yet every one 
knows that size and shape are not sensations. 

" This I would therefore humbly propose as an experimen- 
tum crucis, by which the ideal system must stand or fall ; and 
it brings the matter to a short issue. Extension, figure, and 
motion, may — any one or all of them — be taken for the sub- 
ject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, 
or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an 
idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sen- 
sation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pre- 
tence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and 
must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph.'' i 

" If, in a variety of cases presenting a general resemblance, 
whenever a certain circumstance is present, a certain eifect 
follows, there is a strong probability that one is dependent on 
the other ; but if you can also find a case where the circum- 
stance is absent from the combination, and the effect also dis- 
appears, your conclusion has all the evidence in its favour of 
which it is susceptible. When a decisive trial can be made 
by leaving out, in this manner, the cause of which we wish 
to trace the eifect, or by insulating any substances so as to 
exclude all agents but those we wish to operate, or in any 
other way, such a decisive trial receives the title of experi- 
mentum crucis. One of the most interesting on record is that 
of Dr. Franklin, by which he established the identity of light- 
ning and the electricity of our common machines." ^ 
EXTEITSION" [extendo, to stretch from). — " The notions acquired 
liy the sense of touch, and by the movement of the body, 
compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up the idea 
expressed by the word extension."^ 

Extension is that property of matter by which it occupies 
space ; it relates to the qualities of length, breadth, and thick- 
ness, without which no substance can exist ; but has no re- 
spect to the size or shape of a body. Solidity is an essential 
quality of matter as well as extension. And it is from the 

' Reid, Inquiry into Hum. Mind, ch. 5, sec. 7. 
2 S. Bailey, Discourses, Lond., 1852, p. 169. 
^ Taylor, Elements of Thouylit. 

17 



182 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXTENSION — 

resistance of a solid body, as the occasion, that we get the 
idea of externality — q. v. 

According to the Cartesians, extension was the essence of 
matter. "Sola igitur extensio corporis naturam constitiiit, quum 
ilia omni solum seniperqiie conveniat, adeo ut tiihil in corpore 
prius percipere possumus." ^ 

Hobbes's views are given, Phil. Prima? 

Locke's views are given, in Essay on Hum. Understand.^ 
Extension (Logical), when predicated as belonging to a general 
term, means the number of objects included under it, and 
comprehension means the common characters belonging to 
such objects. 

" I call the comprehension of an idea, those attributes which 
it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it 
without destroying it ; as the comprehension of the idea tri- 
angle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and 
the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c. 

" I call the extension of an idea those subjects to which that 
idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general 
term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the 
idea of triangle in genertfl extends to all the different sorts of 
triangles." ■• 

We cannot detach any properties from a notion without ex- 
tending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, if we 
abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending only to 
those which it connotes as a plant, we extend its application, 
before limited to flowers with red petals, to the oak, fir, &e. 
But as we narrow the sphere of a notion, the qualities which 
it comprehends proportionally increase. If we restrict the 
term body to animal, we include life and sensation — if to man, 
it comprehends reason. 

Thus emerges the law of the inverse ratio between the ex- 
tension of common terms and their comprehension, viz., the 
greater the extension the less the comprehension, and vice 
versa. 

' Le Grand, Inst. PhilosopJi., pars iv., p. 152. 
^ Pars ii., c. 8, sect. 1. 

^ B. ii., chap. 13, see also chap. 15 ; Reid, Inquiry, c. 5, sect. 5, 6 ; Intell. Pow., essay 
ii., c. 19. 
* Port. Roy. Logic, part i. chap. 6. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 183 

EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS. — " Pressure or resistance ne- 
cessarily supposes externality in the thing which presses or 
resists." ' 

"Distance or outness is neither immediately of itself per- 
ceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines 
and angles, but is only suggested to our thoughts," &c.^ — V. 
Perception. 



EABLE. — " The word fahle is at present generally limited to 
those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in ques- 
tion is not direct but analogical." ^ 

Fable and Myth were at one time synonyms. "Fables of 
JEsop and other eminent mythologists," by Sir R. L'Estrange.* 
— V. Apologue. 
FACT. — "Whatever really exists, whether necessarily or rela- 
tively, may be called ^fact. A statement concerning a num- 
ber oi facts, is called a doctrine (when it is considered abso- 
lutely as a truth), and a law (when it is considered relatively 
to an intelligence ordaining or receiving it)."'' 

By a matter of fact, in ordinai-y usage, is meant something 
which might, conceivably, be submitted to the senses; and 
about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement 
among persons who should be j^^^^sent, and to whose senses it 
should be submitted ; and by a matter of opinion is understood 
anything respecting which an exercise of judgment would be 
called for on the part of those who should havd certain objects 
before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their 
judgment thereupon."* — V. Opinion. 

"By a matter oi fact, I understand anything of which we 
obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any 
individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensa- 
tion."' 

It is thus opposed to matter of inference. Thus, the destruc- 

'■ Adam Smith, On the Senses. 

^ Berkeley, Principles of Knowledge, part i., sect. 43. 

3 Whately, Bhet, part i., ch. 2, g 8. ■■ Fol., Lond., 1704. 

5 Irons, On Pinal Causes, p. 48. ^ Whately, Ehet., pt. i., ch. 2, § 4. 

' Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on Influence of Authority, pp. 1-4. 



IM VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACT— 

tiveness of cholera is matter of fact, the mode of its propa- 
gation is matter of inference. Matter of fact also denotes what 
is certain, as opposed to matter of doubt. The existence of 
God is matter of fact, though ascertained by reasoning. 

" The distinction of fact and theory is only relative. Events 
and phenomena considered as particulars which may be col- 
ligated by induction, are facts; considered as generalities 
already obtained by colligation of other facts, they are theories 
The same event or phenomenon is a fact or a theory, according 
as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the 
indvictive bracket." ' 

" Theories which are true, avefacfs."^ — V. Opinion. 
FACTITIOUS [factito, to practise), is applied to what is the 
result of use or art, in distinction to what is the product of 
nature. Mineral waters made in imitation of the natural 
springs are csXledi factitioiis. 

Cupiditas aliorum existimationis non est factitia sed nobis 
congenita ; deprehenditur enim et in infantibus qui, etiam ante 
7'eflectionis usum, molestia affciuntur, quiini parvi a ceteris 
penduntur.^ 

" It is enough that we have moral ideas, however obtained; 
whether by original constitution of our nature, or factitiously, 
makes no diiFerence." ■* 

" To Mr. Locke, the writings of Hobbes suggested much of 
the sophistry displayed in the first book of his essay on the 
factitious nature of our moral principles."* 
FACULTY. — Facultates sunt aid quihus facilius^^, aut sine quibus 
omnino confici non potest.^ 

Facultas est qucelibet vis activa, seu virtus, seu potestas. Solei 
etiam vocari potentia, verum tunc intelligenda estjwtentia activa, 
seu habilitas ad agendum.'' 

" The word faculty is most properly applied to those powers 
of the mind which are original and natural, and which make 
part of the constitution of the mind."^ 

' Whewell, Philosoph. Induct. Sciences, aphorism 23. 

^Ibid., On Induction, p. 23. ^ N. Lacoudre, Inst. Philosoph., tova. iii., p. 21. 

* Hampden, Introd. to Mor. Philosoph., p. 13. 

' Stewart, Prelim. Dissert., p. 64 ^ Cicero, De Invent., lib. ii., 40 

' Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph. ' Reid, Intell. Pow., essay i., chap. 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 185 

FACULTY - 

A faculty is the natural power by which phenomena are 
produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct and 
concentrate the power which he possesses.' 

Bodies have the property of being put in motion, or of being- 
melted. The magnet has an attractive power. Plants have 
a medical virtue. But instead of blind and fatal activity, let 
the being who has power be conscious of it, and be able to 
exercise and regulate it ; this is what is meant hy faculty. It 
implies intelligence and freedom. It is personality which 
gives the character of faculties to those natural powers Avhich 
belong to us.^ 

'•The facilities of the mind and its 2}otvers," says Dr. Reid, 
" are often used as synonymous expressions. But," continues 
he, " as most synonyms have some minute distinction that 
deserves notice, I apprehend that the word faculty is most 
properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original 
and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the 
mind. There are other powers which are acquired by use, 
exercise, or study, v,diich are not called faculties, but habits. 
There must be something in the constitution of the mind 
necessary to our being able to acquire Itabits, and this is com- 
monly called capacity." 

Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Reid would assign 
to these words, and these meanings are in accordance both with 
their philosophical and more familiar use. The distinction 
between power and faculty is, that faculty is more properly 
applied to what is natural and original, in t, pposition or con- 
trast to what is acquired. We say the faculty of judging, but 
the power of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we 
can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to 
what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the 
power of judging and the power of habit. The acquiring of 
habits is peculiar to man : at least the inferior animals do so to 
a very limited extent. There must, therefore, be something in 
the constitution of the human mind upon which the acquiring 
of habits depends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a capacity. 
The capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did 

' Joufifroy, Melanges, Bruxell, 1834, p. 2i9. ^ Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

17* 



186 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACULTY — 

not recognize the distinction between active and passive power. 
But a capacity is a passive power. The term is applied to 
those manifestations of mind in which it is generally regarded 
as passive, or as aifected or acted on by something external to 
itself. Thus, we say a man is capable of gratitxide, or love, 
or grief, or joy. We speak also of the caimcittj of acquiring 
knowledge. Now, in these forms of expression, the mind is 
considered as the passive recipient of certain affections or im- 
pressions coming upon it. Taking into account the distinction 
of powers as active and passive, " these terms," says Sir Wm. 
Hamilton,' " stand in the following relations. Powers are 
active and passive, naim-al and acquired. Powers natural and 
active d 3 called faculties. Powers natural and passive, ca- 
pacities or receptivities. Powers acquired are habits, and habit 
is used both in an active and passive sense. The power, 
again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." This is 
quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. Reid, only 
that instead of disposition he employs the term capacity, to 
denote that on which the acquiring of habits is founded. Dis- 
position is employed by Dr. Pieid to denote one of the active 
principles of our nature. 

One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts and 
phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy of 
mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the opera- 
tions of mind according to the general circumstances under 
which they are observed. Thus we find that the mind fre- 
quently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of the objects 
around it by means of the bodily senses. These operations 
vary according to the sense employed, and according to the 
object presented. But in smelling, tasting, and touching, and 
in all its operations by means of the senses, the mind comes 
to the knowledge of some object different from itself. This 
general fact is denoted by the term perception ; and we say 
that the mind, as manifested in these operations, has the power 
ox faculty of perception. The knowledge which the mind thus 
acquires can be recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation 
which the mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure 
which it feels in reviving objects of former knowledge, and the 

' Reid's Works, p. 221. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 187 

FACULTY— 

benefit which results from reflecting upon them. But the re- 
calling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an act 
altogether different from the act of originally obtaining it. It 
implies the possession of a peculiar power to perform it. And 
hence we ascribe to the mind a power of recollection or a 
faculty of memory. A perception is quite distinct from a recol- 
lection. In the one we acquire knowledge which is new to us — 
in the other we reproduce knowledge which we already possess. 

In the operations of recollection or memory it is often neces- 
sary that the mind exert itself to exclude some objects which 
present theniselves, and to introduce others which do not at 
first appear. In such cases the mind does so by an act of re- 
solving or determining, by a volition. Now, a "olition is alto- 
gether different from a cognition. To know is one thing, to 
will is quite another thing. Hence it is that we assign these 
different acts to different powers, and say that the mind has a 
power of understanding, and also a power of willing. The 
power of understanding may exert itself in different ways, and 
although the end and result of all its operations be knowledge, 
the different ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved 
may be assigned, as we have seen they are, to different joowers or 
faculties — but these are all considered as powers of understand- 
ing. In like manner the power of willing or determining may 
be exerted under different conditions, and, for the sake of 
distinctness, these may be denoted by different terms ; but still 
they are included in one class, an^ called powers of the 
will. 

Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure or 
pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that state 
or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of which we 
are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the power or 
capacity of being affected by them is denoted by the term 
sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only to have powers 
of understanding and will, but powers of sensibility. 

When we speak, therefore, of a power ov faculty of the mind, 
we mean that certain operations of mind have been observed, 
and classified according to the conditions and circumstances 
under which they manifest themselves, and that distinct names 
have been given to these classes of phenomena, to mark what 



188 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

faculty- 
Is peculiar in the act or operation, and consequently in the 
power or faculty to which they are refei-red. But when we 
thus classify the operations of the mind, and assign them to 
different powers, we are not to suppose that we divide the 
mind into different compartments, of which each has a different 
energy. The energy is the same in one and all of the oper- 
ations. It is the same, mind acting according to different con- 
ditions and laws. The energy is one and indivisible. It is only 
the manifestations of it that we arrange and classify. 

This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the friend 
and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, which 
is translated from his work De Ratione Animce: — " The soul 
bears divers names according to the nature of its operations ; 
inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul [anima) ; 
inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit [spiritus) ; inas- 
much as it feels, it is sentiment [sensus) ; since it reflects, it 
is thought [animus); as it comprehends, intelligence [mens) ; 
inasmuch as it discerns, reason (ratio); as it consents, will 
{voluntas); as it recollects, memory [memoria). But these 
things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is 
the soul, and one soul only." 
Faculties of the Mind (Classification of). — The faculties of the 
human mind were formerly distinguished as gnostic or cogni- 
tive, and orectic or appetent. They have also been regarded 
as belonging to the understanding or to the will, and have been 
designated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification 
of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to the 
heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, and of 
activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, it is 
common to speak of several subordinate faculties. 

" This way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a 
confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had 
their several provinces and authorities, and did command, 
obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings : 
which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, 
and uncertainty, in questions relating to them." ' 

Dr. Brown,^ instead of ascribing so many Aisiinci faculties to 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 21, § 17, 20. 
2 Lecture xvi. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 189 

FACXriTY — 

the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different 
states, or under different affections. — V. Opekations of the 
Mind. 

"Les divers facultes que Ton considere dans Fame, ne sont 
point des choses distinctes reellement, mais le meme etre dif- 
ferement consider^." ' 

" Quoique nous donnions a ces facultes des noms differents, 
par rapport a leur diverses operations, cela ne nous oblige 
pas a les regarder comme des choses differentes, car I'entende- 
ment n'est autre chose que Fame, en tant qu'elle retient et se 
ressouvient; la volonte n'est autre chose que Fame, en tant 

qu'elle veut et qu'elle choisit De sorte qu'on 

peut entendre que toutes ces facultes ne sont, au fond, que 
le mgme ame, qui, recoit divers noms, a cause de ses differentes 
operations."^ 

"Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence, 
sometimes in a predominant state of feeling, and sometimes in 
a predominant state of action and determination. To call 
these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the 
mark. No act of intelligence can be performed without the 
will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act 
either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling 
being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst they each have 
their own distinctive characteristics, yet there is a perfect 
unity at the root." ^ 

"I feel that there is no more reason for believing my mind 
to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, ov faculties, 
than that my foot is made up of walking and running. My 
mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, and remembers, just 
as simply as my body walks, and runs, and rests." ■* 

" It would be well if, instead of speaking of 'the powers 
[ov faculties) of the mind' (which causes misunderstanding), 
we adhered to the designation of the several ' operations of 
one mind ;' which most psychologists recommend, but in the 
sequel forget." ° 

' Arnaud; Des Vrais et des Fausses Idees, ch. 27. 

*• Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu, ch. 2, art. 20. 

' Morel], Psychology, p. 61. * Irons, Final Causes, p. 93. 

5 Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychol, Svo, 1847, p. 120. 



190 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

FACULTY - 

" The judgment is often spoken of as if it were a distinct 
power or faculty of the soul, differing from the imagination, 
the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the lungs, or the 
brain from the stomach. All that ought to be understood by 
these modes of expression is, that the mind sometimes com- 
pares objects or notions; sometimes joins together images; 
sometimes has the feeling of past time with an idea now 
present, &c."^ 

" Notwithstanding Ave divide the soul into several powers 
and factdties, there is no such division in the eoul itself, since 
it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or 
imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, under- 
standing, will, imagination, and the like /acuities, is for the 
better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted 
subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in 
the soul itself." ^ 

" The expression, ' man perceives, and remembers, and 
imagines, and reasons,' denotes all that is conveyed by the 
longer phrase, 'the mind of man has the /acuities of percep- 
tion, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.' "* 

"Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent 
faculties as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some 
severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is 
only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which is 
open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in physical 
mechanics, we know force only from its effects ; but the con- 
sciousness of distinct effects will thus form the real basis of 
psychology. The faculties may then be retained as a con- 
venient method of classification, provided the language is 
properly explained, and no more is attributed to them than is 
warranted by consciousness. The same consciousness which 
tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that 
volition is distinct from both ; and to speak of the faculty of 
will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness 
of a distinct class of mental phenomena." ■* 
FAITH. — F. Belief. 

» Taylor. Elements of Thought » Spectator, No. 600. 

^ S. Bailey, Letters on Philosoph. Hum. Mind, p. 13. 
' Mansel, Prolegoni. Lor/., p. 34, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 191 

FALLACY (A) is an argument, or apparent argument, profess- 
ing to decide the matter at issue, while it really does not. 
Fallacies have been arranged as logical, semi-logical, and non- 
logical. By Aristotle they were arranged in two classes — 
according as \hQ fallacy \q,j in ih.Qform, in dictione; or in the 
matter, extra dictionem. The Jallacies, in form or expression, 
are the following : — 

Fallacia iSquivOCationis, arising from the use of an equivo- 
cal word ; as, the dog is an animal ; Sirius is the dog ; there- 
fore, Sirius is an animal. 

Fallacia Amphiboliae, arising from doubtful construction; 
quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit ; columna tangitur a So- 
crate ; ergo columna sentit. In the major proposition sentit 
means " Socrates feels." In the conclusion, it means " feels 
Socrates." 

Fallacia Compositionis, when what is proposed, in a divided 
sense, is afterwards taken collectively ; as, two and three are 
even and odd ; five is two and three ; therefore five is even 
and odd. 

Fallacia Divisionis, when what is proposed in a collective, is 
afterwards taken in a divided sense ; as, the planets are seven ; 
Mercury and Venus are planets ; therefore Mercury and Venus 
are seven. 

Fallacia Accentus, when the same thing is predicated of dif- 
ferent terms, if they be only written or pronounced in the 
same way ; as, Eqniis est quadrupes ; Jristides est oiquns; ergo 
Aristides est quadi'upes. 

Fallacia Figurse Bictionis, when, from any similitude between 
two words, what is granted of one is, by a forced application, 
predicated of another ; as, proj ectors are unfit to be trusted ; 
this man has formed a project ; therefore, this man is unfit to 
be trusted. 

Fallacies in the matter, or extra dictionem, according to 
some, are the only fallacies strictly logical ; while, according 
to the formal school of logicians, they are beyond the province 
of logic altogether. 

Fallacia Accidentis, when what is accidental is confounded 
with what is essential ; as, we are forbidden to kill ; using 
capital punishment is killing ; we are forbidden to use capital 
punishment. 



192 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

FALLACY— 
Fallacia a Dicto Secundum quid ad Dictum Simplieiter, 

when a term is used, in one premiss, in a limited, and in the 
other in an unlimited sense ; as, the Ethiopian is lohite as to 
his teeih; therefore he is white. 

Fallacia Ignorationis Elenchi, an argument in which the 
point in dispute is intentionally or ignorantly overlooked, and 
the conclusion is irrelevant ; as if any one, to show the inu- 
tility of the art of logic, should prove that men unacquainted 
with it have reasoned well. 

Fallacia a non Causa pro Causa, is divided vnio fallacia a non 
vera pro vera, and fallacia a non tali pro tali; as, "a comet 
has appeared, therefore, there will be war." " What intoxi- 
cates should be prohibited. Wine intoxicates." Excess of it 
does. 

Fallacia Consequentis, when that is inferred which does not 
logically follow ; as, " he is an animal ; therefore he is a 
man." 

Fallacia Petitionis Principii (begging the question), when 
that is assumed for granted, which ought to have been proved ; 
as, when a thing is proved by itself (called petitio statim), " he 
is a man, therefore, he is a man; or by a synonym ; as, "a 
sabre is sharp, therefore a scimitar is ;" or by anything equally 
unknown ; as. Paradise was in Armenia, therefore, Gihon is 
an Asiatic river; or by anything more unknown; as, "this 
square is twice the size of this triangle, because equal to this 
circle ;" or by reasoning in a circle, i. e., when the disputant 
tries to prove reciprocally conclusion from premises, and pre- 
mises from conclusion ; as, " fire is hot, therefore it burns ;" 
and afterwards, "fire burns, therefore it is hot;" "the stars 
twinkle, therefore they are distant ;" '.' the stars are distant, 
therefore they twinkle." 

Fallacia Plurium Interogationum, when two or more questions, 
requiring each a separate answer, are proposed as one, so that 
if one answer be given, it must be inapplicable to one of 
the particulars asked ; as, " was Pisistratus the usurper and 
scourge of Athens?" The answer "no" would be false of 
the former particular, and " yes " would be false of the latter. 
The fallacy is overthrown by giving to each particular -a sepa- 
rate reply. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 193 

FALSE, FALSITY. — The false, in one sense, applies to things ; 
and there is falsity either when things really are not, or when 
it is impossible they can be ; as when it is said that the pro- 
portion of the diagonal to the side of a square is commensur- 
able, or that you sit — the one is absolutely /aZse, the other 
"^laccidentally — for in the one case and the other the fact 
affirmed is not. 

The false is also predicated of things which really exist, but 
which appear other than they are, or what they are not ; a 
portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but they 
really are not what they represent. Thus, we say that things 
are false, either because they do not absolutely exist, or be- 
cause they are but appearances and not realities. 

Falsity is opposed to verity or tndJi, — q. v. 

To transcendental truth, or truth of being, the opposite is 
nonentity rather than falsity. A thing that really is, is what 
it is. A thing that is not is a nonentity. Falsity, then, is two- 
fold — objective and formal. Objective falsity is when a thing 
resembles a thing which it really is not, or when a sign or 
proposition seems to represent or enunciate what it does not. 
Formal falsity belongs to the intellect when it fails to discover 
objectively yaZsi/?/, and judges according to appearances rather 
than the reality and truth of things. Formal falsity is error ; 
which is opposed to logical truth. To moral truth, the oppo- 
site is falsehood or lying. 

FANCY {'^avta.aia). — " lm%gm.&t\on ox phantasy , in its most ex- 
tensive meaning, is the faculty representative of the phenomena 
both of the internal and external worlds."' 

"In the soul 
Are many lesser faculties, that serve 
Reason as chief; among them fancy next 
Her office holds ; of all external things 
Which the five watchful senses represent 
She forms imaginations, airy shapes." 

Milton, Paradise Lost, book v. 

" Where fantasy, near handmaid to the mind, 
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all; 
Compounds in one things different in their kind, 

Compares the black and white, the great and small." 

Sir John Davies. Immortality. 

* Sir W. Hamilton, Rcid's Works, note b, sect. 1. 

18 



194 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



" When nature rests, 
Oft in her absence mimic fancy wakes 
To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes, 
Wild Tvork produces oft, but most in dreams." 

" Tell me where is fancy bred, 
Or in the heart, or in the head? 4f 

How begot, how nourished?" 

Merch. of Venice, act iii., scene 2. 

"Break, Phantsie, from thy cave of cloud, 

And wave thy purple wings. 
Now all thy figures are allowed. 

And variovis shapes of things. 
Create of airy forms a stream; 

It must have blood and nought of phlegm; 
And though it be a waking dream, 

Yet let it like an odour rise 
To all the senses here, 

And fall like sleep upon their eyes. 
Or music ou their ear." — Ben Jonson. 

" How various soever the pictures oi fancy, the materials, 
according to some, are all derived from sense; so that the 
maxim — Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu — though 
not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the phantasy." ' 

Addison^ said that he used the words imagination and fancy 
indiscriminately. 

Mr. Stewart^ said, "It is obvious that a creative imagina- 
tion, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be 
regarded as forming one characteristic of his genius, implies 
a power of summoning up at pleasure a particvilar class of 
ideas ; and of ideas related to each other in a particular 
manner ; which power can be the result only of certain habits 
of association, which the individual has acquired. It is to 
this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn 
of thought, and not one of the common principles of our 
nature," that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name fancy. 
" The office of this power is to collect materials for the 
imagination ; and therefore, the latter power presupposes the 
former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. 
A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustra- 
ting or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or 

' Monboddo, Ancient Mctapliys., b. ii., ch. 7. 

^ Spectator, No. 411. ^ Elements, chap. 5 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 195 

FANCY— 

analogous ideas, we call a man oi fancy ; but for an eiFort of 
imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly 
the powers of taste and judgment; without which we can hope 
to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. 
It is the power of fancy which supplies the poet with meta- 
phorical language, and with all the analogies which are the 
foundation of his allusions : but it is the power of imagination 
that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious 
- characters he delineates. To fancy we apply the epithets 
of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, those of beautiful or 
sublime." 

Fancy was called by Coleridge " the aggregative and associa- 
tive power.'' But Wordsworth says, " To aggregate and to 
associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to imagina- 
tion as io fancy. ^vA fancy does not require that the materials 
which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in 
their constitution from her touch ; and, where they admit of 
modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, 
limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are 
the desii-es and demands of the imagination. She recoils 
from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite." 
— Wordsworth.' — V. ImaginatiojST. 
FATALISM, FATE.— "i^a!;»TO is derived h'omfari; that is, to 
pronovince, to decree ; and in its right sense, it signifies the 
decree of Providence." — Leibnitz.^ "Fate, derived from the 
Latin fari, to sj>eak, must denote the word spoken by some 
intelligent being who has power to make his words good."— 
Tucker.^ 

Among all nations it has been common to speak oi fate or 
destiny as a power superior to gods and men — swaying all 
things irresistibly. This may be called ih.& fate oi poets and 
mythologists. Philosophical fate is the sum of the laws of the 
universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the blind 
properties of matter. Theological fate represents Deity as 
above the laws of nature, and ordaining all things according 
to his will — the expression of that will being the law. 

' Preface to Worlcs, vol. i., 12mo, Lond., 1836. 

2 Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke. 

3 Light of Nattire, vol. ii., part ii., chap. 26. 



196 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FATALISM — 

Leibnitz > says : — " There issiFaium Maliometanum, uFatum 
Stoimm, and a Fatum Christianum. The Turkish fate will 
have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be 
avoided ; as if there was an absolute necessity. The Stoical 
fate will have a man to be quiet, because he must have pa- 
tience Avhether he will or not, since 't is impossible to resist 
the course of things. But 't is agreed that there is Fatum 
Christiamim, a certain destiny of everything, regulated by the 
fore-knowledge and providence of Grod." 

"Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and 
events, may be reduced to these three heads — First, such as 
asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and 
determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to 
us; which kind of fate, though philosophers and other ancient 
Avriters have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been 
principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary 
to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose 
a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the 
general frame of things in the world ; from whence, by a 
series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done 
in it: which, fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves 
necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, 
Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to 
follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all 
things without a Deity ; which fate Epicurus calls -triv -tiov 
^vaixciv slfiap^iivriv, the fate of the naturalists, that is, indeed, 
the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the 
Democritical fatalists."'^ 

Cicero, De Fata; Plutarchus, De Fata; Grotius, Fhiloso- 
phonmi Sententice De Fato. 

FEAE, is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or con- 
templation of something evil coming upon us. 

FEELING. — " This word has two meanings. First, it signifies 
the perceptions we have of external objects, by the sense of 
touch. When we speak oi feeling a body to be hard or soft, or 
rough or smooth, hot or cold, to feel these things is to perceive 



' Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke. 

^ Cudwortb, Intell. »Sysi., tiook i., chap. 1, 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 197 

FEELIlSfG — 

them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the 
mind by wliich we feel them is easily distinguished from the 
objects felt. Secondly, the wovA feeling is used to signify the 
same thing as sensation; and in this sense, it has no object; 
the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same. 

" Perhaps hQiwixi feeling, taken in this last sense, and sen- 
sation, there may be this small difference, that sensation is 
most commonly used to signify those feelings which we have 
by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily 
pains and pleasures. But there are feelings of a nobler 
nature accompanying our affections, our moral judgments, and 
our determinations in mattei's of taste, to which the word sen- 
sation is less properly applied." ^ — Reid.^ 

"Feeling, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a 
general term, signifying that internal act by which we are 
made conscious of our pleasures and our pains ; for it is not 
limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus, feeling being 
the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is 
the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ 
of sense ; and accordingly we say indifferently, ' I feel plea- 
sure from heat, and pain from cold ;' or, ' I have a sensation 
of pleasure from heat and of pain from cold.' But the mean- 
ing oi feeling, as is said, is much more extensive. It is proper 
to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in 
friendship ; and pain m losing a child, in revenge, in envy ; 
sensation is not properly applied to any of these. 

" The term, feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, 
to signify what we feel or are conscious of ; and in that sense 
it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for 
all our other pleasures and pains." ^ 

All sensations are feelings ; but all feelings are not sensa- 
tions. Sensations are i\\ose feelings which arise immediately 
and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. 
But we have feelings which are connected not with our animal, 



' The French use of sensation — as when we say such an occurrence excited a grfiat 
sensation, that is, feeling of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is becoming more 
common. 

^ Intell, Paw., essay i., chap. 1. 

^ Karnes, EUnients of Cnlisism, Appendix. 

18* 



198 Vocabulary or philosophy. 

FEELING - 

but with our intellectual, and ratiouai, and moral nature ; 
such as feelings of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and 
gratitude, of approbation and disapprobation. Those higher 
feelings it has been proposed to call Sentiments — g. v. 

From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the 
sense of touch, feeling has been extended to signify immediate 
perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in this sense 
to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths or 
the principles of common sense. " By external or internal 
perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as 
existing ; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I 
know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of 
mind, may not, in reality, be a mode of mind ; I can only say, 
using the simplest language, ' I know it to be true, because I 
feel, and cannot but feel,' or ' because I believe, and cannot 
but believe,' it so to be. And if further interrogated how I 
know, or am assured that I thus feel or thus believe, I can 
make no better answer than, in the one case, ' because I believe 
that I feel;' in the other, 'because I feel that I believe.' It 
thus appears, that when pushed to our last resort, we must 
retire either WTQon feeling or belief, or upon both indifferently. 
And, accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great 
many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate 
the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are 
reducible ; while some employ both, even though they may 
award a preference to one. ... In this application of it 
we must discharge that signification of the word by which 
we denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure." i— V. Belief. 
FETICHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the theo- 
logical philosophy ; and is described as consisting in the as- 
cription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our 
own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether 
organic or inorganic, natural or artificial.^ The Portuguese 
call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa ye^mo — 
bewitched or possessed by fairies. Such are the grisgris of 
Africa, the manitous and the ockis of America, and the burk- 



' Sir William Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sect. 5. 
^ Comte, Philosoph. Positive, i , 3. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 199 

FETICHISM — 

hans of Siberia — good and evil genii inhabiting the objects 
of nature which they worship. The priests of this worship 
are called griots in Africa, jongleurs or jugglers in America, 
and chamanes in Central Asia. 

Mr. Grote,' in reference to Xerxes scourging the Hellespont 
which had destroyed his bridge, remarks, that the absurdity 
and childishness of the proceeding is no reason for rejecting 
it as having actually taken place. " To transfer," continues 
he, "to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing 
and designing attributes of human beings, is among the 
early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the 
primitive forms of religion ; and although the enlargement 
of reason and experience gradually displaces this Q\Qn\Qni- 
ary JeticJiism, and banishes it from the region of reality into 
those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary pas- 
sion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and 
even an intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agoni- 
zing pain to kick or heat the lifeless object from wliich he has 
suffered." 

Dr. Reid was of opinion that children naturally believed all 
things around them to be alive — a belief which is encouraged 
by the education of the nursery. And when under the smarting 
of pain we kick or strike the inanimate object which is the 
occasion of it, we do so, he thought, by a momentary relapse 
into the creed of infancy and childhood. 

FIGURE. — r. Syllogism. 

FITNESS and ITNFITK'ESS " most frequently denote the con- 
gruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude, of any means 
to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they 
generally signify the same with 7'ight and wrong ; nor is it often 
hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to 
be understood. It is worth observing i\\SLi fitness in the former 
sense is equally undefinable y^iih. fitness in the latter; or, that 
it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous 
words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, ' that 
they have & fitness to one another ; or are^^ to answer certain 
purposes,' as when we say, ' reverencing the Deity is fit, or 

' Hist, of Greece, yoL v., p. 22. 



200 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FITI^ESS — 

beneficence is fit to be practised.' In the first of these in- 
stances, none can avoid owning the absurdity of making an 
arbitrary sense the source of the idea oi fitness, and of con- 
cluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no 
one thing can be properly the means of another. In both 
cases the term fit signifies a simple perception of the under- 
standing." ' 

According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in acting 
in conformity to the nature and fit7iess of things. In this 
theory the term fitness does not mean the adaptation of an 
action, as a means tovrards some end designed by the agent ; 
but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action 
and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. 
Dr. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr. 
Brown ^ and others.' 

" Our perception of vice and its desert arises from, and is 
the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and 
capacities of the agent. And hence arises a proper application 
of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, 
to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious."* 
In like manner, when our moral faculty determines actions 
to be virtuous, there is a propriety in the application of the 
epithets congruous, suitable, proportionate,^;;. 

FORCE is an energy or power which has a tendency to move a 
body at rest, or to affect or stop the progress of a body already 
in motion. This is sometimes termed active force, in contra- 
distinction to that which merely resists or retards the motion 
of a body, but is itself apparently inactive. But according to 
Leibnitz, by whom the term ^brce was introduced into modern 
philosophy, no substance is altogether passive. Force, or a 
continual tendency to activity, was originally communicated 
by the Creator to all substances, whether material or spiritual. 
Every yo?-ce is a substance, and every substance is a, force. The 
two notions are inseparable ; for you cannot think of action 
without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance 
entirely passive is a contradictory idea.* — V. Monad. 

' Price, Keview, ch. 6. ^ Lect. IsxtI. 

^ See Wardlaw, Christ. Ethics, note E. ■* Butler, Dissertation on Viritie, 

' See Leibnitz, De primce Philosophice emendatione, et de notione suhstantim. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 201 

FORCE- 

In like manner Boscovich' maintained that the ultimate 
particles of matter are indivisible and unextended points, 
endowed ■vrith the forces of attraction and repulsion. 

According to the dynamic theory of Kant, and the atomic 
theory of Leucippvis, the phenomena of matter were explained 
by attraction and repulsion. 

"La force proprement diie, c'est ce qui regit les actes, sans 
regler les volontes." If this definition of force, which is given 
by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a distinction 
between force and jyower. Power extends to volitions as well 
as to operations, to mind as well as matter. But we also speak 
0^ force as physical, vital, and mental. 
FORM " is that of which matter is the receptacle," says Lord 
Monboddo.^ A trumpet may be said to consist of two parts ; 
the matter or brass of which it is made, and the ^brm which 
the maker gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the 
former ; since although the matter were silver, it would still 
be a trumpet ; but without the form it would not. Now, al- 
thovigh there can be no form without matter, yet as it is the 
form which makes the thing what it is, the word ybr??i came 
to signify essence or nature. " Form is the essence of the 
thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all 
its other qualities." 

Matter void oi form, but ready to receive it, was called, 
in metaphysics, materia prima, or eleiiientary ; in allusion to 
which Butler has made Hudibras say, tnat he 

Professed 
He had first matter seen undressed, 
And found it naked and alone, 
Before one rag of form was on. 

Form was defined by Aristotle Xoyoj ■tin oisiai, and as ovoia, 
signifies, equally, substance and essence, hence came the 
question whether form should be called substantial or essen- 
tial ; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, and the 
Cartesians the latter. 



' Dissertaiiones dwB de viribus vivis, 4to, 1745. See also Stewart, Philosophical Essays, 
essay li., cbap. 1. 
= Ancient Metaphys., book ii., chap. 2. 



202 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FOEM — 

According to the Peripatetics, in any natural composite 
body, there were — 1. The matter. 2. Quantity, which fol- 
lowed the matter. 3. The substantial yb??w. 4. The qualities 
which followed the form. According to others, there were 
only — 1. Matter. 2. Essential _/orm; as g'z/aniiYy is identified 
with matter, and qualities with matter or form, or the com- 
pound of them. 

According to the Peripatetics, form, was a subtle substance, 
penetrating matter, and the cause of all acts of the compound ; 
in conformity with the saying, formce est agere, materice vero 
pati. According to others, form is the union of material 
parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some added a 
certain motion and position of the parts.' 

He who gives yo?7w to matter, must, before he do so, have 
in his mind some idea of the particular form which he is 
about to give. And hence the word form is used to signify 
an idea. 

Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite points. 
" That which contemplated objectively (that is, as existing ex- 
ternally to the mind), we call a law; the same contemplated 
subjectively (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an 
idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws ; and Lord Bacon, 
the British Plato (?), describes the laws of the material uni- 
verse as ideas in nature. Quod in natura naturata lex, in 
natura naturante idea clictur."^ Bacon^ says, "When we 
speak 0^ forms, we understand nothing more than the laws 
and modes of action which regulate and constitute any simple 
nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter sus- 
ceptible of them ; so that the form of heat, or the form of 
light, and the law of heat, and the law of light, are the same 
thing." Again he says,* " Since the form of a thing is the 
very thing itself, and the thing no otherwise differs from the 
form., than as the apparent differs from the existent, the out- 
ward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation 
to man from that which is considered in relation to the uni- 
verse, it follows clearly that no nature can be taken for the 

' Derodon, Phys., pars prima, pp. 11, 12. 

° Coleridge, Chjirch and State, p. 12. 

= In JVov. Org., ii., 17. « Ibid., 2, 13. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 203 

FORM— 

trueyb?-m., unless it ever decreases when the nature itself de- 
creases, and in like manner is always increased when the 
nature is increased." 

As the word form denotes the law, so it may also denote 
the class of cases brought together and united by the law. 
" Thus to speak of the /brm of animals might mean, first, the 
law or definition of animal in general ; second, the part of 
any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is 
what it is; and last, the class of animals in general formed 
by the law." ' 

" The sense attached at the present day to the words 
form and matter, is somewhat different from, though closely 
related to, these. The form is what the mind impresses 
upon its perceptions of objects, which are the matter ; form 
therefore means mode of viewing objects that are presented 
to the mind. When the attention is directed to any object, 
we do not see the object itself, but contemplate it in the light 
of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is 
regarded by the poor and ignorant under the form of a very 
fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above 
their own reach ; by the religious mind under the form of 
a person with more than ordinary temptations to contend 
with ; by the political economist, under that of an exam- 
ple of the unequal distribution of wealth ; by the tradesman, 
under that of one whose patronage is valuable. Now, the 
object is really the same to all these observers ; the same 
rich man has been represented under all these different yb?-»zs. 
And the reason that the observers are able to find many in 
one, is that they connect him severally with their own prior 
conceptions. 1:\\eform, then, in this view, is mode of know- 
ing ; and the matter is the perception, or object, we have to 
know." ^ 

Sir W. Hamilton" calls the theory of substantial forms, " the 
theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoined with, and not 
as mere dispositions or modifications of matter." 



• Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thovghf, p. 33, 2d edit. 

3 Ibid., p. 34. " Heid^s Works, p. 827. 



204 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FOEM — 

Aristotle,' Michelet,^ Ravaisson.'' — V. Law, Matter. 

FORMALLY.— F. Real, Virtual, Action. 

FOS.TITUBE is one of the virtues called cardinal. It may dis- 
play itself actively by resolution or constancy, which con- 
sists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and difficulty 
which cannot be avoided, or by intrepidity or courage, which 
consists in maintaining firmness and presence of mind in the 
midst of perils from which there may be escape. The dis- 
plays of fortitude passively considered may be comprehended 
under the term patience, including humility, meekness, sub- 
mission, resignation, &c. 

FREE WILL.— F. Liberty, Necessity, Will. 

FRIEHBSHIP is the mutual affection cherished by two persons 
of congenial minds. It springs from the social nature of man, 
and rests on the esteem which each entertains for the good 
qualities of the other. The resemblance in disposition and 
character between friends may sometimes be the occasion of 
their contracting friendship ; but it may also be the effect of 
imitation and frequent and familiar intercourse. And the 
interchange of kind offices which takes place between friends 
is not the cause of their friendship, but its natural result. 
Familiarities founded on views of interest or pleasure are not 
to be dignified by the name of friendship. 

Dr. Brown* has classified the duties oi friendship as they 
regard the commencement of it, the continuance of it, and its 
close. 

See the various questions connected with friendship treated 
by Aristotle,^ and by Cicero.^ 

FTJNCTIOM" [fimgor, to perform). — " The pre-constituted forms or 
elements under which the reason forms cognitions and assigns 
laws, are called ideas. The capacities of the reason to know in 
different modes and relations, we shall call \ifi functions."'' 

' ' The function of conception is essential to thought." The first 
intention of every word is its real meaning ; the second inten- 



^.Metaphys., lib. 7 et 8. 

2 Examen CHtique de la Metaphysique d'Aristote, 8vo, Paris, 1836 ; p. 164 et p. 287. 

' Essai sur la Metaphyxique d'Aristote, 8vo, Paris, 1837, torn, i., p. 149. 

^ Lect. Ixxxix. ' In Ethics, books viii. and ix. 

5 In liig treatise De Amicita. ' Tappan, Log , p. 119. 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 205 

FUNCTION — 

tion, its logical value, according to the function of thought to 
which it belongs." ' 

" ThQ function of names is that of enabling us to remember 
and to communicate our thoughts."^ 



GENERAL TERM. — F. Term. 

GENERALIZATION " is the act of comprehending, under a 
common name, several objects agreeing in some point Avhich 
we abstract from each of them, and which that common name 
serves to indicate." 

" When we are contemplating several individuals which 
resemble each other in some part of their nature, we can (by 
attending to that part alone, and not to those points wherein 
they differ) assign them one common name, which will express 
or stand for them merely as far as they all ag7'ee ; and which, 
3f course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which pro- 
cess is called generalization) ; and each of these names is called 
a common term, from its belonging to them all alike; or a 
predicable, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them 
or any of them."^ 

Generalization is of two kinds — classification and generaliza,- 
tion properly so called. 

When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circum- 
stances, and reduce these circumstanctw^ to such as are essen- 
tial and common, we obtain a law. 

When we observe individual objects and arrange them 
according to their common characters, we obtain a class. 
When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to 
the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. 
When the character selected is not natural the classification 
is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, 
we would have a classification which had no reference to the 
laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate 
or invertebrate, we have a classification founded on their or- 
ganization. Artificial classification is of no value in science, 

' Thomson, Outline of Laivs of Thought, pp. 25 and 40, 2d edit. 

» Mill, Log., b. u., ch. 2, J 2. = Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 6. § 2. 

19 



206 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

GENERALIZATION— 

it is a mere aid to the memory. Natural classification is the 
foundation of all science. This is sometimes called generaliza- 
tion. It is more properly classification. — V. Classification. 

The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a single 
stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies 
must have been observed to fall before the fact was gene- 
ralized, and the law stated. And in this process oi generalizing 
there is involved a principle which experience does not fur- 
nish. Experience, how extensive soever it may be, can only 
give the particular, yet from the particular we rise to the 
general, and afErm not only that all heavy bodies which have 
been observed, but that all heavy bodies whether they have 
been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief 
that there is order in nature, that under the same circum- 
stances the same substances will present the same phenomena. 
This is a principle furnished by reason, the process founded on 
it embodies elements furnished by experience. — V. Ixduction. 

The results of generalization are general notions expressed 
by general terms. Objects are classed according to certain 
properties which they have in common, into genera and spe- 
cies. Hence arose the question which caused centuries of 
acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species a real, inde- 
pendent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind ? 
— V. RealiSjAI, Nominalism, Conceptualism.^ 

The principle of generalization is, that beings howsoever 
different agree or are homogeneous in some respect. 
GENIUS (from geno, the old form of the verb gigno, to produce). 

This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary god 
or spirit appointed to watch over every individual from his 
birth to his death. As the character and capacities of men 
were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature 
of their genius, the word came to signify the natural powers 
and abilities of men, and more particularly their natural in- 
clination or disposition. But the peculiar and restricted use of 
the term is to denote that high degree of mental power which 
produces or invents. " Genius," says Dr. Blair,^ " always 
imports something inventive or creative." " It produces," 

' Reid, Tntell. Poiv., essay T., chap. 6; Stewart, Elements, chap. 4. 
' Lectures on RMtoric, leet. iii. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 207 

GENIUS — 

says another, "what has never been accomplished, and which 
all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements 
are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive 
and productive. According as one or other predominates, 
genius becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case, it 
seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not 
reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous 
application ; and as it were intuitively recognizing in pheno- 
mena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the 
latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate 
forms, it realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates 
the beautiful." 

" To possess the powers of common sense in a more eminent 
degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely 
different, and diversity in things nearly the same ; this it is 
that constitutes Avhat we call genius, that power divine, which 
through every sort of discipline renders the difi'erence so con- 
spicuous between one learner and another." ^ 

" Nature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits, and 
that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by genius." ^ 

Dryden has said, — 

"What the child admired. 
The youth endeavoured, and the man acquired." , 

He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exactness, 
before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted his eyes 
in the "picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled the margin 
of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, in the beginning 
of childhood, drew with a piece of charcoal on the walls of 
the house." 

"In its distinctive and appropriate sense, the term genius 
is applied to mind only when under the direction of its indi- 
vidual tendencies, and when those are so strong or clear as to 
concentrate all its powers upon the production of new, or at 
least independent results ; and that whether manifested in the 
reo-ions of art or science. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, were 
no less men oi genius, tlian Michael Angelo, Raphael, Shake- 

' Harris, Philosoph. Arrange., chap. 9. ' Couper. 

' Pleasures, cCc., of Literature, l2mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28. 



208 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

GEmus— 

speare, and Scott, although the work they performed and the 
means they employed were different." ' 

Sharp, Dissertation on Genius;'^ Duff, Essays on Original 
Genius ;^ Gerard, Essay on Genius ;^ Lcelius and Hortensia ; or. 
Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste and Genius ;^ 
Beattie, Dissertations, Of Imagination.^ 
Genius and Talent. — "Genius is that mode of intellectual 
power which moves in alliance with the genial nature ; i. e., 
with the capacities of pleasure and pain ; whereas talent has no 
vestige of such an alliance, and is perfectly independent of all 
human sensibilities. Consequently, genius is a voice or breath- 
ing that re2)resents the total nature of man, and therefore, his 
enjoying and suffering nature, as well as his knowing and 
distinguishing nature ; whilst, on the contrary, talent repre- 
sents only a single function of that nature. Genius is the 
language which interprets the synthesis of the human spirit 
with the human intellect, each acting through the other; 
whilst taleyit speaks only of insulated intellect. And hence 
also it is that, besides its relation to suffering and enjoyment, 
genius always implies a deeper relation to virtue and vice ; 
whereas talent has no shadow of a relation to moral qualities 
any more than it has to vital sensibilities. A man of the 
highest talent is often obtuse and below the ordinary standard 
of men in his feelings ; but no man of genius can unyoke him- 
self from the society of moral perceptions that are brighter, 
and sensibilities that are more tremulous, than those of men 
in general."'' 

GENUINE.— F. Authentic. 

GENUS is " a predicable which is considered as the material part 
of the species of which it is affirmed."^ It is either summum 
or suhalternum, that is, having no genus above it, as being, or 
having another genus above it, as quadruped ; proximum or 
remotum, when nothing intervenes between it and the spe- 
cies, as animal in respect of man, or when something inter- 
venes, as animal in respect of a crow, for between it and crow, 

1 Moffat, Study of (Esthetics, p. 203, Cincinnati, li5G. ^Lond., 1755. 

3 Lond.. 1767. ■• Lond., 1774. 5 Edin., 1782. 6 cbap. 3, 4to, Lond., 1783. 

' De Quincy, Sketches, Crit. and Biograph., p. 275 

8 Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 6, g 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 209 

GENUS - 

brute and bird intervene. A genus physicum is part of the 
species, as animal in respect of man, who has an animal body 
and a rational soul. A genus metapliysicum is identified ade- 
quately with the species and distinguished from it extrinsi- 
cally, as animal in respect of brute, colour in respect of 
blackness in ink. Logically the genus contains the species ; 
whereas metaphysically the species contains the genus; e. g., 
we divide logically the genus man into European, Asiatic, &c., 
but each of the species, European, &c., contains the idea of 
man, together with the characteristic difference. 

In modern classification, genus signifies "a distinct but sub- 
ordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that of all 
the species of which it is composed. 

GNOME [yvufirj) a weighty or memorable saying. — The saying in 
the parable (Matt. xx. 1-16), "Many that are first shall be 
last, and the last shall be first," is called by Trench' a gnome. 
— V. Adage. 

GOB, in Anglo-Saxon, means good. 

One of the names of the Supremo I'oinp;. The correspond- 
ing terms in Latin [Dens] and in Greek (©soj) were applied 
to natures superior to the human nature. With vis, God al- 
ways refers to the Supreme Being. 

That department of knowledge which treats of the being, 
perfections, and government of God, is Theology — q. v. 

" The true and genuine idea of God in general, is this — a 
perfect conscious understanding being [ot mind), existing of 
itself from etei'nity, and the cause of all other things." ^ 

" The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted 
form, is this — a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone 
to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is 
demonstrable."'' 

" I define God thus — an essence or being, fully and absolutely 
perfect. I say fully and absolutely perfect, in contradistinction 
to such perfection as is not full and absolute, but the perfection 
of this or that species or kind of finite beings, suppose a lion, 
horse, or tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect, is to be, 

* On the Parables, pp. IfU, 165. 

^ Cudworth, Intell. Si/st., b. i., ch. 4, sect. 4, 

= Ibid, sect. 8. 

19 * • p 



210 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

GOD— 

at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive 
without a contradiction." " 
GOOD (The Chief). — An inquiry into the chief good, or the 
sumnium homim, is an inquiry into what constitutes the perfec- 
tion of human nature and the happiness of the human condition. 
This has been the aim of all religion and philosophy. The 
answers given to the question have been many. Varro enu- 
merated 288.2 gy^ ^jigy jjjay easily be reduced to a few. 
The ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they 
may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, interest 
and duty. What conduces to these ends we call good, and 
seek after ; what is contrary to these ends we call evil, and 
shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and the chief 
good of man lies in the discharge of duty. By doing so he 
perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the 
highest happiness. 

" Semita certe 
Tranquillae pei- virtutem patet unica vitse." 

JuTenal, lib. iv., sat. 10. 

Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malornm; L'Abbe Anselme, 
Sur le Souverain Men des anciens, Mem. d. I' Acad, des Inscript., 
et Belles Lettres.^ — .Jouffroy, Miscell. — V. Bonum (Summum). 
GEAMMAE (Universal). — This word gy-ammar comes to us from 
the Greeks, who inckided under tix^''} ypa-f^/^a-tiistixri the art 
of Avriting and reading letters. But "grammar," says B. 
Jonson,^ " is the art of true and well speaking a language ; 
the writing is but an accident." Language is the expression 
of thought — ^thought is the operation of mind, and hence lan- 
guage may be studied as a help to psychology.* 

Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that is, 
the object of thought is either simply apprehended or conceived 
of, or something is affirmed concerning it. Ideas are expressed 
in words, judgments by propositions ; so that as ideas are the 
elements of judgments, words are the elements of propositions. 

Every judgment involves the idea of a substance, of which 

' H. More, Antidote against Atheism, ch. 2. 

'^ August., De Civit., lib. 19, cap. 1. 

^ 1 ser., torn . v. ' English Grammar, c. 1. 

° Reid, Intell. Paw., essay i., chap. 5. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 211 

GRAMMAR - 

some quality is affirmed or denied—so that language must have 
the substantive or noun, the adjective or qiiality, and the verb 
connecting or disconnecting. 

If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contemplated 
singly, these parts of speech Avould be sufficient. But the 
relations between objects and the connection between proposi- 
tions, render other parts of speech necessary. 

It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas that 
are individual, that we have also nouns common and proper; 
and it is because we have ideas of unity and plurality, that we 
have numbers, singular, dual, and plural. Tenses and moods 
arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional 
or positive. Even the order or construction of language is to 
be traced to the calm or impassioned state of mind from which 
it proceeds. 

In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between 
grammar and psychology, it may be noticed that those who 
have done much for the one have also improved the other. 
Plato has given his views of language in the Cratylus, and 
Aristotle, in his Interpretation and Analytics, has laid the 
foundations of general grammar. And so in later times the 
most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been 
attentive to the theory of language. 

In Greek, the same word (jtdyoj) means i*eason and lan- 
guage. And in Latin, reasoning is called discursus — a mean- 
ing which is made English by our great poet, when he speaks 
of " large discourse of reason." In all this the connection be- 
tween the powers of the mind and language is recognized. 

Montemont,' Beattie,^ Monboddo.* 
GRANDEUR. — " The emotion raised by grand objects is awful, 
solemn, and serious." 

" Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the 

most grand The emotion which this grandest of 

all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion — a 
serious recollected temper, which inspires magnanimity, and 
disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue. 

' Grammaire, General ou Pkilosoplue des Langues, 2 torn., 8vo, Paris, 1845. 
* Dissertations, Theory of Language, part ii., 4to, Lond., 1783. 
' On the Origin and Progress of Language, 3 toIs. 



212 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

GRANDEUE- 

" The emotion produced by other objects which may be 
called grand, though in an inferior degree, is, in its nature 
and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to 
seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a kind 
of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a contempt of 
what is mean. .... 

" To me grandeur in objects seems nothing else but such a 
degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our 
admiration."' — V. Sdblimity, Beauty, Esthetics. 
GRATITTTBE is one of the affections which have been designated 
benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or intended, 
and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also characterized 
as a moral affection, because the party cherishing it has the 
idea that he who did or intended kindness to him has done 
right and deserves a return ; just as the party who has received 
an injury has not merely a sense or feeling of the wrong done, 
but a sense of injustice in the doing of it, and the feeling or 
conviction that he who did it deserves punishment. 

See Chalmers,^ Shaftesbury .^ 
GYMNOSOPHIST (yv^id?, naked ; tfo^oj, wise). — " Among the 
Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call gi/mnosopMsts, 
who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able to endure 
all the day long, looking full against the sun, without winking 
or once moving their ejes."* 

The Brahmins, pJthough their religion and philosophy were 
but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by Cicero.^ 
Arrian.* 

Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained the 
Indian philosonhy. 



HABIT (sltj, habitus). — "Habit, or state, is a constitution, frame, 
or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted to act or 

' Eeid, Intdl. Pow., essay viii., chap. 8. 

''■ Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy, chap. 8. 

3 Moralists, pt. iii., sect. 2. « Holland, Pliny, b. vii., c. 2. 

' Tuscul; lib. T., c. 27. « Exped. Alexand., lib. vii., c. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 213 

HABIT — 

suifer iu a certain way." * By Aristotle ^ ffcj is defined to be, 
in one sense, the same with Siddsaii, or disposition. His com- 
mentators make a distinction, and say s'lis is more permanent. 
A simihxr distinction has been taken in English between habit 
and disposition. 

Habits have been distinguished into natural and super- 
natural, or acquired and infused. Natural habits are those 
acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural habits are 
such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or 
graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology. 

Acquired habits are distinguished into intellectual and moral. 
From habit results power or virtue, and the intellectual habits 
or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. 
" These may be subservient to quite contrary purposes, and 
those who have them may exercise them spontaneously and 
agreeably in producing directly contrary elFects. But the 
moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are deter- 
mined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man 
in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his 
healthy state of body, and never otherAvise, when his motions 
are natviral and voluntary ; and iu the same manner the habits 
of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned 
by them to act justly and temperately."^ 

Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. The 
determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of 
our bodily organs, give birth to active hubits ; the acts of the 
memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive habits. 

Aristotle'' proves that our habits are voluntary, as being 
created by a series of voluntary actions. "But it may be 
asked, does it depend merely on our own will to correct and 
reform our bad habits? It certainly does not ; neither does it 
depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice 
of a physician, to recover that health which has been lost by 
profligacy. When we have thrown a stone we cannot restrain 
its flight ; but it depended entirely on ourselves whether we 
should throw it or not." 



' Monboddo, Ancient Mdaphys., chap. 4. 

* Metaphys., lib. iv., cap. 20. 

'^ Arjst., Ethic, lib. v., cap. 1. '' Ibid., lib. iii. 



214 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HABIT — 

Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout ; 
habits only as to their beginnings. 

Thurot' calls "habit the memory of the organs, or that 
which gives memoi'y to the organs." 

Several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of the 
exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall enu- 
merate a few of them. 

" The first is, that we should, from the very commencement^ 
be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too easy a 
nature ; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the diffident 
temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in the self-confi- 
dent temper you will excite an opinion whereby it will promise 
itself more than it can accomplish, the consequence of which 
will be sloth. But in both dispositions it will happen that the 
trial will not answer the expectation, a circumstance which 
always depresses and confounds the mind. But if the task be 
of too trivial a kind, there will be a serious loss on the total 
progress. 

" The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty 
for the acquirement of habit, two particular times should be 
carefully observed : the one when the mind is best disposed, 
the other, Avhen worst disposed to the matter ; so that, by the 
former, we may make most progress on our way ; by the latter, 
we may, by laborious effort, wear out the knots and obstruc- 
tions of the mind, by which means the intermediate times shall 
pass on easily and smoothly. 

" The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes inci- 
dental mention : — ' That we should, with all our strength (yet 
not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the opposite of 
that to which we are by nature the most inclined ;' as when we 
row against the current, or bend into an opposite direction a 
crooked staff. In order to straighten it. 

"The fourth precept depends on a general law, of undoubted 
truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything more suc- 
cessfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be not the chief 
object in the agent's design, but is accomplished, as it were, by 
doing something else ; since the bias of our nature is such, that 

' De V Entendcment, torn, i., p. 138. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 215 

HABIT — 

it usually dislikes constraint and rigorous authority. There 
are several other rules which may be given with advantage on 
the government of habit; for liahit, if wisely and skilfully 
formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying 
is) ; but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, 
as it were, the ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the 
life, but only clumsily and awkwardly." 

Bacon, ' Maine de Birau,^ Dutrochet,^ M. F. Ravaisson,* 
Butler,^ Reid.® — V. Custom. 
HAPPINESS "is not, I think, the most appropriate term for a 
state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all 
hap, that is, chance. 

"Felicity, in its proper sense, is but another word for for- 
tunateness, or happiness ; and I can see no advantage in the 
improper use of words, when proper terms are to be found, 
but on the contrary, much mischief."'' 

The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is 
allotted or happens to a man siit'd;^'''*! that is, good hap; or, 
more religiously, suSaiftowa, that is, favourable providence.* 

To live well and to act well is synonymous with being 
happy .^ 

Happiiiess is never desired but for its own sake only. 
Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desirable 
on their own account, but they are also desirable as means 
towards happiness. But happiness is never desirable as a 
means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself. 

^^ Happiness is the object of human action in its most general 
form, as including all other objects, and appi'oved by reason. 
As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of 
prudence, so happiness is the aim of wisdom. Happiness is 
conceived as necessarily an idtimate object of action. To be 
happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we 
are happy, we do not miss that which we have not ; if we are 



' On Advancement of Learning, book vii. ^ L' Influence de Habitude. 

^ Theoric de V Habitude. * De V Habitude. 

' Analog]/, pt. i., ch. 5. 

* Act. Pow., essay Hi., pt. i., ch. 3; Intell. Pow., essay iy., ch. 4. 

■■ Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. i., pp. 31-2. ^ Ibid. 

^ Aristotle, Ethic, lib. i , c. 4. 



216 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HAPPmESS — 

not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The 
desire of happiness is the supreme desire. All other desires 
of pleasure, wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are 
subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate 
objects ; but we can do so only by identifying them with this. 
Happiness is our being's end and aim. 

" Since happiness is necessarily the supreme object of our 
desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can 
be no harmony in our being, except our happiness coincide 
with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate 
and universal object of desire, must be identical with that 
which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of 
our intentions. As moral beings, our happiness must be found 
in our moral progress, and in the consequences of our moral 
progress we must be hapjoy by being virtuous.'' ' 

See Aristotle,^ Harris.^— F. Good (Chief). 

HARMONY (Pre-established). — When an impression is made 
on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes 
percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the bodily 
oi'gans are ready to execute it. How is this brought about ? 
The doctrine of a p)re-estahlishecl harmony has reference to this 
question, and may be thus stated. 

Before creating the mind and the body of man, God had a 
perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all possible 
bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and bodies, it 
was impossible but that there should come together a mind the 
sequence of whose ideas and volitions should correspond with 
the movements of some body : for, in an infinite number of 
possible minds and possible bodies, every combination or union 
was possible. Let us, then, suppose a mind, the order and 
succession of whose modifications corresponded with the series 
of movements to take place in some body, God would unite 
the two and make of them a living soul, a man. Here, then, 
is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which 
man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, 
no action and reaction. The mind is an independent force 



' Whewell, Morality, Nos. 544, 545. = Ethic, iib. i. 

^ Dialogue on Happiness. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 217 

HARMONY— 

which passes from one volition or perception to another, in 
conformity with its own nature ; and would have done so 
although the body had not existed. The body, in like man- 
ner, by virtue of its own inherent force, and by the single 
impression of external objects, goes through a series of move* 
ments ; and would have done so although it had not beeii 
united to a rational soul. But the movements of the bodj 
and the modifications of the mind correspond to each other, 
In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a 
material automaton. Like two pieces of clockwork, they are 
so regulated as to mark the same time ; but the spring which 
moves the one is not the spring which moves the other ; yet 
they go exactly together. The harmony between them existed 
before the mind was united to the body. Hence this is called 
the doctrine of pre-established liannony. 

It may be called correspondence or parallelism, but not liar- 
rti07?.?/ between mind and body — for there is no unity superior 
to both, and containing both, which is the cause of their mu- 
tual penetration. In decomposing human personality into two 
substances,^ from eternity abandoned each to its proper im- 
pulse, which acknowledges no superior law in man to direct 
and control them, liberty is destroyed.^ 

The doctrine oi pre- established harmony differs from that of 
occasional causes "only in this respect, that by the former 
the accordance of the montal and the bo/"Hly phenomena was 
supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, 
while by the latter their harmony was supposed to be brought 
about by His constant interposition.'^^ — Y. Causes (Occa- 
sional). 

This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his Theo- 
dicee and Monadologie. 

Bilfinger, De Harmonia Prwstabilita.^ 
HARMONY (of the Spheres), — The ancient philosophers sup- 
posed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodies 
throughout space formed a kind of harmony, which they called 
the harmony of the spheres. 

' Soul and body, however, constitute one suppositum or person. 

^ Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hum., p. 394. 

^ Ferrier, Inst, nf Mdaphys.. p. 478. ■• 4to, Tubing., 1740. 

20 



218 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HARMONY- 

" Look how the floor of heaven 
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold; 
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st 
But in his motion like an angel sings, 
Still quiring to the young-ey'd cherubim : 
Such harmony is in immortal souls ; 
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decaj' 
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it." 

Merchant of Venice, Act v., sc. 1. 

HATRED.— F. Love. 

HEDOK^ISM (jySoj'jj, pleasure), is the doctrine that the chief good 
of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine 
of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school. 

HERMETIC BOOKS. — A collection of treatises ascribed to the. 
Egyptian Thoth or Taaut, and also to the Hermes or Mercury 
of the Greeks. Different opinions have been entertained as to 
their origin and author. Marsilius Ficinus has collected the 
quotations made from the Hermetic books scattered throughout 
the writings of the Platonicians and early Christians ; of 
which he published a Latin translation in 147L They are a 
miscellany of theosophy, astrology, and alchemy — partly 
Egyptian, partly Greek, and partly Jewish and Christian.' 

HEURISTIC— F. OsTExsivE. 

HOLINESS suggests the idea, not of perfect virtue, but of that 
peculiar affection wherewith a being of perfect virtue regards 
moral evil ; and so much indeed is this the precise and charac- 
teristic import of the term, that, had there been no evil either 
actual or conceivable in the universe, there would have been 
no holiness. There would have been perfect truth and perfect 
righteousness, yet not lioliness ; for this is a word which' 
denotes neither any one of the virtues in particular, nor the 
assemblage of them all put together, but the recoil or the 
repulsion of these towards the opposite vices — a recoil that 
never would have been felt, if vice had been so far a nonentity 
as to be neither an object of real existence nor an object of 
thought." 2 

HOMOLGGTJE (0^05, same ; Xoyoj). — "A homologue is defined as 
the same organ in different animals, under every variety of 



> Lenglet du Fresnoy, Hist, de la JPhilosoph. Hermetique, 3 torn., ]2mOj Paris, 1742. 
2 Chalmers, Nat. Theol, vol. ii., p. 3S0. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 219 

HOMOLOGUE — 

form and function. Thus, the arms and feet of man, the fore 
and hind feet of quadrupeds, the wings ana feet of birds, and 
the fins of fishes, are said to be homologous." ' 

" The corresponding parts in different animals are called 
homologues, a term first applied to anatomy by the philosophers 
of Germany: and this term Mr. Owen adopts to the exclusion 
of terms more loosely denoting identity or similarity." ^ 

See Owen, On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertehrate 
Skeleton, 1848. — V. Analogue. 

HOMONYMOUS. — F. Equivocal. 

HOMOTYPE [ofjioi, same; tvTCoi;, type). — "The corresponding or 
serially repeated parts in the same animal are called homotypes. 
Thus, the fingers and toes of man, indeed the fore and hind 
limbs of vertebrate animals generally, are said to be homo- 
typal."^ 

HUMOUE, {humor, moisture). — As the state of the mind is influ- 
enced by the state of the fluids of the body, humour has come 
to be used as synonymous with temper and disposition. But 
temper and disp>osition denote a more settled frame of mind 
than that denoted by the word humour. It is a variable mood 
of the teraper or disposition. A man who is naturally of a good 
temper or kind disposition may occasionally be in bad humour. 
— V. Wit. 

HYLOZOISM ("uTn?, matter; and ^w^, life). — The doctrine that 
life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been held 
under difi'erenfc forms. Stracon of Lampsacus held that the 
ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed 
of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not 
accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held 
that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a 
principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. This doc- 
trine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that 
the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. 
Spinoza asserted that all things Avere alive in difi'erent degrees. 
Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. 
Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confounding 



• M'Cosh, Typical Fi/rms, p. 25. 
" Whewell, Supplem. Vol., p. 142. 
" M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25. 



220 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HYIOZOISM- 

of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and Bosco- 
vich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even the vis 
inertice ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and repulsion, and 
chemical affinity, all indicate activity in matter ; but life is a 
force always connected with organization, which much of matter 
wants. Spontaneous motion, growth, nutrition, separation of 
parts, generation, are phenomena which indicate the presence 
of life ; which is obviously not co-extensive with matter. 

HYPOSTASIS. — F. SUBSISTENTIA. 

HYPOTHESIS [vTtodiot^i;, stq^positio, supposition). — In Logic 
Aristotlo gave the name Ossis to every proposition which, 
without being an axiom, served as the basis of demonstration, 
and did not require to be demonstrated itself. He distinguished 
two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a 
thing, and the other which expressed its existence or non- 
existence. The first is the optOiudj or definition — the second, 
the vTioOisi^. 

When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained 
by any known cause, we are uneasy and try to reconcile it to 
unity by assigning it ad interim to some cause which may 
appear to explain it. Before framing an Jiyj^othesis, we must 
see Jirst that the phenomenon really exists. Prove ghosts 
before explaining them. Put the question an sit? before cur 
sit ? Second, that the phenomenon cannot be explained by any 
known cause. When the necessity of an hypothesis has been 
admitted, a good hypothesis — First, should contain nothing 
contradictory between its own constituent parts or other esta- 
blished truths. The Wernerians suppose water once to have 
held in solution bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The 
Huttonians ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now pro- 
duce. Second, it should fully explain the phenomenon. The 
Copernican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho 
Brahe. Third, it should simply explain the phenomenon, that 
is, should not depend on any other hypothesis to help it out. 
The Copernican system is more simple. It needs only gravi- 
tation to carry it out — that of Tycho Brahe depends on several 
things. 

By hypothesis is now understood the supposing of something, 
the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to explain 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 221 

HYPOTHESIS — 

phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in 
signification from theory, Avhicli explains phenomena by causes 
which are known to exist and to operate. " HyjyotJiesis," says 
Dr. Gregory,' "is commonly confounded with theory; but a 
hypothesis properly means the supposition of a principle, of 
whose existence there is no proof from experience, but Avhich 
may be rendered more or less probable by facts which 
are neither numerous enough* nor adequate to infer its exist- 
ence." 

"In some instances," says Boscovich,^ "observations and 
experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other cases, 
we avail ourselves of the aid of hypothesis ; by which word, 
hoivever, is to he understood, not fictions altogether arbitrary, 
hut suppositions conformable to experience or analogy." " This," 
says Dr. Brown, "is the right use o^ hypothesis — not to super- 
sede, but to direct investigation — not as telling us what we 
are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to ascer- 
tain." And it has been said,^ that " the history of all dis- 
coveries that have been arrived at, by Avhat can with any pro- 
priety be called philosophical investigation and induction, 
attests the necessity of the experimenter proceeding in the 
institution and management of his experiments upon a pre- 
vious idea of the truth to be evolved. This previous idea is 
what is properly called an hypothesis, which means something 
placed under as a foundation or platform on which to institute 
and carr'y on the process of investigation." 

Different opinions have been held as to the use of hypotheses 
in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, that hypo- 
theses are admissible and may be useful as a means of stimu- 
lating, extending, and directing inquiry. Bvit they ought not 
to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the absence of 
support from facts. They are not to be set up as barriers or 
stopping places in the path of knowledge, but as way-posts to 
guide us in the road of observation, and to cheer us with the 
prospect of speedily arriving at a resting place — at another 
stage in our journey towards truth. They are to be given 

' Lectures on Duties and Qualifications of a Physician. 
^ ^ De Solis ac Luna Defectihus, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212. 

" Pursuit of Knowledge, vol. ji.. p. 255, weekly vol., No. 3' . 
20* 



222 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

HYPOTHESIS — 

only as provisional explanations of the phenomena, and are to 
be cheerfully abandoned the moment that a more full and 
satisfactory explanation presents itself.' — V. Theory. 
HYPOTHETICAL. — F. Proposition, Syllogism. 



I. — V. Ego, Subject. 

IDEA [idea, elSoi , forma, species, image). — "Plato agreed with 
the rest of the ancient philosophers in this — that all things 
consist of matter and form ; and that the matter of which all 
things were made, existed from eternity, without form ; but 
he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all pos- 
sible things which exist, without matter ; and to those eternal 
and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. 

" In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns accord- 
ing to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal 
world." 2 

The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says : — 

" God saw his works were good. 
Answering his fair idea." 

And Spenser gives its meaning in the following passage: — 

"What time this world's great workmaister did cast, 
To make all things such as we now behold, 
It seems that he before his eyes had plast 
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould 
He fashioned them as comely as he could, 
That now so fair and seemly they appear, 
As nought may be amended anywhere. 

That wondrous patterne. wheresoe'er it be. 
Whether in earth, laid up in secret store, 
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see 
With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflorp. 
Is perfect beavity." 

We are accustomed to say that an artificer contemplating 
the idea of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a chair or 
bed. But he does not make the idea of them. " These forms 
of things," said Cicero,'' " Plato called ideas, and denied that 

' Reid, Intell. Pow., essay i., chap. 3. 

' Sir "William Hamilton. ' Orat, c. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 223 

IDEA- 

they were born, but were always contained in reason and 
intelligence." ^ 

"Idea is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no sub- 
sistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, and 
becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and evi- 
dence. Socrates and Plato supposed that there be substances 
separate and distinct from matter, howbeit subsisting in the 
thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, of mind and 
understanding. Aristotle admitted verily these forms and 
ideas, howbeit not separate from matter, as being patterns of 
all that God hath made. The Stoics, such at least as were of 
the school of Zeno, have delivered that our thoughts and con- 
ceits are the ideas." ^ 

" lAesd stmt principales formm qticedarn, vel rationes rerum 
stabiles, atque incommutahihs, qtice ipsce formatm nbn sunt, ac 
per hoc CEternoe ac semper eodem modo sese hahentes, quce in 
divina intelligentia continentur : et cum ipsce neque oriantur, 
neque intereant ; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur, quicquid 
oriri et interi?^ potest, et omne quod oritar et interit." ^ 

"Tu cuncta superno 
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherimus ipse 
Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formens."* 

Tiberghien^ has said, — " Seneca considered ideas, accord- 
ing to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their 
form, Diogenes Laertirs as their ca?<se md principle, Aristotle 
as substances; and in the middle ages and in our day they are 
general notions, in opposition to particular or individual no- 
tions. The ideas of Plato embrace all these meanings. The 
terms which he employs are ibia and fZSoj to designate the 
Pivine image, the ideal model or type (tvTto;) of all things 
and beings. He also calls them rtapaSsty^a-r'a, altMi apa:;oi, to 
denote that these eternal exemplars are the principle and 
cause of the existence and development of all that is in nature. 
They are also the thoughts of God (vojj^a-fa), who has pro- 



» Heusde, Jnit. Philosoph. Platon., torn, ii., pars, 3. 

a Plutarch. Opinions of Philosophers, ch. 10, fol. 666 of the trauslation by Holland. 
= Augustine, lib. Ixxxiii., 99, 46. ' Boeth., De ConsoU 9. 

» Essai des Connaiss. Hum., p. 207. 



224 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEA- 

duced all things according to the type of these ideas. And 
the terms tvahi^, fiovdSsi, indicate the affinity between the 
theory of Plato and the numbers of Pythagoras." 

In another passage^ the same author has said, that, "ac- 
cording to the Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, 
ideas are as it were the essence and matter of our intelli- 
gence. They are not as such, a product or result of intelli- 
gence, they are its primitive elements, and at the same time 

the immediate object of its activity They are the 

primary anticipations which the mind brings to all its cogni- 
tions, the principles and laws by reason of which it conceives 
of beings and things. The mind does not create ideas, it cre- 
ates by means of ideas There are two great 

classes of ideas — 1. Those which are related in some sense to 
experience ; as the principles of mathematics, notions of 
figure, magnitude, extension, number, time, and space. 2. 
Those which are completely independent of all sensible repre- 
sentation, as the ideas of good and evil, just and unjust, true 
or false, fair or deformed." — p. 208. — V. Notion. 

According to Plato, t'cZeas were the only objects of science or 
ti-ue knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual 
flux, there can be no real knowledge with respect to them. 
But the divine ideas being eternal and unchangeable, are 
objects of science properly so called. According to Aristotle 
and the Peripatetics, knowledge, instead of originating or 
consisting in the contemplation of the eternal ideas, types, or 
forms, according to which all things were created, originated, 
and consisted in the contemplation of the things created, and 
in the thoughts and the operations of mind to which that con- 
templation gives rise. But as external things cannot them- 
selves be in the mind, they are made known to it by means 
of species, images, or phantasms [q. v.) ; so that, in perception, 
we are not directly cognizant of the object, but only of a 
representation of it. In like manner, in imagination, memory, 
and the operations of intellect, what is directly present to the 
mind is not the real object of thought, but a representation 
of it. 

' Essai des Connaiss. Hum^ pp. 33, 34. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHV. 225 

IDEA- 

Instead of employing the various terms image, species, phan- 
tasni, &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes adopted 
the term idea, which till his time had been all but exclusively 
employed in its Platonic sense. 

By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term idea was 
employed to signify all our mental representations, all the 
notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in con- 
tradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modern use 
of the word. Mr. Locke, for example, who uses the word idea 
so frequently as to think it necessary to make an apology for 
doing so, says — "It is the term which, I think, serves best to 
stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when 
a man thinks : I have used it to express whatever is meant by 
phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind 
can be employed about in thinking." 

Against this modern use of the word idea, more especially 
in reference to the doctrine of perception {q. v.), Dr. Reid 
most vehemently protested. — " Modern philosophers," said he,' 
" as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have con- 
ceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects 
of our thoughts ; that there must be some image of them in 
the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And 
the name idea, in the jahilosophical sense of it, is given to 
those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The 
external thing is the remote or immediate object; but the 
idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate 
object, -without which we would have no perception, no re- 
membrance, no conception of the mediate object. 

"When, therefore, in common language, we speak of having 
an idea of anything, we mean no more by that expression than 
thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this expression implies 
a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call think- 
ing, and an object about which we think. But besides these 
three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth ; to wit, 
the idea which is the immediate object. The idea is in the 
mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that 
thinks; but the remote or mediate object may be something 
external, as the sun or moon ; it may be something past or 



' Iniell. Pow., essay i., chap. I. 



226 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEA— 

future ; it may be something which never existed. This is 
the philosophical meaning of the word idea; and we may 
observe that this meaning of the word is built upon a philo- 
sophical opinion; for if philosophers had not believed that 
there are such immediate objects of all our thoughts in the 
mind, they would never have used the word idea to express 
them. 

"I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use 
the word idea in this philosophical sense in explaining the 
opinions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it in ex- 
pressing my own, because I believe ideas, taken in this sense, 
to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular 
meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, be- 
cause the English words thougJd, notion, apprehension, answer 
the purpose as well as the Greek word idea ; with this advan- 
tage, that they are less ambiguous." 

Now it may be doubted whether in this passage Dr. Reid 
has correctly understood and explained the meaning of the 
word idea as employed by all modern philosophers, from the 
time of Descartes. 

Dr. Reid takes idea to mean something interposed between 
the mind and the object of its thought — a tertium quid, or a 
quartum quid, an independent entity different from the mind 
and from the object thought of. Now this has been the 
opinion both of ancient and modern philosophers ; but it is not 
the opinion of all. There are many, especially among modern 
philosophers, who, by the idea of a thing, mean the thing itself 
in the mind as an object of thought. Even when the object 
thought of is represented to the mind, the representation is a 
modification of the mind itself, and the act of representing and 
the act of knowing the object thought of, are one and the 
same ; the representation and cognition are indivisible. But 
Dr. Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is repre- 
sentative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of ideas as 
meaning something interposed between the mind and the 
objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our knowledge im- 
mediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things 
past, and of an immediate knowledge of things future. Now 
all knowledge is present knowledge, that is, it is only know- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 227 

IDEA- 

ledge Avhen we have it. But all knowledge is not imme- 
diate knowledge. Things that are past are not actually 
present to the mind when we remember them. Things that 
are future are not actually present when we anticipate them, 
for they have as yet no actual existence. But the mind 
frames to itself a representation of these things as they have 
been, or as they will be, and in thus representing them has 
knowledge of them. This knowledge, however, cannot be 
called immediate. In memory there is the faculty, and there 
is the object of the faculty or the thing remembered. But 
the object or the thing remembered is not actually present to 
the faculty. It is reproduced or represented, and in repre- 
senting the object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as 
a past reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a repre- 
sentative faculty. Now, in perception, where the object of 
the faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the 
mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the 
external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct 
contact,' and the knowledge or perception is the immediate 
result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had ac- 
knowledged the distinction, he might have called perception a 
presentative faculty, as memory is a representative faculty.' 
According to other philosophers, however, there is a repre- 
sentation even in perception. The external reality is not in 
the mind. The mind merely frames w itself a representation 
or image of what the external reality is, and in this way has 
knowledge of it. But this representation or image is not 
something interposed or different from the mind and the exter- 
nal object. It is a modification of the mind itself. It is the 
external object in the mind as an object of thought. It is the 
idea of the external reality. This is a theory of perception 
which Dr. Reid did not clearly distinguish ; but it is at variance 
with his own, and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he 
would have condemned it. In like manner he would have 
condemned the use of the word idea to denote a representative 
image, even although that representation was held to be 

* See Eeid's Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton; Note b, Of Presentative and 
Representative Knowledge; and Note c. Of the Various Theories of External Per- 
ception. 



228 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IBEA — 

merely a modification of mind. But this is the sense in which 
the term idea is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in 
reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense it 
means anything present to the mind, whether really or repre- 
sentatively, as an object of thought.^ 

Ideas, regarded according to the nature and diversity of 
their objects, are sensible, intellectual, or moral; according to 
the essential characters of these objects, they are necessary 
and absolute, or contingent and relative: according to the as- 
pect in which they represent things, they are simple or com- 
pound, abstract or concrete, individual or general, partitive or 
collective ; according to their origin or formation, they are ad- 
ventitious, factitious, or innate; according to their quality or 
fidelity, they are true or false, real or imaginary, clear or 
obscure, distinct or confused, complete or incomplete, adequate 
or inadequate.^ 

As to the origin of our ideas, the opinions of metaphysicians 
may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who deny the 
senses to be anything more than instruments conveying objects 
to the mind, perception being active (Plato and others). 2. 
Those who attribute all our ideas to sense (Hobbes, Gassendi, 
Condillas, the ancient Sophists). 3. Those who admit that 
the earliest notions proceed from the senses, yet maintain that 
they are not adequate to produce the whole knowledge pos- 
sessed by the human understanding (Aristotle, Locke). ^ — V. 
Innate. 

See Trendlenburg, De Ideis Platonis ; Richter, De Ideis 
Platonis ; Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy ; 
Beid's Works; Dugald Stewart, Philosoph. Essays;* Adam 
Smith, Essays on Philosoph. Subjects.^ 
IDEAL. — "Though ideas are widely separated from sensible 
reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely sepa- 
rated, and that is the ideal. A few examples will enable you 
to comprehend the difference between ideas and the ideal: 

' Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise meaning 
of the word idea (which she said she had been reading about in some metaphysical 
work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, " Idea, madam, is the femi- 
nine of idiot, and means a female fool." — Moore. Diary, toI. iv., p. 38. 
- 2 Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, b. ii., ch. 22. ' Dr. Mill, Essays, 314, 321. 

* Appendix ii. ' P. 119, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. '229 

IDEAL — 

Perfection is an idea; humanity in all its perfection is an 
ideal; human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are ideas ; 
the wisdom of the Stoics is an ideal. The ideal, then, is the 
intellectual existence of a thing which has no other charac- 
ters than those determined by the idea itself. The idea, thus 
individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions ; 
it is a model, which we may approach in a greater or lesser 
degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. 
We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of 
the monitor, that exists within us. We all judge and correct 
ourselves with reference to this ideal, without the power of 
ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute 
of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely chi- 
merical. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which 
requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order 
to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. 
But would you realize the ideal in experience as the hero of a 
romance ? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and 
useless enterprise ; for the imperfection of our nature, which 
ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion im- 
possible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the 
idea, resemble a fiction." ^ 

"By ideal I understand the idea, not in concreto but in 
individuo, as an individual thing, determinable or determined 
by the idea alone. What I have termed an ideal, Avas in 
Plato's philosoph}' an idea of the Divine mind — an individual 
object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every 
kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal 
existences." ^ 

"We call attention," says Cousin,^ "to two words which 
continually recur in this discussion — they are, on the one 
hand, nature or experience ; on the other, ideal. Experience 
is individual or collective ; but the collective is resolved into 
the individual ; the ideal is opposed to the individual and to 
collectiveness : it appears as an original conception of the 
mind. Nature or experience gives me the occasion for con- 

' Henderson, The Philosophy of Kant, p. 119. 

* Meiklejohn, Translation of Kant's Crit. of Pure Reason, p. 351. 

^ On the Beautiful. 

21 



230 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEAL — 

ceiving the ideal, but the ideal is something entirely different 
from experience or nature ; so that, if we apply it to natural, 
or even to artificial figures, they cannot fill up the condition 
of the ideal conception, and we are obliged to imagine them 
exact. The word ideal corresponds to an absolute and inde- 
pendent idea, and not to a collective one." 

" L'id^al, voil^ ,1'echelle mysterieuse qui fait monter Fame 
du fini, a rinfini.''^ 

When the word ideal is used as a noun and qualified by 
the adjective heau, its sense is critical or sesthetic, and has 
reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and painting. 
" The common notion of the ideal as exemplified more espe- 
cially in the painting of the last century, degrades it into a 
mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into 
an ideal, you must get rid of everything individual about it. 
Whereas the true ideal is the individual freed from everything 
that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded, and 
animated, and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows 
from the centre." ^ 

The ideal is to be attained by selecting and assembling in 
one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen 
in different individuals, excluding everything defective or un- 
seemly, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus, 
the Apollo Belvedere is the ideal of the beauty and propor- 
tion of the human frame ; the Farnese Hercules is the type 
of manly strength. The ideal can only be attained by follow- 
ing nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but 
such as nature exhibits ; but the elements of beauty and per- 
fection must be disengaged from individuals, and embodied 
in one faultless whole. This is the empirical accovmt of the 
ideal. 

According to Cicero,^ there is nothing of any kind so fair 
that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. " We 
can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. 
Nor did the artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Mi- 
nerva, contemplate any one individual from which to take a 
likeness ; bvit there was in his mind a form of beauty, gazing 

' Cousin, Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bwn, 9me. lecon, p. 189. 

'^ Oiiesses at Truth, second series, p. 218. ^ Orator., c. 2, 3. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 231 

IDEAL — 

on which, he guided his hand and skill in imitation of it." 
In the philosophy of Plato this form was called jtapdSaoyfia, 
Seneca ' takes the distinction between ISsa and elSo^, thus : — 
when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his I5m — the 
likeness is the clSoi or image. The slSo^ is in the Avork — the 
tSf'a is out of the work and before the woi-k. This distinction 
is commended by Heusde.^ And he refers to Cicero,^ who 
states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of 
Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a 
perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platonic sense of TiapdSstyfia 
or the ideal. According to this view, the beau ideal is a type 
of hypothetical perfection contemplated by the mind, but 
which may never have been realized, how nearly soever 
it may have been approached in the shape of an actual spe- 
cimen. 
IDEALISM is the doctrine that in external perceptions the 
objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held under 
various forms. — See Sir W. Hamilton;"* Berkeley, Works; 
Sir W. Drummond, Academic Questions ; Reid, Inquiry. 

Some of the phases of modern idealism among the Germans, 
may be seen in the following passage from Lewes ; ® — " I see a 
tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are three 
things implied in this one fact of vision, viz. : a tree, an image 
of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte 
tells me that it is I alone who exist. The +ree and the image 
of it are one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. 
This is subjective idealism. Schelling tells me that both the 
tree and my ego (or self), are existences equally real or ideal; 
but they are nothing less than manifestations of the abso- 
lute, the infinite, or unconditioned. This is objective idealism. 
But Hegel tells me that all these explanations are false. The 
only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the 
idea, the relation. The ego and the tree are but two terms of 
the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is absolute 
idealism. According to this there is neither mind nor matter, 
heaven nor earth, God nor man. — Y. Nihilism. The only 

' Epist., Iviii., sect. 15-18. '^ Init. Phil. Plat., vol. ii., pars 3, p. 105, 

' De Invent., U., 1. ' EeicPs Works, note c. 

5 Biograph. Hist of Phil., vol. iv., p. 209. 



232 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEALISM — 

real existences are certain ideas or relations. Everything 
else that has name or being derives its name and being 
from its constituting one or other of the two related terms, 
subject and object; but the only thing that is true or real 
is the identity of their contradiction, that is, the relation 
itself." 

The doctrine opposed to idealism is realism — q. v. See also 
Perception. 

IDEALIST. — " In England, the word idealist is most commonly 
restricted to such as (with Berkeley) reject the existence of a 
material world. Of late its meaning has been sometimes 
extended (particularly since the publication of Reid) to all 
those who retain the theory of Descartes and Locke, concern- 
ing the immediate objects of our perceptions and thoughts, 
whether they admit or reject the consequences deduced from 
this theory by the Berkeleian. In the present state of the 
science, it would contribute much to the distinctness of our 
reasonings were it to be used in this last sense exclusively." ' 

IDEATION and IDEATIONAL. — " The term sensation has a 
double meaning. It signifies not only an individual sensation, 
as, when I say, I smell this rose, or I look at my hand ; but 
it also signifies the general faculty of sensation ; that is, the 
complex notion of all the phenomena together, as a part of 
our nature." 

" The word idea has only the meaning which corresponds 
to the first of these significations ; it denotes an individual 
idea ; and we have not a name for that complex notion which 
embraces, as one whole, all the difi'erent phenomena to which 
the term idea relates. As we say sensation, we might also 
say ideation ; it would be a very useful word ; and there is no 
objection to it, except the pedantic habit of decrying a new 
term. Sensation would, in that case, be the general name for 
one part of our constitution ; ideation for another." 

Quoting this from Mr. James Mill as his authority. Dr. 
Carpenter^ has introduced the adjective ideational to express 
a state of consciousness which is excited by a sensation 
through the instrumentality of the sensorium. 

1 Stewart, Dissert, part ii., 166, note. "^ Princip. of Hum. Phys., p. 446. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 283 

IDEATION — 

" The basement convolutions of the cerebrum are the central 
organs of the perceptive consciousness, the portals to intel- 
lectual action, where sensorjr impressions, the intuitions of the 
special senses, whether sights, sounds, tastes, smells, or feel- 
ings become idealized and registered ; that is, perceived, remem- 
hered, and associated ; and where, too, the ideation of outward 
individualities is eflPected. . . . Ideation is the first step 
in the intellectual progress of man. Ideas are the pabula of 
thought, and form equally a constituent element in the com- 
posite nature of our animal propensities, and of our emotional 
and moral feelings. Ideation is as essential to the very exist- 
ence of memor}^ as memory is to the operation of thought. 
For what, in reality, is memory but the fact of retained ideal- 
ized imp7'essions in the mind ? And without these retained 
idealizations, embodied in the memory as representative ideas, 
where are the materials of thought ? and how are the pro- 
cesses of thought to lie effected ?" ' 

IDENTICAL PEOPOSITION. — "It is Locke, I believe, who 
introduced, or at least gave currency to the expression iden- 
tical proposition, in philosophic language. It signifies a judg- 
ment, a proposition, in which an idea is afiirmed by itself, 
or in which we affirm of a thing what we already know of 
it." 2 

We must distinguish between analytic and taiitologous judg- 
ments. Whilst the anahjtic display the-neaning of the sub- 
ject, and put the same matter in a new form, the tautologous 
only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter, in the 
same form, as, " Whatever is, is."" 

A proposition is called identical whenever the attribute is 
contained in the subject, so that the subject cannot be con- 
ceived as not containing the attribute. Thus, when you say 
a body is solid, I say that you make an identical proposition, 
because it is impossible to have the idea of body without that 
of solidity. 

IDENTISM or IDENTITY (idem, the same), or the doctrine 

* Journal of Psychol. Med., Jan., 1S57, pp. 139, 144. 

2 Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Pliilosoph., lect. xxiv. ; Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., 
■foook iv., chap. 8, sect. 3. 
^ Thomson, OulUne of Laws of Thought, p. 196. 

21* 



234 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 

IDENTISM- 

of absolute identity, teaches that the two elements of thought, 
objective and subjective, are absolutely one ; that matter and 
mind are opposite poles of the same infinite substance ; and 
that creation and the Creator are one. This is the phi- 
losophy of Schelling. It coincides ultimately with Pan- 
theism — q. V. 

" If the doctrine of identity means anything, it means that 
thought and being are essentially one ; that the process of 
thinking is virtually the same as the process of creating ; that 
in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do vir- 
tually the same thing as Deity accomplished in developing 
himself in all the forms and regions of creation ; that every 
man's reason, therefore, is really God ; in fine, that Deity is 
the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world/' ' 
IDENTITY means sameness. Unity is opposed to division, iden- 
tity to distinction. A thing is one when it is not divided into 
others. A thing is the same when it is not distinguishable 
from others, whether it be divided from them or not. Unity 
denies the divisibleness of a thing in itself. Identity denies 
the divisibleness of a thing from itself, or from that with 
which it is said to be the same. It is unity with persistence 
and continuity ; unity perceived even in plurality ; in multi- 
plicity and succession, in diversity and change. It is the 
essential characteristic of all substance or being, that it is one 
and endures. 

Unorganized matter may be said to have identity in the per- 
sistence of the parts or molecules of which it consists. Or- 
ganized bodies have identity so long as organization and life 
remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a great 
tree, is still the same tree.^ 

IDENTITY (Personal). — "What is called personal identity, is 
our being the same persons from the commencement to the 
end of life ; while the matter of the body, the dispositions, 
habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. 
We feel and know that we are the same. This notion or 
persuasion of personal identity results from memory. If a 



• Morell, Hist, of Phil., toI. ii., p. 127. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum,. Understand., book ii., cbap. 27, sect. 3. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 235 

IDENTITY- 

man loses all recollection of liis early life, he continues, 
nevertheless, actually the same person." ' 

Dr. Brown '^ changes the jihrase peisonal identity into mental 
identity. Locke* says — "To find wherein personal identity 
consists we must consider what person stands for ; which, I 
think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing in diiferent times and places." 

This looks like confining jpersonal identity to the mind. But 
Leibnitz* called it a "metaphysical communication by which 
soul and body make uji one suppositum, which we call a per- 
son." In a Revieiv of the Doctrine of Personal Identity,^ it 
has been proposed to define it as "the continuation of the 
aame organization of animal life in a human creature possess- 
ing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with the ordi- 
nary faculties of reason and memory, without reference to the 
original formation or constitution of that mind, whether it be 
material or immaterial, or whether it survives or perishes 
with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be said personal 
identity consists in the same thinking intelligent substance 
united to the same human body. By the same human body, 
however, is not meant the same particles of matter, but of 
the same human structure and form." — V. Personality. 

Locke® makes personal identity consist in consciousness. 
" Consciousness is inseparable from tlii..-king ; and since it is 
so, and is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, 
and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking 
beings, in this alone consists personal identity, i. e., the same- 
ness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness 
can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so 
far reaches the identity of that person." 

But it has been remarked that " Consciousness, without any 
regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent substance, 
cannot constitute personal identity. For, then, a disordered 



' Taylor, Elements of Thought. a Lecture xi 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., ch. 27. 

* Theodicie, p. 172. 

» P. 73, 8to, London, 1827. 

s Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii,, ch. 27. 



236 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

IDENTITY— 

imagination might make one man become two, ox even twenty 
2')ersons, whose actions he should imagine himself to have per- 
formed. And if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of 
having done certain actions, he vrill then not be the same 
person vrho did them." ' 

Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates j)e?'Sona^ide?!i!;i7?/, 
but does not constitute it. Consciousness presupposes personal 
identity as knovrledge presupposes truth. 

See Butler, Disaertation on Personal Identity ; Reid, Intell. 
Poto. ; " Stewart, Elements.'^ 

IDENTITY (Principle of). — It is usually expressed thus — a 
thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to 
the same as the principle of contradiction — q. v. In Logic it 
is expressed thus — conceptions which agree can be in thought 
united, or aiErmed of the same subject at the same time. 

IDEOLOGY or IDEALOGY.— The analysis of the human mind 
by Destutt de Tracy, piiblished about the end of last century, 
was entitled "Eletnens d' Ideologic," and the word has come to 
be applied to the philosophy of the sensational school, or the 
followers of Condillac — as Cabanis, Garat, and Volney. Of 
this school, De Tracy is the metaphysician; Cabanis* is the 
physiologist; and Volney^ is the moralist. The followers of 
this school were leading members of the Academic des Sciences 
Morales et Politiqties, and also took an active share in political 
assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were contrary to 
the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike by suppressing 
the Academic des Sciences Morales et Politiques. But the 
members of the school kept up their doctrines and their meet- 
ings, and it was on the motion of De Tracy that the Senate 
decreed the abdication of the emperor in 1814.^ 

" For Locke and his whole school, the study of the under- 
standing is the study of ideas ; hence the recent and celebrated 
expression ideology, to designate the science of the human 
understanding. The source of this expression is in the Essay 



' Whitehead, On Materialism, p. 79. 

^ Essay iii., ch. 6, with note. ^ Part ii., ch. 1, sect. 2. 

* Bapports du Physique at de Moral de I'Homine. 

5 Catechism du Citoyen Francais. 

'^ Damiron, Hist, de Philosoph. en Franpe au 19 siecle. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 237 

IDEOLOGY— 

on the Hum. Understanding, and the ideological school is the 
natural offspring of Locke." ' 

" By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, ideologie 
(for idealogie), a word which could only properly suggest an a 
priori scheme, deducing our knoAvledge from the intellect, has 
in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that phi- 
losophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge 
from sensation."'^ 

" Destutt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title 
of the father of ideology."^ 
IDIOSYNCRASY (16105, jyropriiis; avv, con, and xpoicrtj, mixtio), 
means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. " The soul 
in its first and .pure nature hath no idiosyncrasies, that is, hath 
no proper natwal inclinations, which are not competent to 
others of the same kind and condition."'* It is seen, however, 
that different persons " of the same kind and condition" may 
soon manifest different inclinations — which if not natiiral are 
partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their tempera- 
ment, as well as to the effect of circumstances. 

Sir Thomas Browne^ asks, "Whether quails from any idio- 
syncrasy or peculiarity of constitution do invariably feed 
upon hellebore, or rather sometimes but medically use the 
same?" In like manner some men are violently affected by 
honey and coffee, which have no such effects on others. This 
is bodily idiosyncrasy. Sympathy and- ::ntipathy — q.v., when 
peculiar, may be traced to idiosyncrasy. 

Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his Elements, 
says he uses temperament as synonymous with idiosyncrasy. — '■ 
V. Temperament. 
IDOL (stScoXor, from sJSoj, an image). — Something set up in place 
of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon^ calls those false 
appearances by which men are led into error, idols.'^ "I do 
find, therefore, in this enchanted glass four idols, or false 
appearances, of several distinct sorts, every sort comprehend- 
ing many subdivisions : the first sort I call idols of the nation 

' Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philnsoph., lect. 16. 

2 Sir W. Hamilton, Edin. Rev., Oct., 1S30, p. 112. 

= Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, essay iii. * Glanvill, Pre-existence of Souls, c. 10. 

s Vulgar Errors, book iii., chap. 28. " De Augment. Scient., lib. iv., cap.^. 



238 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDOL— 

or tribe ; the second, idols of the den or cave ; the third, idols 
of the forum; and the fourth, idols of the theatre."' — V. 
Prejudice. 
IGNORANCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the law 
or the action, and is distinguished into ignorantia juris, and 
ignorantia facti. 

Ignorantia facti excusat. Ignorance of what is done excuses, 
as, when a contract is signed under a wrong impression as to 
the meaning of the terms, such contract is voidable. 

Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scive neminem excusat. 
Every man is supposed to know the laws of the land in which 
he lives ; and if he transgress any of them, although in igno- 
rance, he is not excused. A merchant continuing to deal in 
goods which have been declared contraband is liable to the 
penalty, though he did not know the law. 

In respect of an action, ignorance is called efficacious or con- 
comitant, according as the removaP of it would, or would not, 
prevent the action from being done. In respect of the agent, 
ignorance is said to be vincible or invincible, according as it 
can, or cannot, be removed by the use of accessible means of 
knowledge. 

Vincible ignorance is distinguished into affected or wilfid, by 
which the means of knowing are perversely rejected ; and 
supine or crass, by which the means of knowing are indolently 
or stupidly neglected. 

Ignorance is said to be invincible in two ways — in itself, and 
also in its cause, as when a man knows not what he does, 
through disease of body or of mind ; in itself, but not in its 
cause, as when a man knows not what he does, through in- 
toxication or passion. 
ILLATION [illatum, from infero, to bring in), or ^'■inference 
consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there 
is between the ideas in each step of the deduction, whereby 
the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagree- 
ment of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives 

' De. Inlerpretatione Naturm, sect. 39; Reid, Intell. Pnw., essay iv., chap. 8. 

* Aristotle {Ethic, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done through 
ignnranci (iia ayvoiav), and an action done ignorantly {ayvotiyv). In the former case 
tlu! ignorance is the direct cause of the action, in the latter case it is an accident or 
concojuitaut. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 239 

ILLATION - 

at knowledge ; or their probable connection on which it with- 
holds its assent, as in opinion." ^ — V. Inference, Induction 

ILLUMIUATI [illumino, to enlighten). — The name given to a 
secret society said to exist in Germany and other countries of 
Europe, towards the close of the last century. They pro- 
fessed the purest principles of virtue ; but their real design 
was to subvert all religion and all government. Doubts have 
been entertained as to the extent and influence of any such 
society ; and some have even denied its existence.^ 

IMAGrlK^ATION. — -"Nihil aliud est imaginari (iw&ro. rei cox'porese 
figuram sen imaginem contemplari."' 

Mr. Addison'' says, " The pleasures of imagination are such 
as arise from visible objects, since it is the sense of sight that 
furnishes the imagination with its ideas." Dr. Reid says, 
"■Imagination, in its proper sense, signifies a lively conception 
of objects of sight. It is distinguished from conception, as a 
part from a whole." Bu.t a much wider signification has been 
given to the word by others. 

"By imagination we mean, in a comprehensive sense, that 
operation of the mind by which it — (1) receives, (2) retains, 
(3) recalls, and (4) combines, according to higher laws the 
ideal images furnished to it by the csenesthesis and by the 
senses ; for all these acts are manifestly links of one chain. 
At the first step, we usually call this operation^ the faculty of 
conception ; at the second, memory ; at the third, reproductive 
fancy ; and at the fourth, productive fancy." ^ 

" In the language of modern philosophy, the word imagina- 
tion seems to denote — first, the power of apprehending or con- 
ceiving ideas, simply as they are in themselves, without any 
view to their reality ; secondly, the power of combining into 
new forms or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions, 
which we have derived from experience or from information. 



' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., b. iv., c. 17. 

3 Robison, Pronfsof a Conspiracy, <£e. >i Descartes, Medit. Secunda. 

* Spectator, No. 411. 

5 " It would be well, if instead of speaking of the powers of the mind (which causes 
a misunderstanding), we adhere to the designation of the several (operations of one 
mind; which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget." 

" Feuchterslcben, Med. Psychol., p. 120. 8vo, 1847. 



240 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMAGINATION - 

These two powers, though distinguishable, are not essentially 
different."^ 

"Imagination as reproductive, stores the mind with ideal 
images, constructed through the medium of attention and 
memory, out of our immediate perceptions. These images, 
when laid up in the mind, form types with which we can com- 
pare any new phenomena we meet with, and which help us to 
begin the important work of reducing our experience to some 
appreciable degree of unity. 

" To understand the nature oi productive or creative imagina~ 
tion, we must suppose the reprodvictive process to be already 
in full operation, that is, we must suppose a number of ideas 

to be already formed and stored up within the mind 

They may now be combined together so as to form new images, 
which, though composed of the elements given in the original 
representations, yet are noiv purely mental creations of our 
own. Thus, I may have an image of a rock in my mind, and 
another image of a diamond. I combine these two together 
and create the purely ideal representation of a diamond 
rock."^ 
IMAGrlHATIOE" and FANCY. — "A man has imagination in 
proportion as he can distinctly copy in idea the impressions 
of sense ; it is the faculty which images within the mind the 
phenomena of sensation. A man has fancy in proportion as 
he can call up, connect, or associate at pleasure, these internal 
images [^avtdlui, is to cause to appear) so as to comjjlete ideal 
representations of absent objects. Imagination is the power 
of depicting, and fancy, of evoking or combining. The ima- 
gination is formed by patient observation ; the fancy, by a 
voluntary activity in shifting the scenery of the mind. The 
more accurate the imagination, the more safely may a painter, 
or a poet, undertake a delineation or description, without the 
presence of the objects to be characterized. The more versa- 
tile i\\Q fancy, the more original and striking will be the deco- 
rations produced."* 

Wordsworth'' finds fault with the foregoing discrimination, 

' Beattie, Dissert., Of Imagination, chap. 1. 

"^ Morell, Psychol., pp. 175, 176. 8vo, Lond., 1853. ^ Taylor, Synonyms. 

^ Preface to his Works, vol. i., 12mo, Lond., 1836. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 241 

IMAGINATION- 

and says, "It is not easy to find how imagination thus ex- 
plained, differs fi"om distinct remembrance of images ; or 
fancy, from quick and vivid recollection of them ; each is 
nothing more than a mode of memory." According to Words- 
worth, "imagination, in the sense of the poet, has no reference 
to images that are merely a faithful copy, existing in the mind, 
of absent external objects; but is a word of higher import, 
denoting operations of the mind upon these objects, and pro- 
cesses of creation or composition governed by fixed laws." 

" It is the divine attribute of the imagination, that it is irre- 
pressible, unconfinable ; that when the real world is shut out, 
it can create a world for itself, and with a necromantic power, 
can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions 
to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of the 
dungeon." — W.Irving.' 

" And as imagination bodies forth 
The form of things unlinown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing 
A local habitation and a name." 

To imagine in this high and true sense of the word, is to 
realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the 
forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the 
visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, imagina- 
tion maj'' be regarded as the differentia of man — the distinctive 
mark which separates him a grege muiorum. That the inferior 
animals have memory, and what has bev.n called passive ima- 
gination, is proved by the fact that they dream — and that in 
this state the sensuous impressions made on them during their 
waking hours, are reproduced. But they show no trace of that 
higher faculty or function which transcends the sphere of 
sense, and which out of elements supplied by things seen and 
temporal, can create new objects, the contemplation of which 
lifts us to the infinite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts 
which wander through eternity. High art is highW meta- 
physical, and whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or 
in sculpture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us 
with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or heard, 
or handled in the world around us, but in carrying us across 
the gulf which separates the phenomenal from the real, and 

^ Sketch Book. 

22 B 



242 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMAGmATION — 

placing us in the presence of the truly heantiful, and surroixnd- 
ing us with an atmosphere more pure than that which the sun 
enlightens. 

IMAGIITATIOIT and CONCEPTION. — " The business of con- 
ception," says Mr. Stewart,' "is to present us with an exact 
transcript of what we have felt or ^^erceived. But we have, 
moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining 
the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes 
■ of our own creation. I shall employ the word imagination to 
express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper 
sense of the word ; if imagination be the power which gives 
birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is 
not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction 
to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which 
have been perceived in conjunction ; and also judgment and 
taste to direct us in forming the combinations." And he 
adds,^ "The operations of imagination are by no means con- 
fined to the materials which conception furnishes, but may be 
equally employed about all the subjects of our knowledge." — 
V. Conception, Fancy. 

IMAGINATION and MEMORY.— " ifmo?-?/ retains and recalls 
the past in the form which it assumed when it was previously 
before the mind. Imagination brings up the past in new 
shapes and combinations. Both of them are reflective of 
objects ; but the one may be compared to the mirror which 
reflects whatever has been before it, in its proper form and 
colour ; the other may be likened to the kaleidoscope which 
reflects what is before it in an infinite variety of new forms 
and dispositions."" 

" Music when soft voices die 
Vibrates in the memory; 
Odours, when sweet violets sicken. 
Live within the sense they quicken." — Shelley. 

See Hunt, Imagination and Fancy ; Wordsworth, Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads; Eclin. Eevieio for April, 1842, article on 
Moore's Poems; Akenside, Pleasures of Imagination. 
IMITATION [imitor, quasi mi mitor, from fiifieofiai. Vossius.) — ■ 

' Elements, chap. 3. ' Chap. 6, 

^ M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 450. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 243 

IMITATION — 

" is a facultie to expresse livelie and perfitelie that example, 
which ye go about to follow." ' 

As a social and improvable being, man has been endowed 
with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This propensity 
manifests itself in the first instance spontaneously or instinc- 
tively. Children try to follow the gestures and movements 
of others, before their muscles are ready to obey, and to irni- 
tate sounds which they hear, before their voice is able to do so. 
Mr. Stewart^ has made a distinction between the propensity 
and the power of imifaiion. Both are peculiarly strong and 
lively in children, and answer the most important purposes. 
But the propensity to imitate what others do, and the manner 
of doing it, continues throughout life, and requires to be care- 
fully watched and properly directed. 

Man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries to copy 
nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he imitates 
the forms which strike and please him. And the germ of 
some of the highest discoveries in science has been found in 
attempts to copy the movements and processes of nature.^ 

IMMANENCE implies the unity of the intelligent principle in 
creation, in the creation itself, and of course includes in it 
every genuine form of pantheism. Transcendence implies the 
existence of a separate divine intelligence, and of another and 
spiritual state of being, intended to perfectionate our own."* 

IMMANENT {immaneo, to remain in), means that which does 
not pass out of a certain subject or certain limits. " Logicians 
distinguish two kinds of operations of the mind ; the first kind 
produces no effect without the mind, the last does. The first 
they call immanent acts ; the second transitive. All intellec- 
tual operations belong to the first class ; they produce no efi"ect 
upon any external object."^ 

"Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, pur- 
pose, are also immanent."^ 

" Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are what 

* Ascham, The Schulemaster, h. ii. 
' Elements, vol. iii., chap. 2. 

" Reicl, Act. Poiuers, essay iii., part i., chap. 2. 

* J. D. Morell, Manchester Papers, No. 2, pp. 108-9. 
' Reid, Intell. Pow., essay ii., chap. 14. 

^ Correspondence of Dr. Reid, p. 81. 



244 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMMANENT — 

the schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind, which pro- 
duce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a transitive 
act, AYhich produces an effect distinct from the operation, and 
this effect is the picture." ' 

The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is some- 
what different. According to him we make an immanent and 
valid use of the forms of the understanding, and conceive of 
the matter, furnished by the senses, according to our notions, 
of time and space. But when we try to lift ourselves above 
experience and phenomena, and to conceive of things as they 
are in themselves, we are making a transcendent and illegiti- 
mate use of our faculties. 

Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by an 
immanent act, but he created the world by a transient act. 

The doctrine of Spinoza^ is, Deus est omniu^n rerum causa 
immanens, non vero transiens, — that is, all that exists, exists 
in God ; and there is no difference in substance between the 
universe and God. 

"We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by our 
narrow selves, we ascribe intellections, volitions, decrees, jnir- 
poses, and such like immanent actions to that nature which hath 
nothing in common with us, as being infinitely above us."^ 
IMMATERIALISM is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that 
there is no material substance, and that all being may be re- 
duced to mind, and ideas in a mind. 

Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 
1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, " Going to England very 
young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a sect 
there, called the immaterialists, by the force of a very curious 
book upon that subject." 

" In the early j^art of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs us 
that he Avas actually a convert to the scheme of immaterialism ; 
a scheme which he probably considered as of a perfectly in- 
offensive tendency, so long as he conceived the existence of 
the material world to be the only point in dispute."* 

A work published a few years ago in defence of Berkeley's 

• Keid, Intell. Fow., epsay iv., chap. 1. '^ Ethic, pars 1, pref. 18. 
' Glanvill, Vanity of Dogmatizing, edit. 1661, p. 101. 

* Reid, Intell. Pow.. essay ii., chap. 10. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 245 

IMMATERIALISM— 

doctrine, Avas entitled Immaterialism ; and a prize offered to 
any one who would refute the reasoning of* it. 

IMMATERIALITY is predicated of mind, to denote that as a 
substance it is different from matter. Spirituality is the posi- 
tive expression of the same idea. Simplicity is also used in 
the same sense. Matter is made up of parts into which it can 
be resolved. Mind is simple and has no parts, and so cannot 
be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was maintained by 
Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the three first cen- 
turies. At the end of the fourth, the immateriality of the 
soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, and Mamertus 
Claudianus.' 

IMMOETALITY (OF THE SOUL) is one of the doctrines of 
natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved 
into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, is 
not affected by the dissolution of the body. How long, or in 
what state it may survive after the death of the body, is not 
intimated by the term immortality. But the arguments to 
prove that the soul survives the body, all go to favour the 
belief that it will live for ever. 

See Plato, Phcedon ; Porteus, Sermons; Sherlock, On the 
Immortality of the Soul; Watson, Intimations of a Future 
State; Bakewell, Evidence of a Future State; Autenrieth, On 
Man, and his Hope of Immortality, Tubingen, 1815. 

IMMUTABILITY is the absence or impossibility of change. It 
is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there can be 
no inconstancy in his character or government. It was argued 
for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, Natural Religion. 

IMPENETRABILITY is one of the primary qualities of matter, 
in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot at the 
same time be occupied by more than one portion of matter. 
It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. A nail 
driven into a board does not penetrate the wood ; it merely 
separates and displaces the particles. Things are penetrable, 
when two or more can exist in the same space — as two angels ; 
impenetrable, when not — as two stones. 

IMPERATE. — F. Elicit, Act. 

IMPERATIVE [imperativ), that which contains a should or ought 

' Guizot, Hist, of Civiliz., vol. i., p. 394. 

22* • 



246 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

IMPERATIVE - 

[sollen). It is the formula of the commandment [gebot) of 
reason. ' 

IMPERATIVE (CATEGORICAL, THE), is the phrase em- 
ployed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and 
obligatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the categorical 
imperative, that is, in seeing an action to be right, we see, at 
the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense of 
obligation springs from no view of the consequences of the 
action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and abso- 
lute idea of the reason ; involving, according to Kant, the 
power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obligation, 
therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom. 

IMPOSSIBLE (THE), or that which cannot be, has been distin- 
guished as the metaphysically or absolutely impossible, or that 
which implies a contradiction, as to make a square circle, or 
two straight lines to enclose a space ; the physically impossible, 
the miraculous, or that which cannot be brought about by 
merely physical causes, or in accordance with the laws of na- 
ture, as the death of the soul ; and the ethically impossible, or 
that which cannot be done without going against the dictates 
of right reason, or the enactments of law, or the feelings of 
propriety. That which is morally ijnjyossible, is that against 
the occurrence of which there is the highest probable evidence, 
as that the dice should turn up the same number a hundred 
successive times.' 

"It may be as really impossible for a person in his senses, 
and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, as 
it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it ; but 
who sees not these impossibilities to be totally different in 
their foundation and meaning? or what good reason canthei'e 
be against calling the one a moral and the other a natural 
impossibility ? " - 
[MPRESSIOK {imprimo, to press in, or on), is the term employed 
to denote the change on the nervous system arising from a 
communication between an external object and a bodily organ. 
It is obviously borrowed from the effect which one piece of 
matter which is hard has, if pressed upon another piece of 
matter which is softer ; as the seal leaving its impression or 

' Whately, Log., Append, i. ^ Price, Review, chap. 10, p. 431. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 247 

IMPEESSION- 

configuration upon the wax. It is not intended, however, to 
convey any affirmation as to the nature of the change which 
is eiFected in the nervous system, or as to the nature of sensa- 
tion ; and still less to confound this preliminary change with 
the sensation itself. The term impression is also applied to 
the effects produced upon the higher sensibility, or our senti- 
ments. Thus, we speak of moral impressions, religious im- 
pressions, impressions of sublimity and beauty. 

Hume divided all modifications of mind into impressions and 
ideas. Ideas were impressions when first received ; and became 
ideas when remembered and reflected on.' 

" Mr. Stewart^ seems to think that the word impress io7i was 
first introduced as a technical term, into the philosophy of 
mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct ; for, besides 
the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, of the il- 
lustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory from the 
analogy of an impress and a trace, words corresponding to 
impression were among the ancients familiarly applied to the 
processes of external perception, imagination, &c., in the 
Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical phi- 
losophies ; while among modern psychologists (as Descartes 
and Gassendi), the term was likewise in common use."'' 

Dr. Reid'' distinguishes the impressions made on the or- 
gans of sense into mediate and immediate. The impressions 
made on the sense of touch are immediate, the external body 
and the organ being m contact. The impressions made on 
the ear by sounding bodies are mediate, requiring the air 
and the vibrations of the air to give the sensation of hearing. 
It may be questioned whether this distinction is well or deeply 
founded.^ 
IMPULSE and IMPULSIVE [impello, to drive on), are used 
in contradistinction to reason and rational, to denote the in- 
fluence of appetite and passion as differing from the authority 
of reason and conscience. " It may happen, that when appe- 



* See Reid, IntcU. Puw., essay i., chap. 1. 

' Elements, toI. iii., Addenda to vol. i., p. 43. 

^ Sir Will. Hamilton, lieid's Works, p. 294, note. * Intell. Pow., essay ii. 

6 See Dr. Young, Intell. Philosoph., p. 71; Sir Will. Hamilton, Heid^s Works, p. 104. 



248 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMPULSE — 

tite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or 
passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has au- 
thority without any impulsive force.^ 

" Passion often gives a violent impulse to the will, and 
makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he 
lives." ^ 

IMPUTATION [imjmto,' to ascribe, to charge), is a judgment by 
which a person is considered the author of an action. In all 
moral action there is the presence of knowledge and intention 
on the part of the agent. In such cases he is held to be 
responsible, and the action is im^mted to him or set down to 
his account. 

INCLIITATION {incUno, to lean towards), is a form or degree of 
natural desire. It is synonymous with propensity or with the 
penchant of the French. It is more allied to aifection than to 
appetite. " It does not appear that in things so intimately 
connected with the happiness of life, as marriage and the 
choice of an employment, parents have any right to force 
the inclinations of their children."" — V. Disposition, Ten- 
dency. 

IHDEFIK'ITE {in and dejiniium, that which is not limited), 
means tha^t, the limits of which are not determined, or at least 
not so determined as to be apprehended by us. The definite is 
that of which the form and limits are determined and appre- 
hended by us. That of which we know not the limits, comes 
to be regarded as having none; and hence indejinite has been 
confounded with the infinite. But they ought to be carefully 
distinguished. The infinite is absolute ; it is that of which we 
not only know not the limits, but which has and can have no 
limit. The indefinite is that of which there is no limit fixed. 
You can suppose it enlarged or diminished, but still it is finite.* 
— V. Infinite. 

INDIFFERENCE (Liberty of) is that state of mind in which 
the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an 



' Reid, Act. Poiv., essay iii., pt. ii., chap. 1. * Ibid., chap. 6. 

' Beattie, Mor. Science, vol. ii., part ii. 

■* Leibnitz, Discours de la Conformite de la Foi et de la jRaiion, sect 70 ; Descartes, 
Princip. Philosoph., pars 1, c. 26, et 27. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 249 

mDIFFERENCE — 

object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also called 
liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called liberty of 
indetermination, or that state in which the mind is when it 
has not determined to do one of two or more things. — V. 
Liberty, Will. 

IN BIFFERENT. — An action in morals is said to be indifferent, 
that is, neither right nor wrong, when, considered in itself, or 
in specie, it is neither contrary nor conformable to any moral 
law or rule ; as, to bow the head. Svicli an action becomes 
right or wrong, when the end for which it is done, or the cir- 
cumstances in which it is done are considered. It is then 
regarded in individuo ; as, to bow the head, in token of 
respect, or in a temple, in token of adoration. 

INDIFFEHEH'TISM or IDENTISM — g. v., is sometimes em- 
ployed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to 
which there is no difference between the real and the ideal, or 
the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea is the reality. 
Indifferentism is also used to signify the want of religious 
earnestness. "In the indifferentism of the Lutheran Church, 
we see a marked descent towards the rationalism which has 
overspread the states of Germany." ^ 

INDISCERNIBLES (Identity of ). — It is a doctrine of the phi- 
losophy of Leibnitz, that no two things can be exactly alike. 
The difference between them is always more than a numerical 
difference. We may not, always be able/o discern it, but still 
there is a difference. Two things radically indiscernible the 
one from tlie other, that is, having the same qualities, and of 
the same quantity, would not be two things, but one. For the 
qualities of a thing being its essence, perfect similitude would 
be identity. But Kant objected that two things perfectly 
alike, if they did not exist in the same place at the same time, 
would, by this numerical difference, be constituted different 
individuals.^ 

" There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from 
each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, 
discoursing Avith me, in the presence of Her Electoral High- 
ness the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herenhausen,^ 

' Dr. Vaiighati, Essays, vol. ii , p. 255. 

^ Leibnitz, Nmiveanx Essais, Avant-Propos. 



250 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INDISCERNIBLES — 

thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The Prin- 
cess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long 
time to look for some, but it was to no purpose. Two drops 
of water, or milk, viewed through a microscope, will appear 
distinguishable from each other. This is an argument against 
atoms ; which are confuted, as well as a vacuum, by the prin- 
ciples of true metaphysics. 

" To suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same 
thing under two names." ^ 

" From the principle of the sufficient reason I infer that 
there cannot be in nature two real beings absolutely indiscern- 
ible; because if there were, God and nature would act without 
reason, in treating the one diiferently from the other ; and 
thus God does not produce two portions of matter perfectly 
equal and alike." ^ 

mDIVIDUAL, INDIVIDUALISM, mDIVIDUALITY, IN- 
DIVIDUATION (from in and divido, to divide). 
Individual was defined by Porphyry — Id cnjus proprietates alteri 
simul convenire non possunt. 

"An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, 
and cannot be logically divided, is called individual."^ 

An individual is not absolutely indivisible, but that which 
cannot be divided Avithout losing its name and distinctive 
qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other things 
of the same nature, is an individual whole. A stone or a 
piece of metal may be separated into parts, each of which shall 
continue to have the same qualities as the whole. But a plant 
or an animal when separated into parts loses its iiidividuality ; 
which is not retained by any of the parts. We do not ascribe 
individuality to brute matter. But what is that which distin- 
guishes one organized being, or one living being, or one 
thinking being from all others ? This is the question so much 
agitated by the schoolmen, concerning the principle of indivi- 
duation. In their bai'barous Latin it was called Hcecceietas, 
that is, that in virtue of which they say this and not that; or 
Ecceietas, that of which we say, lo ! here, and not anywhere 

' Leibnitz, Fourth Paper to Clarke, p. 05. 
"^ Ibid., Fifth Paper to Clarke. 
^ Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 5, g 5. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 251 

INDIVIDUAL - 

else. Peter, as aii individual, possesses many properties -which 
are quiddative, or common to him with others, such as suhstan- 
tialitas, corporeietas, animalitas, Hiunaniias. But he lias also 
a reality, which may be called Petreietas or Peterness, which 
marks all the others with a diiference, and constitutes him 
Peter. It is the HcBCceietas which constitutes the principle of 
individuation. It was divided into the extrinsic and intrinsic. 
The number of properties which constituted an individinim 
extrinsecum, are enumerated in the following versicle : — 

Forma, figura, locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis, 
Patria, sunt septem, quae non haiet unum et alter. 

You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, the 
son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xantippe, 
&c., any one of which properties might belong to another man; 
but the congeries of all these is not to be found but in 
Socrates. 

The intrinsic principle of individuation, is the ultimate 
reality of the being — ipsa rei entitas. In physical substances, 
the intrinsic pi-inciple of individuation is ipsa materia et forma 
cum unione. 

Hutcheson' has said, " Si quceratur de causa cur res sit una, 
aut de Individuationi< principio in re ipsa; non aliud assig- 
nandum, quam ipsa rei natura existens. Qucecunque enini causa 
rem quamlibet fecerat aid creaverat, earn it nam etiam fecerat, aut 
individua.m, quo sensu volunt MetapliysiciJ' 

Leibnitz has a dissertation, De principio Individuaiionis, 
which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he main- 
tained that individual substances have a real positive exist- 
ence, independent of any thinking subject. 
Individuality, like personal identity, belongs properly to intelli- 
gent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it to us 
that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded with 
us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible. 

"Individuality is scarcely to be found among the inferior 
animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. Indivi- 
duality is not individualism. The latter refers everything to 

'^ Meto.phys., pars 1, chap. 3. 



252 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

mBIVIBUAL — 

self, and sees nothing but self in all things. Individvaliiy con- 
sists only in willing to be self, in order to be something."' 

But in the Elements of Individualism,^ the word individual- 
ism is used in the sense assigned above to individ^iality. 
IKBIJCTIOK' (Method or Process of) (frtaywy,;, indudio).—''lt 
has been said that Aristotle attributed the discovery of indvc- 
tion to Socrates, deriving the word Irtaywy^ from the Socratic 
accumulation of instances, serving as antecedents to establish 
the requisite conclusion. "^ 

" Tndiiciio est argumention quo ex plvriiim singidarhim rccen- 
sione aliqiiid universale concluditur."* 

Indiictio est argumenivm quo prohatvr qiiid verttm esse de 
quopiam generali, ex eo quodverum sit de particidarihus omnibus, 
saltern de tot ut sit credible.^ 

Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting a 
whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more 
individuals of that class.^ 

'^Induction is that operation of mind by which we infer 
that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, 
will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain 
assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process 
by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals 
of a class, is true of the whole class, or that what is true at 
certain times will be true under similar circumstances at all 
times.'' 

"Induction is usually defined to be the process of drawing 
a general rule from a suiScient number of particular cases ; 
deduction is the converse process of proving that some property 
belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it 
belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. That 
all bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we 
have obtained from examining anumber of bodies goming under 
our notice, by induction; if from this general principle we 
argue that the stone we throw from our hand will show the 
same tendency, we adopt the deductive method 

' Vinet, Essais de Philosoph., Mor., Paris, 1847, p. 142. 

^ By William Maccall. 8vo, Lond., 1847. ^ Devey, Log., p. 151, note. 

' Le Grand, Inst. Pldlosoph., p. 57, edit. 1675. 

» Wallis, Inst. Log., p. 198, 4th edit. 

« Whately, Log., book ii., chap. 5, § 5. ' Mill, Log., b. jii., ch. 2, § 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 253 

INDIICTIOK — 

More exactly, we may define the inductive method as the 
process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes 
from effects ; and the deductive, as the method of deriving 
facts from laws and effects from their causes." ' 

According to Sir William Hamilton,^ "Ind^iciion has been 
employed to designate three very difiTerent operations — 1. 
The objective process of investigating particular facts, as pre- 
paratory to induction, which is not a process of reasoning of 
any kind. 2. A material illation of the universal from the 
singular, as warranted either by the general analogy of na- 
ture, or the special presumptions afforded by the object-mat- 
ter of any real science. 3. A formal illation of the universal 
from the individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of 
thought, and abstract from the conditions of this or that ' par- 
ticular matter.' The second of these is the inductive method 
of Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclu- 
sions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from 
which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars unknown 
to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct examination. 
Aristotle's definition coincides with the third, and 'induction 
is an inference drawn from all the particulars." The second 
and third have been confounded. But the second is not a 
logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily 
inferrible from the premiss, for the some of the antecedent 
does not necessarily legitimate the all of the conclusion, not- 
withstanding that the procedure may be warranted by the 
material problem of the science or the fundamental jjrinci- 
ples of the human understanding. The third alone is pro- 
perly an induction of Logic ; for Logic does not consider 
things, but the general forms of thought under which the 
mind conceives them ; and the logical inference is not deter- 
mined by any relation of casuality between the premiss and 
the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of reason and 
consequence as involved in the thought." 

" The Baconian or Material Induction proceeds on the 
assumption of general laws in the relations of physical phe- 
nomena, and endeavours, by select observations and experi- 

« Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thmght, 2cl edit., pp. 321, 323. 

" Discussions, p. 156. * Prior Analyt., ii., o. 2-3. 

23 



254 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

INDUCTION— 

ments, to detect the law in any particular case. This, whatever 
be its value as a general method of physical investigation, has 
no place in Foi-mal Logic. The Aristotelian or Formal Induc- 
tion proceeds on the assumption of general laws of thought, 
and inquires into the instances in which, by such laws, we 
are necessitated to reason from an accumulation of particular 
instances to an universal rule." ' 

On the difference between induction as known and prac- 
tised by Aristotle, and as recommended by Lord Bacon, see 
Stewart.^ 

INBTTCTION' (Principle of), — By the principle of induction is 
meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what 
has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will 
also happen in other cases, which have not been observed. 
This principle is involved in the words of the wise man,^ "The 
thing that hath been, it is that which shall be: and that 
which is done is that which shall be done." In nature there 
is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a 
sufficient reason, all events occur according to the efficacy of 
proper causes. In the language of Newton, Effectuuvi natu- 
ralimn ejusdem generis ecedem sunt causes. The same causes 
produce the same effects. The principle of induction is an 
application of the principle of casuality. Phenomena have 
their proper causes, and these causes operate according to a 
fixed law. This law has been expressed by saying, substance 
is persistent. Our belief in the established order of nature 
is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, 
and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from experi- 
ence. According to others this belief is a result or inference 
derived from experience. On the different views as to this 
point compare Mill's Log.,* with Whewell's Philosophy of 
Inductive Sciences.^ Also, the Quarterly Revieiu.^ 

On the subject of induction in general, see Reid, Intell. 
Pow.;'' Inquiry;^ Stewart, Elements;^ Philosoph. Essays ;^° 

'- Royer Collard, CEhivres de Reid, par Mons. Jouffroy." 



" Mansel, Prolegom. Loff., p. 209. ^ Element!;, part ii., cbap. 4. sect. 2. 

= Eccles. i. 9. " B. iii., ch. 3. » Book i., cb. 6. 

^ Vol. Ixviii. ■" Essay vi., ch. 5. ' Cb. ti., sect. 24. 

«Vol. ii, Qh. 4, sect. a. '"P. 7!. -' " Tom. iy., p. 277. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 

INEBTIA. — That property of matter by which it would always 
continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it was 
put, unless changed by some external force. Resistance to 
change of state. The quantity of matter in a body is deter- 
mined by its quantity of inertia ; and this is estimated by the 
quantity of force required to put it in motion at a given rate. 
Kepler conceiving the disposition of a body to maintain its 
state of motion as indicating an exertion of power, prefixed 
the word vis to inertia. Leibnitz maintained that matter mani- 
fests force in maintaining its state of rest. 

" The vis insita, or innate force of matter, is a power of 
resisting by which every body, as much as in it lies,' endea- 
vours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or 
of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. This force 
is ever proportional to the body whose force it is ; and differs 
nothing from the inactivity of the mass but in our manner of 
conceiving it. A body, from the inactivity of matter, is not 
without difficulty put out of its state of rest or motion. Upon 
which account this vis insita may, by a most significant name, 
be called vis inertice, or force of inactivity." ^ 

IN ESSE ; IN POSSE.— Things that are not, but which may be, 
are said to be in posse ; things actually existing are said to be 
in esse. 

INFERENCE [infero, to bear, or bring in), is of the same deriva- 
tion as illation and induction — q. v. 

" To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid 
down as true, to draw in another as true : i. e., to see, or sup- 
pose such a connection of the two ideas of the inferred 
proposition."^ 

"An inference is a proposition which is perceived to be true, 
because of its connection with some known fact. There are 
many things and events which are always found together ; or 
which constantly follow each other : therefore, when we 
observe one of these things or events, we infer that the other 
also exists, or has existed, or will soon take place. If we see 
the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, 
we infer that the country is inhabited ; if these prints appear 
to be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we infer 



Newton, Princep., defin. 3. 
' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., ch. 17. 



256 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IlfFEEElSrCE — 

that the inhabitants are at no great distance ; if the prints 
are those of naked feet, we infer that these inhabitants are 
savages ; or if they are the prints of shoes, we iiifer that they 
are, in some degree, civilized." ' 

" We ought to comprehend, within the sphere of inference, 
all processes wherein a trvith, involved in a thought or 
thoughts given as antecedent, is evolved in a thought which 
is found as consequent." ^ 

"We infer immediately, either by contraposition, by subal- 
ternation, by opposition (proper), or by conversion."^ 

Mediate inference is the syllogistic. 
INFEEEHCE aud PROOF. — "Reasoning comprehends inferring 
and proving ; which are not two difiFerent things, but the same 
thing regarded in two different points of view ; like the road 
from London to York, and the road from York to London. 
He who infers, proves; and he who proves, infers; but the 
word infer fixes the mind j^rs^ on the premiss and then on the 
conclusion ; the word prove, on the contrary, leads the mind 
from the conclusion to the premiss. Hence, the substantives 
derived from these words respectively, are often used to ex- 
press that which, on each occasion, is last in the mind ; infer- 
ence being often used to signify the conclusion (^. e., proposi- 
tion inferred), and proof, the premiss. To infer, is the business 
of the pJiilosopher ; to prove, of the advocate."^ 

Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the 
support of a given proposition ; inferring is the deduction of a 
conclusion from given premisses."^ 

" When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we 
term the mental act or state induced a conjecture ; when they 
are strong, we term it an inference or conclusion. Increase 
the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion ; diminish 
the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture."^ — 
V. Fact. 
IHFIU^ITE {in and fnitiwi, unlimited or rather limitless). — 
In geometry, infinite is applied to quantity which is greater 



> Taylor, Elements of Thought. ^ Spalding., Log., p. 1. ' Ibid., p. 160. 

* Whately, Log., b. lv„ ch. 3, § 1. ^ Whately, ibid. 

' S. Bailey, Theory of Reasoning, pp. 31, 32, 8vo, Lond., 1851 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 267 

INFmiTE — 

than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speaking it 
means that which is not only without determinate bounds, but 
which cannot possibly admit of bound or limit. 

" The infinite expresses the entire absence of all limitation, 
and is applicable to the one ni/?ni7e Being in all his attributes. 
The absolute expresses perfect independence, both in being 
and in action. The unconditioned indicates entire freedom 
from every necessary relation. The whole three unite in 
expressing the entire absence of all restriction. But let this 
be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one 
infinite Being cannot exist in relation, they only imply that He 
cannot exist in a necessarij relation, that is, if He exist in 
relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his 
existence." • — V. Absolute, Unconditioned. 

As to our idea of the infinite there are two opposite 
opinions. 

According to some, the idea is purely negative, and springs 
up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or some ob- 
ject of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. Ov, if 
the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished by 
the imagination, which goes on enlarging the finite without 
limit. 

On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the finite 
can never furnish the idea of the infinite, but only of the 
indefinite. ■ The indefinite is merely the confused apprehension 
of what may or may not exist. But the idea of the infinite 
is the idsa of an objective reality, and is implied as a necessary 
condition of every other idea. We cannot think of body but 
as existing in space, nor of an event but as occurring in 
time ; and space and duration are necessarily thought of as 
infinite. 

But have we or can we have knowledge of the infinite? 
Boethius^ is quoted as saying, " Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; 
infmita namque animo comprehend! nequeunt ; quod autem 
ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientise fine 
concluditur ; quare infinitorum scientia nulla est." 

On the other hand, Cudworth'' has said, — " Since infinite is 

' Calderwood, Philosoph. nf the Infinite, p. 37. 

2 In Freed., p. 113. edit. Bas. 3 inf^u, Si/stem, p. 419. 

23* . ■ s 



258 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

mFIIflTE — 

the same with absolutehj perfect, we having a notion or idea 
of the latter must needs have of the former." 

But, whik we cannot compreliend the infiniie, we may ap- 
prehend it in contrast or relation with the finite. And this is 
what the common sense of men leads them to rest satisfied 
with, and, without attempting the metaphysical difiiculty of 
reconciling the existence of the infinite with that of \\\% finite, 
to admit the existence of both. 

" Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same 
with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual 
nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprelienders there- 
of. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we 
have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as 
is adequate and commensurate to the essence of things." — 
Cudworth. 

Ancillon, Essai sur I'Idee et le Sentiment de VInfini; Cousin, 
Coiirs de Philosoph., et Hist, de la Philosopli.; Sir W. Hamil- 
ton, Discussions on Philosophy, &c. ; L. Velthuysen, Bissertatio 
de Finito et Infiniio ; Descartes, 3Iedctatio?is. 

" The infinite and the indefinite may be thus distinguished: 
the former implies an actual conceiving the absence of limits; 
the latter is a not conceiving the presence of limits — processes 
as difi'erent as searching through a house and discovering that 
a certain person is not there, as from shutting our eyes and 
not seeing that he is there. Infinity belongs to the object of 
thought; indefiniteness to the manner of thinking of it."^ 
INELUX (Physical) {infiuo, to flow in), is one of the theories 
as to our perception of external objects. — " The advocates of 
this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes 
of our perceptions, the word efiicient being employed to 
signify that the things by means of some positive power or 
inherent virtue which they possess, were competent to transmit 

to the mind a knowledge of themselves External 

objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the 
transmission of some kind of influence, the nervous System was 
supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain 
images or representations, and thus our knowledge of external 

' Mansel, iect. 07i Philosnph. nf Kant, p. 29. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 259 

IITFLUX- 

things was supposed to be brought about. The representa- 
tions alone came before the mind ; the things by which they 
were caused remained occult and unknown." ^ — F. Causes 
(Occasional). 

INJURY {injuria, from in and^ws, neglect or A'iolation of right), 
in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing of 
wrong. We may bring liarm or evil upon others without in- 
tending it. But injury implies intention, and aAvakens a sense 
of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is on this 
difference in the meaning of liarm and injury that Bishop 
Butler founds the distinction of resentment into sudden and 
deliberate.'^ 

INNATE (IDEAS). — Ideas, as to their origin, have been distin- 
guished into adventitious, or such as we receive from the 
objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a moun- 
tain, or a tree ; factitious, or such as we frame out of ideas 
already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a tree with 
golden fruit ; and innate, or such as are inborn and belong to 
the mind from its birth, as the idea of God or of immortality. 
Cicero, in various passages of his treatise De Natura Deorum, 
speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being inserted, 
or engraven, or inborn in the mind. "IntelUgi necesse est, esse 
deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones hahe- 
vius."^ In like manner, Origen^ has said, " That men would 
not be guilty if they did not carry in their mind common 
notions of morality, innate and written in divine letters." It 
was in this form that Locke ^ attacked the doctrine of innate 
ideas. It has been questioned, however, whether the doctrine, 
as represented by Locke, was really held by the ancient phi- 
. losophers. And Dr. Hutcheson^ has the following passage: — 
" Onuies autem ideas, appreliensiones, etjudicia, quce de rebus, 
diice natura, formamus, quocunque demum tempore Jiocfiat, sive 
quce naturce nostne virihus quibuscunque, necessario fere, atque 
universalHer'' recipiuntur, innata quantum memini, dixerunt 

• Ferrier, Inst, of Metaphys., p. 472. ^ Butler, Sermons, viii. and 9. 

" Lib. i., sect. 17. ' Adv. Celsum, lib i., cap. 4. 

» Essay on Hum. Understand., book i. 

^ Oratio Inauguralis, De Naturali hominum Societate. 

' We have here, in 17.30, the two marks of necessity and universality which subse- 
quently were so much insisted on by Kant and others as characterizing all our a priori 
cosniitious. 



260 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be difficult 
to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has 
been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas innate 
they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with 
naiural, and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, 
to certain ideas which men, as human or rational beings, 
necessarily and viiiversalhj entertain. — See Natural as dis- 
tinguished from Innate. 

" There are three senses in which an idea may be supposed 
to be innate ; one, if it be something originally superadded to 
our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance 
fully developed ; or as one undeveloped, but having the power 
of self-development: another, if the idea is a subjective con- 
dition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of 
the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be 
in some way embodied in, or interwoven with, the powers by 
which the mind receives those ideas : a third, if, without being 
a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or 
faculties of mind, the exercise of which would suffice, inde- 
pendently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontane- 
ously to produce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given 
us at our first creation, without its bearing any special rela- 
tion to our other faculties ; in the second case, it is given us 
as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular 
species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers 
by which we are enabled to receive the thought; in the third 
case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original consti- 
tution of some mental power or powers ; not, however, as in 
the preceding case, simply as a pre-requisite to their exercise, 
but by their being so formed a's by exercise spontaneously, to 
produce the idea.^^ 

The first of these three is the form in which the doctrine of 
innate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine was at 
one time thought essential to support the principles of natural 
religion and morality. But Locke saw that these principles 
were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, although a belief in 
God and immortality, and a sense of the difl'erence between 

' Dr. Alliot, Psydiolotjy and Theology, p. 93, 12mo, Lond., 1855. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 261 

INIfATE — 

right and wrong were not implanted or inserted in the mind ; 
if it could be shown that men necessarily and universally came 
to them by the ordinary use of their faculties. He took a 
distinction between an innate law, and a law of nature ; ' and 
while he did not admit that there was a law "imprinted on 
our minds in their very original," contended " that there is a 
law knowable by the light of nature." In like manner, 
Bishow Law 2 said, "It will really come to the same thing 
with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature of 
virtue and vice, whether the Deity has implanted these in- 
stincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in 
such a manner — has given us such powers and placed us in 
such circumstances, that we must necessarily acquire them." 
V. Nature (Law of). 

" Though it appears not that we have any innate ideas or 
formed notions or principles laid in by nature, antecedently 
to the exercise of our senses and understandings ; yet it must 
be granted that we were born Avith the natural faculty, 
whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement 
of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves ; 
as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are ; 
that one and two make three, that gold Is not silver, nor ice 
formally water; that the whole is greater than its part, &c., 
and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cani^ot deliberately 
and seriously doubt of ics being so. This Ave may call intui- 
tive knowledge, or natural certainty wrought into our very 
make and constitution."* 

" Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can be 
drawn from the state of the passions for or against the Divine 
Benevolence, because they are not innate but acquii-ed. This 
is frivolous. If we are so framed and placed in such circum- 
stances, that all these various passions must be acquired ; it 
is just the same thing as if they had been planted in us ori- 
ginally."'' 

" Ni nos idees, ni nos sentiments, ne sont innes, mais ils 
sent naturels, fondes sur la constitution de notre esprit et de 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book i., ch. 3. 
"^ King's Essay on Origin of Evil, p. 79, note. 
' Oldfield, Essay on Reason, p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707. 
* Balguy, Divine Benevolence, p. 100, note. 



262 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IBM ATE — 

notre ame, et sur nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous envi- 
ronue." — Turgot,' quoted by Cousin.^ 

"We are prepared to defend the following propositions in 
regard to innate ideas, or constitutional principles of the mind. 
First, — -Negatively, that there are no innate ideas in the mind 
(1.) as images or mental representations; nor (2.) as abstract 
or general notions; nor (3.) as principles of thought, belief, 
or action before the mind as principles. But, Second, — Posi- 
tively (1.) that there are constitutional principles operating in 
the in'.nil, though not before the consciousness as principles ; 
(2.) that these come forth into consciousness" as individual 
(not general) cognitions or judgments ; and (3.) that these 
individual exercises, vrhen carefully inducted, but only vrhen 
so, give us primitive or philosophic truths. It follows that, 
while these native principles operate in the mind spontane- 
otisly, we are entitled to use them reflexly in philosophic or 
theologic speculations only after having determined their 
nature and rule by abstraction and generalization."^ 

" Though man does not receive from his Maker either spe- 
culative or moral maxims, as rules of judgment and of con- 
duct, like so mjiny perfect innate propositions enfoi'cing assent 
in his very infancy ; yet he has received that constitution of 
mind which enables him to form to himself the general rules 
or first principles on which religion and science must be built, 
when he allows himself these advantages of cultivation and 
exercise, which every talent he possesses absolutely requires. 
And this is all that is pleaded for ; and it is sufficient for the 
end. Nor is there anything either mystical, or unphilosophi- 
eal, or unscriptural in the notion. For if the proposition be 
not strictly innate, it arises from an innate power, which, in a 
sound mind, cannot form a proposition in any other way that 
will harmonize with enlightened reason and purified moral 
sentiment than in that to which the natural bias of the mind 
leads."" 

The doctrine of innate ideas is handled by Locke in his 
Essay on Hum. Understand.,^ and by most authors who treat 

' QHuvres, torn, iv., p. 308. ^ (Euvres, 1 serie, torn, iv., p. 202. 

3 M'Cosh, MelHi. of Div. Govern., p. 508, 5th edit. 
- Hancock, On Instinol, p. 414. ^ Book !. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 263 

IlflJATE — 

of intellectual philosophy. — See also Ellis, Knoioledge of Divine 
Things;^ Sherlock, On the Immortality of the Soul? 
INSTINCT {iv or ivtoi and (j-fj^io, inttis pungo), signifies an inter- 
nal stimulus. 

In its widest signification it has been applied to plants as 
well as to animals ; and may be defined to be " the power or 
energy by which all organized forms are preserved in the in- 
dividual, or continued in the species." It is more common, 
however, to consider instinct as belonging to animals. And 
in this view of it, Dr. Reid^ has said ; — "By instinct I mean 
a natural blind impulse to certain actions without having any 
end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any 
conception of what we do." An instinct, says Paley,"* " is a 
propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction." 

"An instinct," says Dr. Whately,^ "is a blind tendency to 
some mode of action independent of any consideration on the 
part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads." 

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior 
animals, have been referred to instinct as their spring. 1. 
Those which have reference to the preservation of individuals 
— as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient 
for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, 
and their natural means of defence and attack. 2. Those 
which have reference to the continuation of the species — as 
the bringing forth aixd bringing vip of their young. 

The theories which have been proposed to explain the 
instinctive operations of the inferior animals may be arranged 
in three classes. 

I. According to the 'physical theories, the operations of 
instinct are all provided for in the structure and organization 
of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. 
The principle of life may be'developed — 

1. 'Ry the meclianical play of bodily organs. See Descartes, 
Epistles; Polignac, Anti-Lucretins ;^ Norris, Essay towards 
the Theory of an Ideal World.'' 



1 Pp. 59-86. 2 Chap. 2. 

' Act. Pmv., essay iii., part 1, chap. 2. 

* Nat. Thcol., chap. 18. » Tract on Instinct, p. 21. 

« Book Ti. ■'Part2;Ch. a 



264 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

INSTINCT - 

2. By IrriiaMliiy: Badham, Insect Life; Mason Good, Booh 
of Nature;^ Virey, De la Fhysiologie dans ses rapports, avec 
la PJiilosojMe.'^ 

3. By Sensation: Bushnan, Pliilosopliy of Instinct and 
Reason;^ Barlow, Connection between Physiology and Intellec- 
tual Philosophy ; Kirby, Bridgewater Treatise.'^ 

II. According to the psychical theories, the instinctive 
actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers 
or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those of under- 
standing in man. 

1. Mr. Coleridge^ calls instinct " the power of selecting and 
adapting means to a pi-oximate end." But he thinks "that 
when instinct adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to varijing 
circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior animals, an 
instinctive intelligence, which is not different in kind from 
understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense 
in man." — Green, Vital Dynamics,^ or Coleridge's Works.'' 

2. Dr. Darwin^ contends, that what have been called the 
instinctive actions of the inferior animals are to be referred to 
experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species ; 
"though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about 
fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy." 

3. Mr. Smellie,^ instead of regarding the instinctive actions 
of the inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards 
the power of reasoning as itself an instinct. He holds '" that 
" all animals are, in some measure, rational beings ; and that 
the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are neces- 
sary results of the great variety of instincts which nature has 
been pleased to confer on the species." 

III. According to the theories which may be called hyper- 
psychical, the phenomena of instinct are the results of an 
intelligence, different from the human, which emanates upon 
the inferior animals from the supreme spirit or some subordi- 
nate spirit. 

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the 



• Vol. ii., p. 132. » p. 894. ^ P. 178. ■• Vol. ii., p. 255. 

5 Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. 193, 6th edit. « App. F, p. 88. 

' Vol. ii., App. B, 5. « Zoonomia, vol. i., 4to, p. 256-7. 

3 Philosophy of Nat. Hist, vol. i., 4to. p. 155. '" P. 159. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 265 

msTmcT- 

gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Egypt, and took 
refuge under the form of animals of different kinds. 

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, A Philosophical 
Amnsement on the Language of Beasts, crontends that the bodies 
of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate 
spirits. 

Mr. French ' holds that the actions of the inferior animals 
are produced by good and evil spirits ; the former being the 
cause of the benevolent, and the latter of the ferocious in- 
stincts. 

Others have referred the operations of instinct to the direct 
agency of the Creator on the inferior animals. — See Newton, 
Optics ; ^ Spectator ; ^ Hancock, Essay on Instinct. 

Dr. Reid'' has maintained, that in the human being many 
actions, such as sucking and swallowing, are done by instinct; 
while Dr. Priestley^ regards them as automatic or acquired. 
And the interpretation of natural signs and other acts which 
Dr. Reid considers to be instinctive. Dr. Priestley refers to 
association and experience. — V. Appetite. 
INTELLECT {inielligo, to choose between, to perceive a differ- 
ence). — Intellect, sensitivity, and will, are the three heads under 
which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now 
generally ai'ranged. In this use of it, the term intellect 
includes all those powers by which we acq.ure, retain, and 
extend our knowledge, as perception, memory, imagination, 
judgment, &c. " It is by those powers and faculties which 
compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect 
or understanding that man acquires his knowledge of external 
objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he 
combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view ; 
and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisitions 
he has made."® 

The intellectual powers are commonly distinguished from 
the moral powers ; inasmuch as it is admitted that the 



' Zoological Journal, No. 1. 

* Book iii., xx., query subjoined. 

■• Act. Pow., e.s?ay iii., pt. i., chap. 2. 

' Examin. of Reid, &c., p. 70. 

^ Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, Introd. 

34 



266 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

INTELLECT— 

moral powers partake partly of the intellect and partly of the 
sensitivity, and imply not only knowledge hut feeling. 

And when the moral powers are designated active, it is not 
meant to assert tliat in exercising the intellectual powers the 
mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate that while 
the function of the intellectual powers is to give knowledge, 
the function of the active and moral powers is to prompt and 
regulate actions. 

Lord Monboddo^ reduces the gnostic powers to two, viz. — 
sense and intellect. Under sense he includes the phantasy 
and also the comparing faculty, and that by which we appre- 
hend ideas, either single or in combination. This he consi- 
ders to be partly rational, and shared by us with the brutes. 
But intellect or vovu he considers peculiar to man — it is the 
faculty by which Ave generalize and have ideas altogether 
independent of sense. He quotes Hierocles^ on the golden 
verses of Pythagoras, as representing the Xoyoj or ^vxr] Xoytxjj, 
as holding a middle place betwixt the irrational or lowest 
part of our nature and intellect, which is thC' highest. 

"The term intellect is derived from a verb [intelligere], 
which signifies to understand : but the term itself is usually 
so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles 
explicitly as well as implicitly ; and abstract as well as ap- 
plied ; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than the 
understanding ; and the same extent of signification belongs 
to the adjective intellectual."^ 

"Understanding is Saxon and intellect is Latin for nearly 
the same idea : perhaps understanding describes rather the 
power of inference, a quickness at perceiving that which 
stands under the object of contemplation: perhaps intellect 
describes rather the power of judgment, a quickness at choos- 
ing between [inter and legere) the objects of contemplation."'' 
Intellect and Intellection. — ■'' The mind of man is, by its native 
faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in the same 
manner as the sense does particular ones — that is, as the truth 



' Ancient Metaphysics, book ji., chap. 7. 
^ P. 160, edit. Needham. 
' Whewell. Elements of Morality, introd. 12. 
* Taylor, Hynonyms. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOS0PHY. 267 

mTELLECT — 

of these propositions — Socrates exists, An eagle flies, Buce- 
phalus runs, is immediately perceived and judged of by the 
sense; so these contradictory propositions cannot be both true; 
What begins to exist has its rise from another ; Action argues 
that a thing exists (or, as it is vulgarly expressed, a thing that 
is not, acts not), and such-like propositions, which the mind 
directly contemplates and finds to be true by its native force, 
without any previous notion or applied reasoning ; which 
method of attaining truth is by a peculiar name styled iniel- 
ledioii, and the faculty of attaining it the intellect."^ 
Intellect and Intelligence. — " By Aristotle, vov^ is used to 
denote — ■ 

" 1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge. 

" 2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is, of 
self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments. 

" The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by intel- 
lectiis and intelligeutia ; and some of them appropriated the 
former of these terms to its first or general signification, the 
latter to its second or special." ^ 

Intellect and intelligence are commonly used as synonymous. 
But Trusler has said, "It seems to me that intellecius ought 
to describe art or power, and intelligentia ought to describe use 
or habit of the understanding ; such being the tendency of the 
inliections in which the words terminate. In '.his case intellect 
or understanding power is a gift of nature ; and intelligence, 
or understanding habit, an accumulation of time. So discri- 
minated, intellect is inspired, intelligence is acquired. The 
Supreme Intellect, when we are speaking of the Wisdom, the 
Supreme Intelligence when we are speaking of the Knowledge 
of God. Every man is endowed with understanding ; but it 
requires reading to become a man of intelligence." — V. Rea- 
son, Understanding. 
Intellectus Patiens, and Intellectus Agens. — Aristotle^ dis- 
tinguished between the intellectus patiens and intellectus agens. 
The former, perishing with the body, by means of the senses, 
imagination, and memory, furnished the matter of knowledge ; 

* Barrow, Malliem. Lectures, 1734, p. 72. 

^ Sir William HauiiUotij Eeid's Works, note a, sect. 5. 

° De Aninia, cap. 5. 



268 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrnY. 

INTELLECT — 

the latter, separable from the body, and eternal, gave that 
knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the 
mind is passive ; but -while external things rapidly pass, ima- 
gination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the 
knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this 
knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give 
universal notions, but merely generalized ones. The intellectus 
agens, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by 
the senses, actually evolves the idea which the intellectus 
paiiens potentially possessed. His illustration is, — as light 
makes colours existing potentially, actvially to be, so the intel- 
lectus agens converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to 
a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the intel- 
lectus pattens. As the senses receive the forms of things ex- 
pressed in matter, the intellect comprehends the universal 
form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior 
to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common 
illustration of Aristotle is that the senses perceive the form 
of a thing, as it is to ol/xov or a height ; the intellect has know- 
ledge of it as resembling -fijj xoi-ki^, a hollow, out of which the 
height was produced. 

Aristotle has often been said to reduce all knowledge to 
experience. But although he maintained that we could not 
shut our eyes and frame laws and causes for all things, yet he 
maintained, while he appealed to experience, that the intellect 
was the ultimate judge of what is true.^ 

According to Thomas Aquinas,^ ^^Intellectus noster nihil intel- 
ligit sine pliantasmate." But he distinguished between the 
intellect passive and the intellect active; the one receiving im- 
pressions from the senses, and the other reasoning on them. 
Sense knows the individual, intellect the universal. You see 
a triangle, but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this 
power of generalizing which specializes man and makes him 
what he is, intelligent. 
INTENT or INTENTION [in-tendo, to tend to), in morals and 
in law, means that act of the mind by which we conteinplate 



' See Hermann Rassow, Aristotelis de Nbtionis Definitione Doclrina, Berol.. 1343. 
2 Adv. Genles, lib. iil, cap. 41. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 269 

INTENT - 

and design the accomplishment of some end. It is followed 
by the adoption and use of suitable means. But this is more 
directly indicated by the word ptirpose. " He had long har- 
boured the intention of taking away the life of his enemy, and 
for this jnirjyose he provided himself with weapons." Purpose 
is a step nearer action than intention. But both in law and in 
morals, intention, according as it is right or Avrong, good or 
bad, affects the nature or character of the action following. 
According to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, intention 
may altogether change the nature of an action. Killing may 
be no murder, if done with the intention of freeing the church 
from a persecutor, and society from a tyrant. And if a priest 
administers any of the sacraments without the intention of 
exercising his priestly functions, these sacraments may be 
rendered void. — V. ELECTioisr. 

INTENTION (Logical). 

Quotli he, whatever others 'deem ye, 

I understand your metonymy,' 

Your words of second-hand intention. 

When things by wrongful names you mention. 

Butler, Hudihras?' 

Intention, with logicians, has the same meaning as notion; 
as it is by notions the mind tends towards or attends to objects. 
— V. Notion. 

Intention (First and Second). 

"Nouns of the ^rs^ intention are those which are imposed 
upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by 
which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. 
Such are man and stone. But nouns of the second intention 
are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of what 
they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being subject to 
the intention which the mind makes concerning them; as, 
when we say that man is a species, and animal a genus." ^ 

Raoul le Breton, Super Lib. Poster. Analyt. He was a 
Thomist. 

' "The transference of words from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what 
grammarians call metonymy. Thus a door signifies both an opening in the wall (more 
strictly called the doorway) and a board which closes it: T^ich are things neither 
similar nor analogous." — Whately, Log., b. iii., § 10. 

^ Part ii., canto .", 1. 587. ^ Aquinas, Opiiscula, xlii., art. 12, ad init. 



270 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INTENTION - 

See Tractatio de Sccundis Intentionibus secundum docirinam 
Scoti. By Sarnaniis, 4to, Ursellis, 1622. 

A first intention, may be defined " a conception of a thing or 
things formed by the mind from materials existing Avithout 
itself." 

A second intention is "a conception of another conception 
or conceptions formed by the mind from materials existing in 
itself." Thus the conceptions "man, animal, wJiiieness," &c., 
are framed from marks presented by natural objects. "The 
conceptions, gemis, species, accident, &c., are formed from the 
first intentions themselves viewed in certain relations to each 
other." ' 
INTEEPKETATION of NATURE.—" There are," says Bacon,^ 
" two ways, and can be only two, of seeking and finding 
truth. One springs at once from the sense, and from par- 
ticulars, to the most general axioms ; and from principles 
thus obtained, and their truth assumed as a fixed point, judges 
and invents intermediate axioms. This is the way now in 
use. The other obtains its axioms (that is, its truths) also 
from the sense and from particulars, by a connected and gra- 
dual progress, so as to arrive, in the last place, at the most 
general truths. This is the true way, as yet untried. The 
former set of doctrines we call," he says,* " for the sake of 
clearness, 'Anticipation of Nature,' the latter the 'Interpreta- 
tion of Nature.' " 

INTUITION (from intueor, to behold). — "Sometimes the mind 
perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas imme- 
diately by themselves, without the intervention of any other ; 
and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in 
this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but 
perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being 
directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that white is 
not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more 
than two, and equal to one and two." * 

" What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or 

• Mansel, Note to Aldrich, 1849, pp. 16, 17. See Mevieiv of Whately's Logic, No. cxv., 
Edin. Review. 

^ Nov. Org., i., Aph. 19. 3 ^ph. 26. 

* Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., b. iv., ch. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 271 

INTUITION— 

attend to it, we are said to know by intuition: tilings which 
we know by intuition, cannot be made more certain by argu- 
ments, than they are at first. We know by intuition that all 
the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. 
Axioms are propositions known by intuition." ' 

^'Intuition has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not 
only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the 
' axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the 
authority of the fundamental laAvs of belief, when we hear 
them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use 
of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice ; 
according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects 
of intuition are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed ■ 
to Euclid's Elements. In some other respects this innovation 
might perhaps be regarded as an improvement on the very 
limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to 
avail ourselves in our present discussions."^ 

''Intuition is properly attributed and should be carefully - 
restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external 
and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which 
were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and 
Avhich we have called the Primary Principles, whilst self- 
evidence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, or 
the Secondary Principles of truth.'"' 

On the difference between knowledge as intuitive, immediate, 
or presentative, and as mediate, or representative, see Sir W. 
Hamilton.'* 

Intuition is used in the extent of the German AnscTiaimng, 
to include all the products of the perceptive (external or in- 
ternal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, 
in short, of which the immediate object is an individual, 
thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of 
distinct existence in space or time."^ 

"Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual 
perception), it has been employed to denote a kind of appre- 



' Ta3'lor, Elements of Thought. 

"^ Stewart, Elements, part ii., chap. 1, sect. 2. 

^ Tatham, C?Mrt and Scale of Truth, ch. 7, lect. 1. 

'' Seicrs Works, note b. ' Mansel, Prolcgom. Log., p. 



272 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

miuiTioif- 

hension and a kind of judgment. Under the former head it 
has been used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and 
present, in opposition to the abstractive kno^Yledge which 
we have of the possible in imagination, and of the past in 
memory. 2. An immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, 
in contrast to a representative, vicarious or mediate, appre- 
hension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, 
SchcUing, and others, intuition is employed to designate the" 
cognition as opposed to the conception of the absolute.) 3. The 
knowledge, which we can adequately represent in imagination, 
in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we 
cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under 
a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the 
tei-m to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of Time 
and Space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the 
Understanding). 4. Perception proper (the objective), in 
contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive 
consciousness. 5. The simple apprehension of a notion, in 
contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms 
of a proposition. 

" Under the latter head it has only a single signification, 
viz.: — To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, 
the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what 
are called self-evident yn'opositions." ' 

INTITITION and COITCEPTIOH.— " The perceptions of sense 
are immediate, those of the understanding mediate only; sense 
refers its perceptions directly and immediately to an object. 
Hence the perception is singular, incomplex, and immediate, 
i. e., is intuition. When I see a star, or hear the tones of a 
harp, the perceptions are immediate, incomplex, and intuitive. 
This is the good old logical meaning of the word intuition. In 
our philosophic writings, however, intuitive and intuition have 
come to be applied solely to propositions ; it is here extended 
to the first elements of perception, whence such propositions 
spring. Again, intuition, in English, is restricted to percep- 
tions a, 2Jriori; but the established logical use and wont applies 
the word to every incomplex representation whatever ; and 



Sir W. Ilamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sect. 5, p. 759. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 273 

USTTUITIOJf — 

it is left for further and more deep inquiry to ascertain what 
inhiiiions are founded on observation and experience, and 
what arise from a priori sources." ' 

INVElfTION [invenio, to come in, or to come at) is the creation 
or construction of something which lias not before existed. 
Discovery is the making manifest something which hitherto 
has been unknown. We discover or uncover what is hidden. 
We come at new objects. Galileo invented the telescope. 
Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood. 

" We speak of the invention of printing, the discovery of 
America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of the 
invention of America, you feel at once how unsuitable the lan- 
guage is. And why ? Because Columbus did not make that 
to be which before him had not been. America was there 
before he revealed it to European eyes ; but that which before 
was, he showed to be ; he withdrew the veil which hitherto 
had concealed it, he discovered it." ^ 

Newton discovered the law of gravitation, but Watt invented 
the steam engine. We speak with a true distinction, of the 
inventions of Art, the discoveries of Science. 

In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the 
older writers, to invent is currently used for to discover. Thus 
Bacon* says, " Logic does not pretend to invent science, or the 
axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a cuiqrie in sua arte 
ci'edendum." 

IROETY {dpoiveta, dissimulation), is an ignorance purposely af- 
fected to provoke or confound an antagonist. It was very 
much employed by Socrates against the Sophists. In modern 
times it was adopted by Burke in his Defence of Natural 
Society, in which, assuming the person of Bolingbroke, he 
proves, according to the principles of that author, that the 
arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally 
lie against civil, institutions. Sir William Drummond, in his 
CEdipus Judaicus, maintained that the history of the twelve 
patriarchs is a mythical representation of the signs of the 
Zodiac. Dr. Townsend, in his CEdipus Rojnamis, attempts 
to show that upon the same principles the twelve patriarchs 

' Semple. Inlrod. to Melapliys. nf Ethics, p. 34. 

- Trench. On Words. ^ Adv. nf Learning. 



274 VOCABULART OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IRONY— 

were prophecies of the twelve Caesars. Dr. Whately, in a 
pamphlet entitled Historic Doubts, attempted to show that 
objections similar to those against the Scripture-history, and 
much more plausible, might be urged against all the received 
accounts of Napoleon Bonaparte. 



JTJBGMEE'T. — "A judgment is a combination of two concepts, 
related to one or more common objects of possible intuition." ' 

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either proble- 
matical, assertive, or demonstrable; or, in other words, the 
results of opinion, of belief, or of science. 

" The problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor 
objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty 
by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly repre- 
sents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. 
It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of 
certainty ; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, 
may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries 
are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a 
conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment 
of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the 
nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever 
we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, 
the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circum- 
stances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testi- 
mony, we can but form a problematical judgment, and must 
admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our 
decision. 

" The assertive judgment is one of which we are fully per- 
suaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that 
. shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is there- 
fore subjectively, but not objectively, certain. It commends 
itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of 
the same disposition, they will accept it likewise. 

" The demonst7'ative judgment is both subjectively and object- 
ively true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical 



' Mansel. Prolegom. Log., p. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 275 

JUDGMENT — 

axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, 
as the theories of mathematics and the laws of physical 
science." 1 

Port Royal definition: — "Judgment is that operation of the 
mind through which, joining different ideas together, it af&rms 
or denies the one or the other; as when, for instance, having 
the ideas of the earth and roundness, it affirms or denies that 
the earth is round." 

When expressed in words a, judgment is called a proposition. 
According to Mr. Locke, judgment implies the comparison of 
two or more ideas. But Dr. Reid^ says he applies the word 
judgment to every determination of the mind concerning what 
is true or false, and shows that many of these determinations 
are simple and primitive beliefs (not the result of comparing 
two or more ideas), accompanying the exercise of all our 
faculties, judgments of nature, the spontaneous product of 
intelligence. 

"One of the most important distinctions of ovir judgments 
is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on 
argument." 

In his Inquiry,^ he shows that judgment and belief, so far 
from arising from the comparison of ideas, in some cases pre- 
cede even simple apprehension. 

The same view has been taken by Adolphe Garnier, in his 
Traits des Facultes cZe I'ame.* 
Judgments, Analytic, Synthetic, and Tautologous. — " Some 
judgments are merely explanatory of their subject, having for 
their predicate a conception which it fairly implies, to all who 
know and can define its nature. They are called analytic 
judgments because they unfold the meaning of the subject, 
without determining anything new concerning it. If we say 
that 'all triangles have three sides,' the judgment is analytic; 
because having three sides is always implied in a right notion 
of a triangle. Such judgments, as declaring the nature or 
essence of the subject, have been called ' essential propositions.' 

"Judgments of another class attribute to the subject some- 
thing not directly implied in it, and thus increase our know- 



' Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thnivght, pp. 304-6. 

2 IrdeXl. Pniv., essay Ti., chap. 1. Chap. 4. = Chap. 2, sect. 4. 

" 3 tom.j Sto, Piris, 1S52. 



276 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

JUDGMENT — 

ledge. They are called synthetic, from placing together two 
notions not hitherto associated. 'All bodies possess power of 
attraction ' is a synthetic judgment, because we can think of 
bodies without thinking of attraction as one of their imme- 
diate primary attributes. 

"We must distinguish between analytic and tautologous 
judgments. Whilst the analytic display the meaning of the 
subject, and put the same matter vn a, ne^ form, \\ie tautologous 
only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter in the 
same form, as ' whatever is, is.' 'A spirit is a spirit.' 

" It is a misnomer to call analytic judgments identical pro- 
positions.^ ' Every man is a living creature ' would not be an 
identical proposition unless ' living creature ' denoted the same 
as 'man;' whereas it is far more extensive. Locke ^ under- 
stands by identical propositions only such as are tautologous. 
— Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought? 
JITE.ISPK.TJDEI^CE {jurisprudentia, the science of rights). — 
Some refer the Latin word jus to jussuni, the supine of the 
Yerh jubeo, to order or enact. Others refer it to justum, that 
which is just and right. But as right is, or ought to be, the 
foundation of positive law, a thing is jussutn, quia justum est — 
made law because it was antecedently just and right. 

Jurisprudence is the science of rights in accordance with 
positive law. It is distinguished into universal and particular. 
" The former relates to the science of law in general, and 
investigates the principles which are common to all positive 
systems of law, apart from the local, partial, and accidental 
circumstances and peculiarities by which these systems respec- 
tively are distinguished from one another. Particular juris- 
priulence treats of the laws of particular states ; which laws 
are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of uni- 
versal jurifsprudence itself, specifically developed and applied.'' 

There is a close connection between jurisjoriidence and 
morality, so close that it is difficult to determine precisely the 
respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law of 
right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But 
while morality enjoins obedience to that law in all its extent, 
jurisprudence exacts obedience to it only in so far as the law 

» Mill, Log., b. i., chap. 6. » B. iv., oh. 8, 3. = Pp. 194, 195. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 277 

JURISPRTTDENCE — 

of nature has been recognized in the law of nations or the 
positive institutions of society. Morality is, therefore, more 
extensive than jurisprudence. Morality has equal reference 
to the whole of human duty. Jurisprudence has special 
reference to social duty. All social duty as enjoined by the 
light of nature — whether included under justice or benevo- 
lence — belongs to morality. Junsprudence treats chiefly or 
almost exclusively of duties of justice, which have been 
made the subject of positive law; which duties of benevo- 
lence cannot well be. The rules of morality as such, are en- 
forced merely by the law within ; but in so far as they 
have been adopted by jurispi-udence, they can be enforced by 
external law. The moralist appeals to our sense of duty, the 
jurist to a sense of authority or law. "As the sense of duty 
is the sense of moral necessity simply, and excluding the 
sense of physical (or external) compulsion, so the sense of 
law is the sense of the same necessity, in combination with 
the notion of phj^ical (or external) compulsion in aid of its 
requirements." ' 

The difference between morality and jurisj^rudence as to 
extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of signi- 
fication between the word rigid, when used as an adjective, 
and when used as a substantive. Morality contemplf+es all 
that is right in action and disposition. Jurisprudence con- 
templates only that which one man has a right to from 
another. " The adjective right," says Dr. Whewell,^ " has a 
much wider signification than the substantive right. Every- 
thing is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of 
human action ; but that only is a right which, being conform- 
able to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a 
particular person. Hence the two words may often be pro- 
perly opposed. We may say, that a poor man has no right to 
relief; but it is right he should have it. A rich man has a 
right to destroy the harvest of his fields ; but to do so would not 
he right." So that the sphere of morality is wider than that of 
jurisprudence, the former embracing all that is right, the latter 
only particular rights realized or vested in particular persons. 

' Foster, Elements of Jurisprudence, p. 39. 
^ EUmmts of Morality, No. Si. 

25 



ZlQ VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

JURISPRUDENCE — 

Morality and jurispmdence differ also in the immediate 
ground of obligation. Morality enjoins us to do what is right, 
because it is rigid. Jurisprudence enjoins us to give to others 
their right, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth 
made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally 
bound to do so ; but, appealing more directly to the fact, that 
our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his 
demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. 
And this difference between the immediate ground of obli- 
gation in matters of morality and matters of jurisprudence, 
gives rise to a difference of meaning in the use of some words 
which are generally employed as synonymous. For example, 
if regard be had to the difference between morality im({ juris- 
prudence, duty is a word of wider signification than ohligation; 
just as right, the adjective, is of wider signification thann'^^^, 
the substantive. It is my duty to do what is right. I am 
under obligation to give , another man his right. A similar 
shade of difference in meaning may Ife noticed in reference to 
the words ought and obliged. I ought to do my duty ; I am 
obliged to give a man his right. I am not obliged to relieve a 
distressed person, but I ought to do so. 

These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that 
■what is. enioined hj jurisprudence is oi perfect obligation, and 
what is enjoined only by morality is of imperfect obligation, — 
that is, that we may or may not do what our conscience dic- 
tates, but that we can be compelled to do what positive law 
demands. But these phrases of perfect and imperfect obli- 
gation are objectionable, in so far as they tend to represent 
the obligations of morality as infei'ior to those of jurispmdence 
— the dictates of conscience as of less authority than the 
enactments of law — whereas the latter rest upon the former, 
and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law 
of nature. 

Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads; Puffendorff, De Officio 
Hominis et Civis; Leibnitz, Jiirisprudentia ; Montesquieu, 
Spirit of Laws; Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Laiv; 
Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Ijaiv; Mackintosh, Dis- 
course of the Law of Nature and of Nations; Lerminier, Sur 
le Droit. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 279 

JUSTICE {SixMoavvT], justitia) , is one of the four cardinal virtues. 
It consists, according to Cicero,' in suo cuiqiie tribuendo, in ac- 
cording to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and 
also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue 
or duty. The word righteousness is used in our translation 
of the Scripture in a like extensive signification. As opposed 
to equity, justice [to vofiixov) means doing merely what posi- 
tive law requires, while equity [to tsov) means doing what is 
fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. 
Justice is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but 
in our idea of Avhat is right. And laws are just or unjust in 
so far as they do or do not conform to that idea. 

" To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is 
commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Montes- 
quieu,^ " is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal 
till you had drawn the circumference." 

Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and 
political. The first consists in Ao'mg justice between man and 
man as men ; the second, in doing justice between the mem- 
bers of a family or household ; and the third, in doing justice 
betAveen the members of a community or commonwealth. 
These distinctions are taken by More in his Enchiridion Ethi- 
cum, and are adopted by Grove in his Moral Philosophy. 

Plato's Republic contains a delineation oi justice. — Aristotle, 
Ethic. ;^ Cicero, Be Finibus. 

Horace^ gives the idea of a just or good man. — V. Right, 
Duty, Equity. 



KABALA.— In Hebrew kabal signifies "to receive ;" masora "to 
hand down." " The Kabalists believe that God has expressly 
committed his mysteries to certain chosen persons, and that 
they themselves have received those mysteries in trust, still 
further to hand them down to worthy recipients." * 

The origin of the kabala has been carried back to Moses, 

' De Finibus, lib. v., cap. 23. 

^ Spirit of Laws, book i., chap. 1. 

^ Lib. V. " Epist, lib. i., 16, 40. 

^ Etheridge, Heb. Liter., p. 293. 



280 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

KABALA — 

and even to Adam. The numerous allusions to it in the 
Mishna and Gemara, show, that under the Tanaim, a certain 
philosophy, or religious metaphysic, was secretly taught, and 
that this system of esoteric teaching related especially to the 
Creation and the Godhead. So early as a. d. 189, the time of 
the Mishna redaction, it was recognized as an established thec- 
sophy, the privilege of select disciples. Two works of the 
Mishnaic period are still extant in authentic and complete form, 
viz., Sepher Tetsira and the Zohar. The kahala, considered 
as a constructed science, is theoretical and practical. The 
practical department comprises a symbolical apparatus, and 
rules for the use of it. The theoretical consists of two parts — 
the cosmogonic, relating to the visible universe, and the theo- 
gonic and pneumatoJogical, relating to the spiritual world and 
the perfections of the Divine nature. Pantheism is the foun- 
dation of both. The universe is a revelation of the Infinite — 
an immanent effect of His ever active power and presence. 
Towards the end of the fifteenth century the kahala was 
adopted by several Christian mystics. Ra,ymond Lully, 
Reuchlin, Henry More, and others paid much attention to it. 
Eeuchlin, De Arte Cahalistica ; ^ De Verbo Mirifico;^ Atha- 
nasius Kircher, CEdijjus (Egt/jotiacus;^ Henry More, Cabbala;'^ 
Ad. Franck, La Kabbah ; ^Etheridge, Hebrew Literature ;^'PiGua 
(J. Paris.), Cabalistarum Selectiora Obscurioraque Dogmata^ 
KNOWLEDGE {yv:.6Li, cognitio). 

. . . . " Learning dwells 
In heads replete with thoughts of other men. 
Knowledge in minds attentive to their own." 

" Knoioledges (or cognitions), in common use with Bacon 
and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, 
ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any 
English lexicographer.''^ 

"Knowledge is the perception of the connection and agree- 
ment, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. 

• Eol., Hagen, 1517. ^ Fol., Basil, 1494. ' Fol., Rom., 1652. 
2 Fol , Lond., 1662. ' 8vo, Paris, 1843. 

8 Svo, Lend., 1856. ' 12mo, Venet., 1569. 

* Sir William Hamilton, Eeid's WorTcs, note A, sect. 5. p. Tes. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ' 281 



Where this perception is, there is loiowledge ; and where it is 
not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we 
always come short of knowledge." — Locke. ^ And in chap. 
14, he says, " The mind has two faculties conversant about 
truth and falsehood. First, knoidedge, wjiereby it certainly 
perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or 
disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judgment, which is the 
putting ideas together, or separating them from one another 
in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement 
is not perceived, but presumed to be so." Knowledge is here 
opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which 
vre attain to certainty, as well as to opinion. "And," says 
Dr. Reid,- " I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, 
for calling knowledge a faculty, any more than for calling 
opinion a faculty." 

"Knowledge implies three things, — 1st, Fi7'ni Belief; 2d, 
of what is true; 3d, On sufficient grounds. If any one, e.g., 
is in doubt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he can- 
not be said to knoio the proposition proved by it ; if, again, he 
is fully convinced of anything that is not trtie, he is mistaken 
in supposing himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are 
each fully confident, one, that the moon is inhabited, and the 
other, that it is not (though one of these opinions must be 
true), neither of them could properly be said to know the 
truth, since he cannot have sufficient ^roq/" of it."^ 

Knowledge supposes three terms : a being who knows, an 
object known, and a relation determined between the knowing 
being and the known object. This relation properly consti- 
tutes knowledge. 

Bat this relation may not be exact, in conformity with the 
nature of things ; knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a sub- 
jective conception — a relative state of the human mind; it 
resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and 
its object. Truth, on the contrary, is the reality itself, the 
reality ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute 
relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal 



'■ Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 1. 

^ Jntell. Pmv., essay iv., chap. 3. 

^ Whately, Log., book iy., chap. 2, § 2, note. 

2.5 * 



282 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

KNOWLEDGE — 

conceptions. Truth has its source in God ; knowledge proceeds 
from man. Knowledge is true and perfect from the moment 
that our conception is really conformable to that ^^hich is — 
from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. 
And, in this view, truth may be defined to be the conformity 
of our thought with the nature of its object. 

But truth is not yet certitude. It may exist in itself Avithout 
being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually 
for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired 
it by the employment of method. Certitude is thus truth 
brought methodically to the human intelligence, — that is, 
conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is 
evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we 
can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it 
directly or indirectly ; and that we may have of these truths, 
howsoever remote, a cei'tainty as complete as that of the point 
of departure. 

Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is the relation of truth 
to knowledge, the relation of man to God, of ontology to 
psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, 
has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the reality, 
it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, 
to individualize the truth in us ; and from this individualiza- 
tion results the certitude which becomes, in some sort, per- 
sonal, as knotcledge ; all the while preserving the impersonal 
nature of tridh. 

Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the one 
subjective — man or the human consciousness ; the other objective 
and absolute — the !3upreme Being. God and consciousness 
are the two arbiters of certitude.' 

" The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two 
species, cognitio intuitiva, and cognitio ahstractiva. By intui- 
tive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an im- 
mediate presentation of the real individual object; by abstrac- 
tive, that which we gain and hold through the medium of a 
general term ; the one being, in modern language, a percep- 
tion, the other a concept.""^ — V. Abstractive. 



' Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hum., p. 34. 
^ Mort'll, Psychology, p. 158. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 283 

KNOWLEDGE — 

Leibnitz took a distiuction between knowledge as intuitive or 
symbolical. When I behold a triangle actually delineated, 
and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles, 
&c., according to the idea of it in my mind, my Icnoivledge is 
intuitive. But when I use the word triangle, and know what 
it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea 
of it, my kiwidedge is blind or symbolical.^ 
Knowledge as Immediate and Presentative or Intuitive — 
and as Mediate and Eepresentative or Eemote, 

"A thing is known immediately or proximately, when we 
cognize it in itself; mediately or remotely, when we cognize it 
in or through something numerically differeid from itself. Im- 
mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, 
involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the 
knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, 
involves only the possibility of its existence. 

"An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is 
itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative ; 
and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, vieived by 
the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition. 
A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up 
or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be 
called a representative cognition. 

"A thing known is an object of knowledge. 

"In n presentative ox ivfwwQ^iiSiiQ cognition there is o?ie soZe 
object ; *hQ thing (immediately) known and the thing existing 
being one and the same. In a representative or mediate cog- 
nition there may be discriminated two objects ; the thing (im- 
mediately) known and the thing existing being numerically 
different. 

"A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intui- 
tive object oi knowledge, or the (sole) object of & presentative 
or intuitive knowledge. A thing known in and through some- 
thing else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, existent or repre- 
sented object of (mediate) knowledge — objectum quod ; and a 
thing through tohich something else is known is the secondary, 
immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object 

* Leibnitz, De Cognitione, &c. ; Wolf, Psychol. Einpir., sect. 286, 289. 



284 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

KNOWLEDGE — 

of (mediate) knowledge — objecfum quo or ^jer quod. The 
former may likewise be styled — objectjim entitativum." ^ 

Knowledge, in respect of the mode in which, it is obtained, 
is intuitive or discursive — intuitive -w\iQ\\ things are seen in 
themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly ex- 
hibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them — 
as, a whole is greater than any of its parts — discursive when 
objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of 
the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In 
respect of its strength, knowledge is certain or probable. If we 
attend to the degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either science, 
or art, or experience, or opinion, or belief — q. v. 

"Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and 
reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind 
to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state 
for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding 
ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale ; 
but a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the 
relief of man's estate."^ — V. Certainty, Truth, Wisdom. 



LAHGrlTAGrE. — " The ends of language in our discourse with 
others are chiefly these three : first, to make known one man's 
thoughts or ideas to another ; secondly, to do it with as much 
ease and quickness as is possible ; and thirdly, thereby to 
convey knowledge of things." ^ 

Language has been thus divided by Mons. Duval-Jouve : * 



Natural 



f Absolute — Cries and Gestures. 
\ Conventional — Speech. 
Languages are <| (A.\i%o\v.ie — Painling, Sculpture. 

Artificial < Conventional — Emblems, Telegraphic Signs, 
(^ Hieroglyphics, Writing. 

Reid, Inquiry.^ — V. Signs. 
LAUGHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridiculous. 
This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which prompts 

' Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note b, sect. 1. ^ Bacon. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iii., oh. 10. * Logic, p. 201. 

' Chap, ii.j sect. 2, 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 285 



it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distin- 
guishes him from the inferior animals.' — Hutcheson, Essay on 
Laughter; Beattie, Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Com- 
position ; Akenside, Pleasures of Imagin. ; ^ Spectator.^ 
LAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying "to lay down." 

"All things that are have some operation not violent or 
casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, 
that which doth moderate the force and power, that which'' 
doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same' we 
term a law."* 

"Laws in their most extended signification are the necessary 
relations arising from the nature of things ; and, in this sense, 
all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material 
world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the 
beasts have their laws, and man has his laws." ^ 

Thus understood, the word comprehends the laivs of the 
physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary signi- 
fication was that of a command or a prohibition, addressed by 
one having authority to those who had power to do or not to 
do. There are in this sense laws of society, laivs of morality, 
and laws of religion — each resting upon their proper authority. 
But the word has been transferred into the whole philosophy 
of being and knowing. And when a fact frequently eLserved 
recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare 
it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has 
been established, and say it recurs according to a law. On 
the analogy between political laivs or laios proper, and those 
Avhich are called metaphorically laivs of nature, see Lindley, 
Introduction to Jurisprudence.^ 

Austin, Province of Jurispnidence Determined, p. 186. 
Law and Cause. 

The word law expresses the constant and regular order 
according to which an energy or agent operates. It may thus 



1 The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful; and Mon- 
taigne said he was not sure whether his fayourite cat might not sometimes be laughing 
as much at him as with him. 

2 Book iii. =" Nos. 47 and 249. 

* Hooker, Eccles. Pol., book i., sect. 2. 

* Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, book i., cli. 1. ^ App., p. 1, 



ZSb VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

LAW— 

be distluguished from cause — the latter denoting efficiency, the 
former denoting the mode according to which efficiency is de- 
veloped. "It is a perversion of language," says Paley,' "to 
assign any laio, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. 
A law presupposes an agent ; this is only the mode, accord- 
ing to which an agent proceeds ; it implies a power ; for it is 
the order according to which that power acts. Without this 
agent, without this poAver, which are both distinct from itself, 
•the lai<) does nothing, is nothing." To the same purpose Dr. 
Reid has said, " The laws of nature are the rules according 
to which effects are produced ; but there must be a cause 
which operates according to these rviles. The rules of navi- 
gation never steered a ship, nor the law of gravity never 
moved a planet." 

" Those who go about to attribute the origination of man- 
kind (or any other effect) to a bare order or law of natiire, as 
the primitive effecter thereof, speak that which is perfectly 
irrational and unintelligible ; for although a law or rule is the 
method and order by which an intelligent being may act, yet 
a law, or rule, or order, is a dead, unactive, uneffective, thing 
of itself, without an agent that useth it, and exerciseth it as 
his rule and method of action. What would a law signify in 
a kingdom or state, unless there were some person or society 
of men that did exercise and execute, and judge, and deter- 
mine, and act by it, or according to it ? " ^ 

To maintain that the world is governed by laios, without 
ascending to the superior reason of these laws — not to recog- 
nize that every law implies a legislator and executor, an agent 
to put it in force, is to stop half-way ; it is to hypostatize 
these laws, to make beings of them, and to imagine fabulous 
divinities in ignoring the only God who is the source of all 
laws, and who governs by them all that lives in the universe.' 

"A law supposes an agent and a power; for it is the mode, 
according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to 
which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, 
of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the law 



' Nat. Theol., ch. 1. * Hale, Prim. Origin., chap. 7, sect. 4. 

^ See Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hum., p. 743. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 287 

LAW- 

depends, producing the eifects which the law prescribes, the 
law can have no efficacy, no existence. Hence we infer, that 
the intelligence by which the law is ordained, the power by 
which it is put into action, must be present at all times and 
in all places, where the effects of the laio occur ; that thus the 
knowledge and the agency of the Divine Being pervade every 
portion of the universe, producing all action and passion, all 
permanence and change. The laws of matter are the laws 
which he, in his wisdom, prescribes to his own acts ; his 
universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of 
events ; his universal agency, the only organ of any efficient 
force." 1 

Law, Physical, Mental, Moral, Political. 

Laws may acquire different names from the difference in 
the agents or energies which operate according to them. A 
stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height pro- 
portional to the force with which it is thrown, and then 
falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place 
according to physical laws, or what are commonly called laws 
of nature.'^ 

" Those principles and faculties are the general laivs of our 
constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of 
mind that the general laws we investigate in physics nold in 
that branch of science." ^ When an impression has been made 
upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in the mind. 
And when a state of sensation has been long continued or 
often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. These are 
mental laws. We have a faculty of memory by which the 
objects of former consciousness are recalled; and this faculty 
operates according to the laios of association. 

Moral laios are derived from the nature and will of God, 
and the character and condition of man, and may be under- 
stood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelli- 
gence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. 
It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude should be cherished. 
These things are in accordance with the nature and condition 

' Whewell, Astronomy, p. -361. 

^ See M'Cosh, Meth. of Div. Govern., b. ii., chap. 1. 

^ Stewart, Elemetits, part i., Introd. 



288 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

LAW- 

of man, and with the will of God — that is, they are in accord- 
ance with the moral law of conscience and of revelation. 

Political lavjs are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated 
by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or 
disobeyed ; but the disobedience of them implies punish- 
ment. 

" The intent or purpose of a law is wholly different from 
the motives or grounds of the law. The former is its practi- 
cal eiid or effect ; the latter, the pre-existing circumstances 
which suggested and caused its enactment.' For example, 
the existence of a famine in a country may tend to the enact-' 
ment of a poor law. In this case the famine is the motive or 
ground of the laio; and the relief of the poor its intent or 
purpose. The one is its positive cause, the latter its desired 
effect." 2 

In reference to the moral law, Hobbes and his followers 
have overlooked the difference between a law and the principle 
of the law. An action is not right merely in consequence of 
a law declaring it to be so. But the declaration of the law 
proceeds upon the antecedent rightness of the action. 
Law and Forhl, "though correlative terms, must not, in strict 
accuracy, be used as synonymous. The former is used pro- 
perly with reference to an operation ; the latter with reference 
to its product. Conceiving, judging, reasoning, are subject to 
certain laics; concepts, jiidgments, syllogisms, exhibit certain 
forms."^ 
LAW (Empirical). — " Scientific inquirers give the name of e/??^!- 
rical laws to those uniformities which observation or experi- 
ment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely 
in cases varying much from those which have been actually 
observed, for want of seeing any reason ichy such a law should 

' Suarez (De Legibus, iii., 20, sect. 2) says, "Sine dubio in animo legislatoris base duo 
distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas seu intentio ejus, secundum quam vult prasoipere, et 
ratio, ob quam movetur." 

The ratio legis and the mens legis are distinguished by Grotius (J. B. et P., ii., 16, 
sect. 8) with Barbeyrac's notes ; and by Puffendorff (v., 12, sect. 10). The purpose of a 
law and its motive have often been confounded under the general term ratio legis. — See 
Savigny, System des Rechts. vol. i., pp. 216-22-1. 

* Sir 6. C. Lewis, Method of Ohserv. in Politics, ch. 12. sect. 6. 

" Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 240. 



. VOCABULARY OF PIIILOSOPnY. 289 

LAW- 

exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical 
law, that it is not an ultimate law ; that if true at all, its 
truth is capable of being, and requires to be, accounted for. 
It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known. 
To state the explanation, the why of the empirical law, would 
be to state the laws from which it is derived ; the ultimate 
causes on which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we 
should also know what are its limits ; under what conditions 
it would cease to be fulfilled."^ 

As instances of empirical laws he gives the local laws of the 
flux and reflux of the tides in different places ; the succession 
of certain kinds of weather to certain appearances of the sky, 
&c. But these do not deserved to be called laws. 

LEMMA (from Tjxfi^dvco, to take for granted, to assume). — This 
term is used to denote a preliminary proposition, which, while 
it has no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serves 
to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for 
granted is sometimes called a lemma. To prove some proposi- 
tion in mechanics, some of the propositions in geometry may 
be taken as lemmata. 

LIBERTAEIAN. — " I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may 
claim the merit of adding the word Libertarian to the English 
language, as Priestley added that of Necessai'ian." ^ 

Both words have reference to the questions concerning 
liberty and necessity, in moral agency. 

LIBERTY of the WILL or LIBERTY of a MORAL AGENT. 
" The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to 
do or forbear any particular action, according to the determi- 
nation or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is pre- 
ferred to the other." ^ 

"By the Ztierif/y of a moral agent, I understand a power over 
the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had 
power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he 
is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination 
of his will be the necessary consequence of something involun- 
tarjr in the state of his mind, or of something in his external 

' Mill, Log., b. iii., chap. 16. 

' CorresponcUnce of Dr. Reid, p. 88. 

^ Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii., ch. 21, sect. 8. 

26 u 



290 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

LIBERTY— 

circumstances, he is not free ; he has not what I call the liberty 
of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity." ^ 

It has been common to distinguish liberty into freedom from 
co-action, audi freedom from necessity. 

Freedom from co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence 
of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the 
absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented 
from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to 
do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will 
not to do it, we are not free from co-action. This general 
explanation of freedom agrees equally with bodily freedom, 
mental freedom, and moral freedom. Indeed, although it is 
common to make a distinction between these, there is no dif- 
ference, except what is denoted by the diiferent epithets intro- 
duced. We have bodily freedom, when our body is not sub- 
jected to I'estraint or compulsion — mental freedom, when no 
impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our 
powers of mind — and moral freedom, when our moral princi- 
ples and feelings are allowed to operate within the sphere 
which has been assigned to them. Now it is with freedom 
regarded as moral that we have here to do — it is with freedom 
as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and 
who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light 
of reason, and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of 
this kind is asllfidi freedom from necessity. 

Freedom from necessity is also called liberty of election, or 
power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly 
determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into 
liberty of contrariety, or the power of determining to do either 
of two actions Avhich are contrary, as right or wrong, good or 
evil ; and liberty of contradiction, or the power of determining 
to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk 
or to sit still, to Avalk in one direction or in another. 

Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called liberty of 

indifference, because, before he makes his election, the agent 

has not determined in favour of one action more than another. 

Liberty of indifference, however, does not mean, as some would 

'have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more 

' Reid, Act. Paw., essay iv., ch. 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 291 

LIBERTY — 

inclination towards one action or one mode of action than 
towards another ; for although he may have motives prompting 
more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has 
liberty of election, if he has the power of determining in favour 
of another action or another course of action. Still less can the 
phrase liberty of indifference be understood as denoting a power 
to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any 
motive. A being with liberty of indifference in the former of 
these senses Avould not be a reasonable being ; and an action 
done without a motive is an action done without an end in 
view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, 
could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral 
agent. 

Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect to the object, 
and 2d, in respect of the action. In both respects it may be 
liberty of, 1st, contrariety, or 2d, of contradiction. 

Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the will 
is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or contrary — as 
when a man is free, for the sake of health, to take hot water 
or cold water. Liberty of contradiction is when the will is in- 
different to any object, and to its opposite or contradictory — 
as walking and not walking. 

In respect of the act of loill, there is liberty of contrariety, 
when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions conisrning 
the same particular object, — as to choose or reject some parti- 
cular good. There is liberty of contradiction, when the will is 
free not to contrary action, but to act or not to act, that is, to 
will or not to will, to exercise or suspend volition. 

Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, liberty of spe- 
cification, and 2d, liberty of exercise. The former may be said 
to coincide with liberty of contrariety, and the latter with 
liberty of contradiction. ^ 
LIFE belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vegetables. 
Birth and development, decay and death, are peculiar to living 
bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct on the one hand 
from matter and its forces, and on the other, from mind and 
its energies ? According to Descartes, Borelli, Boerhaave, and 
others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by 

' Baroniu?, Metaphys., p. 96. 



292 VOCABULARi' OF IHILOSOrHY. 

LIFE — 

the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter. 
According to Bichat, there is nothing in common — but rather 
an antagonism — between the forces of dead matter and the 
phenomena of life, which he defines to be " the sum of func- 
tions which resist death." Bichat and his followers are called 
Organicists. Barthez and others hold that there is a vital 
principle distinct from the organization of living bodies, which 
directs all their acts and functions which are only vital, that 
is, without feeling or thought. Their doctrine is Vitalism. 
The older doctrine of Stahl was called Animism, according to 
which the soul, or anima mundi, presides not only over the 
functions of the sensibility and thought but over all the func- 
tions and actions of the living economy. 

Are life and sensibility two things essentially distinct, or two 
things essentially united ? 

Irritahility and Excitability are terms applied to the sensi- 
bility which vegetables manifest to external influences, such 
as light, heat, &c. Bichat ascribed the functions of absorp- 
tion, secretion, circulation, &c., which are not accompanied 
with feeling, to what he called organic sensibility. 

The characteristics of the several kingdoms of nature given 
by Linnaeus are the following: — Lapides crescunt; vegetabilia 
crescunt et vivunt; animalia crescunt vimint et sentiwnt. 

The theories of life and its connection with the phenomena 
of mind are thus classified by MorelL' 

" 1. The chemical theory. This was represented by Sylvius 
in the seventeenth century, who reduced all the phenomena 
of vital action and organization to cliemical processes. 2. The 
mechanical theory. This falls to the time when Harvey dis- 
covered the circulation of the blood, and Boerhaave represented 
the human frame as one great hydraulic machine. 3. The 
dynamical theory. Here we have the phenomena of mind 
and of life drawn closely together. The writings of Stahl 
especially show this point of view. He regarded the whole 
man as being the product of certain organic powers, which 
evolve all the various manifestations of human life, from the 
lowest physical processes to the highest intellectual. 4. The 
theory of irritation. This we find more especially amongst the 

'■ Psychology, p. 77, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 29o 

LIFE- 

French physiologists, such as Bichat, Majendie, and others, who 
regard life as being the product of a mere organism, acted 
on by physical stimuli from the world without. 5. The theory 
of evolution. Schultz and others of the German writers of 
the same school, regard life as a regular evolution, created by 
opposing powers in the universe of existence, from the lowest 
forms of the vital functions to the highest spheres of thought 
and activity. To these speculators nature is not a fixed 
reality, but a relation. It is perpetual movement, an unceas- 
ing becoming, a passing from death to life, and from life to 
death. And just as physical life consists in the tension of the 
lower powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of 
its higher powers. 6. The theory of the Divine ideal. Here, 
Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the 
ideal side of nature, as well as the real, and united them 
together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus 
connected the whole dynamics of nature with their Divine 
original." 

Plato, Timceus : Aristotle, De Anima;^ Descartes, (Euvres, 
par Cousin ; ^ Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard ; Cole- 
ridge, Posthumous Essay: Hints towards the Formation of a 
more Comprehensive Theory of Life. 
LOGIC {xoyix-q, "Koyou reason, reasoning, language). — The word 
logica was early used in Latin ; while tj %oyixri ' and ■to 
%oyi.x6v were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle 
did not UPC either of them. His writings which treat of the 
syllogisui and of demonstration were entitled Analytics [q. v.) 
The name organon was not given to the collected series of 
his writings upon logic till after the invention of printing. 
The reason of the name is, that logic was regarded as not 
so much a science in itself as the instrument of all science. 
The Epicureans called it xavovLxri, the rule by which true 
and false are to be tried. Plato in the Phgedrus, has called 
it a part du/poj), and in the Parmenides the organ (opyaroj/) 
of philosophy.'' An old division of philosophy was into logic, 
ethics, and physics. But excluding physics, philosophy may 



' Lib. ii., cap. 10. » Tom. iv. 

' See Trendelenburg, Elementa Log. Arist., 8vo, Basil, 1842, pp. 4S, 49. 

26- 



294 VOCABULARY OE PHILOSOPHY, 

LOGIC— 

be regarded as consisting of four parts — viz., psychology, 
logic, ethics, and metaphysics properly so called. 

"Logic is derived from the v\'ord {%6yoi), v^'liich signifies 
communication of thought usually by speech. It is the name 
which is generally given to the branch of inquiry (be it 
called science ot art) in vphich the act of the mind in reason- 
ing is considered, particularly with reference to the connec- 
' tion of thought and language." ' 

" A\ e divide logicians into three schools, according as they 
hold words, things, or conceptions, to be the subject of logic; 
and entitle them respectively, the verbal, the phenomenal, and 
the concepfional." "^ 

"When we attend to the procedure of the human intellect 
we soon perceive that it is subject to certain supreme laws 
which are independent of the variable matter of our ideas, 
and which posited in their abstract generality, express the 
absolute and fixed rules not only of the human intellect, but 
of all thought, whatever be the subject which frames it or 
the object which it concerns. To determine those universal 
laws of thought in general, in order that the human mind in 
particular may find in all its researches a means of control, 
and an infallible criterion of the legitimacy of its procedure, 
is the object of logic. At the beginning of the ^rior analytics, 
Aristotle has laid it down that 'the object of logic is demon- 
stration.' 

"Logic is the science of the laws of thought as thought — 
that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, consi- 
dered in itself, is subject."^ 

" 'Logic is the science of the laws of thought.' It is a 
science rather than an art. As the science of the necessary 
laws of thought it is pure. It only gives those principles 
which constitute thought ; and pre-supposes the operation of 
those principles by which we gain the materials for thinking. 
And it is the science of the foi-m or formal laws of thinking, 
and not of the matter.'"*' — V. Intention, Notion. 

Others define logic to be the science of the laws of reason- 

* De Morgan, Formal Logic, ch. 2. ^ Chretien, Logical Method, p. 95. 

3 Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 698, note. 
•* Thomson, Ouiline of the Laws of Thought. 



VOCABULAllY or PHILOSOPHY. 295 



ing. Dr. Whately has said, "Logic in its most extensive 
application, is tlie science as well as the art of reasoning. So 
far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in 
reasoning, it is strictly a science ; while so far as it investigates 
the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and 
furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deduc- 
tions, it may be called the art of reasoning." 

Kirwan^ has said, "Logic is both a science and an art; it is 
a science inasmuch as, by analyzing the elements, principles, 
and structure of arguments, it teaches us how to discover 
their truth or detect their fallacies, and point out the sources 
of such errors. It is an art, inasmuch as it teaches us-how 
to arrange arguments in such manner that their truth may be 
most readily perceived or their falsehood detected." Sir Wil- 
liam Hamilton 2 thinks that Dr. Whately had this passage in 
view when he constructed his own definition ; but he adds, 
" Not a single reason has been alleged to induce us to waver 
in our belief, that the laivs of tliought, and not the laiDS of 
reasoning, constitute the adequate object of the science." 

According to the significations attached to the terms art and 
science, and according to the point of view in which it is 
regarded, logic may be called a science or an art, or both, that 
is, a scientific art. 

Thought may manifest itself in framing conceple, or judg- 
ments, or reasonings ; and logic treats of these under three 
corresponding heads. Method, which is the scientific arrange- 
ment of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. But 
to some it appears that method belongs more properly to psy- 
chology than to logic. Barthelemy St. Hilaire,^ who takes this 
view, has said, " In logic considered as a science there are 
necessarily four essential parts, which proceed from the simple 
to the compound, and in the following order, which cannot be 
changed : 1, A theory of the elements of a proposition ; 2, A 
theory of propositions ; 3, A general theory of reasoning 
formed of propositions connected with one another according 
to certain laws ; and, lastly, a theory of that special and 
supreme kind of reasoning which is called demonstration, and 

' Logic, vol, i., p. 1. ^ Discussions, pp. 131-4. 

" Did. des Sciences Philosoph., art. " Logiquei" 



296 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

LOGIC — 

gives assurance to the mind of man of the forms of truth, if 
it be not truth itself." 
LOVE and HATBEB are the two genetic or mother passions or 
affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. 
The former is awakened by the contemplation of something 
which is regarded as good ; and the latter by the contempla- 
tion of something Avhich is regarded as evil. Hence springs 
a desire to seek the one, and a desire to shun the other ; and 
desire, under its various forms and modifications, may be 
found as an element in all the manifestations of the sensi- 
tivity. 



MACEOCOSM and MICROCOSM (;uaxpoj, large ; ^u.^^pdj, small; 

xoanoi, world). 

"As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if (as 
some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man a micro- 
cosm, because his body is really made up of all the several 
kinds of creatures the macrocosm or greater world consists of, 
and so is but a model or epitome of the universe." ^ 

Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an ani- 
mal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, 
exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the macro- 
cosm and the microcosm, according to which man was an 
epitome of creation, and the universe was a man on a grand 
scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived 
in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was 
believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the 
universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on 
the actions and destiny of man. Hence arose Alchemy and 
Astrology, which were united in the Hermetic medicine. Such 
views are fundamentally pantheistic, leading to the belief that 
there is only one suljstance, manifesting itself in the universe 
by an infinite variety, and concentrated in man as in an epi- 
tome. Van Helmont, Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and othera 
held some of these views. 



' Boyle, Works, vol. ii., p. 54. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 297 

MACEOCOSM — 

Dr. Reid] has said, "Man has not, without reason, been 
called an epitome of the universe. His body, by which his 
mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material system, is 
subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part 
of his existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He 
rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, to 
the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all." 

"Man is not only a microcosm, in the structure of his body, 
but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them 
within him, from the basest to the most sublime." "^ 

" Man is a living synthesis of the universe."^ 

Cousin'* has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de 
Chartres, entitled Megacosmus el Microcosmus. 
MAGIC {ficxyiia., from juciyoj, a Magian). — "It is confessed by all 
of understanding that a magician (according to the Persian 
word) is no other than a studious observer and expounder of 
divine things." * 

But while magic was used primarily to denote the study of 
the more sublime parts of knowledge, it came at length to sig- 
nify a science of which the cultivators, by the help of demons 
or departed souls, could perform things miraculous. 

" JVatural magic is no other than the absolute perfection of 
natural philosophy."® Baptista Poi-ta has a treatise on it, 
which was published in 1589 and 1591. It is characterized 
by Bacon'' as full of credulous and superstitious observations 
and traditions on the sympathies and antipathies and the 
occult and specific qualities of things. Sir D. Brewster has a 
treatise under the same title, but of very different character 
and contents, and answering to the definition of Raleigh. 
Campanella, De Sensu Reruin et Magia;^ Longinus, Trinon 
Magicnm? 

MAGNANIMITY and EaUANIMITY [magnus, great ; aequus, 
even; animus, mind), are two words which were much used 
by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers. 

' Active JPow., essay iii., part i., chap. 1. 

® Harris, Pldlnsoph. Arrange., cap. 17. ^ Tiberghien. 

* Introd. aux (Eavres Inedites d'Abelard, p. 127. 

' Raleigh, Hist, of the fVo7-ld, h. i., c. 11, s. 3. 

'^ Ibid., Hist, of the World, b. i., c. 11, s. 2. ' De Augm., lib. iii. 

s 4tOj Par.; 1637. a 12mo, Francf., 1616. 



298 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MAGNANIMITY - 

Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and 
evil of this life — so that vrhile the former vras not necessary to 
our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The 
favourite example of magnanimity, among the Eomans, Tvas 
Fabius Maximus, Avho, amidst the provocation of the enemy 
and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed to give battle 
till he savr how he could do so succesfully. 

Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and means 
the preservation of an even mind in the midst of vicissi- 
tude — neither elated unduly by prosperity nor depressed 
unduly by adversity. Equanimity springs from Magnanimity. 
Indeed both these words denote frames or states of mind 
from which special acts of virtue spring — rather than any 
particular virtue. They correspond to the active and passive 
fortitude of modern moralists. 

" Aequam memeuto rebus in arduis 
Servare mentem, Don secus in bonis 
A insolenti temperatam 
Lsetitia, moriture Delli." — Hor. 

"Est hie, 

Est ubi via, animus si te non deficit sequus." — Hor. 

"True happiness is to no spot confined; 
If you preserve a firm and equal mind, 
'Tis here, 'tis there, 'tis everywhere." 

MANICHEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, 
who flourished about the beginning of the third century), is 
the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or powers, 
the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and 
misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned 
whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of 
denying the Divine unity, or that the system of things had 
not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, 
before Manes, maintained dualism so as to give the supremacy 
to the good principle ; and that Manes maintained both to be 
equally eternal and absolute. 

The doctrine of manicheism was ingrafted upon Christianity 
about the middle of the third century. The Cathari or Albi- 
genses who appeared in the twelfth century are said also to 
have held the doctrine of diialism or ditheism — q. v. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 299 

MANICHEISM — 

To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing 
principles were equal, they would neutralize each other — if 
they were unequal, the stronger would prevail, so that there 
would be nothing but evil, or nothing but good in the world ; 
which is contrary to fact. 

Matter, Hist. Criiiq. du Gnosticism;^ Beausobre, 1?2S<. du 
Manicheisme. 
MATERIALISM. — "The materialists maintain that man consists 
of one uniform substance, the object of the senses ; and that 
perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or other- 
wise, of the organization of the brain." ^ The doctrine 
opposed to this is spiritualism, or the doctrine that there is a 
spirit in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In 
like manner he who maintains that there is but one substance 
[unisuhstancisme) , and that that substance is matter, is a ma- 
terialist. And he who holds that above and beyond the mate- 
rial frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining and 
directing it, is a spiritualist. The philosopher who admits 
that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the universe, is a 
perfect spiritualist. He who denies spirit in man or in the 
universe, is a perfect materialist. But some have been incon- 
sistent enough to admit a spirit in man and deny the exist- 
ence of God, while others have admitted the existence of 
God and denied the soul of man to be spiritual. — V. Imma- 
teriality. 

Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateriality of 
the soul. Belsham and Priestly have defended materialism 
without denying the existence of God. 

Priestley, Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit; Three Dis- 
sertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical 
Necessity; Price, Letters on Materialism and PhilosojyJiical 
Necessity. 
MATHEMATICS [^aQruxatw-q [sc. frtwr-^^i;] -ta /xaOrjuata), ac- 
cording to Descartes,^ treat of order and measures. "Ilia om- 
nia tantum, in quibus ordo vel mensura examinatur, ad mathesim 
referri, nee interesse utriim in ntimeris vel Jiguris, vel astris, vel 
sonis, aliove quovis objecto talis mensura qucerenda est." 

' 3 torn., Paris, 1843. '^ Belsham, Moral Philosophy, chap, xi., sect. 1. 

' Reg. ad Direct. lugenii, Reg. 4. 



300 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MATHEMATICS — 

Mathematics are either Pure or Mixed. Arithmetic, Geo- 
metry, Algebra, and the Differential and Integral Calculus 
belong to Pure Mathematics. Mixed Mathematics is the appli- 
cation of Pure Mathematics to physical science in its various 
departments: Mechanics, Hydrodynamics, Optics, Astronomy, 
Acoustics, Electricity, Magnetism, &c., are physico-mathemati- 
cal sciences. Among philosophers, Anaxiraander of Miletus, 
and Pythagoras are called mathematicians. 
MATTER, as opposed to mind or spirit [q. v.), is that which 
occupies space, and with which we become ^ acquainted by 
means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of which 
we have any knowledge is either matter or mind, i. e., spirit. 
Mind is that which knows and thinks. Matter is that which 
makes itself known by means of the bodily senses. 

" The first form which matter assumes is extension, or length, 

. breadth, and thickness — it then becomes body. If body were 

infinite there could be no Jigure, which is body bounded. But 

body is not physical body, unless it partake of or is constituted 

of one or more of the elements, fire, air, earth, or water." ' 

According to Descartes the essence of mind is thought, and 
the essence of matter is extension. He said, Give me extension 
and motion, and I shall make the world. Leibnitz said the 
essence of all being, whether mind or matter, \s force. Matter 
is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of 
physics may be called dynamical, in opposition to that of 
Newton, which may be called mechanical ; because Leibnitz 
held that the monads possessed a vital or living energy. We 
may explain the phenomena of matter by the movements of 
ether, by gravity and electricity ; but the ultimate reason of 
all movement is a force primitively communicated at creation, 
a force which is everywhere, but which while it is present in 
all bodies is differently limited ; and this force, this virtue or 
power of action is inherent in all substances material and 
spiritual. Created substances received from the creative sub- 
stance not only the faculty to act, bvit also to exercise their 
activity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz, De Primce 
Philosophice Emendatione et de Notione Stihstantice, or Nouveau 

' Jlonboddo, Ancient Metaxihys., b. ii., c. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 301 

MATTEE — 

Systeme de la Nature et de la Commnnicatiojt des Substances, 
in the Journal des Savans, 1695. On the various hypotheses 
to exphiin the activity of matter, see Stevrart.^ 

The properties v?hich have been predicated as essential to 
matter are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, 
weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, 
heat, and motion : and by observation it is discovered to 
possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c. 

Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of matter 
into primary and secondary, and have said that our knowledge 
of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and 
absolute — while our knowledge of the latter, as of sound and 
smell, is obscure and relative. This distinction taken by 
Descartes., adopted by Locke and also by Reid and Stewart, 
was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our 
knowledge is relative. And others who do not doubt the 
objective reality of matter, hold that our knowledge of all its 
qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely 
stated and strenuously upheld by Sir William Hamilton ; ^ and 
ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emilie Saisset.^ 

Matter and Form. 

Matter as opposed to Jbi-m [q. v.) is that elementary consti- 
tutent in composite substances, which appertains in common 
to them all without distinguishing them from one another. 
Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is 
generated or made out of something else ; and this something 
else is called its subject or matter. Such is iron to the boat, 
such is timber to the boat. Matter void of form was called v^fj 
rtpwT'j;, or, prima materia — (i'Xj;, means wood. — V. Hylozo- 
ism). Form when united to matter makes it determinate and 
constitutes body — q. v. 

" The term matter is usually applied to whatever is given to 
the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within 
the province of the art itself to supply. The form is that which 
is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In 
sculpture, the matter is the marble in its rough state as given 

' Outlines, part ii., ch. 2, sect. 1, aud Act. and 3Ior. Pow., last edit., vol. ii., note A. 

2 Reid's Works, note D. 

* In 7)ict. des Sciences Philosoph., art. '• llatierc." 

27 



302 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MATTER — 

to the sculptor ; the form is that which the sculptor in the 
exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between 
matter andybrm in any mental operation is analogous to this. 
The former includes all that is given to, the latter all that is 
given hy, the operation. In the division of notions, for ex- 
ample, the generic notion is that given to be divided ; the 
add^jtion of the difference in the art of division constitutes the 
species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated by 
logicians the material, Difference, the formal part of the 
species." ' 

Harris, Philosoph. An-ange.;^ Monboddo, Ancient Meta- 
pliys.;^ Reid, Intell. Poiv^ — V. Action, Proposition. 
MAXIM {maxima propositio, a proposition of the greatest weight), 
is used by Boethius as synonymous with axiom, or a self- 
evident truth.^ It is used in the same way by Locke.^ 
"There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of 
maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science." 
"By Kant, maxim, was employed to designate a subjective 
principle, theoretical or practical, i. e., one not of objective 
validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the sub- 
ject. Maxim, and 7'effiilative jjriiicijyie are, in the critical phi- 
losophy, opposed to knv and constitutive principle." 

In Morals, we have Rochefoucald's Maxims. 

In Theology, Fenelon wrote Maxims of the Saints, and 
Rollin made a collection of Maxims drawn from holy writ. 
MEMORY (from memini, preterite of the obsolete from meneo or 
meno, from the Greek ^iviw, manere, to stay or remain. From 
the contracted form ^vaw comes fivri/xT], the memory in which 
things remain. Lennep). — "The great Keeper, or Master 
of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for 
the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those 
things which else he would so carry away as if they had not 
been."'' 

Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been 
present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with 

' Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 226. '^ Chap. Iv. 

^ Book u., chap. 1. « Essay ii., chap. 19. 

' Sir Will. Hamilton, Eeid's WurTiS, note A, sect. 5. 

" Essay on Hum. (Jndersland., b. iv., chap. 7. 

' Bishop Hall, Righteous Mammon. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 303 

MEMOEY- 

the additional consciousness that it has formerly been present 
to it. When this takes place we are said to remember, and the 
faculty of which remembrance is the act is memory. 

Memory implies, — 1. A mode of consciousness experienced. 
2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of consciousness 
so that it may subsequently be revived without the presence 
of its object. 3. The actual revival of that mode of conscious- 
ness ; and 4. The recognizing that mode of consciousness as 
having formerly been experienced. 

" The word viemory is not employed uniformly in the same 
precise sense ; but it always expresses some modification of 
that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for 
future use, the knowledge we acquire ; a facvilty which is 
obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, 
and without which no advantage could be derived from the 
most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things ; a 
capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to 
our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The 
word memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity, 
and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive 
memory, we use it in the former sense ; when of a ready 
memory, in the latter." ' 

Memory has, and must have, an object; for he th?t remem- 
bers must remember something, and that which he remembers 
is the object of memory. It is neither a decaying sense, as 
Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Con- 
dillac would have it to be ; but a distinct and original faculty, 
the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of 
any other power. The objects of memory may be things 
external to us, or internal states and modes of consciousness ; 
and we may remember what we have seen, touched, or tasted ; 
or we may remember a feeling of joy or sorrow which we 
formerly experienced, or a resolution or purpose which we 
previously formed. 

Hobbes would confine memory to objects of sense. He 
says,^ "By the senses, which are numbered according to the 
organs to be five, we take notice of the objects without us, 



' Stewart, Philusoph. of Hum. Mind, chap. 6. 
2 Hum. Nature, ch. 3, sect. 6. 



30-1: VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

MEMOEY— 

and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice 
also, some way or other, of our conception, for when the 
conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice 
that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same 
conception before, which is as much as to imagine a thing 
past, which is impossible to the sense which is only of things 
present; this, therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but 
internal ; not external as the rest, and is commonly called 
remembrance." 

Mr. Stewart holds that memory involves "a power of 
recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts 
that ironi time to time occur to us: a power which is not 
implied in that law of our nature which is called the asso- 
ciation of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between 
memory and association is not very consistent with a further 
distinction which he takes between the memory of things and 
the memory of events.^ " In the former case, thoughts which 
have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without 
suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of 
time whatever ; as when I repeat over a poem which I have 
got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent 
friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distin- 
guish the act of the mind by the name of conception; but 
in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical 
writing, it is considered as an exertion of memory. In these 
and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this 
faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past. The 
case is different with respect to the memory of events. When 
I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former 
objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular 
point of time ; so that, of every such act of memory, the 
idea of the past is a necessary concomitant." Mr. Stewai-t 
therefore supposes "that the remembrance of a past event is 
not a simple act of the mind ; but that the mind first forms a 
conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, 
of the period of time to which it is to be referred. But the 
remembrance of a thing is not a simple act of the mind, any 
more than the remembrance of an event. The truth seems to 

• Elements, chap. 6. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 305 

MEMORY- 

be that things and events recur to the mind equally unclothed 
or unconnected with the notion of pastness.' And it is not 
till they are recognized as objects of former consciousness that 
they can be said to be remembered. But the recognition is 
the act of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have for- 
merly been present to the mind may again become present to 
it Avithout being recognized. Nay, they may be entertained 
for a time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been 
recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can 
be regarded as remembered thoughts,^ so that an act of 
memory y whether of things or events, is by no means a simple 
act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in any 
mental operation we can detect any single faculty acting in- 
dependently of others. What we mean by calling them dis- 
tinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar func- 
tion ; not that that function is exercised independently of 
other faculties. — V. Faculty. 

Mr. Locke^ treats of retention. "The next faculty of the 
mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress 
toAvards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the 
keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflec- 
tion it hath received. This is done two ways : first, by keep- 
ing the idea which is brought into it for some timq actually 
in view ; which is called contemplation. The other way of 
retention, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas 
which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it 
were laid aside out of sight ; and thus we do, when we con- 
ceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, — the object being re- 
moved. This is memory, which is as it were the storehouse 
of our ideas.'' — V. Retention. 

The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or 
insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the 
memory, are chiefly — Vividness, Repetition, and Attention. 
AVhen an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable 

' See Younp;, Intellect. Philnsoph., lect. xtI. 

■■* Aristotle (De Meraoria et Reminiscentia, cap. 1), has said that memory is always 
aocouipanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that hare the notion 
of time have memory. 

•' Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii., c. 10. 

27^^ V 



306 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

MEMOEY— 

manner — when it is frequently or familiarly observed — or 
when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more 
easily and surely remembered. 

"The things which are best preserved by the memory," said 
Lord Herbert,' " are the things which please or terrify — which 
are great or netv — to Avhich much attention has been paid— or 
which have been oft repeated, — which are apt to the circum- 
stances — or which have many things related to them." 

The qualities of a good memory are susceptibility, retentive- 
ness, and readiness. 

The common saying that memory and judgment are not 
often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must be 
received with qualification. 

Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced, 
and guided by what have been called the laws of associa- 
tion — q. V. 

In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, 
and thoughts are allowed to coi:i1e and go through the mind 
without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be 
exercised with intention and will ; some thoughts being sought 
and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible 
excluded. Spontaneous 'memory is remembrance. Intentional 
memory is recollection or reminiscence. 

The former in Greek is Mrj^fti?, and the latter 'Avdfivr;at,i. 
In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible of 
the influence which association has in regulating the exercise 
of this faculty. 

By memory, we not only retain and recall former knowledge, 
but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means of memory 
that we have the notion of continued existence or duration ; 
and also the persuasion of our personal identity, amidst all 
the changes of our bodily frame, and all the alterations of 
our temper and habits. 

Memory, in its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is com- 
mon to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle denied 
that they are capable oi recollection or reminiscence, which is a 
kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present conscious- 

' De Veritate, p. 156. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 307 

MEMORY— 

ness to a former, aud from that to a more remote, till the 
whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. And 
Dr. Reid has remarked that the inferior animals do not mea- 
sure time nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of 
time. In man memory is the condition of all experience, and 
consequently of all progress. 

Memory in its exercises is very dependent upon bodily 
organs, particularly the brain. In persons under fever, or in 
danger of drowning, the brain is preternaturally excited ; and 
in such cases it has been observed that memory becomes more 
remote and far-reaching in its exercise than under ordinary 
and healthy cii'cumstances. Several authentic cases of this 
kind are on record.' And hence the question has been sug- 
gested, whether thought be not absolutely imperishable, or 
whether every object of former consciousness may not, under 
peculiar circumstances, be liable to be recalled ? ^ 

MEMORIA TECHBTICA, or MNEMONICS.— These terms are 
applied to artificial methods which have been devised to assist 
the memory. They all rest on the association of ideas. The 
relations by which ideas are most easily and firmly associated 
are those of contiguity in place and resemblance. On these 
two relations the principal methods of assisting the memory 
have been founded. The methods of localization or local 
m.emory, associate the object which it is wished to remember 
with some place or building, all the parts of which are well 
known. The methods of resemblance or symholization, esta- 
blish some resemblance either between the things or the words 
which it is wished to remember, and some object more familiar 
to the mind. Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, 
technical verses have been framed for that purpose in various 
departments of study. 

The topical or local memory has been traced back to Simo- 
nides, who lived in the sixth century, b. c. Cicero^ describes 
a local memory or gives a Topology. Quintilian^ and Pliny 
the naturalist^ also describe this art. 

• See Coleridge, Biograpliia Literaria ; De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium- 
Eater ; and Sir John Barrow, Autobiography, p. 398. 

^ Aristotle, De Memoria et Reniiniscentia ; Beattie, Dissertations ; Reid, Intell. Pow., 
essay iii. ; Stewart, Elements, cbap. 6. 

^ De Orators, ii. 86. * xi., 2. ' vii. 2i. 



308 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MEMOKIA TECHmCA— 

In modern times may be mentioned, Gray ' and Fei- 
nagle.^ 

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. — The adjective mental comes to us 
from tlie Latin mens, or from the Greek ^ivoi, or these may be 
referred to the German meiiien, to mean, to mark. If the 
adjective mental be regarded as coming from tlie Latin mens, 
then mental philosophy will be the philosophy of the human 
mind, and v^^ill correspond with psychology. If the adjective 
mental be regarded as coming from the German meinen, to 
mean or to mark, then the phrase mental philosophy may be 
restricted to the philosophy of the mind in its intellectual 
energies, or those faculties by which it marks or knows, as dis- 
tinguished from those faculties by which it feels or wills. It 
would appear that it is often used in this restricted significa- 
tion to denote the philosophy of the intellect, or of the intel- 
lectual powers, as contradistinguished from the active powers, 
exclusive of the phenomena of the sensitivity and the Avill.^ 

MEB.it {meritum, from /ttspoj, a part or portion of labour or re- 
ward), means good desert; having done something worthy of 
praise or reward. 

"Fear not the anger of the wise to raise; 
Those best can bear reproof, who merit praise." 

Pope, Essay on Criticism. 

In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that 
we ought to do it ; and Avhen we have done it we experience a 
feeling of conscious satisfaction or self-approbation. We thus 
come by the idea of merit or good desert. The approbation of 
our own mind is an indication that God approves of our con- 
duct ; and the religious sentiment strengthens the moral one. 
We have the same sentiments towards others. When we see 
another do what is right, we applaud him. When we see him 
do what is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we 
say he has much merit. Such conduct appears to be deserv- 
ing of reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. 
We are satisfied that under the government of God they will 
do so. 

• Memoria Technica, 1730. * New Art of Memory, 1812. 

^ See Chalniers, Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy, c. 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 309 

MEEIT - 

The idea of merit then is a primary and natural idea to the 
mind of man. It is not an after thought to j^raise the doing 
of Avhat is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but a sponta- 
neous sentiment iudissolubly connected with our idea of what 
is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its truthfulness by the 
structure of the human mind and the character of God.* 

The scholastic distinction between merit of congruity and 
merit of condignity is thus stated by Hobbes:^ — "God Al- 
mighty having promised paradise to those that can walk 
through this world according to the limits and precepts pre- 
scribed by Him ; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit 
paradise ex congriio. But because no man can demand a right 
to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, 
but by the free grace of God only ; they say, no man can merit 
paradise ex condigno." — V. Virtue. 
METAFHOE, {(uta^opiu,, to transfer). — "A metaplior is the 
transferring of a word from its usual meaning, to an analogous 
meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such trans- 
fer."^ For example: the usual meaning of evening is the 
conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclusion, the con- 
clusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all 
conclusions, we arrange in order the two we have alleged, and 
say, that " as evening is to the day, so is age to hum£.,ii life." 
Hence by an easy permutation (which furnishes at once two 
metaphors) we say alternately, that " evening is the age of the 
day," and that " age is the evening of life."^ 

" Sweet is j^rimarily and properly applied to tastes ; second- 
arily and improperly (i. e., by analogy) to sounds. 

" When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on 
some fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced 
for ornament's sake, we call this a metaplior, as when we speak 
of a ship's ploughing the deep ; the turning up of the surface 
being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to 
the ship." 2 
METAPHOE and SIMILE. — "A metaphor differs from a 
simile in form only, not in substance. In a simile, the two 

' See Price, Review, ch. 4. ^ Of Man, pt. i., oh. 14. 

3 Arist,, Poet., cap. 21. * Harris, Philosoph. Arrange., p, 441. 

5 Whately, Log., b. iii., § 10. 



810 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 



subjects are kept distinct in the expression, as well as in 
the thought ; iu a metaphor they are kept distinct in the 
thought, but not in the expression. A hero resembles a lion ; 
and upon that resemblance many similies have been founded 
by Homer and other poets. But let us invoke the aid of the 
imagination, and figure the hero to be a lion, instead of only 
resenftling one ; by that variation the simile is converted into 
a metaphor, which is supported by describing all the qualities 
of the lion that resemble those of the hero.' When I say of 
some great minister, that 'he upholds the state like a pillar 
which supports the weight of a whole edifice,' I evidently 
frame a comparison ; but when I say of the same minister, 
that ' he is a pillar of the state,' this is not a comparison but 
a metaphor. The comparison between the minister and the 
pillar is instituted in the mind, but without the aid of words 
which denote comparison. The comparison is only insinuated, 
not expressed; the one object is supposed to be so like the 
other, that, without formally drawing the comparison, the 
name of the one may be substituted for that of the other." ^ — 
V. Analogy, Allegory. 
METAPHYSICS. — This word is commonly said to have originated 
in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the collectors and 
conservers of the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion 
of them the words To, fi^ta •fa Ovaixd. But a late French 
critic, Mons. Ravaisson," says he has found earlier traces of 
this phrase, and thinks it probable that, although not em- 
ployed by Aristotle himself, it was applied to this portion of 
his writings by some of bis immediate disciples. Whether the 
phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should 
stand, or that it should be studied, after the physics, in the col- 
lected woi'ks of Aristotle, are the two views which have been 
taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand after 
the physics. But in the order of science or study, Aristotle 
said, that after physics should come mathematics. And Dero- 
don* has given reasons why metaphysics should be studied after 
logic, and before physics and other parts of philosophy. But the 

' Arist., Rhd., lib. iii., cap. 4. 

^ Irving, English Composition, p. 172. 

3 Essai sur la Metaphysique, torn, i., p. 40. 

* Proem. Mttcqihys. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 811 

METAPHYSICS — 

truth is that the preposition ixe-ifd means along loith as well as 
after, and might even be translated above. In Latin meta- 
pJiyslca is synonymous with su2Jernaturalia. And in English 
Shakspeare has used metaphysical as synonymous with super- 
natural. 

..." Fate and metaphysical aid doth seem 
To have thee crowned." 

Macbeth, Act i., scene 3. 

Clemens Alexandrinus ' considered metaphysical as equiva- 
lent to supernatural; and is supported by an anonymous 
Greek commentator, whom Patricius has translated into 
Latin, and styles Philoponus. 

But if (A.i-td be interpreted, as it may, to mean along with, 
then metaphysics or metaphysical philosophy will be that phi- 
losophy which we should take along with us into physics, and 
into every other philosophy — that knowledge of causes and 
principles which we should carry with us into every depart- 
ment of inquiry. Aristotle called it the governing philosophy, 
which gives laws to all, but receives laws from none.^ Lord 
Bacon ^ has limited its sphere, when he says, " The one part 
(of philosophy) which is physics enquireth and handleth the 
material and efficient causes ; and the other which is meta- 
physic handleth the formal and final cause." But all causes 
are considered by Aristotle in his Avritings which have been 
entitled metaphysics. The inquiry into ^causes was called by 
him the first philosophy — science of truth, science of being. 
It has for its object — not those things which are seen and 
temporal — phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and 
eternal, things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the 

' Strom, i. ^ Metaphys., lib. i., cap. 2. 

" Advancement of Learning, book ii. In another passage, however, Bacon admits 
the advantage, if not the validity, of a higher metaphysic than this. " Because the 
distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one 
angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet ia a stem, 
which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continviance, before it come to 
discontinue and break itself into arms and houghs; therefore, it is good to erect and 
constitute one universal science by the uame oi ' philosopjhia prima,' primitive or sum- 
mary philosophy, as the main and common way, before wo come where the ways part 
and divide themselves; which science, whether I should report deficient or no, I stand 
doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by speculation 
a, priori, even this science would have been hut lightly esteemed by Bacon. 



312 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

METAPHYSICS — 

first principles of nature and of thought, the ultimate causes 
of existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their 
essence, independently of the particular properties or deter- 
mined modes which make a difference between one thing and 
another. In short, it is ontology or the science of being as 
being, that is, not the science of any particular being or 
beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but 
the science of being in its general and common attributes. 
There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. 
But metaphysics is the science of being as common to both. 

" The subject of meiapJiysics is the whole of things. This 
cannot be otherways known than in its principles and causes. 
Now these must necessarily be what is most general in nature; 
for it is from generals that particulars are derived, which can- 
not exist without the generals; whereas the generals may exist 
without the particulars. Thus, the species, man, cannot exist 
without the genus, animal ; but animal may be without man. 
And this holds universally of all genuses and specieses. The 
subject therefore of meta-physics, is what is principal in nature, 
and first, if not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, 
and in order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the 
universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and their 
several properties, to particular sciences, this universal science 
compares these subjects together; considers wherein they 
differ and wherein they agree : and that which they have in 
common, but belongs not, in particular, to any one science, ia 
the proper object of metapJiysics." ^ 

Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in 
opposition to the many and the apparent.^ Matter, as per- 
ceived by the senses, is a combination of distinct and hetero- 
geneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some by smell, 
&c. What is the thing itself, the subject and owner of these 
several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of 
them ? What is it by virtue of which those several attri- 
butes constitute or belong to one and the same thing? Mind 
presents to consciousness so many distinct states, and ope- 
rations, and feelings. What is the nature of that one mind, 

' Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book iii., chap. 4. 
* Arist., Mctaphys., lib. iii., c. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 313 

METAPHYSICS — 

of which all these are so many modifications? The inquiry 
may be carried higher still, can we attain to any single con- 
ception of being in general, to which both mind and matter 
are subordinate, and from which the essence of both may be 
deduced ? ' 

" Aristotle said every science must have for investigation a 
determined province and separate form of being, but none of 
these sciences reaches the conception of being itself. Hence 
there is needed a science which should investigate that which 
the other sciences take up hypothetically, or through experience. 
This is done by the first philosophy, which has to do with 
being as such, while the other sciences relate only to deter- 
mined and concrete being. The metaphysics, which is this 
science of being and its primitive grounds, is the first 
philosophy, since it is pre-supposed by every other discipline. 
Thus, says Aristotle, if there were only a physical substance, 
then would physics be the first and the only philosophy ; but 
if there be an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the 
ground of all being, then must there be also an antecedent, 
and because it is antecedent, a universal philosophy. The first 
ground of all being is God, whence Aristotle occasionally gives 
to the first philosophy the name of theology.^ 

Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into geni,al and 
special. The former was called Ontology — [q. v.), or the science 
of being in general, whether infinite or finite, spiritual or 
material ; aud explained therefore the most universal notions 
and attributes common to all beings — such as entity, non- 
entity, essence, existence, unity, identity, diversity, &c. This 
is metaphysics properly so called. Special metaphysics was 
sometimes called Pneumatology — [q. v.), and included — 1. 
Natural Theology, or Theodicy; 2. Rational Cosmology, or 
the science of the origin and order of the world ; and 3. 
Rational Psychology, which treated of the nature, faculties, 
and destiny of the human mind. 

The three objects of special metaphysics, viz., God, the 
world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas 



' Wolf, Philosoph. Ration. Disc. Prdim., sect. 73; Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 277. 
' Schwegler, Hist, of Philos., p. 112. 
28 



314 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METAPHYSICS - 

of the pui'e reason. According to him, a systematic exposi- 
tion of those notions and truths, the knowledge of which is 
altogether independent of experience, constitutes the science 
of metaphysics. 

"Time was," says Kant,' " when metapliysics was the queen 
of all the sciences ; and if we take the will for the deed, she 
. certkinly desei'ves, so far as regards the high importance of 
her object matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion 
of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her ; and the 
matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba — 

' Modo, maxima rerum, 
Tot generis, natisque potens, 
Nunc trahor exul, inops.' "' 

According to D'Alembert,^ the aim of metaphysics is to ex- 
amine the generation of our ideas, and to show that they all 
come fi'om sensations. This is the ideology of Condillac and 
De Tracy. 

Mr. Stewarf^ has said that " Metaphysics was a word formerly 
appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology of the schools, 
but now understood as equally applicable to all those inqui- 
ries which have for their object, to trace the various branches 
of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitu- 
tion of the human mind." And* he has said that by meta- 
physics he understands the "inductive philosophy of the 
human mind." In this sense the word is now popularly em- 
ployed to denote, not the rational psychology of the schools, 
hnt psychology, or the philosophy of the hunian mind prose- 
cuted according to the inductive method. In consequence of 
the subtle and insoluble questions prosecuted by the school- 
men, under the head of metaphysics, the word and the inqui- 
ries which it includes have been exposed to ridicule.^ 

' Preface to the first edition of the Crit. of Pure Reason. 

* Melanges, torn, iv., p. 143. ^ Dissert., part ii., p. 476. 

' In the Preface to the Dissert. 

5 The word metapliysics was handled by Eev. Sydney Smith {Elementary Sketches 
of Moral Philosojyhy, cliap. 1, p. 3,) with as mvich caution as if had heen a hand- 
grenade. 

" There is a woi-d." he exclaimed, when lecturing, with his deep, sonorous, warning 
Toice, "of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept concealed if I 
possibly could, but as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at once, and get 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 315 

METAPHYSICS — 

But there is and must be a science of being, otherwise there 
is and can be no science of knowing. 

" If by metaphysics we mean those truths of the pure reason 
which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict 
the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) 
spiritual verities which can only be spiritually discerned, and 
this is the true and legitimate meaning of metaphysics, fiB-ia ifa, 
^vgixd, then I affirm, that this very controversy between the 
Arminians and the Calvinists (as to grace), in which both are 
partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in 
what they deny, is a proof that without metaphysics there can 
be no light of faith." ' 

In French the word metaphysique is used as synonymous with 
philosophic, to denote the first principles, or an inquiry into 
the first principles of any science. La Metaphysique du Droit, 
La Metaphysique du Moral, &c. It is the same in German. 
METEMPSYCHOSIS [n-std, beyond; £>4-d;};ow, to animate), is 
the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to 
another. "We read in Plato, that from the opinion o? metem- 
psychosis, or transmigration of the souls of men into the bodies 
of beasts most suitable unto their human condition, after his 
death, Orpheus the musician became a swan." ^ 

This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence - :ind irn- 
mortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus,' the 
Egyptians were the first to espouse both doctrines. They 
believed that the soul at death entered into some animal 



out of It as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very tremendous one of 
' metaphysics,' which in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems likely to produce as much 
alarm as the cry of ' fire ' in a crowded playhouse ; when Belvidera is left to cry by 
herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner he can. I must beg of my 
audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to make use of the language which 
the manager would probably adopt on such an occasion: I can assure ladies and gen- 
tlemen there is not the smallest degree of danger." 

The blacksmith of Glamis' description of metaphysics was — "Twa folk disputin' the- 
gither; he that's listenin' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's 
gpeakin' disna ken what he means himsel' — that's metaphysics." 

Another said— "God forbid that I should say a word against metaphysics, only, if a 
man should try to see down his own throat, with a lighted candle in his hand, let him 
take care lest he set his head on fire." 

* Coleridge, JS^otcs on Eng. Div., vol- i., p. 340. 

^ Browne, Vulgar Errors, b. iii., c. 27. 

' Lib. ii., sect. 123. 



316 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METEMPSYCHOSIS - 

created at the moment ; and that after having inhabited the 
forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it 
returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, 
to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the 
inhabitants of India the transmigration of the soul was more 
nearly allied to the doctrine of emanation — g. v.) The common 
opinit5n is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from 
Egypt into Greece. But, before any communication between 
the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. 
Pythagoras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It 
was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly taught 
among the early Christians, according to one of St. Jerome's 
letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead to abstaining 
from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the 
fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the 
philosophy of Pythagoras. 
METHOD (fif'Sogoj, p-s-ed and 6805), means the way or path by 
which Ave proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. In 
its widest acceptation, it denotes the means employed to obtain 
some end. Every art and every handicraft has its method. 
Cicero ' translates iiiOohoi by via, and couples it with ars. 

Scientific or philosophical method is the march which the 
mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is 
the putting of our thoughts in a certain order Avitli a view to 
improve our knowledge or to convey it to others. 

Method may be called, in general, the art of disposing well a 
sernes of many thoughts, either for the discovering truth when we 
are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already 
known. Thus there are two kinds of method, one for discover- 
ing truth, which is called ayialysis, or the method of resolution, 
and which may also be called the method of invention ; and 
the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, 
which is called synthesis, or the method of comjjosiiioii, and 
which may also be called the method of doctrine.'^ 

'^Method, which is usually described as the fourth part of 
Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. It is rather a 



> Brutus, c. 12. Compare De Finihus, ii., 1, and also De Orat., i., ' 
^ Port Roy. Logic, part iv., ch. 2. 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 317 

METHOD — 

power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, 
than its tangible product." ' 

Every department of philosophy has its own proper method; 
but there is a universal method or science of method. This 
was called by Plato, ^ dialectic ; and represented as leading to 
the true and the real. It has been said that the word insfloSoj, 
as it occurs in Aristotle's Ethics, should be translated " sys- 
tems," rather than " method." ^ But the construction of a 
system implies m,ethod. And no one was more thoroughly 
aware of the importance of a right method than Aristotle. He 
has said,* " that we ought to see well what demonstration (or 
proof) suits each particular subject; for it would be absurd 
to mix together the research of science and that of method ; 
two things, the acquisition of which offers great difficulty." 
The deductive method of philosophy came at once finished from 
his hand. And the inductive method was more extensively 
and successfully followed out by him than has been generally 
thought. 

James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, was 
born at Trent, and came to England in 1567. He published 
a work, De Methodo, of which Mons. Degerando^ has given 
an analysis. According to him all knowledge deduced from 
a process of reasoning presupposes some primitive truths, 
founded in the nature of man, and admitted as soon as an- 
nounced ; and the great aim of method should be to bring 
these primitive truths to light, that by their light we may 
have more light. Truths obtained by the senses, and by 
repeated experience, become at length positive and certain 
knowledge. 

Descartes has a discourse on Method. He has reduced it to 
four general rules. 

I. To admit nothing as true of which we have not a clear 
and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our 
own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything 
else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this idea, 
it ought to be received or rejected. 

* Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, sect. 119. ^ Repuh., lib. vii. 

^ Paul, Analysis of Aristotle's JEUiics, p. 1. * Metaphys., lib. ii. 

° Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie, part ii., torn, ii., p. 3. 

28*- 



518 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

METHOD- 

II. To divide every object inquired into as much as possi- 
ble into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the ego, or 
self-consciousness. In proportion as the object of inquiry is 
simplified, the evidence comes to be nearer that of self-con- 
sciousness. 

III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that 
are more complex. The real is often complex : and to arrive 
at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by synthesis 
reunite the parts which were previously separated. 

IV. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the 
parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful and 
incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give the 
reality. 

This metliod begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by ana- 
lysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in propor- 
tion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness. 

These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. 
But different sciences have different methods suited to their 
objects and to the end in view. 

In prosecuting science with the view of extending our 
knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow 
the metliod of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure 
will be chiefly in the way of analysis. But in communicating 
what is already known, we follow the method of exposition 
or doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of 
synthesis. 

In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the 
object of the science is to discover the possible application of 
them. In these sciences the method is deductive, as in geome- 
try. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are given, and 
the object of the science is to discover the principles or laws. 
In these sciences the proper method is inductive, proceeding by 
observation or experiment, as in psychology and physics. The 
metliod opposed to this, and which was long followed, was the 
constructive method; which, instead of discovering causes by 
induction, imagined or assigned them a, priori, or ex hypothesi, 
and afterAvards tried to verify them. This method is seductive 
and bold but dangerous and insecure, and should be resorted 
to with great caution. — V. Hypothesis. 



VOCABULARY 0^ PHILOSOPHY. S19 

METHOD- 

The use of method, both in obtaining and applying know- 
ledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it 
to others, is great and obvious. " CmTenti extra viam, quo 
Jiabilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aherrationem." ' 
" Une bonne methode doune a I'esprit une telle puissance 
qu'elle pent en quelque sorte remplacer le talent. C'est un 
levier qui donne a I'homme faible, qixi I'employe, une force 
que ne sauvait posseder I'homme le plus fort qui serait prive 
d'un semblable moyen."^ La Place has said, — "La connais- 
sance de la methode qui a guide I'homme de genie, n'est pas 
moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a sa propre 
glorie, que ses decouvertes.'' 

" Marshal thy notions into a handsome method. One will 
carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in bundles, 
than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging about his 
shoulders.'"' — V. System. 

METHODOLOGY {Methodenlehre) is the transcendental doctrine 
of method.^ The elementary doctrine has been called by 
some Elementology, or the science treating of the form of a 
metaphysical system. 

METONOMY. — K Intention. 

MICEOCOSM.— F. Macrocosm. 

MIUD is that which moves, body is that which is movedr" 

" By mind we mean something which, when it acts, knows 
what it is going to do ; something stored with ideas of its 
intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are 
fashioned."^ 

^^ Mind, that which perceives, feels, thinks, and wills."'' 
"Among metaphysicians, mind is becoming a generic, 
and soul an individual designation. Mind is opposed to 
matter ; soul to body. Mind is soul without regard to per- 



* Nov. Org., i., 61. ^ Oomte, Traite de V Legislation Aih. i., c. 1. 
'Pleasures of Literature, 12mo, Loud., 1851, p. 104. See Descartes, On Method; 

Coleridge, On Method, Introd. to Enajclop. Metropol. ; Frieiid; vol. iii. 

* See Kant, Oi'it. of Pure Reason, p. 541, Haywood's translation. 

» Monboddo, Ancient Meiaphys., book ii., chap. 3. See his remarks on the definition 
of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4. 
^ Harris, Hermes, p. 227. 
' Taylor, Elements of Thought. 



820 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MIND — 

sonaiity ; suul is the appropriate mind of the being under 
notice. Etymologically, mind is the principle of volition, 
and soul the principle of animation. "I mean to go'' was 
originally " I mind to go." Soid, at first identical with self, 
is from sellan, to say, the faculty of speech being its charac- 
teristic. 

"Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty. 
He has do mind to marry."' 

— V. Soul. 

MIHACLE [miror, to wonder). — " A miracle I take to be a sen- 
sible operation, which being above the comprehension of the 
spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established 
course of nature, is taken by men to be divine." ^ 

"A miracle," says Mr. Hume,^ " is a violation of the laws 
of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has es- 
tablished these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the 
very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from 
experience can possibly be imagined ; and if so, it is an un- 
deniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any 
proof whatever derived from human testimony." 

Mr. Hume says the first hint of that argument occurred 
to him in a conversation with a Jesuit in the College of La 
Fleche. It has been replied to by Dr. Adams,* Dr. Campbell,^ 
Bp. Douglas.* 

MNEMONICS.— F. Memoria Technica. 

MODALITY is the term employed to denote the most general 
points of view under which the different objects of thought 
present themselves to our mind. Now all that we think of 
we think of as possible, or co7itingent, or impossOile, or neces- 
sary. The possible is that which may equally be or not be, 
which is not yet, but which may be ; the contingent is that 
which already is, but which might not have been ; the neces- 
sary is that which always is ; and the impossible is that which 
neveF is. These are the modalities of being, which neces- 
sarily find a place in thought, and in the expression of it in 

' Taylor, Synonyms. . ' Locke, A Discourse of Miracles. 

* Essay on Miracles. * Essay in Answer, he. 

s Dissert on Miracles. 

8 Criterion of Miracles. See also Lemoine, A Treatise on Miracles, Sto, Lend., 1747. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 321 



judgments and in propositions. Hence arise the four modal 
propositions which Aristotle^ has defined and opposed. He 
did not use the term modality, but it is to be found among his 
commentators and the scholastic philosophers. In the phi- 
losophy of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four 
heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In refer- 
ence to modality they are either problematic, or assertory, or 
apodeictical. And hence the category of modality includes 
possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, 
necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence 
should have no place ; the contingent and the necessary are 
not different from being.^ 
MOBE. — " The manner in which a thing exists is called a mode or 
affection ; shape and colour are modes of matter, memory and 
joy are modes of mind."^ 

"Modes, I call such complex ideas, which, however com- 
pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by 
themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affec- 
tions of, substances."^ 

" There are some m.odes Avhich may be called internal, be- 
cause they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, 
square ; and others which may be called external, because they 
are taken from something which is not in the substance, as 
loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the action of 
another ; and this is what is called in the schools an external 
denomination." ^ 

"Modes or modifications of mind, in the Cartesian school, 
mean merely what some recent philosophers express by states 
of mind; and include both the active &xv^ passive phenomena 
of the conscious subject. The terms were used by Descartes 
as well as by his disciples." ^ 

Mode is the manner in which a substance exists ; thus wax 
may be round or square, solid or fluid. Modes are secondary 
or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which 



* Ilspi ipjirtvdag, c. 12-14. 2 Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

' Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

■* Locke, Essay on Hum,. Understand., b. ii., chap. 12, sect. 4. 
^ Port Roy. Logic, part i., chap. 2. 
^ Sir William Hamilton, Keid's Works, y. 29.5, note. 
W 



322 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MODE — 

exists by itself. Substances are not confined to any mode, but 
must exist in some. Modes are all variable conditions, and 
though some one is necessary to every substance, the particu- 
lar ones are all accidental. Modification is properly the bring- 
ing of a thing into a mode, but is sometimes used to denote 
the mode of existence itself. State is a nearly synonymous 
but a more extended term than mode. 

A mode is a variable and determinate affection of a sub- 
stance, a quality vphich it may have or not, without affecting 
its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, 
a mind may affirm or deny, vrithout ceasing to be. They are 
not accidents, because they arise directly from the nature of 
the substance which experiences them. Nor should they be 
called phe?iomena, which may have or not have their cause in 
the object which exhibits them. But modes arise from the 
nature of the substance afi"ected by them. It is true that one 
substance modifies another, and in this view modes may some- 
times be the efi"ect of causes out of the substance in which 
they appear. They are then called modifications. Fire melts 
wax ; the liquidity of wax in this view is a modification. 

All beings which constitute the universe modify one another ; 
but a soul endowed with' liberty is the only being that modi- 
fies itself, or which can be altogether and in the same mode, 
cause and substance, active and passive.' 

" That quality which distinguishes one genus, one species, or 
even one individual, from another, is termed a modification ; 
then the same particular that is termed a, property or qualHy, 
when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of 
individuals, is termed a modificaiioji when considered as dis- 
tinguishing the individual or the class from another ; a black 
skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro ; the same 
circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro 
from a man of different species, are denominated modifications." ^ 
MOLECULE {molecula, a little mass), is the smallest portion of 
matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something real, 
and thus differs from atom, which is notj;erceived but conceived. 



' Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

^ Karnes, Eleme>its of Crilicism, App. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. - 323 

MOLECULE — 

It is the smallest portion of matter which we can reach by our 
means of dividing, while atom is the last possible term of all 
division. When molecules are of simple homogeneous elements, 
as of gold or silver, they are called integrant; when they are 
of compound or heterogeneous elements, as salts and acids, 
they are called constituent. 
MONAD, MONADOLOGY (^omj, unity, one). — According to 
Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces not 
acting mechanically, but from an internal principle. They are 
incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible to all change from 
without, but subject to internal movement. This hypothesis 
he explains in a treatise entitled Monadologie. He thought 
inert matter insufScient to explain the phenomena of body, 
and had recourse to the entelechies of Aristotle, or the substan- 
tial forms of the scholastic philosophy, conceiving of them as 
primitive forces, constituting the substance of matter, atoms 
of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, 
metaphysical points, full of vitality, exact as mathematical 
points, and real as physical points. These substantial unities 
which constitute matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and 
soul, but they are imperishable, although they may undergo 
transformation. 

"Leibnitz conceived the whole iv.:' verse, bodies bl well as 
minds, to be made up of monads, tliat is, simple substances, 
each of which is, by the Creator, in the beginning of its exist- 
ence, endowed with certain active and perceptive powers. A 
monad, therefore, is an active substance, simple, without parts 
or figure, which has within itself the power to produce all the 
changes it undergoes from the beginning of its existence to 
eternity. The changes which the monad undergoes, of what 
kind soever, though they may seem to us the effect of causes 
operating from without, are only the gradual and successive 
evolutions of its own internal powers, which would have pro- 
duced all the same changes and motions, although there had 
been no other being in the universe." ' 

Mr. Stewart^ has said, — "After studying, with all possible 
diligence, what Leibnitz has said of his monads in different 

' Reid, Intell. Pow., essay ii., eh, 15. 
'^ Dissert., part ii., note 1, p. 219. 



324 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MONAD — 

jjarts of his works, I find myself quite incompetent to annex 
any precise idea to the word as he has employed it." The 
most intelligible passage which he quotes is the following:' — 
"A monad is not a material but a formal atom, it being im- 
possible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a 
real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to 
revive the obsolete doctrine of substantial forms (the essence 
of which consists in force), separating it, however, from the 
various abuses to which it is liable." 

'' Monadology rests upon this axiom — Every substance is at 
the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has 
therefore in itself the principle of its own development : such 
is the monad ; it is a simple force. Each monad has relation 
to all others ; it corresponds with the plan of the universe ; it 
is the universe abridged ; it is, as Leibnitz says, a living 
mirror which reflects the entire universe under its own point 
of view. But every monad being simple, there is no imme- 
diate action of one monad upon another ; there is, however, a 
natural relation of their respective development, which makes 
their apparent communication ; this natural relation, this 
harmony which has its reason in the wisdom of the supreme 
director, is pre-established harmony." ^ 

MONOGAMY [ft-ovo^, ydjxoi, one marriage), is the doctrine that 
one man should have only one wife, and a wife only one hus- 
band. It has also been interpreted to mean that a man or 
woman should not marry more than once. — V. Polygamy. 

MONOTHEISM (fidi-oj, 9i6i, one God), is the belief in one God 
only. 

" The general propensity to the worship of idols was totally 
subdued, and the Jews became monotheists, in the strictest sense 
of the term." 2 — V. Theism, Polytheism. 

MOOB. — F. Syllogism. 

MOHAL {moralis, from mos, manner), is used in several senses in 
philosophy. 

In reasoning, the word moral is opposed to demonstrative, 

' Tom. ii., p. 50. 

^ Cousin, Hist. Mod. Philosoph., vol. ii., p. 86. 

^ Cogan, Discourse on Jewish Dispensation, c. 2, s. 7. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 325 

MORAL — 

and means probable. Sometimes it is opposed to material, and 
in this sense it means mental, or that the object to which it is 
applied belongs to mind and not to matter. Thus we speak of 
moral science as distinguished from physical science. 

It is also opposed to intellectual and to cesthetic. Thus we 
distinguish between a 7noral habit and an intellectual habit, 
between that which is morally becoming and that which 
pleases the powers of taste. 

Moral is opposed to positive. "Moral precepts are precepts, 
the reasons of which we see ; positive precepts are precepts, 
the reasons of which we do not see. Moral ditties arise out of 
the nature of the case itself, prior to external command ; posi- 
tive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from 
external command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it 
not for such command received from Him whose creatures and 
subjects we are." ' 

'^ A positive precept concerns a thing that is right because 
commanded ; a moral precept respects a thing commanded 
because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both to 
honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem ; but the 
former was commanded because it was right, and the latter 
was right because it was commanded." ^ 
MORAL FACULTY. — F. Conscience. 

MORALITY. — " To lay down, in their universal form, the laws 
according to which the conduct of a free agent ought to be 
regulated, and to apply them to the diff'erent situations of 
human life, is the end of morality." 

"A body of moral truths, definitely expressed, and arranged 
according to their rational connection," is the definition of a 
" system of morality" by Dr. WhewelL' 

" The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong is 
morality." "" 

" There are in the world two classes of objects, persons and 
things. And these are mutually related to each other. There 
are relations between persons and persons, and between things 
and things. And the peculiar distinctions of moral actions, 



' Butler, Analogy, part ii., ch. 1. ' Whately, Lessons on Morals. 

^ On Systemaiic Morality, lect. i. * Whewell, Morality, sect. 76. 

29 



326 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

MORALITY— 

moral characters, moral principles, moral habits, as contrasted 
with the intellect and other parts of man's nature, lies in this, 
that tliey alivays imply a relation between tivo persons, not be- 
tween two things." ' 

"Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred dis- 
tinction between thing and person. On this distinction all 
law, human and divine, is grounded." ^ 

"What the duties of morality are, the apostle instructs the 
believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of 
negative and positive ; negative, to keep himself pure from the 
world ; and positive, beneficence from loving-kindness, that is, 
love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last and highest 
come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, acts, and duties, 
that have an especial reference to the timeless, the permanent, 
the eternal, to the sincere love of the true as truth, of the 
good as good, and of God as both in one. It comprehends 
the whole ascent from uprightness (morality, virtue, inward 
rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the acts, exercises, and dis- 
ciplines of mind, will, and aifections, that arc requisite or con- 
ducive to the great design of our redemption from the form 
of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the 
divine image. 

" It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish 
the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which 
each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is more 
particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corresponds to 
the sense and the understanding ; the moral to the heart and 
the conscience ; the spiritual to the will and the reason, that 
is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with, and in subordi- 
nation to, the reason, as a ray from that true light which is 
both reason and will, universal reason and will absolute." 

How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the Pla- 
tonic, see Prudence.^ 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of human duty. The 
knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human 
nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary 



• Sewell, Christ. Morals, p. 339. 

= Coleridge, Aids to Reflectiom, vol. i., p. 265. ' Ibid., vol. i., pp. 22, 23. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 327 

MORAL — 

to know what man is. Not that the moral philosopher, before 
entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, 
must go over the science of human nature in all its extent. 
But it is necessary to examine those elements of hviman 
nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A 
full course of moral philosophy should consist, therefore, of two 
parts — the first containing an analysis and illustration of those 
powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and 
by the possession of which, he is capable of acting under a 
sense of duty ; the second, containing an arrangement and 
exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor 
of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and 
phenomena presented by an examination of the active and 
moral nature of man, the first part may be characterized as 
psychological ; and as laying down the duties arising from the 
various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been 
placed, the second part may be designated as deontological. 

" The moral philosopher has to investigate the principles 
according to which men act — the motives which influence 
them in fact — the objects at which they commonly aim — the 
passions, desires, characters, manners, tastes, which appear in 
the world around him, and in his own constitution. Further, 
as in all moral actions, the intellectual principles ar: impli- 
cated with the feelings, he must extend his inquiry to the 
phenomena of the mental powers, and know both what they 
are in themselves, and how they are combined in actions with 
the feelings." ' — V. Ethics. 

MORAL SENSE. — F. Senses (Reflex). 

MORPHOLOGY (^op^?;, form; Tioyoj). — "The branch of botani- 
cal science which treats of the forms of plants is called 7nor- 
phology, and is now regarded as the fundamental department 
of botany." ^ 

" The subject of animal morphology has recently been ex- 
panded into a form, strikingly comprehensive and systematic, 
by Mr. Owen."'' So that morphology treats of the forms of 
plants and animals, or organized beings. 

* Hampden, Inlrod. to Mm: Phil., !ect. vi., p. 187. 
^ M'Cosli, Typical Farms, p. 23. 
^ Whcwell, Supplem. vol., p. 140. 



328 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MOTION" (xtVj^st;) is the continued change of place of a body, or 
of any parts of a body ; for in the cases of a globe turning on 
its axis, and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of these 
bodies change their places, vrhile the bodies themselves remain 
stationary. 

Motion is either physical, that is, obvious to the senses, or 
not physical, that is, knovrable by the rational faculty. 

Aristotle has noticed several kinds of physical motion. 
Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to 
another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as when 
a body from being round, becomes square. Augmentation or 
diminution, as when a body becomes larger or smaller. All 
these aie changes from one attribute to another, while the 
substance remains the same. 

But body only moves because it is moved. And Aristotle 
traced all motion to impulses in the nature of things, rising 
from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and desire, up 
to the intelligent contemplation of what is good. 

As Heraclitus held that all things are continually changing, 
so Parmenides and Zeno denied the possibility of motion. The 
best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that given by Diogenes 
the Cynic, who walked into the presence of Zeno in refuta- 
tion of them. 

The notion of movement or motion, like that of extension, is 
acquired in connection with the exercise of the senses of sight 
and touch. 

MOTIVE. — " The deliberate preference by which we are moved 
to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the 
principle of action ; and desire and reason, which is for the 
sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference." ^ 

Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of appe- 
tition which he calls the mobile or spring [die Triehfeder), 
and the objective principle of the will, which he calls motive 
or determining reason [heweggrund) ; hence the diiference be- 
tween subjective ends to which we are pushed by natural dis- 
position, and objective ends which are common to us with all 
beings endowed with reason.^ 



• Aristotle, Ethic, lib. vi., cap. 2. 

' Wlllm, Hist, de la PMlcsoph. Alkmande, torn, i., p. 357. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 329 

MOTIVE - 

This seems to be the difference expressed in French be- 
tween mobile and motif. 

"A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as to 
produce either desire or aversion." ' 

"By motive," said Edwards,^ "I mean the whole of that 
which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whe- 
ther that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. 
Many particular things may concur and unite their strength 
to induce the mind ; and when it is so, all together are, as it 

were, one complex motive Whatever is a 

motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the 
view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving 
faeidty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act 
anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way 
or other in the mind's view ; for what is wholly unperceived, 
and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect .the mind 
at all." 

Hence it has been common to distinguish motives as external 
or objective, and as internal or subjective. Regarded objectively, 
motives are those external objects or circumstances, which, 
when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which 
prompt or influence the will. Regarded subjectively, motives 
are those internal views or feelings which arise on the con- 
templation of external objects or circumstances. In common 
language, the term motive is applied indifferently to the exter- 
nal object, and to tiie state of mind, to which the apprehen- 
sion or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation 
of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid'' said, that he " under- 
stood a motive, when applied to a human being, to be that for 
the sake of which he acts, and therefore that what he never 
was conscious of, can no more be a motive to determine his 
will, than it can be an argument to determine his judgment."* 



• Lord Karnes, Essay on Liberty and, Necessity. 

" Inquiry, part i., sect. 2. 

' Correspondence pre/ixed to his Works, p. 87. 

■• " This is Aristotle's definition {rd evtKa ov) of end ov final cause ; and as a synonym 
for end or final cause the term motive had been long exclusively employed." — Sir Will. 
Hamilton. 

29* 



330 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MOTIVE — 

In his Essays on iJie Active Poioers,^ he said, " Everything that 
can be called a motive is addressed either to the animal or to 
the rational part of our nature." Here the word motive is 
applied objectively to those external things, which, when con- 
templated, affect our intelligence or our sensitivity. But, in 
the very next sentence, he has said, "motives of the former 
kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word 
motive is applied stihjectively to those internal principles of our 
nature, such as appetite, desire, passion, &c., which are ex- 
cited by the contemplation of external objects, adapted and 
addressed to them. 

But, in order to a more precise use of the term motive, let it 
be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly 
distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, 
always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external 
object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind 
resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For 
example, bread or food of any kind, is the external object, 
which is adapted to an internal principle which is called 
appetite, and hunger or the desire for food is the internal 
feeling, which is excited or allayed as the circumstances may 
be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal 
principle. In popular language, the term motive might be 
applied to any one of these three ; and, it might be said, that 
the motive for svich an action was bread, or appetite, or hunger. 
But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive; it 
Avas that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or 
inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. 
The same may be said of motives of every kind. In every case 
there may be observed the external object, the internal 
principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind ; and the 
term motive may be applied, separately and successively, to 
any one of them ; but speaking strictly it should be applied to 
the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a 
principle of human nature having been addressed by an object 
adapted to it; because, it is this state or affection of mind 
which prompts to action. The motive of an agent, in some 
particular action, may be said to have been injury, or resent- 

- E?say iv., chap. i. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 331 

MOTIVE — 

ment, or anger — meaning by the first of these words, the 
■wrongous behaviour of another ; by the second, the principle 
in human nature affected by such behaviour ; and by the 
third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is 
said that a man acted prudently, it may intimate that his con- 
duct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and pru- 
dence ; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and 
forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to 
be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a 
man acted conscientiously, it may mean, that the particular 
action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty, 
or, that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or, that he 
felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these 
cases, the term motive is strictly applicable to the terminating 
state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the 
volition or determination to act. 

To the question, therefore, whether motive means something 
in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what moves the will 
is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of 
mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But 
what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated 
— must be brought Avithin the view of the mind, before it can 
in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary a. remote 
sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be 
called motives, or be said to move the will. Motives are, 
strictly speaking, subjective — as they are internal states or 
affections of mind in the agent. 

And motives may be called subjective, not only in contradis- 
tinction to the external objects and circumstances which may 
I be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different 
effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, 
not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same 
individuals, at different times. 

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive 
the value or importance of an object when presented to him, 
or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that 
may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man 
of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that 
with the same motives {objectively considered) presented to 



S32 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

MOTIVE — 

them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in refer- 
ence to the advantage held out, while the other will at once 
apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections 
will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling 
any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he 
whose sensibilities are more acute and lively, will instantly 
be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury 
done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indig- 
nation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant mea- 
sures of retaliation or revenge ; while, in another man, it will 
only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action 
which will be contemplated with horror by a man of tender 
conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose 
moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern 
between good and evil. In short, anything external to the 
mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitu- 
tion and training of the different minds within the view of 
wMch it may be brought. 

And not only may the same objects differently affect dif- 
ferent minds, but also the same minds, at different times, or 
under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain 
of hunger may be tempted to steal in order to satisfy his 
hunger ; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is under 
no such temptation. A sum of money which might be suffi- 
cient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the honesty of 
another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, con- 
siderations of prudence and propriety have not the same 
weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, 
in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have 
attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us 
in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in pros- 
perity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect 
and in possession. 

It would thus appear that motives are in their nature 
subjective, in their influence individual, and in their issue 
variable. 
MYSTICISM and MYSTERY have been derived from jitvu, to 
shut up ; hence (.ivatrji, one who shuts up. 

" The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descriptive 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 333 

MYSTICISM— 

of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by the lofty 
mysticism of his philosophy, and even by the remote origin 
of the theological fables which are said to have descended 
to him from Orpheus." ' 

Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known 
face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding 
to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a 
running up of all knowledge and all dvity to the contem- 
plation and love of Him.^ 

Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science ; it 
believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the 
senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and 
absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God either in 
nature, and hence a physical and naturalistic mysticism; or in 
the soul, and hence a moral and metapliysical mysticism. It 
has also its historical views ; and in history it considers espe- 
cially that which represents mysticism in full, and under its 
most regular form, that is religious ; and it is not to the letter 
of religions, but to their spirit, that it clings ; hence an 
allegorical and symbolical mysticism- Van Helmont, Ames, 
and Pordage, are naturalistic mystics; Poiret is moral, and 
Bourignon and Fenelon are Divine mystics. Swedenborg's 
mysticism includes them all. 

"Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, 
m,ysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective 
existence to the subjective creations of Ouir own faculties, to 
ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching 
and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read 
in them what takes place in the world without."^ 

The Germans have two words for mysticism; mystik and 
mysiicismus. The former they use in a favourable, the latter 
in an unfavourable sense. Just as we say 2jiety and pietism, 
or rationality and rationalism ; keeping the first of each pair 
for use, the second for abuse.* 



* Stewart, Philosopli. Essays, ii., chap. 5. 

^ Cousin, Hist, de la PMlosoph. Mod., premiere s^rie, torn, ii., le§on 9, 10, 

* Mill, Log., b. v., chap, iii., § 5. 

* Vaughan, Hours ivith the Mystics, vol. i., p. 23. 



334 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MYSTICISM— 

Cousin,' Schmidt (Car.).^ 

MYTH and MYTHOLOGY [uiOoi, a tale; ?i6yo;).— "I use this 
term {myfn) as sjmouymous Avith ' invention,' having no his- 
torical basis." ^ 

The early history and the early religion of all nations are 
full of fables. Hence it is that myths have been divided into 
the traditional and the theological, or the historical and the 
religious.'^ 

A myth is a narrative framed for the purpose of exjsressing 
some general truth, a lavr of nature, a moral phenomenon, or 
a religious idea, the different phases of which correspond to 
the turn of the narrative. An allegory agrees vs^ith it in 
expressing some general idea, but diiffers from it in this, — that 
in the allegory the idea was developed before the/or??!, which 
was invented and adapted to it. The allegory is a reflective 
and artificial process, the m,yth springs up spontaneously and 
by a kind of inspiration. A symbol is a silent myth, which 
impresses the truths which it conveys not by successive stages, 
but at once [avv, jSdx^co) throws together significant images of 
some truth. 

Plato has introduced the myth into some of his writings in 
a subordinate way, as in the Gorgias, the Republic, and the 
TimcBus. 

Blackwell,5 Huttner,^ Bacon,^ Mliller.s 

On the philosophic value of myths, see Cousin,® and the 
Argument of his translation of Plato. 

Some good remarks on the difference between the parable, 
the fable, the myth, &c., will be found in Trench.'" 



' Hist, of Mod. Philosoph., vol. ii., pp. 94-7. 

^ Essai sur Ics Mystiques du QuatorHeme siecle. Strasburg, 1836. 

' Pococke, India in Greece, p. 2, note. 

* Among the early nations, every truth a little remote from common apprehension 
■was embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class would contain myths 
concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last are pro- 
perly cSiWeA pldlosophemes. 

<• Letters 'Concerning Mythology, 8vo, Lond., 1748. 

* De Mythis Platonis, 4to, Leipsic, 1788. 
' On tJie Wisdom of the Ancients. 

' Mythology: Translated by Leitch, 1844. 

* Gours, 1828 ; 1 and 15 lemons. 
'" On the Parables, Introd. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 335 

MYTH- 

On the diiFerent views taken of Greek mythology, see 
Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann. 

See an Essay on Comparative Mythology,^ Grote.'^ 



NATURA. — F. Nature. 

NATURAL, as distinguished from Supernatural or Miraculous. 

— " The only distinct meaning of the word natural is stated, 
fixed, or settled; since what is natural as much requires and 
presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to 
affect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural 
or miraculous does to effect it for once."'' 
Natural, as distinguished from Innate or Instinctive. 

"There is a great deal .of difference," said Mr. Locke,^ 
" between an innate law, and a law of nature; between some- 
thing imprinted on our minds in their very original, and 
something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the know- 
ledge of by the use and application of our 7iatural faculties. 
And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into 
contrary extremes, either affirm an innate laio, or deny that 
there is a law knowable by the ligJit of nature, without the 
help of positive revelation." 

"Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are 
some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so 
as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers 
which we have in common with the brutes, and which are 
necessary to the preservation of the individvial, or to the con- 
tinuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature 
hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the 
rearing of them to human culture.^ It is by the proper cul- 
ture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in 
intellectuals, in tastes, and in morals, which exalt and dignify 
human nature ; while, on the other hand, the neglect or per- 
version of them makes its degeneracy and corruption."^ 

' In the Oxford Essays for 1856. ^ Sist. of Greece, vol. i., p. 400. 

^ Butler, Analogy, part i., chap. 1. ■* Essay on Hum. Understand., hook i., ch. 3. 

' Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of natural rights (Act. Pow., essay v., ch. 5) uses in- 
nate as synonymous with natural. 
" Reid, Inquiry, ch. 1, sect. 2. 



336 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATUEAL - 

" Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are necessarily led 
to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, and 
by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to our 
preservation, are to be considered as parts of human nature, 
no less than those which are implanted in the mind at its first 
formation." ' 

"Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed na- 
tural, as much as those which are commonly so called, if they 
are as rarely found wanting." ^ 
IfATirRALISM is the name given to those systems of the philo- 
sophy of nature which explain the phenomena by a blind force 
acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found in Lucretius,^ 
and was held by Leucippus and Epicurus. The Systeme de la 
Nature of D'Holbach, the Traite de la Nature of Robinet, and 
the PJiUosophie de la Nature of Delisle de Sales, also contain it. 

Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to idealism. Of 
Albert Durer it is said that " he united to the brilliant deli- 
cacies of Flemish naturalism the most elevated and varied of 
Italian idealism."^ 

NATURE [nascor, to be born). — According to its derivation, 
nature should mean that which is produced or born ; but it 
also means that which produces or causes to be born. The 
word has been used with various shades of meaning, but they 
may all be brought under two heads, Natura Naturans, and 
Natura Naturata. 

I. Natura Naturans. — a. The Author of nature, the un- 
created Being who gave birth to everything that is. b. The 
plastic nature or energy subordinate to that of the Deity, by 
which all things are conserved and directed to their ends and 
uses. c. The course of nature, or the established order ac- 
cording to which the universe is regvilated. 

Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, cientem 
motus in corporibus necessarios ; alii auiem vim participem 
ordinis, tanquam via progredientem.^ 

II. Natura Naturata. — a. 1. The works of nature, both mind 

' Stewart, Act. and Mor. Pow., vol. i., p. 351. 

* Mackintosh, Prelimin. Dissert., p. 67. ' De Rerum Natura. 
■• Labarte, HanclhooTc of the Middle Ages. 

* Cicero, De Nat. Deornm, lib. ii. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 337 

NATUKE — 

and matter. 3. The visible or material creation, as distinct 
from God and the soul, which is the object of natural science. 

" The term nature is used sometimes in a wider, sometimes 
in a narrower extension. When employed in its most exten- 
sive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. 
When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a 
synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinc- 
tion to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word ^vatj 
was general in its meaning ; and the great branch of philoso- 
phy, styled ^physical or physiological,' included under it not 
only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, 
the term nature is more vaguely extensive than the terms 
physics, physical, physiology, physiological, or even than the 
adjective, natural; whereas, in the philosophy of Germany, 
natur and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin deriva- 
tion, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in con- 
trast to the world of intelligence."^ 

b. Nature as opposed to art, all physical causes, all the 
forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inorganic, 
c. The nature or essence of any particular being or class of 
beings, that which makes it what it is. 

"The word nature has been used in two senses, — viz., 
actively and passively; energetic [= forma forman^), and 
material {= forma formata) . In the first it signifies the in- 
ward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a 
thing as existent ; while the essence, or essential 2:)roperty, sig- 
nifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the possi- 
bility of a thing. Plence, in accurate language, we say the 
essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the 
nature, because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, 
there is no expression or implication of their real existence. 
In the second or material sense of the word nature, we mean 
by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of 
our senses, and consequently of possible experience — the 
aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer 
senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning na- 
ture, would therefore (the word physiology being both am- 

' Sir W. Hamilton. Beid's Worlcs. p. 216, note. 

30 X 



do8 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATTJEE- 

biguous in itself, and already otherwise ap^sropriated) be more 
properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two 
grand divisions, somatology^ and psychology."^ 
K'ATTJRE (Course or Power of). — " There is no such thing as 
what men commonly call the course of nature, or the power of 
nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is 
nothing else but the wiZZ of God producing certain effects in a 
continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner ; which 
course or manner of acting, being in every movement per- 
fectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time as to be 
preserved. And if (as seems most probable), this continual 
acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of cre- 
ated intelligences appointed for that purpose by the Supreme 
Creator, then it is easy for any of them, and as much within 
their natural power (by the permission of God), to alter the 
course of nature at any time, or in any respect, as it is to pre- 
serve or continue it."^ 

"All things are artificial," said Sir Thomas Browne, "for 
nature is the art of God." The antithesis of nature and art is 
a celebrated doctrine in the peripatetic philosophy. Natural 
things are distinguished from artificial, inasmuch as they have, 
what the latter are without, an intrinsic principle of forma- 
tion."'* 

^^Nature," said Dr. Reid,^ " is the name we give to the eiBcient 
cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under observation. 
But if it be asked what nature is ? whether the first universal 
cause® or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether 
intelligent or unintelligent? — upon these points we find various 
conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we 
can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are 
sensible that they know nothing of the matter." 

The Hon. Robert Boyle wrote an Enquii^y into the vulgarly 



• Both tlie.=e are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty 
years ago, — \-iz., Somatopsychonologia. 

' Coleridge, Friend, p. 410. 

' Clai-ke, Evidences of JVat. and Mevealed Religion, p. 300, 4th edit. 

* Arist., Dc Gen., Aniin. ii., c. 1. ' Act. Pow., essay i., eh. 5. 

® Natura est prindpiuni et causas efficiens omnium rerum nalnralium, quo sensu a 
veteribus pJiilosophus cum Deo confiindebahir. — Cicero, De Nat. Dear., lib. i., c. 8, and 
lib. ii., c. 22, 32. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 339 

NATUEE- 

received notion of Nature, in which he attempted to show the 
absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy between the 
Creator and His works.' 

Nature or Force (Plastic) (rtxdcfcfcd, to form), was the name 
given by ancient physiologists to a power to which they attri- 
buted the formation of the germs and tissues of organized and 
living beings. In opposition to the doctrine of Democritus, 
who explained all the phenomena oi nature by means of matter 
and motion, and in opposition to the doctrine of Strato, who 
taught that matter was the only substance, but in itself a 
living and active force, Cudworth maintained that there is a 
plastic nature, a spiritual energy, intermediate between the 
Creator and His works, by which the phenomena of nature are 
produced. To ascribe these phenomena to the immediate 
agency of Deity would be, he thought, to make the course of 
nature miraculous ; and he could not suppose the agency of 
the Deity to be exerted directly, and yet monstrosities and 
defects to be found in the works of nature. How far the facts 
warrant such an hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis 
explains the facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not 
much diiferent from that of the anima mundi, or soul of mat- 
ter, which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as 
well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers. — 
V. Anima Mundi. 

Nature (Philosophy of). — The philosophy of nature includes 
all the attompts which have been made to account for the ori- 
gin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of these 
have been noticed under Matter — q. v. And for an account of 
the various Philosophies of nature, see T. H. Martin,^ J. B. 
Stallo, A. M.3 
NATURE (Law of). — By the laio of Nature is meant that law of 
justice and benevolence which is written on the heart of every 
man, and which teaches him to do to others as he would wish 
that they should do unto him. It was long called the law of 
nature and of nations, because it is natural to men of all nations.'' 

' 12mo, Lond., 1785. 

^ Philosophie, Spiritualiste de la JVatvre, 2 torn., Paris, 1849. 
" General Principles of Philosopk. of Nature, Lond., 1848. 

* Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines cmislituit, id apud omnes populos permque 
custoditur, vocaturquejus gentium ; quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur. — Gains. 



340 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATURE — 

But by the phrase laiv of nations is now meant international 
law, and by the law of nature, natural law. It is not meant 
by the phrase that there is a regular system or code of laws 
made known by the light of natvire in which all men every- 
where acquiesce, but that there are certain great principles 
universally acknowledged, and in accordance with which men 
feel themselves bound to regulate their condiict. 

" Why seek the law or rule in the world ? What would you 
answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you would only 
listen to it ? You are like a dishonest debtor who asks for the 
bill against him when he has it himself. Quod, petis intus 
habes. All the tables of the law, the two tables of Moses, the 
twelve tables of the Romans, and all the good laws in the 
world, are but copies and extracts, which will be produced in 
judgment against thee who hidest the original and pre- 
tendest not to know what it is, stifling as much as possible 
that light which shines within thee, but which would never 
have been without and humanly published but that that which 
was within, all celestial and divine, had been contemned and 
forgotten." ' 

According to Grotius, "Jus naiurale est dictatum rectce ra- 
tionis, indicans, actui allcui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconve- 
nientia cum ipsanatura rationali, inesse moralem tiirpitudinem, 
uut necessitatem moralem ; et consequenter ab authore naturce, 
ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aid prcecipi." 

"Jus gentium is used to denote, not international law, but 
positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all 
nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, they 
termed it Jus Feciale, the law of heralds, or international 
envoys."^ 

Selden,° Grotius,'' Puifendorff,* Sanderson,® Tyrell,'' Cul- 
verwell.^ 
UATTJEE (of Things). — The following may be given as an outline 
of the views of those philosophers, Cudworth, Clarke, Price, 

' ChaiTon, De la Sagesse. liv. ii., chap. 3, No. 4. 

a AVhewell, MoraUty, No. 1139. a De Jure Naturali, lib. i., e. 3. 

* De Jure Belli et Pacts, Prolegom., sect. 5, 6, lib. 1., cap. 1, sect. 10. 

' De Officio Sbminis et Civis, lib. iii., c. 3. 

" De Ohlig. ConscienticK, Praelect. Quarts, sect. 20-24. 

^ On Law of Noiure. s Discourse of the Light of Nature, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 34:1 

fSATVRE — 

and others, -who place the foundation of virtue in the nature, 
reason, and fitness of things : — 

"Everything is vrhat it is, by having a nature. As all 
things have not the same nature, there must be diiferent 
relations, respects, or proportions, of some things tOM^ards others, 
and a consequent_^!!ness or unfitness, in the application of dif- 
ferent things, or different relations, to one another. It is the 
same with jjsrsons. There is a, fitness, or suitableness of certain 
circumstances to certam persons, and an unsuitableness of othe^rs. 
And from the different relations of difi'erent persons to one 
another, there necessarily arises a, fitness or unfitness of certain 
manners of behaviour of some persons tovrards others, as v;q\\ 
as in respect to the things and circumstances v^dth which they 
aiV surrounded. Now, we stand in various relations to God, 
as our Creator, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Governor, 
and our Judge. We cannot contemplate these relations, with- 
out seeing or feeling a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing 
certain affections and discharging certain services towards Him, 
and a Wrongness in neglecting to do so, or in manifesting a 
different disposition, or following a different covirse of action. 
We stand, also, in various relations to our fellow-creatures ; 
some of them inseparable from our nature and condition as 
human beings, such as the relations of parent and child, 
brother and friend ; and others which may be voluntarily 
established, such as the relations of husband and wife, master 
and servant. And we cannot conceive of these relations 
without at the same time seeing a Rectitude or Rightness in 
cherishing suitable affections and following a suitable course 
of action. Not to do so we see and feel to be Wrong. We 
may even be said to stand in various relations to the objects 
around us in the world ; and, when we contemplate our 
nature and condition, we cannot fail to see, in certain manners 
of behaviour, a suitableness or unsuitableness to the circum- 
stances in which we have been placed. Now, Rectitude or 
conformity with those relations which arise from the nature 
and condition of man, is nothing arbitrary or fictitious. It is 
founded in the nature of things. God was under no necessity 
to create human beings. But, in calling them into existence, 
he must have given them a nature, and thus have constituted 

30 * 



342 VOCABULARY OF PHILGKOPHY. 

NATURE — 

the relations in which they stand to Him and to other beings. 
There is a suitableness or congruity, between these relations 
and certain manners of behaviour. Reason, or the Moral 
Faculty, perceives and approves of this suitableness or con- 
gruity. The Divine mind must do the same, for the relations 
were constituted by God ; and conformity to them must be in 
accordance with His will. So that Conscience, when truly 
enlightened, is a ray from the Divine Reason ; and the moral 
law, which it reveals to us, is Eternal and Immutable as the 
nature of God and the nature of things." ' 

NATURE (Human). — As to the diiferent senses in which nature 
may be understood, and the proper meaning of the maxim, 
Follow nature, — see Butler.^ 

NECESSITY [ne and cesso, that which cannot cease). — "I have 
one thing to observe of the several kinds of necessity, that the 
idea of some sort of firm connection runs through them all : — 
and that is the proper general import of the name necessity. 
Connection of mental or verbal propositions, or of their 
respective parts, makes iup the idea of logical necessity, — 
connection of end and means makes up the idea of moral 
necessity, — connection of causes and effects is physical neces- 
sity, — and connection of existence and essence is metaphysical 
necessity."^ 

Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of 
the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that man 
be a rational animal, because these are the terms in which he 
is defined. 

Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot well 
be, although, absolutely speaking it may. A man who is lame 
is under a moral necessity to use some help, but absolutely he 
may not. 

" The phrase moral necessity is used variously ; sometimes it 
is used for necessity of moral obligation. So we say a man is 
under necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience 
from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes by moral 
necessity is meant that sure connection of things that is a 

' Manual of Mor. Phil., p. 124. 
' Three Sermons on Hum. Nature. 
3 Waterland, Worl:s, vol. iv., p. 432. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 343 

NECESSITY— 

foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense moral neces- 
sUy signifies mvich the same as that high degree of probability, 
which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind in their con- 
duct and behaviour in the woi'ld. Sometimes by moral neces- 
sity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence 
which arises from such moral causes as the strength of incli- 
nation or motives, and the connection which there is in many 
cases between them, and such certain volitions and actions. 
It is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity in the 
following discourse." ' 

"By natural (or physical) necessity, as applied to men, I 
mean such necessity as men are under through the force of 
natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, 
at\} the subjects of particular sensations by necessity ; they 
feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects 
placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: 
so they assent to the truths of certain propositions as soon as 
the terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, 
that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross 
one another ; so by a natural (a 2)Tiysical) necessity men's 
bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support 
them." ^ 

Necessity is characteristic of ideas and of actions. A neces- 
sary idea is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained 
by the human mind ; as every change implies a cause. Neces- 
sity and universality are the marks of certain ideas which are 
native tc the human mind, and not derived from experience. 
A necessary action is one the contrary of which is impossible. 
Necessity is opposed to freedom, or to free-will. — V. Liberty. 
NECESSITY (Doctrine of). 

"' There are two schemes of necessity, — the necessitation by 
efficient — the necessitation hj final causes. The former is brute 
or blind fate ; the latter rational determinism. Though their 
practical results be the same, they ought to be carefully dis- 
tingviished."'* 

Leibnitz* distinguishes between — 

1. Hypothetical necessity, as opposed to absolute necessity, aa 

• Edwards, Works, toI. i., p. 116. * Ibid, vol. i., p. 146- 
' Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 87, note. 

• Tn his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 157. 



344 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NECESSITY- 

that "which the supposition or the hypothesis of God's foresight 
and preordination lays upon future contingents. 

2. Logical, metaphysical, or matliematical necessity, which 
takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction; and 

Z. Moral necessity, whereby a wise being chooses the best, 
and every mind follows the strongest inclination. 

Dr. Clarke' replies, "Necessity, in philosophical questions, 
always signifies absolute necessity. Hypothetical necessity and 
moral necessity are only figurative ways of speaking, and in 
philosophical strictness of truth, are no necessity at all. The 
question is not, whether a thing must be, when it is supposed 
that it is, or that it is to be (which is hypioihetical necessity). 
Neither is the question whether it be true, that a good being, 
continuing to be good, cannot do evil ; or a wise being, con- 
tinuing to be wise, cannot act unwisely ; or a veracious person, 
continuing to be veracious, cannot tell a lie (which is moral 
necessity). But the true and only question in philosophy con- 
cerning liberty, is, whether the immediate physical cause, or 
principle of action be indeed in him whom we call the agent ; 
or whether it be some other reason, which is the real cause by 
operating upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed 
an agent, but a n\Qve patient." 

NECESSITY (Logical). 

" The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species 
of necessity — necessitas conseqnentice, and another — necessitas 
conseqnentis. The former is an ideal or formal necessity ; the 
inevitable dependence of one thought upon another, by reason 
of our intelligent nature. The latter is a real or material 
necessity ; the inevitable dependence of one thing upon another 
because of its own nature. The former is a logical tiecessity, 
common to all legitimate consequence, whatever be the material 
modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical necessity, 
over and above the syllogistic inference, and wholly dependent 
upon the modality of the consequent. This ancient distinction 
modern philosophers have not only overlooked but confounded. 
(See contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. 
Dugald Stewart.^) — Sir William Hamilton.^ 

' P. 287. ^ In Dissertations on Eeid, p. 701, note. 

^ Discussions, p. 144. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 345 

NEGATIOE" {nego, to deny), is the absence of that which does not 
naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or -vvhich hiis 
no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it ; as when 
we sdj — A stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, has 
no life, nor sight, nor hearing ; or when we say — A carpenter 
or fisherman is unlearned ; these are mere negations} 

According to Thomas Aquinas,^ simple negation denies to 
a thing some certain realities which do not belong to the 
nature of the same. Privation, on the contrary, is deficiency 
in some reality which belongs to the notion of the being. — V. 
Privation. 

In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, 
so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, notions, 
or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called represent 
the most positive realities ; as infinity, immensity, immortality, 
&c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, deafness, in- 
sensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away of something 
from the object of which these ideas are entertained. But this 
is privation ((5i'£p-/^(3t5) rather than negation [aTio^aati). And 
in general it may be said that negation implies some anterior 
conception of the object of which the negation is made. Ab- 
solute negation is impossible. We have no idea of nothing. 
It is but a word.'' 

39'IHILISM {nihil, nihilum, nothing), is scepticism carried to the 
denial of all existence. 

" The sum total," says Fichte, " is this. There is absolutely 
nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only 
an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any ex- 
istence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am 
nothing. Images [Bilder) there are ; they constitute all that 
apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after 
the manner of images ; images that pass and vanish without 
there being aught to witness their transition ; that consist in 
fact of the images of images, without significance and without 
an aim. I myself am one of these images ; nay, I am not even 
thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality 
is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of. 



• Watts, Log., part i., chap. 2, sect. 6. 
' Summa, p. i., qu. 48, art. 5. 
" Diet, des Sciences Philosnph. 



346 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NIHILISM - 

and without a mind to dream ; into a dream made up only of 
a dream itself. Perception is a dream ; thought, the source 
of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to my- 
self of my existence, of my power, of my destination — is the 
dream of that dream." ' 

In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of 
consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as according 
to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of external 
realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not prove the exist- 
ence of mind — so that there is neither matter nor mind, for 
anything that we can prove. 
NIHILUM or NOTHING " is that of which everything can 
truly be denied, and nofJiing can be truly aflBrmed. So that 
the idea of nothing (if I may so sjjeak) is absolutely the nega- 
tion of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a finite or 
infinite nothing, is a contradiction in terms." ^ 

Nothing, taken positively, is what does not but may exist, 
as a river of milk — taken negatively, it is that which does not 
and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a 
valley. Nothing positively is ens potentiale. Nothing nega- 
tively is nan ens. 
NOMINALISM {nomen, a name), is the doctrine that general 
notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities cor- 
responding to them, and have no existence but as names 
or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is realism. 
To the intermediate doctrine of conceptiialism, nominalism is 
closely allied. It may be called the envelope of conceptttalism, 
while conceptualism is the letter or substance of nominalism. 
"If nominalism sets out from conceptnalism, conceptualistn 
should terminate in nominalism," says Mons. Cousin.' 

Universalia ante rem, is the watchword of the Realists; 
Universalia in re, of the Concejjtualists ; Universalia post rein, 
of the Nominalists. The Nominalists were called Terminists 
about the time of the Reformation.'* 

" The Terminists, among whom I was, are so called be- 

• Sir William Hamilton, Reid's Worlcs, p. 129, note. 

* Clarke, Answer to Seventh Letter, note. 

° Inlrod. auxouvrages inedits d' Ahailaird, 4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181. 
'' Ballantyne, Exarain. of Hum. Mind, chap. 3, sect. 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 347 

NOMINALISM - 

cause they speak of a thing in its o-^ni proper words, and do 
not apply them after a strange sort. They are also called 
Occamists, from Ockham their founder. He was an able and 
a sensible man." ' 

In asserting that universals existed, but only in the mind, 
Ockham agreed exactly with the modern Conceptualists. — V. 
Universals. 

NON SEOpTJITUE, (it does not follow ; the inference is not neces- 
sary.) — It is sometimes used as a substantive ; and an incon- 
clusive inference is called a non seqiiitnr. 

NOOGONIE {vovi, mind; yoroj, birth, or generation). — "Leib- 
nitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized 
notions, in that system which I might call a noogonie, in place 
of admitting two different sources of our representations, 
which are objectively valid only in their connection." ^ 

NOOLOGY {vovi, mind; Xoyo^), is a term proposed by Mons. 
Paffe,* to denote the science of intellectual facts, or the facts 
of intellect ; and patliology {psychological), to denote the 
science of the phenomenes affectifs, or feeling, or sensibility. 

The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton'* as the 
title given to Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles, by 
Calovius, in 1651; Mejerus, in 1662; Wagnerus, in 1670; and 
Zeidlerus, in 1680 — and he has said, " The correlatives ■Aoeiic 
and dianoetic would afford the best philosophical designations, 
the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand ; 
the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second 
hand. Noology or noological, clianoialogy and dianoialogical, 
would be also technical terms of much convenience in various 
departments of philosophy." 

Mons. Ampfere proposed to designate the sciences which 
treat of the human mind Les sciences Noologiques. 

" If, instead of considering the objects of our knowledge, we 
consider its origin, it may be said that it is either derived from 
experience alone, or from reason alone ; hence empirical phi- 
losophers and those which Kant calls noologists: at their head 

« Lutber, Table Talk, p. 540-2. 

* Kant, Crit. de la Raison Pure, pp. 326, 327. 
^ Sur la Sensibilite, p. 30. 

* Reid's Worles, note A, sect. 5, p. 770, 



348 VOCABULARY Or PHTLOSOPHY. 

NOOLOGY — 

are Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, and Locke and 
Leibnitz among the moderns." ' 

NOE-M {norma, from yi'wpt^oj, a square or rule of builders), is used 
as synonymous ^rith law. Anything not in accordance with 
the law is said to be abnormal. 

" There is no uniformity, no norma, principle, or rule, per- 
ceivable in the distribution of the primeval natural agents 
through the universe."^ 

NOTIOH [')iosco, to know). — Bolingbroke^ says, "I distinguish 
here between ideas and notions, for it seems to me, that, as we 
compound simple into complex ideas, so the composition we 
make of simple and complex ideas may be called, more pro- 
perly, and with less confusion and ambiguity, notions." 

Mr. Locke'* says, "The mind being once furnished with 
simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions,, 
and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining 
whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think 
it is that these ideas are called notions, as they had their origi- 
nal and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than 
in the reality of things." 

" The distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and notions, is 
one of the most common and important in the j^hilosophy of 
mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. 
It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their 
discrimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence ; 
it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Sei-jeant, Stilling- 
fleet, Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet 
signalized it ; and under the contrast of AnscJiativngen and 
Begriffe, it has long been an established and classical discrimi- 
nation with the philosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself 
suggests it in the distinction he requires between imagination 
and conception, — a distinction which he unfortunately did not 
carry out, and which Mr. Stewai't still more unhappily per- 
verted. The terms notion and conception (or more correctly 
concept in this sense), should be reserved to express what we 
comprehend but cannot picture in imagination, such as a rela- 

' Henderson, Philosoph. of Kant, p. 172. 

» Mill, Log., b. lii., ch. 16, § 3. 

' Essay i., On Human Knowledge, sect. 2. 

* Essay on Bimi. Understand., book ii., ch. 22. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 849 

ISOTIOIS— 

tion, a general term, &c. The word idea, as one prostituted to 
all meanings, it were better to discard. As for the represen- 
tations of imagination or phantasy, I would employ thelerm 
image or phantasm, it being distinctly understood that these 
terms are applied to denote the representations not of our 
visible perceptions merely, as the term taken literally would 
indicate, but of our sensible perceptions in general.' 

Notion is more general in its signification than idea. Idea 
is merely a conception, or at most a necessary and universal 
conception. Notion implies all this and more, — a judgment or 
series of j udgments, and a certain degree of knowledge of the 
object. Thus we speak of having no notion or knowledge of a 
thing, and of having some notion or knowledge. It began to 
'^ used by Descartes,^ and soon came into current use among 
French philosophers. It enables us to steer clear of the ideas 
of Plato, of the species of the scholastics, and of the images of 
the empirical school. Hence Dr. Reid tells us that he used it 
in preference.^ 

Des Maistre^ uses the French word notion as synonymous 
with pure idea, or innate idea, underived from sense. 

Chalybseus, in a letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator of 
his work), says, " In English as in French, the word idea, 
idee, is applied, without distinction, to a representation, •'.o a 
notion, in short to every mental conception ; while in Ger- 
man, in scientific language, a very careful distinction is made 
between sensuous '■oorstellung' (representation), abstract 'wer- 
standes-hegriff' (intellectual notion), and ^ideen' (ideas), of 
reason.'' 

Notions or concepts are clear and distinct, or obscure and 
indistinct. "A concept is said to be clear when the degree of 
consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a whole 
from others, and obscure when the degree of consciousness is 
insufficient to accomplish this. A concept is said to be distinct 
when the amount of consciousness is such as enables us to dis- 
criminate from each other the several characters or constituent 
parts of which the concept is the sum, and indistinct or con- 

• Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 291, note- 

" In bis RegulcR ad Directionem Ingenii. ^ Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

* Smr&es di St. Petersbourgh. p. 164. 

31 



350 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOTIOIf — 

fused when the amount of consciousness requisite for this is 
wanting." In the darkness of night there is no perception of 
'objects, this is obscuriti/. As light dawns we begin to see 
objects, this is indistinctness. As morning advances wemake 
a distinction between trees and houses, and fields and rivers, 
as wholes difi'ering from one another, this is clearness. At 
length when day approaches noon, we see the parts which 
make up the wholes, and have a distinct view of everything 
before us. 

We have a clear notion of colours, smells, and tastes ; for 
we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But 
we have not a distinct notion of them, for we are not acquainted 
with the qualities which form the difference ; neither can we 
describe them to such as cannot see, smell, and taste. We 
have a clear notion of a triangle when we discriminate it from 
other figures. We have a distinct notion of it when we think 
of it as a portion of space bounded by three straight lines, as 
a figure whose three angles taken together are equal to two 
right angles. 
First Notions and Second Jfotions. 

The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) otjirst and 
second notions [notiones, conceptus, intentiones, intellecta prima 

et seciinda) is a highly philosophical determination.' 

A first notion is the concept of a thing as it exists of itself, and 
independent of any operation of thought ; as man, John, 
animal, &c. A second notion is the concept, not of an object 
as it is in reality, but of the mode under which it is thought hy 
the mind; as individual, species, genus, &c. The former is 
the concept of a thing, real, immediate, direct: the latter the 
concept of a concept, formal, 7nediate, reflex."'^ 

"Notions are of two kinds ; they either have regard to things 
as they are, as horse, ship, tree, and are called ^?-s^ notions; 
or to things as they are understood, as notions of genus, species, 
attribute, subject, and in this respect are called second notions, 
which, however, are based upon the first, and cannot be con- 

' The Americiins call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinket?, &c., being " laden with 
notions,'' and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps in his 
head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is '• laden with notions." — Moore 
Diary, p. 2<9. ' 

* Sir William Hamilton, Discussioiis. p. 137. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 351 

NOTION — 

ceived without them. Now logic is not so much employed 
upon first notions of things as upon second ; that is, it is not 
occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with 
the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has 
nothing to do with ascertaining whether a horse, or a ship, 
or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be re- 
garded as a genus or species, whether it can be called a sub- 
ject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many 
second notions a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can 
be formed. Th.Q first intention of every word is its real mean- 
ing ; the second intention, its logical value according to the 
function of thought to which it belongs."' — Thomson.^ — V. 
Intentiox. 
Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical. 

Leibnitz was the first to employ intuitive and intuition to 
denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual object 
either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to our in- 
direct and symbolical cognitions acquired through the use of 
signs or language in the understanding. 

"When our notion of any object or objects consists of a 
clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential 
ones, he would call it intuitive. But where the notion is com- 
plex and its "properties numerous, we do not commonly realize 
all that it conveys ; the powers of thinking would be need- 
lessly retarded by such a review. We think more compen- 
diously by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties 
of our notion, and this naturally is the term by which we are 
accustomed to convey the notion to others. A name, then, 
employed in thought is called a symbolical cognition; and the 
names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another 
of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are 
symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact mean- 
ing of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than 
they regularly reflect that every sovereign which passes 

* "See Buhle (Arist., 1. p. 432). who-^e woi-ds I hare followed. See also Cracauthorp 
(JLag. Proem.), and Sir W. Hamilton {Edin. Rev , No. 115, p. 210). There is no authority 
whateyiT for Aldrich's view, which makes second intention mean, apparently, 'a term 
defined for scientific use;' though with the tenacious vitality of error, it still lingers 
in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal." — V. Intention. 

2 Outline of the Laws of Thought, 2d ed,, pp. 39. 40. 



352 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOTION — 

through their hands is equivalent to 240 pence. Such ^rords 
as the State, Happiness, Liberty, Creation, are too pregnant 
"with meaning for us to suppose that we realize their full 
sense every time we read or pronounce them. If Ave attend 
to the working of our minds, we shall find that each word 
may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though per- 
haps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the 
moment. A very simple notion is always intuitive ; we cannot 
make our notion'ot brown or red simpler than it is by any 
symbol. On the other hand, a highly complex notion, like 
those named above, is seldom fully realized — seldom other 
than ai/iiioolicjl." ' 

irOTIOH"ES COMMUK'ES, also called prcenoiiones, anticipa- 
tiones, communes notitice, TipoX-q^^ni, xoiva.i hvomv — first truths, 
natural judgments, p)rinciples of common sense, are phrases em- 
ployed to denote certain notions or cognitions which are native 
to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear 
and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but 
forming the ground of proof and evidence as to other truths. 
— V. Anticipation, Truths (First). 

NOIIMENON (to voovfjLcvov), in the philosophy of Kant (an object 
as conceived by the understanding, or thought of by the rea- 
son, vovi), is opposed to phenomenon (an object such as we 
represent it to ourselves by the impression which it makes on 
our senses). Noumenon is an object in itself, not relatively to 
us. But we have, according to Kant, no such knowledge of 
things in themselves. For besides the impressions which 
things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the 
sensibility and the categories of the understanding, according 
to which, and not according to the nature of things in them- 
selves, it may be, are our conceptions of them. 

Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as they 
appear to us, Kant calls negative nonmena; and reserves the de- 
signation of positive noumena, to intelligibles properly so called, 
which are the objects of an intuition purely intellectual.^ 

The two kinds of noumena taken together are opposed to 
phenomena, and form the intelligible world. This world we 

' Thomsou, Ouiline of the Laws of Thought, p. 47. 

* Willm, Hist, de la Pkilosoph. Alkmande, torn, i., p. 200. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 353 

NOtTMEIf- 

admit as possible, but unknown. Kautism thus trends to- 
wards scepticism. 

" The word phenomenon has no meaning except as opposed 
to something intelligible— to a noumenon, as Kant says. Now, 
either we understand by the latter Avord a thing which cannot 
be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the 
mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in 
a negative sense ; or we understand it as the object of a real 
intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and 
then we take it in a positive sense. Which of these two is 
truth ? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed a priori that the 
only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and 
it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be 
tjiown to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, 
this is only a possibility. To justify us in afBrming that there 
really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, 
any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our 
knowledge ; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. 
We, therefore, cannot adopt the word noumenon in any positive 
sense; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an 
intuition, but of a conception — in other words a hypothesis of 
the understanding." 1 — V. Phenomenon. 
NOVELTY (novus, new), " is not merely a sensation in the ui'.nd 
of him to whom the thing is new ; it is a real relation which 
the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But we are so 
constituted, that what is new to us commonly gives pleasure 
upon that account, if it be not in itself disagreeable. It rouses 
our attention, and occasions an agreeable exertion of our facul- 
ties Curiosity is a capital principle in the human 

constitution, and its food must be what is in some respect 

new Into this part of the human constitution, I 

think, we may resolve the pleasure we have from novelty in 
objects."^ 

Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, 
when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, 
the consideration of which belongs to Esthetics — or that de- 
partment of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste. 



' Henderson, Philosophy of Kant, p. 76. 
* Reid, Intell. Pow., essay viii., chap. 2. 

31* V 



354 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NUMBEB. was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle 
of being. His views were adopted to a certain estent by 
Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, num- 
bers and the proportions subsisting between them, were em- 
ployed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But 
in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, num- 
bers were banished from metaphysics, and the consideration 
of them was allotted to a separate science — arithmetic and 
algebra. 



OATH. — An oath is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of 
all that is true -and right, and a solemn promise to speak the 
truth and to do what is right ; renouncing the divine favour 
and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we fail to do so. 
Oaths hsbve heen distinguished as — 1. The asserioi-i/, or oath 
of evidence, and 2. The promissory, or oath of office — the for- 
mer referring to the past, and the latter to the future. But 
both refer to the future, inasmuch as both are confirmatory 
of a promise, to give true evidence, or to do faithful service. 
— V, Affirmation. 

OBJECTIVE [ohjicio, to tlu'ow against), is now used to describe 
the absolute independent state of a thing ; but by the elder 
metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as objects 
of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, " Natural pheno- 
mena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such 
as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures 
are, therefore, one and the same." Sii'is, sect. 292, where 
real and objective are expressly distinguished. The modern 
nomenclature appears to me very inconvenient.' 

With Aristotle VTioxdjAivov signified the subject of a pro- 
position, and also substance. The Latins translated it subjec- 
ium. In Greek object is avtixsi^jxEvov, translated oppositum. 
In the Middle Ages subject meant substance, and has this 
sense in Descartes and Spinoza ; sometimes also in Reid. 
Subjective is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists 
independent of mind, objective that which the mind feigned. 
This shows what is meant by realitas objectiva in Descartes,^ 



• Fitzgerald, Notes to Aristotle, p. 191. » Med. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 855 

OBJECTIVE — 

Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings : subject is the 
mind which knows — object that which is known. Subjective 
the varying conditions of the knowing mind — objective that 
which is in the constant nature of the thing known.' 

By objective reality Descartes^ meant tlie reality of the object 
in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it — by 
formal, or actual reality the reality of the object as conform 
to our idea of it. Thus the svin was objectively in our thought 
or idea of it — actually or formally in the heavens. He had 
also a third form of reality which he called eminent — that is, 
an existence superior at once to the idea and the object, and 
which contained in posse what both these had in esse. 

"In philosophical language, it were to be wished that the 
■v;;ord subject should be reserved for the subject of inhesion — 
the materia in qua ; and the term object exclusively applied to 
the subject of operation — the materia circa quam. If this be 
not done, the grand distinction of subjective and objective, in 
philosophy, is confounded. But if the employment of subject 
for object is to be deprecated, the employment of object for 
purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) 
is to be absolutely condemned, as a recent and irrational con- 
fusion of notions which should be carefully distinguished." ^ 
— V. Subject. 
OBLIGATION [obligo, to bind), is legal or moral. 

"Obligation, as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the 
doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In consequence 
of original sin man comes into the world a debtor to divine 
justice. He is under an obligation to punishment, on account 
of his deficiency from that form of original justice in which he 
rendered to God all that service of love which the great good- 
ness of God demanded. Hence our terms due and duty, to 
express right conduct." '' 

Obligation (Moral) has been distinguished as internal and ex- 
ternal; according as the reason for acting arises in the mind 
of the agent, or from the will of another. 

' Trendelenburg, Notes to AristotT£s Logic. 

"^ Response d la Seconde Objection. 

^ Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 97, and App., note b. 

* Hampden, Bampton Led., vi., p. 296. 



S66 Vocabulary op philosophy. 

OBLIGATION — 

In seeing a thing to be right we are under obligation to do 
it. This is internal obligation, or that reason for acting which 
arises in the mind of the agent along with the perception of 
the Tightness of the action. It is also called rational obliga- 
tion. Dr. Adams' has said, "Rigid implies duty in its idea. 
To perceive that an action is right, is to see a reason for doing 
it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations 
Avhatever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude 
in the action, is the very essence of obligation ; that which 
commands the "approbation of choice, and binds the conscience 
of every rational being." And Mr. Stewart^ has said, "The 
very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation." 

External obligation is a reason for acting which arises 
from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. 
It is also called authoritative obligation. Bishop Warburton' 
has contended that all obligation necessarily implies an obli- 
ger diiferent from the party obliged ; and moral obligation, 
being the obligation of a free agent, implies a law ; and a 
law implies a lawgiver. The will of God, therefore, is the 
true ground of all obligation, strictly and properly so called. 
The perception of the difference between right and wrong 
can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of 
God. 

There is no incompatibility between these two grounds of 
obligation.* 

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters 
has been parted. They have grounded obligation altogether 
on the will of God, and have overlooked or made light of 
the obligation which arises from our perception of rectitude. 
Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke.^ 
And both A¥arburton and Horsley, as well as Paley and his 
followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, promi- 
nence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as 
prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, in 

* Sermnn on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue. 

* Act. and Mor. Pow., vol. ii., p. 294. 
' Div. Leg., book i., sect. 4. 

* See Whewell, Sermons on the Foundation of Morah, pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, 
Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i., p. 7S. 

' Life by Lord King. vol. ii., p. 129. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 357 

OBLIGATIOSr— 

accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils 
of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the dis- 
charge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, 
both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to 
come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our 
own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief spring, 
of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the divine 
will may spring from veneration and love to the divine 
character, arising from the most thorough conviction of the 
rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. 
And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of ever- 
lasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as 
plain as it is important to remark. To do what is right, even 
for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a 
motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and vene- 
ration for the character and commands of Him who is just 
and good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most ele- 
vated conceptions are inadequate. That which should bind 
us to the throne of the Eternal is not the iron chain of selfish- 
ness, but the golden links of a love to all that is right ; and 
our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings 
after the prevalence of universal purity, rather than desires 
of our own individual happiness. Self and its little circle is 
too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a 
sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge 
of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration 
of all that is right and good ; and expands with a love which 
refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and 
the capacities of enjoyment. In the nature and will of Ilim 
from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknow- 
ledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission; 
and in surrendering itself to His authority is purified from all 
the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm 
and unquenchable love to all that is right and good.' — V. 
Right, Sanction. 

' See Sanderson, De Juramenti Ohligatione, praslec. i., sect. 11 ; De Obligatimie Con- 
scienticE, pr^lec. v.; Whewell, Mwalif.y, book i., chap. 4, pp. 84-89; King, Essay on Evil, 
Prelim. Dissert., sect. 



358 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

GBSESVATIOH. — " The difference between experiment and ob- 
servation, consists merely in the comparative rapidity with 
which they accomplish their discoveries ; or rather in the com- 
parative command we possess over them, as instruments for 
the investigation of truth." ' 

Mr. Stewart^ has said, that according to Dr. Reid, "Atten- 
tion to external things is observation, and attention to the sub- 
jects of our own consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid^ 
has said, that " reflection, in its common and proper meaning, 
is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of con- 
sciousness — and has censured Locke for restricting it to that 
reflection which is employed about the operations of our minds. 
In like manner we may observe the operations of our own 
minds as well as external phenomena. Observation is better 
characterized by Sir John Herschell as passive experience. — 
V. Experience. 

It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and matter. 
According to some,* experiment can be applied to matter, but 
only observation to mind. But to a certain extent the study 
of mind admits experiment,^ 

"We can scarcely be said to make experiments on the 
minds of others. It is necessary to an experiment, that the 
observer should know accurately the state of the thing ob- 
served before the experiment, and its state immediately after 
it. But when the minds of other men are the svibject, we can 
know but little of either the one state or of the other. We are 
forced, therefore, to rely not on experiment, but on experi- 
ence ; that is to say, not on combinations of known elements 
effected for the purpose of testing the result of each different 
combination ; but on our observation of actual occurrences, 
the results of the combination of numerous elements, only a 
few of which are within our knowledge. And the consequence 
is, that we frequently connect facts which are really independ- 
ent of one another, and not unfrequently mistake obstacles 
for causes. .... 

' Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2. 
® Elements, vol. i., p. 106, note. 
8 JnieU. Pnw., essay Ti., chap 1. 
* Edin. Rev., vol. iii., p. 269. 

6 See Hanipdea, Introd. to Mar. Phil., sect, ii., p. 51 ; and Mr. Stewart, Philosoph, 
Essa'j.^. Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 359 

OBSERVATION — 

" Wheu we direct our attention to the workings of our own 
minds ; that is to say, when we search for premises by means 
of consciousness instead of by means of observation, our powers 
of trying experiments are much greater. To a considerable 
degree we command our own faculties, and though these are 
few, perhaps none which we can use separately, we can at 
will exercise one more vigorously than the others. We can 
call, for instance, into peculiar activity, the judgment, the 
memory, or the imagination, and note the differences in our 
mental condition as the one faculty or the other is more active. 
And this is an experiment. Over our mental sensations we 
have less power. We cannot at will feel angry, or anxious, 
or frightened ; but we can sometimes, though rarely, put our- 
selves really into situations by which certain emotions will be 
excited. And when, as is usually the case, this is impossible 
or objectionable, we can fancy ourselves in such situations. 
The first is an actual experiment. We can approach the 
brink of an unprotected precipice and look down — we can 
interpose between our bodies and that brink a low parapet, 
and look over it, and if we find that our condition in the two 
cases differ, that though there is no real danger in either case, 
though in both our judgment equally tells us that we are safe, ' 
yet that the apparent danger in the one produces fear, while 
we feel secure in the other, we infer that the imagination can 
excite fear for which the judgment affirms that there is no 
adequate cause. The second is the resemblance of an expe- 
riment, and which when tried by a person with the vivid 
imagination of Shakspeare or Homer, may serve for one ; but 
with ordinary minds it is a fallacious expedient. Few men, 
when they picture themselves in an imaginary situation, take 
into account all the incidents necessary to that situation ; and 
those which they neglect may be the most important."^ 

"Instead of contrasting observation and experiment, we 

should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena 

- as alike subjects of observation. Facts furnished by artificial 

contrivances require to be observed just in the same way as 

those which are presented by nature without our interference ; 

' Senior, Four Lectures on Pol. Econ.. 1852, p. 31. 



360 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OBSERVATIOIT — 

and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in confining 
observation to the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of 
something which ceases where experiment begins ; while in 
simple truth, the business of experiment is to extend the 
sphere of observation, and not to take up a subject where 
observation lays it down." ^ 

All men are apt tQ notice likenesses in the facts that come 
before them, and to group similar facts together. The faculty 
by which such similarities are apprehended is called observa- 
tion; the act of grouping them together under a general 
statement, as when we say, "All seeds grow — all bodies 
fall," has been described as generalization. — V. Generaliza- 
tion. 

According to M. Comte^ there are three modes of observa- 
tion: — 1. Observation, properly so called, or the direct exami- 
nation of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally. 2. 
Experiment, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, so modi- 
fied more or less by artificial cii-cumstances introduced inten- 
tionally by ourselves, with a view to its more complete inves- 
tigation. 3. Comparison, or the successive consideration of 
a series of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes 
more and more simple. The third head (as to which see tom. 
iii., p. 343) seems not so much a species of observation, as a 
mode of arranging observations, with a view to a proper in- 
vestigation of the phenomena.* 

According to Humboldt^ there are three stages of the in- 
vestigation of nature — passive observation, active observation, 
and experiment. 

The difference between active and passive observation is 
marked in Bacon.'' The former is when Experientia lege certa 
procedit, seriatim et continenter. 

" This word experimental has the defect of not appearing to 
comprehend the knowledge which flows from observation, as 
well as that which is obtained by experiment. The German 

' S. Bailey., Theory of Reasoning, pp. 114-15, 8to, Lond., 1851. 

'•' Cours de Philosoph. Positive, tom. ii., p. 19. 

' Sir G. C. Lewis, Mdh. of Observ. in Politics, chap. 5. note. 

^ Cosmos, vol. ii., p. 212. 

* Ifov. Org., 1, Aphor. 100. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 361 

OBSEEVATIOH - 

word empirical is applied to all the information which expe- 
rience affords ; but it is in our language degraded by another 
application. I therefore must use experimental in a larger 
sense than its etymology warrants." — Sir J. Mackintosh.^ 
Experiential has been proposed as equivalent to empirical. 

OCCASION. — Cicero- says: — Occasio est pars temporis, habens in 
se alicujus rei idonearn, faciendi opportunitatem. Tempus autem 
aciionis opportummi, Grgece, sxixaipta ; Latine, appellatur occasio.^ 
The watchman falling asleep gives occasion to thieves to break 
into the house and steal. 

" There is much difference between an occasion and a proper 
cause: these two are heedfuUy to be distinguished. Critical 
and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, distinguish 
betwixt the 6,fx^ ^^d the aitia,, the beginning occasions and 
the real causes, of a war." — Flavell.'* 

"What is caused seems to follow naturally; what is occa- 
sioned follows incidentally, and what is created receives its 
existence arbitrarily. A wound causes pain, accidents occa- 
sion delay, scandal creates mischief. 

" Between the real cause and the occasion of any phenome- 
non, there is a wide diversity. The one implies the pro- 
ducing poiver, the other only some condition upon which this 
power comes into exercise. If I cast a grain of corn into the 
earth, the occasion of its springing up and producing plant, 
ear, and grain, is the warmth and moisture of the soil in which 
it is buried ; but this is by no means the cause. The cause 
lies in the mysterious vital power which the seed contains 
within itself; the other is but the condition upon which this 
cause produces the effect."^ 

OCCASIOSTAL CAUSES (Doctrine of).— K Cause. 

OCCULT aUALITIES. — F. Quality. 

OlfE. — F. Unity\ 

02TEIK0MAHCY. — F. Dreaming. 



' On Bacon and Loclcc, Worlcs, vol. i., p. 333. 

' 1. Di Inveniione. » De Offic, lib. i. 

* Discourse of the Occasions, Causes, Nature, Rise, Groivth, and Remedies of Mental 
Errors. 

s Morell, Specul. Phil., vol. i, p. 99. 

32 



302 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 



(w and Xoyoj, the science of being). — "Ontology 
is a discourse of being in general, and the various or most 
■universal modes or affections, as vrell as the several kinds or 
divisions of it. The word being here includes not only what- 
soever actually is, but whatsoever can be."i 

Ontology is the same as metaphysics. Neither the one name 
nor the other was used by Aristotle. He called the science 
now designated by them pMlosophia prima, and defined it 
as iTiistrififi -tov ovtoi fi ovtoi — Scieutia Eiitis Quatenws Entis, 
that is, the science of the essence of things ; the science of 
the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being 
in any given circumstances, not as physical or mathematical, 
but as being. The name ontology seems to have been first 
made current in philosophy by Wolf. He divided metaphysics 
into four parts — ontology, psychology, rational cosmology, and 
theology. It was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into 
possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, 
cause, &c., without reference to the laws of our intellect by 
which we are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied 
that we had any knowledge of substance or cause as really 
existing. But there is a science of principles and causes, of 
the principles of being and knowing. In this viev.^ of it, 
ontology corresponds with metapliysics — q. v. 

'^Ontology may be treated of in two different methods, 
according as its exponent is a believer in to w, or in ta 
ofta, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. In 
the former, all objects whatever are regarded as phenomenal 
modifications of one and the same substance, or as self- 
determined effects of one and the same cause. The necessary 
result of this method is to reduce all metaphysical philosophy 
to a Rational Theology, the one substance or Cause being 
identified with the Absolute or the Deity. According to the 
latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of 
beings independently, metaphysics will contain three co-ordi- 
nate branches of inquiry. Rational Cosmology, Rational Psy- 
chology, and Rational Theology. The first aims at a know- 
ledge of the real essence, as distinguished from the phenomena 
of the material world ; the second discusses the nature and 



» Watts, On Ontology, c. 2. — See also Smith, Wealth of Nations, book v., o. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 363 

ONTOLOGY- 

origiu, as distinguished from the faculties and affections, of 
the human soul and of other finite spirits ; the thi^d aspires 
to comprehend God himself, as cognizable d priori in his 
essential nature, apart from the indirect and relative indica- 
tions furnished by his works, as in Natural Theology, or by 
his Word, as in Revealed Religion. 

" These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the 
World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the Pure 
Reason; and the object of his Critique is to shovf that in 
relation to all these, the attainment of a system of speculative 
philosophy is impossible." ' 

" The science of ontology comprehends investigations of 
every real exisi;ence, either beyond the sphere of the present 
world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct ob- 
ject of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from 
the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties 
of the human soul."^ 
OPEKATIOITS (of the Mind).—" By the operations of the mind,"^ 
says Dr. Reid,* " we understand every mode of thinking of 
which we are conscious. 

" It deserves our notice, that the various modes of thinking 
have always and in all language, as far as we know, been 
called by the name of operations of the mind, or by names of 
the same import. To body, we ascribe various properties, but 
not operations, properly so called : it is extended, divisible, 
movable, inert ; it continues in any state in which it is put ; 
every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed 
upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and 
in the precise direction of that force. These are the general 
properties of matter, and these are not operations ; on the con- 
trary, they all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which 
moves only as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. 
But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active 
being. Everything we know of it implies life and active 
energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are 

' Mansel, Frolegom. Log., p. 277. 
^ Archer Butler, Lectures on Ancient Philosophy. 

^ Operation, act, and energi/, are nearly oouvertible terms ; and are opposed to faculty, 
as the actual to the potential. — Sir AVill. HamiltoD. 
* Jntell, Pow., essay i,, ehap. 1. 



364" VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OPEEATIOirS — 

called its operations, is that in all, or in most of them, it is not 
merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active." 
— V. States of Mind. 
OPIIOOK" {opinor, to think). — "The essential idea oi opinion 
seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reason- 
ably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity 
think differently. . . . . Any proposition, the contrary 
of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of 
opinion." ' 

According to the last of these definitions, matter of opinion 
is opposed not to matter oi fact, but to matter of certainty. 
Thus, the death of Charles I. is ?ifact — his authorsMp oi Icon 
Basilike, an opinion. It is also used, however, to denote know- 
ledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that acquired by 
perception. Thus, that the moon gives light, is matter of 
fact ; that it is inhabited or uninhabited, is matter of opinion. 

It has been proposed^ to discard from philosophical use 
these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, accoi-d- 
ing to its sources, into matter of perception and matter of 
inference; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into 
matter of certainty and matter of doubt. 

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment 
in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec- 
tively valid), has the three following degrees: — opinion, belief, 
and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, 
subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively 
sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. 
Knoivledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Sub- 
jective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective 
sufficiency is termed certainty (for all).^ — V. Belief, Know- 
ledge, Certainty, Fact, Judgment. 

OPPOSED, 0PP0SITI02J [th avtoxnfisvov, that which lies over 
against). — Aristotle has said, that "one thing may be opposed 
to another in four ways ; by relation, by contrariety, or as 
privation is to possession, affirmation to negation. Thus, there 
is the opposition of relation between the double and the half; 

' Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on Opinion, p. i., iv. 

^ Edin. Rev., April, 1850, p. 311. 

3 Meiklejohn, Transl. of Crit. of Pure Reason, p. 498. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 365 

OPPOSED — 

of contrariety between good and evil ; blindness and seeing 
are opposed in the way of privation and possession ; the pro- 
positions, he sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation 
and affirmation." — V. Contrary, Privation, Term. 

OPPOSITIOE" (in Logic). — "Two propositions are said to be 
opposed to each other, when, having the same subject and 
predicate, they differ in qiiantity, or quality, or both. It is 
evident, that with any given subject and predicate, you may 
state four distinct propositions, viz.. A, E, I, and ; any two 
of which are said to be opposed; hence there are four different 
kinds of opposition, viz., 1st, the two universals (A and E), 
are called contraries to each other ; 2d, the two particular 
(I and 0), subcontraries ; 3d, A and I, or E and 0, subalterns ; 
4th, A and 0, or E and I, contradictories." ' 

The opposition of propositions may be thus exhibited : — 

> Contraries — may be both false, but cannot both be true. 



No A is B. 
Some A is B. 
Some A is not B 
All A is B. 



\ Subcontraries — may both be true, but cannot both be false. 

} 
} 



\ Contradictories — one must be true and the other false. 
Some A is not B. J 



Also Contradictories 



No A is B. 
Some A is B. 

All A >^ l^- I and { N° A ^''' ^- I Kespectively subalternate. 

Some A is B. i t Some A is not B. i 

" Of two subalternate propositions the truth of the universal 
proves the truth of the particular, and the falsity of the 
particular proves the falsity of the universal, but not vice 
versa." ^ 
OPTIMISM {optimum, the superlative of bonum, good), is the 
doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an infinitely 
perfect Being, is the best that could be created. 

This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great 
philosophical schools of antiquity. During the Middle Ages 
it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times 
comparatively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and 
Malebranche. But the doctrine has been developed in its 
highest form by Leibnitz. 



' Whatelv, Log., b, ii., ch. 2. g 3. ^ Mill, Log., b. ii., ch. 1. 

32-. 



r>66 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

OPTIMISM — 

According to liim, God, being infinitely perfect, could neither 
will nor prodxice evil. And as a less good compared with a 
greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but 
the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and 
all possible conditions of things vrere present to the Divine 
Mind in idea, and composed an infinite number of worlds, 
from among which infinite wisdom chose the best. Creation 
was the giving existence to the most perfect state of things 
which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind. 

The optimism of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and mis- 
represented by Voltaire and others. But the doctrine which 
Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is 
the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of 
beings, nor even to this world as a Avhole, but in reference to 
all Avorlds, or to the universe as a whole — and not even to the 
universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite^ 
progress of which it may contain the germs.' 

According to Mr. Stewart,^ under the title of optimists, are 
comprehended those who admit and those who deny the free- 
dom of human actions, and the accountableness of man as a 
moral agent. 
OH.DEB> means rank, series means succession ; hence there is in 
order something of voluntary ari'angement, and in series some- 
thing of unconscious catenation. The order of a procession. 
The series of ages. A series of figures in uniform — soldiers 
in order of battle.^ 

Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accomplish 
an end, the harmonious relation established between the parts 
for the good of the whole. The primitive belief that there is 
order in nature, is the ground of all experience. In this 
belief we confidently anticipate that the same causes, opera- 
ting in the same circumstances, will produce the same efl'ects. 
This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an 
infinitely perfect being, who orders all things. 

Oi-der has been regarded as the higher idea into which 
moral rectitude may be resolved. Evei-y being has an end 
to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accom- 

* Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee ; Malebranohe, Eiitretiens Metaphysiqiies. 

* Act. and Mor. Pow., b. iii., ch. 3, sect 1. ^ Taylor, Synonyms. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 367 

OEDEE — 

plishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly to- 
wards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place he 
holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and intel- 
ligently endeavour to realize that universal order of which 
he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what 
is right. 

" There is one parent virtue, the universal virtue, the virtue 
which renders us just and perfect, the virtue which will one 
day render us happy. It is the only virtue. It is the love 
of the universal order as it eternally existed in the Divine 
Reason, where every created reason contemplates it. The 
love of order is the whole of virtue, and conformity to order 
constitutes the morality of actions."^ 

vSuch is the theory of Maiebranche, and more recently of 
Jouffroy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, tends 
to the discovery of universal order. And art, in its highest 
attainments, is only realizing the truth of nature ; so that the 
true, the beautiful, and the good, ultimately resolve them- 
selves into the idea of order. 
OB/GAIT. — An organ is'a part of the body fitted to perform a par- 
ticular action, which, or rather the performance of which 
action, is denominated its function. / 

"By the term organ,'" says Gall,^ "I mean the material 
condition which renders possible the manifestation of a 
faculty. The muscles and the bones are the material con- 
dition of movement, but are not the faculty which causes 
movement ; the whole organization of the eye is the material 
condition of sight, but it is not the faculty of seeing. By the 
term ' organ of the soul,' I mean a material condition which 
renders possible the manifestation of a moral quality, or an 
intellectual faculty. I say that man in this life thinks and 
wills by means of the brain ; but if one concludes that the 
brain is the thing that thinks and wills, it is as if one should 
say that the muscles are the faculty of moving ; that the organ 
of sight and the faculty of seeing are the same thing. In 
each case it would be to confound the faculty with the organ, 
and the organ with the facidty." 

' Traiie de Morale, Rott, 1634. 2 Vol. i., p. 228. 



568 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



"All organ of sense is an instrument composed of a pecu- 
liai' arrangement of organized matter, by which it is adapted 
to receive from specific agents definite impressions. Between 
the agent that produces and the organ that receives the im- 
]Dressions, the adaptation is such, that the result of their 
mutual action is, in the first place, the production of sensa- 
tion ; and, in the second place, of pleasure."^ 

According to phrenological writers, particular parts of the 
brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular faculties 
of the mind. This is organology. It is further maintained, 
that the figure and extent of these parts of the brain can be 
discerned esternallj. This is organoscopy. Some who be- 
lieve in the former, do not believe in the latter. 
OEGAHOS" or OEGANUM (opyafoi/, an instrument), is the name 
often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic ; 
because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instru- 
ment of science rather than a science or part of science in 
itself. In the sixth century, Ammonius and vSimplicius ar- 
ranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they 
called logical or organical. But it was not till the fifteenth 
century that the name Orgamim came into common use.^ 
Bacon gave the name of Novum Organutn to the second part 
of his Instatiraiio Magna. And the German philosopher, 
Lambert, in 17G3, published a logical work under the title, 
Das Neve Organon. 

Poste, in his translation of the Posterior Analytics, gives a 
sketch of the Organnm of Aristotle, which he divides into 
four parts, — viz., General Logic, the Logic of Deduction, the 
Logic of Induction, and the Logic of Opinion; the third, in- 
deed, not sufficiently articulated and disengaged from the 
fourth, and hence the necessity of a Noimm Orgamim. 

" The Organon of Aristotle, and the Organon of Bacon 
stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety ; the one con- 
siders the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the 
laws under which the object is to be known. To compare 
them together, is therefore to compare together qualities of 
difi'erent species. Each proposes a different end ; both in 

' Dr. Sovithwood Smith. 

^ Barthelemy St. Hilaire, De la Logiqiie cVAristote, torn, i., p. 19. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 369 

OEGAITOl"— 

different ways are useful ; and both ought to be assiduously 
studied." ' 

OEilGIK" {origo) may be taken in two senses, essentially different 
from each other. It may mean the cause of anything being- 
produced, or it may imply simply the occasion of its produc- 
tion.^ 

OEIGIUATE, OEIGIMATIOM. — These words and their con- 
jugates are coming to be used in the question concerning 
liberty and necessity. Does man originate his own actions ? 
Is man a principle of origination f are forms of expression 
equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent ? 

" To deny all originating power of the will, must be to place 
the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Divine 

nature Whether as a matter of fact an originating 

power reside in man, may be matter of inquiry ; but to main- 
tain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of crea- 
tion. "^ "Will, they hold to be a free cause, a cause which is 
not an effect ; in other words, they attribute to it a power of 
absolute origination."^ 

OSTES'SIVE [ostendo, to show). — "An ostensive conception 
indicates how an object is constituted. It is opposed to the 
heuristic {heuretic) conception which indicates how, under its 
guidance, the quality and connection of objects of experience 
in general are to be sought. The conception of a man, a 
house, &c., is an ostensive one; the conception of the supreme 
intelligence (for theoretic reason) is an Jieuristic conception."^ 

OUGHTHESS. — F. Duty. 

OIJTE'ESS. — " The word outness, which has been of late revived 
by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used 
by Berkeley in his Principles of H^iman Knowledge ;^ and at 
a still earlier period of his life, in his Essay towards a New 
Theory of Vision^ I mention this as I have more than once 
heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation."^ — V. 
Externality. 

' Sir Will. Hamilion, Seid's Wor7cs, p. 712, note. 

^ Morell. Spccul. Phil., vol. i., p. 99. ' Thomson, Christ. Theism, took 1 , chap. 6. 

* Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 595. See also Cairns, On Moral Freedom. 
' Haywood. Explanation of Terms in the Crit. of Pare Reason. 
^ Sect. iZ. ■■ Sect. 46. ' Stewart, Philosnph. Essays, part i.. essay 2. 

Z 



870 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACT. — V. Contract, Promise. 

PANTHEISM (rtaj, all; 9eoi, God). — "It supposes God and 
nature, or God and the whole universe, to he one and the 
same substance — one vmiversal being ; insomuch that men's 
souls are only modifications of the Divine substance." ' 

Pantheistce qui contendunt tinicam esse substantiam, cyjus 
parte.'; sunt omnia entia quce exisiimt.^ 

Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of God 
in nature, is atheism ; and the doctrine of Spinoza has been so 
regarded by many. When explained to mean the absorption 
of nature in God — of the finite in the infinite — it amounts to 
an exaggeration of theism. Hut pantheism,, strictly speaking, 
is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the 
finite and the infinite — of the absolute consubstantiality of 
God and nature — considered as two different but inseparable 
aspects of universal existence ; and the confutation of it is to 
be found in the consciousness which every one has of his 
personality and responsibility, which j)a?!i!/ieis?w destroys. 

PARABLE {napajSoXri, from 7iapa^d%%u, to put or set beside), has 
been defined to be a " fictitious but probable narrative taken 
from the affairs of ordinary life to illustrate some higher and 
less known truth." "It differs from the Fable, moving, as it 
does, in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual 
order of things natural ; from the Myth, there being in the lat- 
ter an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the 
outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separable 
in the Parable; from the Proverb, inasmuch as it is longer 
carried out, and not merely accidentally and occasionally, 
but necessarily figurative ; from the Allegory, comparing, as 
it does, one thing with another, at the same time preserving 
them apart as an inner and an outer, not transferring, as does 
the Allegory, the properties, and qualities and relations of 
one to the other." ^ 

PARADOX (rtapa 6d|a, beyond, or contrary to appearance), is a 
proposition which seems not to be true, but which turns out to 
be true. Cicero Avrote " Paradoxa," and the Hon. Robert 



' Waterland, Worlcs, vol. viii., p. 81. 

= Lacoudre, Inst. Philosoph., torn, ii., p. 120. 

3 Trench. On the Parables. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 371 



Boyle published, in 16G6, Ilydrostatical Paradoxes, made out 
by new experiments. 

PARALOGrlSM (rtapayioyta^tds, from rtttpttXoyJ^Ojitat, to reason wrong), 
is a formal fallacy or pseudo-syllogism, in which the conclu- 
sion does not follow from the premises. We may be deceived 
ourselves by a paralogism ; when we endeavour to deceive 
others by it, it is a sophism — q. v. 
Paralogism of Pure Eeason. — "The logical paralogism con- 
sists in the erroneousness of a syllogism, according to form, 
whatever besides its content may be. But a transcendental 
paralogism has a transcendental foundation of concluding 
falsely, according to the form. In such a way, a like false 
conclusion will have its foundation in the nature of human 
reason, and will carry along with itself an inevitable, although 
not an insoluble illusion." ' 

PARCIMOHY (Law of) {parcimonia, sparingness). — "That 
substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ;" in 
other words, "that a plurality of principles are not to be as-' 
sumed, when the phenomena can possibly be explained by 
one." This regulative principle may be called the law or 
maxim of parcimony.^ 

Eidia tion sunt multplicanda prceier necessitatem, Frustr'a 
Jit per plura cpiod fieri potest per pandora. These are expi'es- 
sions of this principle. 

PAEOlTYMOirS. — F. Conjugate. 

PAS.T (;ti£po.;, pars, part, or portion). — "Part, in one sense, is 
applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that which you 
take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is a part of 
that quantity. Thus two is a paH of three. In another sense, 
you only give the name of part to what is an exact measure 
of quantity ; so that, in one point of view, two will be a part 
of three, in another not. That into which you can divide a 
genus, animal, for example, otherwise than by quantity, is 
still a part of the genus. In this sense species are parts of the 
genus. Part is also applied to that into which an object can 
be divided, whether matter or form. Iron is part of a globe, 
or cube of iron ; it is the matter which receives the form. An 

• Kant, Orit. of Pure Reason, p. 299. 

* Sir Will. HamiltoQ, Reid's Works, p. 751, note a. 



372 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PAjaT— 

angle is also iipart. Lastly, the elements of the definition of 
every particular being are parts of the whole ; so that, in this 
point of view, the genus may be considered as part of the 
species ; in another, on the contrary, the species is part of the 
genus." ^ 

" Of things which exist by parts, there are three kinds. The 
first is of things, the i:)arts of which are not co-existent, but 
successive ; such as time or motion, no two parts of which can 
exist together. 

"The next kind of things consisting of parts, is sucli where 
parts are co-existent and contiguous. Things of this kind are 
said to be extended ; for extension is nothing else but co-exist- 
ence and junction of jMi^ts. 

"The third kind of things existing hj parts is, when the 
parts are co-existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but separate 
and disjoined. Of this kind is nu7nber, ih.Q parts of which are 
separated by nature, and only united by the operation of the 
mind." 2 
PASSIOH {passio, 7idax<^, to suffer), is the contrary of action. 
"A passive state is the state of a thing while it is operated 
upon by some cause. Everything and every being but God, 
is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy — always active, 
but never acted upon ; while everything else is liable to suffer 
change."^ 
PASSIONS (The). — -This phrase is sometimes employed in a wide 
sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the sensi- 
bility — every form and degree of feeling. In a more restricted 
psychological sense, it is confined to those states of the sensi- 
bility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-com- 
mand. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which 
passion is opposed to reason. 

Plato arranged the passions in two classes, — the concupisci- 
ble and irascible, erttdvfxva and Ovfioi, the former springing from 
the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the 
rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to 
the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil. 

' Aristotle, Metaphys., lib. iv., cap. 25. 

■" Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book ii., cbap. 13. 

' See Harris, Dialogue concerning Happiness, p. 86, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 373 

PASSIONS — 

Aristotle included all our active principles under one gene- 
ral designation of oretic, and distinguished them into the 
appetite irascible, the appetite conciipiscible, which had their 
origin in the body, and the appetite rational [jiov'krjgii), which 
is the will, under the guidance of reason. 

Descartes and Malebranche have each given a theory and 
classification of the passions; also. Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. Cogan, 
and Dr. Hutch eson. 
PERCEPTION [capio, to take ; per, by means of), apprehension 
by means of the organs of sense. 

Descartes' says, "Onuies modi cogitandi, qiios in nobis expe- 
rimur, ad diios generales referri possunt : c[uorum unus est pei'- 
ceptio, sive operatio inteUectus ; alius vero, volitio, sive operatio 
voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt 
iantum diversi modi percipiendi ; ut et cvpere, aversari, afflr- 
mare, negare, duhitare, sunt diversi modi volendi." 

Locke^ says, "The two principal actions of the mind are 
these two ; perception or thinking, and volition or willing. The 
power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power 
of volition the loill; and these two powers or abilities of the 
mind are called faculties." 

Dr. Reid thought that ^'■perception is most properly applied 
to the evidence which we have of external objects by our 
senses." He says,^ " The perception of external objects by 
our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, 
and ought to hare a name appropriated to it. It has so in all 
languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to 
express this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that ex- 
press the operations proper to each sense ; perceiving expresses 
that which is common to them all." 

The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Reid, is to 
be found in the philosophy of Kant ; and, as convenient, has 
been generally acquiesced in. 

Sir Will. Hamilton'* notices the following meanings of per- 
ception, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects: — 

' Princip. Philosoph., pars 1, sect. 32. 

" Essay on Hum. Understand., book il., chap. 6. 

^ InteU. Poll}., essay i., chap. 1. ■* In note D* to Reid's Works, p. 876. 

33 



374 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PEHCEPTIOIT— 

1. Perceptio, in its primary philosophical signification, as in 
the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to 
comprehension, notion, cognition in general. 

2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. 
Perception, the Cartesians really identified with idea, and 
allowed them only a logical distinction ; the same representa- 
tive act being called idea, inasmuch as we regard it as a 
representation ; and perception, inasmuch as we regard it as a 
consciousness of such representation. 

3. Perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. 
This limitation was first formally imposed by Reid, and there- 
after by Kant. 

4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority- of 
Reid, is •perception (proper), in conlrast to sensation (proper). 

He defines sensitive perception, ot perception simply as that 
act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, 

a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an animated organ- 
ism, it is contingently susceptible ; and 

6. Those general relations of extension, under which, as a 
material organism, it necessarily exists. 

Of these perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant 
about a subject-object, is sensation propter ; the latter, which is 
thus conversant about an object-object, is perception proper. 
PERCEPTIONS (Obscure), or latent modifications of mind. 

Every moment the light reflected from innumerable objects, 
smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of diS'erent 
bodies are aifecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These 
are what Leibnitz ' calls obscure perceptions — and what Thurot^ 
proposes to call impressions. But this word is already appro- 
priated to the changes produced by communication between 
an external object and a bodily organ. 

The sum of these obscure perceptions and latent feelings, 
which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is 
what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the 
amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which 
attaches vis to life — even when our more defined perceptions 
and feelings are painful. 

' Avant Propos de ses Nouv. Essais. 
* De VEntendement, &c., torn, j., p. 11. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 375 

PERCEPTIONS — 

The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to (ot- 
scure) perceptions is translated from Tiberghien : ^ — 

" Confused or insensible perceiMons are without consciousness 
or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in themselves, 
but they must be, because the mind always thinks. A sub- 
stance cannot be without action, a body without movement, a 
mind without thought. There are a thousand marks which 
make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity 
of perceptions ; but the habit in which we are of perceiving 
them, by depriving them of the attraction of novelty, turns 
away our attention and prevents them from fixing themselves 
in our memory. How could we form a clear perception without 
the insensible perceptions, which constitute it ? To hear the 
noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the 
parts which compose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, 
though each of these little noises does not make itself known 
but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with 
it. A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. 
And sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have 
not some feeble and confused feeling ; one would not be 
wakened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not 
some perception of its commencement, which is small. 

" It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the 
greatest questions of philosophy to these insensible perceptions, 
in so far as they imply the law of continuity. It is by means 
of these we can say that the present ' is full of the past and 
big with the future,' and that in the least of substances may 
be read the whole consequences of the things of the universe. 
They often determine us without our knowing it, and they 
deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of 
equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one 
another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and 
body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two 
things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of indiscern- 
ihles), and that their diflFerence is always more than numerical, 
which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being 
empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action, 

* Esmi des Connaiss. Hum., p. 566. 



376 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

PERCEPT EONS — 

a vacuum in space, aud the atoms of matter. There is another 
consequence — that souls, being simple substances, are always 
united to a body, and that there is no soul entirely separated 
from one. This dogma resolves all the difficulties as to the 
immortality of souls, the difference of their states being never 
anything but that of more or less perfect, which renders their 
state past or future as explicable as their present. It also 
supplies the means of recovering memory, by the periodic 
developments which may one day arrive." 

"Obscure ideas, or more properly, sensations with dormant 
consciousness, are numerous. It is through them, so far as 
they proceed from the nervovis system of vegetative life, and 
thus accompany all its functions, digestion, secretion, &c., 
that the soul, according to Stahl, secretly governs the body. 
'Animus est instar oceani,' says Leibnitz, 'in quo infinita 
multitudo perceptiommi obscimssimarum adest, et distinctce 
idece instar insularimi sunt, qiice ex oceano emergunt.' It is 
they which are active throughout the whole progress of the 
formation of thought ; for this goes on, though we are uncon- 
scious of it, and gives us only the perfect results, viz., ideas 
and notions. It is they which in the habitual voluntary mo- 
tions, for instance, in playing on the piano, dancing, &c., set 
the proper muscles in motion through the appropriate motor 
nerves, though the mind does not direct to them the attention 
of consciousness. It is they which in sleep and in disorders 
of mind act a most important part. It is their totality which 
forms what plays so prominent a part in life under the name 
of disposition or temper."'^ 

Lord Jeffrey had a fancy, or said he had it, that though he 
went to bed with his head stuffed and confused with the names 
and dates and other details, of various causes, they were all in 
order in the morning ; which he accounted for by saying, that 
during sleep "tlicy all crystallized round tlieir proper centres." ^ 
PERFECT, PERFECTIOH [perficio ; perfectum, made out, 
complete). — To be perfect is to want nothing. Perfection is 
relative or absolute. A being possessed of all the qualities 

• Feuchtersleben, Med. Psychology, 1847, p. 169. 
^ Cockburn. Life of Jeffrey, vol. i., p. 243, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 877 

PERFECT — 

belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called 
■perfect in a relative sense. But absolute perfection can only be 
ascribed to the Supreme Being. We have the idea of a Being 
infinitely perfect — and from this Descartes reasoned that such 
a being really exists. 

The perfections of God are those qualities which he has 
communicated to his rational creatures, and which are in Him 
in an infinitely perfect degree. They have been distinguished 
as natural and moral — the former belonging to Deity as the 
great first cause — such as independent and necessary existence 

— the latter as manifested in the creation and government of 
the universe — such as goodness, justice, &c. But they are all 
natural in the sense of being essential. It has been proposed 
to call the former attributes, and the latter perfections. But 
this distinctive use of the terms has not prevailed ; indeed it 
is not well founded. In God there are nothing but attributes 

— because in Him evei'ything is absolute and involved in the 
substance and unity of a perfect being. 

PEEEECTIBILITY (The Doctrine of) is, that men, as indi- 
viduals, and as communities, have not attained to that hap}, i- 
ness and development of which their nature and condition are 
capable, but that they are in a continual progress to a state 
of perfection, even in this life. That men as a race are capable 
of progress and improvement is a fact attested by experience 
and history. But that this improvement may be carried into 
their whole nature — and to an indefinite extent — that all the 
evils which affect the body or the mind may be removed — can- 
not be maintained. Bacon had faith in the intellectual pro- 
gress of men when he entitled his Avork " Of the Advancement 
of Learning." Pascal has articulately expressed this faith in 
a preface to his "Treatise of a Vacuum." "Not only indi- 
vidual men advance from day to day in knowledge, but. men 
as a race make continual progress in proportion as the world 
grows older, because the same thing happens in a succession 
of men as in the di3"erent periods of the life of an individvial ; 
so that the succession of men during a course of so many 
ages, ought to be considered as the same man always living 
and always learning. From this may be seen the injustice of 
the reverence paid to antiquity in philosophy : for as old age 
33* 



378 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PERFECTIBILITY— 

is the period of life most distant from infancy, who does not 
see that the old age of the universal man is not to be sought 
for in the period nearest his birth, but in that most remote 
from it." Malebranche^ expressed a similar opinion; and 
the saying of a great modern reformer is well known, " If you 
talk of the wisdom of the ancients, we are the ancients." It 
cannot be denied that in arts and sciences, and the accommo- 
dations of social life, and the extension of social freedom, the - 
administration of justice, the abolition of slavery, and many 
other respects, men have improved, and are improving, and 
may long continue to improve. But human nature has limits 
beyond which it cannot hf- carried. Its life here cannot be 
indefinitely prolonged, its liability to pain cannot be removed, 
its reason cannot be made superior to error, and all the ar- 
rangements for its happiness are liable to go wrong. 

Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe 
is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible 
that the human race might reach a perfection of which we 
cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the doctrine 
of a palingenesia, or transformation of all things into a better 
state. In the last century the great advocates of social pro- 
gress are Fontenelle, Turgot, and Condorcet, in France ; Les- 
sing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany ; Price and Priestley, 
in England. Owen's views are also well known. ^ 

PERIPATETIC (rtfpCTta-rj^T'i.xoj, ambulator, from rtsptrta-rsw, to 
walk about), is applied to Ai'istotle and his followers, who 
seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while 
walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum. 

PERSON, PERSOHALITY.— PerA'oua, in Latin, meant the mask 
worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the 
voice were concentrated, and through which [personuit) he 
made himself heard by the immense audience. From being 
applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, 
then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, 
and lastly, to any one having any character or station. Mar- 
tinius gives as its composition — per se una, an individual. 

• Search after Tritth, book ii., part ii., chap. 4. 

* Mercier, De la Perfectibilitc Humaine, Svo, Paris, 1842. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 379 

PERSON — 

" Person," says Locke,' " stands for a thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places ; 
which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable 
from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it : it being 
impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that 
he does perceive." " We attribute personality," says Mons. 
Ahrens,^ '•' to every being which exists, not solely for others, 
but which is in the relation of unity with itself in existing, 
or for itself. Thus we refuse personality to a mineral or a 
stone, because these things exist for others, but not for them- 
selves. An animal, on the contrai'y, which exists for itself, 
and stands in relation to itself, possesses a degree of person- 
ality. But man exists for himself in all his essence, in a 
manner more intimate and more extensive ; that which he is, 
he is for himself, he has consciousness of it. But God alone 
exists for himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God is 
entirely in relation to himself; for there are no beings out of 
him to whom he could have relation. His whole essence is 
for himself, and this relation is altogether internal : and it is 
this intimate and entire relation of God to himself in all his 
essence, which constitutes the divine personality." 

"The seat of intellect," says Paley, "is a, person." 

A being intelligent and free, every spiritual and moral 
agent, every cause which is in possession of responsibility and 
consciousness, is & person. In this sense, God considered as a 
creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a person. 

According to Boethius, Persona est rationalis naturm indi- 
vidua substantia. 

" Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, from 
some other being, is a tiling. Whatever possesses a spontane- 
ous action within itself, is & person, or, as Aristotle' defines it, 
an 0.^x^1 rtpalftoj."^ 

"Personality is individuality existing in itself, but with a 
nature as its ground."^ 

" If the substance be unintelligent in which 4he quality 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 27. 

* Gours de Psychologie, torn, ii., p. 272. 

■* Niconi. Eth., lib. iii. * Sewell, Christ. Mor., p. 152. 

' Coleridge, N'oles on Eng. Div., vol. i , p. 4.3. 



380 VOCABULARY OF THILOSOPHY. 

PEESOl" — 

exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelligent, 
we call it a person, meaning by the word perscm to distinguish 
a thing or substance that is intelligent, from a thing or sub- 
stance that is not intelligent. By the wovd person, we therefore 
mean a thing or substance that is intelligent, or a conscious 
being ; including in the word the idea both of the substance 
and its properties together." ' 

"A subsisting substance or suppositum endued with reason 
as man is, that is, capable of religion, is 2u person."'^ 

"Person, as applied to Deity, expresses the definite and 
certain truth that God is a living being, and not a dead mate- 
rial energy. Whether spoken of the Creator or the creature, 
the word may signify either the unknown but abiding sub- 
stance of the attributes by which he is known to us ; or the 
unity of these attributes considered in themselves."^ — V. 
Identity (Personal), Reason, Subsistentia. 

Personality, in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of rights 
and obligations which belong to an intelligent AvilL* 

PETITIO PaiECIPII [oYiietitio qucesiii, begging the question). 
— V. Fallacy. 



V. Idea, Perception. 
— V. Nature. 
Mvofisvov, from ^aCvofiai, to appear), is that 
which has appeared. It is generally applied to some sensible 
appearance, some occurrence in the course of nature. But in 
mental philosophy it is applied to the various and changing 
states of mind. " How pitiful and ridiculous are the grounds 
upon which such men pretend to account for the very lowest 
and commonest phenoniena of nature, without recurring to a 
God and Providence !"^ 

"Among the various 2)henoniena which the human mind 
presents to our view, there is none more calculated to ex- 
cite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication 
which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and active 



' Henry Taylor, Apology of Ben ilordecai, letter i., p. 85. 

^ Oldfield, Essay on Reason, p. 319. 

' R. A. Thompson, Chnsiian Theism, book ij., chap. 7. 

* Jouffroy, Droit. Nat., p. 19. s gouth, vol. iv., Serm. ix. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 381 

PHENOMEIfO¥ — 

principle within us, and the material objects with which we 
are surrounded." ^ 

In the philosophy of Kant, plienomenon means an object 
such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in oppo- 
sition to nounienon, or a thing as it is in itself. 

"According to Kant, the facts of consciousness, in their 
subjective character, are produced partly from the nature of 
the things of which it is conscious ; and hence, in their objec- 
tive character, they a,ve phenomena, or objects as they appear 
in relation to us, not things in themselves, noumena, or reali- 
ties in their absolute nature, as they may bo out of relation 
to the mind. The subjective elements which the mind itself 
contributes to the consciousness of every object are to be 
found, as regards intuition, in the forms of space and time ; 
and as regards thought, in the categories, unity, plurality, and 
the rest.2 To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it 
neither in space nor in time ; for these are furnished by the 
constitution of our perceptive faculties, 'and constitute an ele- 
ment of the phenomenal object of intuition only. To think of 
a thing in itself would be to think of it neither as one nor as 
many, nor under any other category ; for these, again, depend 
upon the constitution of our understanding, and constitute an 
element of i\\Q phenomenal object of thought. The phenome- 
nal is the product of the inherent laws of our own mental con- 
stitution, and, as such, is the sum and limit of all the know- 
ledge to which we can attain."^ 

The definition oi phenomenon is, " that which can be known 
only along with something else."* — V. Noumenon. 

PHILANTHEOPY {'fi%av6p<^7iU, from ^aacepcdrtsijw, to be a 
friend to mankind). — " They thought themselves not much 

' Stewart, Elements, c. 1, sect. 1. 

^ I. Categories of Quantity. II. Categories of Quality. 

Unity. Reality. 

Plurality Negation. 

Totality. Limitation. 

III. Categories of Relation. IV. Categories of Modality. 

Inherence and Subsistence. Possibility, or Impossibility. 

Casviality and Dependence. Existence, or Non-Existeuce. 

Community, or Reciprocal Action. Necessity or Contingence. 

sManscl, Lp.ct. on Phil, of Kant, pp. 21, 22. * Ferrier, Imt. of Mefaphys., p. 319. 



382 • VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PHILANTHEOPY- 

concerned to acquire that God-like excellency, o, philanthropy 
and love to all mankind." ^ 

This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially 
from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from benevolence 
or a desire for the well-being of others. When our benevo- 
lence is purified and directed by the doctrines and precepts of 
religion, it becomes charity or brotherly love. When sus- 
tained b}' large and sound views of human nature and the 
human condition, it seeks to mitigate social evils and increase 
and multiply social comforts, it takes the name oi philan- 
thropy. But there is no incompatibility between the two. It 
is only when philanthropy proceeds on false views of human 
nature and wrong views of human happiness, that it can be 
at variance Avith true charity or brotherly love. 

Philanthropy, or a vague desire and speculation as to im- 
proving the condition of the whole human race, is sometimes 
opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true charity or be- 
nevolence, while it begins with loving and benefiting those 
nearest to us by various relations, Avill expand according to 
the means and opportunities afforded of doing good. And 
while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate 
connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread 
wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the 
distinctions of friendship, of family, and of society, and grasp 
in one benevolent embrace the univei'se of human beings, 
God hath made of one blood all nations of men that d^vell upon 
the face of the earth ; and although the sympathies of friend- 
ship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and 
warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and 
general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind 
— who are all children of one common parent, heirs of the same 
frail nature, and sharers in the same unbounded goodness : — 

" Friends, parents, neighbours, first it will embrace, 
Our country next, and next all human race. 
Wide and more wide, the o'erflowing of the mind. 
Takes every creoture in of every kind. 
Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed, 
And heaven reflects its image in her breast." — Pope. 

' Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., Scrm. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 385 



moulded upon the mass of the brain, every portion of its sur- 
face will present dimensions and developments according to the 
corresponding portion of the brain. But individuals in whom 
such or such a portion of the brain is largely developed, have 
been observed by phrenologists to be remarkable for such or 
such a faculty, talent, or virtue, or vice ; and the conclusion 
is, that the portion of the cranium corresponding to that de- 
velopment of the cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, 
or vice — is its special organ." — See writings of Gall, Spurz- 
heim, and Combe. 

"If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act 
always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combina- 
tion of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same faculty 
in the same process of ratiocination, then 'phrenology is so far 
true ; and if the action of these fasciculi has the efi'ect of elon- 
gating them, so as to produce pressure on the corresponding 
internal surface of the cranium, and if the bony case make a 
corresponding concession of space to the elongation of these 
specific fasciculi, then cranioscopy is true also ; but there are 
so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving at such a result, 
that a vastly greater mass of evidence must be brought for- 
ward before phrenologists and cranioscopists have a right to 
claim general assent to their doctrine." ' 

The British Association, established several years ago, re- 
fused to admit plirenology as a section of their society. 

PHYSIOGE'OMY [^vati, nature; yw,uwv, an index) is defined 
by Lavater to be the "art of discovering the interior of man 
from his exterior." In common language it signifies the judg- 
ing of disposition and character by the features of the face. 
In the Middle Ages, |?7i?/5Jo(7nom?/ meant tlie knowledge of the 
internal properties of any corporeal existence from external 
appeai'ances. 

'■They. found i' the physiognomies 
Of the planets, all men's destinies." — Hudihras. 

It does not appear that among the ancients physiognomy 
was extended beyond man, or at least beyond animated nature. 
The treatise on this subject ascribed to Aristotle is thought to 

^ Wigau, Duality of Mind, p. 162. 

34 2a 



386 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PHYSIOGNOMY— 

be spurious. But all men, in the ordinary business of life, 
seem to be influenced by the belief that the disposition and 
character may in some measure be indicated by the form of 
the body, and especially by the features of the face. 

" Every one is in some degree a master of that art which is 
generally distinguished by the name of Physiognomy, and 
naturally forms to himself the character or fortune of a stranger 
from the features and lineaments of his face. We are no 
sooner presented to any one we never saw before, but we are 
immediately struck with the idea of a proud, a reserved, an 
aifable, or a good-natured man ; and upon our first going into 
a company of strangers, our benevolence or aversion, awe or 
contempt, rises naturally towards several particular persons 
before we have heard them speak a single word, or so much as 
know who they are. For my own part, I am so apt to frame 
a notion of every man's humour or circumstances by his looks, 
that I have sometimes employed myself from Charing Cross to 
the Royal Exchange in drawing the characters of those who 
have passed by me. When I see a man with a sour, rivelled 
face, I cannot forbear pitying his wife ; and when I meet with 
an open, ingenuous countenance, I think of the happiness of 
his friends, his family, and his relations. I cannot recollect 
the author of a famous saying to a stranger who stood silent 
in his company, — ' Speak that I may see thee.' But with 
submission I think we may be better known by our looks than 
by our words, and that a man's speech is much more easily 
disguised than his countenance." ' 

Young children are physiognomists — and they very early 
take likings and dislikings founded on the judgments which 
they intuitively form of the aspects of those around them. 
The inferior animals, even, especially such of them as have 
been domesticated, are affected by the natural or assumed 
expression of the human countenance. As to their taking 
likings or dislikings to particular persons, this is probably to 
be ascribed to the great acuteness not of the sense of sight, 
but of scent. 

The taking a prejudice against a person for his looks is 



' Addison, Speclatw. No. i 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



reckoued among the smaller vices in morality, and is called 
by More, in his Enchiridion Eihicum, Prosopolepda.^ 
PHYSIOLOGY and PHYSICS were formerly used as synony- 
mous. 'Y:h.% former now denotes the laws of organized bodies, 
the latter of unorganized. The former is distinguished into 
animal and vegetable. Both imply the necessity of nature as 
opposed to liberty of intelligence, and neither can be appro- 
priately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, however, entitled the 
first part of one of his works, the Physiology of mind. — T'^. 
Psychology. 

Physiology determines the matter and the form of living 
beings. It describes their structure and operations, and then 
ascends from phenomena to laws ; from the knowledge of 
organs and their actions, it concludes their functions and their 
end or purpose ; and from among the various manifestations it 
seeks to seize that mysterious principle which animates the 
matter of their organization, which maintains the nearly con- 
stant form of the compound by the continual renewal of the 
component molecules, and which at death, leaving this matter, 
surrenders it to the common laws, from the empire of which 
it Avas for a season withdrawn. 

. . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can 
touch and see — matter and its modifications.^ 
PICTUIlESQiTJE " properly means what is done in the style and 
with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am not 
much mistaken, that the word was commonly employed when 
it was first adopted in England. . . . But it has been 
frequently employed to denote those combinations or groups 
or attitudes of objects that are fitted for the purposes of the 
painter."* 

"Picturesque is a word applied to every object, and every 
kind of scenery, which has been or might be represented with 
good effect in painting — just as the wox'd beautiful, when we 
speak of visible nature, is applied to every object and every 
kind of scenery that in any way give pleasure to the eye — and 

'■ See Lavater, Spurzheim. J. Cross, Attempt to Establish Physiognomy upon Scientijio 
Principles, Glsisg., 1817. 
^ Diet, des Sciences Philosojih. 
^Stewart. Philosnph. Essays, part i., chap. 5. 



888 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PICTUEESaUE - 

these seem to be the significations of both words, taken in their 
most extended and popular sense." — Sir Uvedaie Price. ^ 

" The two qualities of roiigJmess and of sudden variation, 
joined to that of irregular iti/, are the most efficient causes of 
the picturesque." ^ — Ibid. 

"Beautt/ and piduresqueness are founded on opposite quali- 
ties ; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness ; the one 
on grandeur, the other on sudden variation ; the one on ideas 
of youth and freshness, the other on those of age, and even 
of decay."'' 

P2TEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means 
that department of it which treats of the mechanical proper- 
ties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used as 
synonymous with pneum otology . 

PNEITMATOLOGY {rtvEiixa, spirit; Xtiyoj, discourse). — The 
branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and opera- 
tions of mind, has by some been c&WqA pneiimatologij. Philo- 
sophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our ovf n mind 
and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evidence for the 
existence of orders of minds intermediate. Popular opinion 
is in favour of the belief. But philosophy has sometimes 
admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has found a place, 
however, in all religions. There may thus be said to be a 
religious pneumatologij, umA. o, philosophical pneumatology. In 
religious pneumatology, in the East, there is the doctrine of 
two antagonistic and equal spirits of good and evil. In the 
doctrines of Christianity there is acknowledged the existence 
of spirits intermediate between God and man, some of whom 
have fallen into a state of evil, while others have kept their 
first estate. 

Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socrates 
had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did not 
discountenance the doctrine, and the Neo-Platonicians of Alex- 
andria carried pneumatology to a great length, and adopted 

• On the Picturi'.sque, ch. 3. 

^ '-A picturesque object may be defined as that which, from the greater facilities which 
it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his art, is, as 
it were, a provocation to painting." — Sir Thos. L. Diclj, note to above chap. 

3 Chap. 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrHY. 389 



the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scholastic ages, 
the belief in return from the dead, apparitions and spirits, was 
universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxony, Emanuel Sweden- 
borg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez Pasqualis and his 
disciple Saint Martin, have all given accounts of orders of 
spiritual beings who held communication with the living. 
And in the present day a belief in spirit rapping is prevalent 
in America. 

Bp. Berkeley " admits the existence of orders of spirits. 

Considered as the science of mind or spirit, pneumatology 
consisted of three parts, treating of the Divine mind, Theology 
— the angelic mind, Angelology, and the human mind. This 
last is now called Psychology, "a term to which no competent 
objection can be made, and which affords us, what the various 
clumsy periphrases in use do not, a convenient adjective — 
paijchologicalJ' ^ 
POETRY or POESY. — " However critics may differ as to the 
definition of poetry, all competent to offer an opinion on the 
subject will agree that occasionally, in prose, as well as in 
verse, we meet with a passage to which we feel that the term 
poetry could be applied, with great propriety, by a figure of 
speech. In the other arts also we find, now and then, what 
we feel prompted from within to call the poetry of painting, 
of statuary, of music, or of whatever art it may be. The fact 
that books have been written under such figurative titles, and 
favourably received, proves that the popular mind conceives 
of something in poetry besides versification — of some spiritual 
excellence, most properly belonging to compositions in verse, 
but which is also found elsewhere. When Byron said that 
few poems of his day were hslf p)oetry, he evidently meant by 
poetry something distinguishable from rhythm and rhyme. 
True, such may be only a figurative use of the word ; but the 
public accept that figurative use as corresponding to some 
actual conception which they entertain of poetry in its best 
degrees. And when they speak of the poetry of any other 
art, it is evident from the use of the same word that they 
believe themselves perceiving the same or similar qualities. 

' Principles of Hivman Knowledge, sect. 81, and throughout. 
= Sir W. ITaiuilton, Reid's Works, p. 219, note. 

34- 



390 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

POETRY— 

To such, conceptions, then, without regard to whence they 
spring, I think, with Coleridge, that it Avould be expedient to 
appropriate the word poesy, thereby avoiding the ambiguity 
which now exists in the use of the word jweti-y ; though popu- 
lar choice, which always prefers a figurative application of a 
common word, has not adopted the suggestion." ' 

POLLICITATION — F. Promise. 

POLYGAMY (rto?LV5, many ; ya/toj, marriage) means a plurality 
of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various forms in 
all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, to be con- 
trary to the light of nature ; and has been condemned and 
punished by the laws of many nations. About the middle of 
the sixteenth century, Bernardus Ochinus, general of the 
order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Protestant, published 
Dialogues in favour of polygamy, to which Theodore Beza 
wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled Polygamia Triiunplia- 
trix appeared under the name of Theophilus Aletheus. The 
true name of the author was Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 
1780, Martin Madan published ThelypMhora, or a Treatise on 
Female Ruin, in Avhich he defended polygamy, on the part of 
the male. See some sensible remarks on this subject in 
Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy.'^ 

POLYTHEISM [noxvi, many; Seoj, god). — "To believe no one 
supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, 
or more (though in their nature good), is to be apolytheist."^ 
Three forms of polytheism may be distinguished. 1. Idola- 
try, or the Avorship of idols and false gods, Avhich prevailed in 
Greece and Rome. 2. Sahaism, or the worship of the stars and 
of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in Chaldea. 3. Fetich- 
ism, or the worship of anything that strikes the imagination 
and gives the notion of great power, which prevails in Africa 
and among savage nations in general. 

POSITIVE. — F. Moral, Term. 

POSITIVISM.— " One man affirms that to him the principle of all 
certitude is the testimony of the senses; this i?, positivism.'"^ 
Of late years the name positivism has been appropriated to 



» Moffat, Study of Esthetics, p. 221. ^ Book iii., ch. 6. 

' Shafttshury, b i.. pt. 1, sect. 2. •■ Morell. Philnsoph. Taiden., p. 15. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 391 

POSITIVISM — 

the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte.' 
This philosophy is thus described by an admirer:^ — " This is 
the mission o{ positivism, to generalize science, and to systema- 
tize sociality; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy 
of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social doc- 
trine is the aim of positivism, a scientific doctrine the means ; 
just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and interpreter 
of life. 

" The leading conception of M. Comte is: — There are but 
three phases of intellectual evolution — the theological (super- 
natural), the metapliysical, and i\iQ positive. In the supertiatu- 
ral phase, the mind seeks cati,ses, unusual phenomena are in- 
terpreted as the signs of the pleasure or displeasure of some 
god. In the metaphysical phase, the supernatural agents are 
set aside for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the 
positive phase, the mind restricts itself to the discovery of the 
laws of phenomena." 
POSSIBLE {possum, to be able). — That which mayor can be. 
" 'Tis possible to infinite power to endue a creature with the 
power of beginning motion."^ 

Possihilitas est consensio inter se, sen non repugnantia partium 
vel attrihutormn quibus res seu ens const ittiatur. 

A thing is said to be possible when, though not actually in 
existence, all the conditions necessary for realizing its exist- 
ence are given. Thus we say it is possible that a plant or ani- 
mal may be born, because there are in nature causes by which 
this may be brought about. But as everything which is born 
dies, we say it is impossible that a plant or animal shovild live 
for ever. A thing is possible, when there is no contradiction 
between the idea or conception of it and the realization of it ; 
and a thing is impossible when the conception of its realiza- 
tion or existence implies absurdity or contradiction. 

We apply the terms possible and impossible both to beings 
and events, chiefly on the ground of experience. In propor- 
tion as our knowledge of the laws of nature increases, we say 
it is possible that such things may be produced ; and in pro- 

' In his Cours de Philosophie Positive. 

* G. H. Lewes, Comte's Philosoph. of Sciences, 1S63, sect. 1. 

* Clarke. On Jttributes, prop. 10. 



392 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

POSSIBLE — 

portion as our knowledge of human nature is enlarged, we say 
it is possible that such events may happen. But it is safer to 
say what is possible than what is impossible, because our know- 
ledge of causes is increasing. 

There are three ways in which what is possible may be 
brought about ; supernaturally, naturally, and morally. The 
resurrection of the dead is supernaturally possible, since it can 
only be realized by the power of God. The burning of wood 
is naturally or physically piossible, because fire has the power 
to do so. li \s morally possible that he who has often done 
wrong should yet in some particular instance do right. These 
epithets apjily to the causes by which i\\Q p)Ossible existence or 
event is realized. 

'^Possible relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to 
power or liberty, and these senses are frequently confounded. 
In the first sense we say, e.g., ' It is jMssible this patient may 
recover,' not meaning that it depends on his choice, but that 
we are not sure whether the event will not be such. In the 
: other sense it is 'possible' to the best man to violate every rule 
of morality ; since if it were out of his power to act so if he 
chose it, there would be no moral goodness in the case, though 
Ave are quite sure that such never icill be his choice."^ 

POSTULATE {ax-ivijxck, posiulaiimi, that which is asked or assumed 
in order to prove something else). — "According to some, the 
difference between axioms and postulates is analogous to that 
between theorems and problems ; the former expressing truths 
which are self-evident, and from which other propositions may 
be deduced ; the latter operations which may be easily per- 
foi'med, and by the heljD of which more difiicult constructions 
may be effected."^ 

There is a difference between a postulate and a hypothesi.'i. 
When you lay down something which may be, although you 
have not proved it, and which is admitted by the learner or the 
disputant, you make a hypothesis. The postulate not being as- 
sented to, may be contested during the discussion, and is only 
established by its conformity with all other ideas on the subject. 

In the philosophy of Kant, a postulate is neither a hypothesis 



' Whately, Lng., Appendix i. 

* Stewai-t, Elemciila, vol. ii., chap. 2. sect. 3. From Wallis. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 893 

POSTULATE — 

nor a corollary, but a proposition of the same binding certainty, 
or whose certainty is incorporated with that of another, so that 
you must reject that other, all evident as it is in self, or admit 
at the same time what it necessarily supposes. He has three 
postulates. 

1. I am under obligation, therefore I am free. 

2. Practical reason tends necessarily to the sovereign good, 
which supposes an absolute conformity with the moral law ; 
such conformity is holiness ; a perfection which man can only 
attain by an indefinite continuity of eifort and of progress. 
This progress supposes continuity of existence, personal and 
identical, therefore the soul is immortal, or the sovereign good 
is a chimera. 

3. On the other hand, the sovereign good supposes felicity, 
but this results from the conformity of things with a ,n\\, and 
has for its condition, obedience to the moral law ; there must 
then be a harmony possible between morality and felicity, and 
this necessarily supposes a cause of the universe distinct from 
nature, — an intelligent cause, who is at the same time the 
Author of the moral law, and guarantee of this harmony of 
virtue and happiness, from which results the sovereign good ; 
then God exists, and is himself the primitive sovereign good, 
the source of all good. Kant's jjostulates of the practical 
reason are thus freedom, immortality, and God.^ 

POTENTIAL is opposed to actual — g. v. This antithesis is a fun- 
damental doctrine of the Peripatetic philosophy. "Aristotle 
saith, that divided they {i.e., bodies) be in infinitum poten- 
tially, but actually not." ^ 

"Anaximauder's infinite Avas nothing else but an infinite 
chaos of matter, in which were either actually or potentially 
contained all manner of qualities.'"' 

POTENTIALITY (Swa^t^).— F. Capacity. 

PO WEE, {possum, to be able ; in Greek, ^vvafni), says Mr. Locke,* 
"may be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able 
to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the 
other passive power." Dr. Reid,^ in reference to this distinc- 

• Willm, Hist, de la Philosopli. Alhmandt, torn, i., p. 420. 

a Holland, Plutarch, p. 667. » Cudworth, Intdl. System, p. 128. 

* Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii., ch. 21. ' Act. Pow., essay i., chap. 3. 



39-1 YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



tion, says, "Whereas he distinguishes power into active and 
passive, I conceive passive poiver to be no poioer at all. He 
means by it the possibility of being changed. To call this 
power seems to be a misapplication of the word. I do not 
remember to have met with the phrase passive poiver in any 
other good author. Mr. Locke seems to have been unlucky in 
inventing it ; and it deserves not to be retained in our lan- 
guage. '^ "This paragraph,'' says Sir W. Hamilton,' "is 
erroneous in almost all its statements." The distinction be- 
tween power as active and passive, is clearly taken by Aristo- 
tle. But he says that in one point of view they are but one 
poiver,'^ while in another they are two.^ He also distinguishes 
p)owers into rational and irrational — into those which we 
have by nature, and those which we acquire by repetition 
of acts. These distinctions have been generally admitted by 
subsequent philosophers. Dr. Reid, however, only used the 
word power to signify active power. That we have the idea 
of power, and how we come by it, he shows in opposition to 
Hume.^ 

According to Mr. Hume, we have no proper notion oi power. 
It is a mere relation which the mind conceives to exist between 
one thing going before, and another thing coming after. All 
that we observe is merely antecedent and consequent. Neither 
sensation nor reflection furnishes us with any idea oi power or 
ef&cacy in the antecedent to produce the consequent. The 
views of Dr. Brown are somewhat similar. It is when the. 
succession is constant — when the antecedent is uniformly fol- 
lowed by the .consequent, that we call the one cause, and the 
other effect ; but we have no ground for believing that there 
is any other relation between them or any virtue in the one to 
originate or produce the other, that is, that we have no pro- 
per idea of power. Now, that our idea of power cannot be 
explained by the philosophy which derives all our ideas from 
sensation and reflection, is true. Poiver is not an object of 
sense. All that we observe is succession. But when we see 
one thing invariably succeeded by another, we not only con- 
nect the one as effect and the other as cause, and view them 

* Reid's WbrJcs, p. 519, note. ^ Metaphys., lib. v., cap. 12. 

^ Ibid.; lib. ix., cap. 1. ■* Act. Pow., essaj' i., chap. 2, 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 395 

POWEE- 

uuder that relation, but we frame the idea of power, and con- 
clude that there is a virtue, an efficacy, a force, in the one 
thing to originate or produce the other ; and that the connec- 
tion between them is not only uniform and unvaried, but uni- 
versal and necessary. This is the common idea of power, and 
that there is such an idea framed and entertained by the 
human mind cannot be denied. The legitimacy and validity 
of the idea can be fully vindicated. 

" In the strict sense, power and agency are attributes of 
mind only ; and I think that mind only can be a cause in the 
strict sense. This power, indeed, may be where it is not 
exerted, and so may be without agency or causation ; but 
there can be no agency or causation without power to act and 
to produce the effect. As far as I can judge, to everything 
we call a cause we ascribe power to produce the (L^^ect. In 
intelligent causes, the potver may be without being exerted ; 
so I have poioer to run when I sit still or walk. But in inani- 
mate causes we conceive no power but what is exerted, and, 
therefore, measure the power of the cause by the effect which 
it actually produces. The power of an acid to dissolve iron is 
measured by what it actually dissolves. We get the notion of 
active power, as well as of cause and effect, as I think, from 
what we feel in ourselves. We feel in ourselves a power to 
move our limbs^ and to produce certain effects when we choose. 
Hence we get the notion of power, agency, and causation, in 
the strict and philosophical sense ; and this I take to be our 
first notion of these three things." ' 

"The liability of a thing to be influenced by a cause is 
called passive poiver, or more properly susceptibility ; while 
the efficacy of the cause is called active power. Heat has the 
power of melting wax ; and in the language of some, ice has 
th.Q poicer of being melted."^ — V. Cause. 

It is usual to speak of a poioer of resistance in matter ; and 
of a poioer of endurance in mind. Both these are j)assive 
poiver. Active power is the principle of action, whether im- 
manent or transient. Passive j)ower is the principle of bearing 
or receiving. 



Dr. Reid, Correspondence, pp. 77, 78. 
' Day, On the Will, p. 33. 



596 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



Aristotle, Metaphys.; ' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand. ;^ 
Hobbes, Opera} 

PEACTICAL (German, jjra/rfiWi). — The strict meaning of this 
word in the philosophy of Kant, is immediate will-deter- 
mining, and the Critick of Practical Reason is nothing else 
but the critick of that faculty of reason which immediately 
determines the will.* 

PE^BICATE, PS^BICABLE, and PEiEDICAMENT, are 
all derived from prcedico, to affirm. A prcedicate is that which 
is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A prcedi- 
cable is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be 
affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A prcedica- 
ment is a series, order, or arrangement of predicates and j)rtE<ii- 
cahles in some summum genus, as substance, or quality. 

What is affirmed or denied is called the prcedicate; and that 
of which it is affirmed or denied is called the subject.^ — V. 
Attribute, Category, Universal. 
Prsedicables. — " Whatever term can be affirmed of several 
things, must express either their whole essence, which is called 
the species ; or & part of their essence (viz., either the material 
part, which is called the genus, or ih^Q formal aud distinguish- 
ing part, which is called differentia, or in common discourse, 
characteristic), or something joined to the essence; whether 
necessarily [i.e., to the ivhole species, or in other words, univer- 
sally, to every individual of it), which is called a property ; 
or contingently [i. e., to some individuals only of the species), 
which is an accident. 

Evei-y Pi'sedicable expresses either 

The «./<oZe essence of its q its essence. oTsomethmg joined' 

subject, Tiz., Species. ^ \ to its essence. 



Genus, differentia. 



Property. 



Uniyersalbut Peculiar but Univer.sal and Inseparable, Separable, 

not Peculiar. not Universal. Peculiar. 

' Lib. Tiii., cap. 1. "^ B. ii., chap. 21. ^ Tom. i., p. 113, edit, by Molesworth. 

* Haywood, Critick of Pure Reason, p. 401. 
» Monboddo, Ancient Metapkys., vol. v., p. 152. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 397 

PREDICATE — 

"Genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, might, -with 
more propriety, perhaps, have been called the Jive classes of 
predicates ; but use has determined them to be called the Jive 
preclicahles ." ' 

Prsedicament. — These most comprehensive signs of things (the 
categories), are called in Latin the prcedicaments, because they 
can be said or prcedicated in the same sense of all other terms, 
as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other 
term can be correctly said of them, because no other is em- 
ployed to express the full extent of their meaning." ^ 

Prse-prsdicamenta and Post-praedicamenta. — "The Greek 
Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three 
sections, calling the first section to rtpo Twi' xafrjyopcujv ; the 
second, to jtipi avtCjv xatrjyopiiJv ; the third, to /j-sta ta^ 
xatriyopcai.^ The Latins adhering to the same division, coin 
new names : ante-prcedicamenta, or prce-prcedicamenta, prcedi- 
camenta and post-prcedicavienta." ^ 
PREJUDICE {prcejudico, to judge before inquiry). — A prejudice 
is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an opinion con- 
cerning anything, before the grounds of it have been fairly or 
fully considered. The opinion may be true or false, but in so 
far as the grounds of it have not been examined, it is errone- 
ous or without proper evidence. " In most cases prejudices 
are opinions which, on some account, men are pleased with, 
independently of any conviction of their truth ; and which, 
therefore, they are afraid to examine, lest they should find 
them to be false. Prejudices, then, are unreasonable judg- 
ments, formed or held under the influence of some other 
motive than the love of truth. They may therefore be classed 
according to the nature of the motives from which they result. 
These motives are, either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and social ; 
or, 2, They are malignant."^ 

Dr. Reid® has treated o^ prejudices or the causes of error, 
according to the classification given of them by Lord Bacon, 
under the name of idols — q. v. Mr. Locke'' has treated of the 

' Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic. ' Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle, c. 2. 

' Ammon. in Prmdic, p. 146. * Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxon., 1672. 

' Taylor, Elements of Thought. « Jntell. Rnv., essay vi., chap. 8. 

£ssaij on Sum. Understand., book iv., chap. 20. 

35 



398 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PESJUBICE — 

. causes of error. And some excellent observations on the pre- 
judices peculiar to men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, 
Search after Truth. ^ 

PREMISS {propositiones prcemissce, propositions which go before 
the conclusion, and from which it is inferred). — A regular 
syllogism consists of two premisses and a conclusion. The two 
premisses are sometimes called the antecedent, and the conclu- 
sion the consequent. 

PRESCIENCE [proiscio, to know before it happens). — " The 
prescience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension 
of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, 
that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, accurately 
representing the natures, powers, and properties of the thing 
it does foreknow." — More.^ 

The prescience of God may be argued from the perfection of 
his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to con- 
ceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our ob* 
scure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not to be 
likened to his clear and direct" beholding of all things. Many 
attempts have been made to reconcile the prescience of God 
with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon its own 
proper evidence. — St. Aiigustin, On the Spirit and the Letter ; 
Bossuet, Traits du Libre Arhitre ; Leibnitz, Theodic^e ; Fene- 
lon. Existence de Diezi. 

PRE SENT ATI VE. — F. Knowledge. 

PRIMARY {primus, first) is opposed to secondary. " Those 
qualities or properties, without which we cannot even imagine 
a thing to exist, are called primary qualities. Extension and 
solidity are called jjrc'wia?'^ qualities of matter — colour, taste, 
smell, are called secondary qualities of matter." * 



• Book ii., part 2. ^ Immortality of Soul, b. ii., ch. 4. 

" When the late Sir James Mackintosh ivas visiting tlic school for the deaf and dumb 
at Paris, then under the care of the Abbe Sicard, he is said to hare addressed this ques- 
tion in writing to one of the pupils, — '-Doth God reason?" The pupil for a short time 
appeared to be distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, the following 
answer : — " To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire : it is the highest attribute of 
a limited intelligence. God sees all things, foresees all things, knows all things: there- 
fore God doth not reason." — Guruey, On Hahit and Discipline, p. 138. 

« Taylor, Elements of Thought. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 399 

PEIMAEY— 

Descai-tes, Locke, Reid, Stewart,' Sir W. Hamilton.^ — V. 

Matter. 

PEIHCIPIA ESSEHBI or PEmCIPLES OF BEIHG are 
distinguished into tlie princiijle of origination and the princi- 
ple of dependence. 

The only proper principle of origination is God, who gives 
essence and existence to all beings. 

The principle of dependence is distinguished into that of 
causality and that of inherence, or effective dependence, as the 
effect depends upon its cause, and subjective dependence, as the 
' quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance. 
PRINCIPLE [jyrincipium, dp;^^, a beginning). — "A principle is 
that which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing. 
'Frincipio autem milla est origo,' said Cicero, ^nam ex principio 
oriuntur omnia : ipsum autem nulla ex re ; nee enim id esset 
principium quod gigneretur aliunde.' " "* 

Aristotle* has noticed several meanings of apz^^ which is 
translated principle, and has added — " What is common to all 
first principles is that they are the priynary source from which 
anything is, becomes, or is knoivn." 

The word is applied equally to thought and to being ; and 
hence principles have been divided into those of being and 
those of knowledge, or principia essendi and principia cogno- 
scendi, or, according to the language of German philosophers, 
principles formal and principles real. Princi-pia essendi may 
also be principia cognoscendi, for the fact that things exist is 
the ground or reason of their being known. But the converse 
does not hold ; for the existence of things is in no way depend- 
ent upon our knowledge of them. 

Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with 
principles of being, investigating the origin and elements of 
all .things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy has 
been chiefly devoted to principles of knoivledge, ascertaining 
the laws and elements of thought, and determining their valid- 
ity in reference to the knowledge which they give. 
PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE are those truths by means of 



' Phil. Essays, ii., chap. 2. ^ Reid's Wo7-ks, note D. 

" Sir Will. Prummond, Acad. Quest., p. 5. * Meiaphys., lib. iv., cap. 1. 

34 2a 



400 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PRINCIPLES — 

which other truths are known. They have been distinguished 
into simple and complex, that is, they may be found in the form 
of ideas, as substance, cause — or in the form of propositions, 
as in the affirmation that every change implies the operation 
of a cause, or in the negation that qualities do not exist with- 
out a substance. Complex p)rinciples have been arranged in 
three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, and axioms. Hypo- 
theses and definitions have been called ditixd, that is, conven- 
tional principles or truths assumed or agreed on for the pur- 
pose of disputation or teaching, and are confined to the depart^ 
ment of knowledge to which they peculiarly belong. Axioms 
are principles true in themselves, and extending to all depart- 
ments of knowledge. These were called ^vsixd or ifi^vta, and 
are such as the mind of man naturally and at once accepts as 
true. They correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, 
or principles of common sense of the Scottish philosophy. — 
V. Common Sense, Axiom. 

" The word principle," says Mr. Stewart,' " in its proper 
acceptation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether 
resting on fact or on hypothesis) upon which, as a datum, a 
train of reasoning proceeds ; and for the falsity or incorrect- 
ness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent process can 
compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity of the air 
fiYG principles of reasoning, in our speculations about the baro- 
meter. The equality of the angles of incidence and reflection ; 
the proportionality of the sines of incidence and refraction, 
are principles of reasoning in catoptrics and in dioptrics. In 
a sense perfectly analogous to this, the definitions of geometry 
(all of which are merely hypothetical) are the first principles 
of reasoyiing in the subsequent demonstration, and the basis 
on which the whole fabric of the science rests." 

Lord Herbert, De Veritate; Buffier, Treatise of First Truths; 
Reid, Intell. Pow? 

Principles as Express or as Operative correspond to principles 
of kaoiving and of bei?ig. An express principU asserts a pro- 
position ; as, truth is to be spoken. An operative principle 
prompts to action or produces change, as when a man takes 



- Elements, vol. i., chap. 1, sect, 2. ^ Essay vi. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 401 



food to satisfy hunger. An express principle assei'ts an origi- 
nal law and is regulative. An operative principle is an original 
element and is constitutive. 
PEINCIPLES OF ACTION may either mean those express prin- 
cipAes which regulate or ought to regulate human actions, or 
those operating or motive principles which prompt human 
action. The latter, which is the common application of the 
phrase, is its psychological meaning. 

When applied to human action psychologically, the word 
■principle is used in the sense of the principle of dependence ; 
and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its 
being produced. It may signify the dependence of causality, 
that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, 
as its efficient cause ; or it may signify the dependence of 
inherence, that is, that the action depends for its production on 
some power or energy which inheres in the agent as its sub- 
ject. Hence it has been said that a. principle of action is two- 
fold — the principium quod, and the principium quo. Thus, 
man as an active being is the principium quod or efficient cause 
of an action being produced ; his will, or the power by which 
he determines to act, is the principium quo. 

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself; 
and in this view may be regarded as the principium quod, 
while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded as 
the principium quo. Before we act, we deliberate, that is, we 
contemplate the action in its nature and consequences ; we 
then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the per- 
formance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise 
of will is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is 
called into exercise by certain influences which are brought to 
bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contem- 
plated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of 
complacency or displaceucy, of liking or disliking, of satisfac- 
tion or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or 
disapprobation are experienced. We pronounce some things 
to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding incli- 
nation or aversion ; and under the influence of these states 
and affections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The 
forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination 

35.^- 2 B 



402 VOCABUI.AUY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PROCIPLES — 

or tendency to or from an object, may assume, are many and 
various ; arising partly from the nature of the objects contem- 
plated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired 
habits of the mind contemplating. But they are all denomi- 
nated, in a general way, prmciples of action. 

PSIVATIOH {at£pt;aoi, privatio). — "A privation is the absence of 
what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or 
which ought to be present with it ; as when a man or a horse 
is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be 
unlearned, these are called privations." ^ 

The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. 
" To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls gtsptjav^ 
or privation, an addition that he has thought proper to make 
to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in order to give 
his system the appearance of novelty ; but without any neces- 
sity, as I apprehend ; for it is not a cause, as he himself ad- 
mits, such as matter and ybrm, but is only that without which 
the first matter could not receive tlje impression of anj form ; 
for it must be clear of everj forvi, which is what he calls j»i- 
vation, before it can admit of any. 

"Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of matter ; 
for as it has the capacity of till form, so it has i\yQ privation of 
all form. In this Avay, Aristotle^ himself has explained the 
nature of matter. And Plato, in the Timcetis, has very much 
insisted upon this quality of matter as absolutely necessary, 
in order to fit it to receive all forms ; and he illustrates his 
meaning by a comparison : — Those, says he, who make un- 
guents or perfumes, prepare the liquid so, to which they are 
to give the pei-fume, that it may have no odour of its own. 
And, in like manner, those who take ofi" an impression of 
anything upon any soft matter, clear that matter of every 
other impression, making it as smooth as possible, in order 
that it may better receive the figure or image intended. In 
like manner, he says, matter, in order to receive the specieses 
of all things, must in itself have the species of nothing."'' 



• Watts, Log., pt. i., c. 2. 

' Physic, lib. i., cap. 8. 

' Monboddo, Ancient Melaphys., book ii., chap. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 403 

PaiVATION — 

Hence privation was defined — Negatio formoe. in subjecto apto 
ad liabendam ialem formam. 

According to Plato, jj^'^^cttion, in tlie sense of limitation, 
imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, 
and the necessary cause of evil. — Leibnitz,' after Augustin, 
Aquinas, and others, held similar views. ^F. Negation. 

PEOBABILITY. — F. Chances. 

PROBABLE [probahilis, provable). — That which does not admit 
of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or contradic- 
tion, IS probable, or admits of proof. "As demonstration is the 
showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the 
intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, 
immutable, and visible connection one with another ; so pro- 
hability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or 
disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection 
is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to 
be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is 
enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true 
or false, rather than the contrary. . . . . The entertain- 
ment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, 
assent, or opinion, which is admitting or receiving any pro- 
position for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to 
persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge 
that it is so. And herein lies the difference between probabi- 
lity and certainty, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of 
knowledge there is intuition ; each immediate idea, each step, 
has its visible and certain connection ; in belief, not so. That 
which makes us believe, is something extraneous to the thing- 
I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and 
so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of, 
those ideas that are under consideration. 

" The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of 
anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experi- 
ence. Second, the testimony of others, touching their obser- 
vation and experience." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ 
Reid, Intell. Poiv? 

» Cauia Dei, sect. 69, 72. Essais Sur la Bonle de Dicu, 1, partie, sect. 29. 31 ; 3, partie. 
Beet. 378. 
* Book. iv.. fhap. 15, ^ Essay vii.. chap. 3. 



404 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



" The word lyrohahle," says Mr. SteAvart/ " does not imply 
any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the jiarticular na- 
ture of that proof, as contradistinguished from another species 
of evidence. It is opposed not to what is certain, but to what 
admits of being demonstrated after the manner of the mathe- 
maticians. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to 
the same word in popular discourse ; according to which, what- 
ever event is said to be probable, is understood to be expected 
Math some degree of doubt But although, in philo- 
sophical language, the epithet probable be applied to events 
which are acknowledged to be certain, it is also applied to 
events which are called jjrobable by the vulgar. The philo- 
sophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more comprehensive 
than the popular ; the former denoting that particular species 
of evidence of which contingent truths admit ; the latter being 
confined to such degrees of this evidence as fall short of the 
highest. These different degrees of probability the philoso- 
pher considers as a series, beginning with bare possibility, 
and terminating in that apprehended infallibility, with which 
the phrase moral certainty is synonymous. To this last term 
of the series, the word probable is, in its ordinary acceptation, 
plainly inapplicable." 

PROBLEM [Tipo^'Kriiia, from rtpojSaxXw, to throw down, to put in 
question). — Any point attended with doubt or difficulty, any 
proposition which may be attacked or defended by probable 
arguments, may be called a problem. Every department of 
inquix-y has questions, the answers to which are problematical. 
So that, according to the branch of knowledge to which they 
belong, 'problems may be called Physical, Metaphysical, Logi- 
cal, Moral, Mathematical, Historical, Literary, &c. Aristotle 
distinguished three classes, — the moral ov practical, which may 
influence our conduct ; as whether pleasure is the chief good : 
the speculative or scientific, which merely add to our knowledge ; 
as, whether the world is eternal : and the auxiliary, or those 
questions which we seek to solve with a view to other questions. 

PEOGEESS. — F. Perfectibility. 

PEOMISE and POLLICITATION, Promittimus rogati—polli 
cemur idtro, — A p>ollicitation is a spontaneous expression of 

' Elements, part ii., chap. 2. sect. 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 405 



our intention to do something in favour of another. It does 
not necessarily imply the presence of the party in reference to 
whom it is made ; and it does not confer upon him a right to 
exact its performance. But in so far as it has become known 
to him, and has awakened expectations of its being performed, 
we may be brought under a moral obligation to perform it, 
especially if its performance is seen to be highly beneficial to 
him, and in no way prejudicial to ourselves. 

A promise is made in consequence of a request preferred tc 
us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the re- 
quest, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect 
moral right to have it fulfilled, and biungs us under a moral 
obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a pj'omise, three 
things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or Litention 
of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward signification 
of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the promise by the 
party to whom it is made. 

A promise implies two parties at least — the promiser and the 
pi^omisee. A pad implies two or more. In this it agrees with 
a contract — q. v. 

It is a dictate of the law of nature, that promises should be 
fulfilled, — not because it is expedient to do so, but because it 
is right to do so. 

The various questions concerning the parties competent to 
give a valid promise, the interpretation of the terms in which 
it may be given, and the cases in which the obligation to fulfil 
it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what may be called 
the Casuistry of Ethics, and Natural Jurisprudence. — V. Con- 
tract. 

PROOF. — " To conform our language more to common use, we 
ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and 
probabilities. By proofs, meaning such arguments from ex- 
perience as leave no room for doubt or opposition." ' Whately 
says that proving may be defined " the assigning of a reason 
or argument for the support of a given proposition," and in- 
ferring "the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. 
In the one case our conclusion is given, and we have to seek 

' Hume, On the Undnsiand., sect. 6, note. 



406 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PEOOF — 

for arguments ; in the other our premises are given, and ■we 
have to seek for a conclusion. Proving may be compared to 
the act of putting away any article into the proper receptacle 
of goods of that description, inferring to that of bringing out 
the article when needed." — See Evidence, Inference. 
PROPEHTY may be distinguished from quality or attribute, and 
also ivoiw faculty. 

Qualities are primary or secondary, essential or non-essen- 
tial. The former are called attributes, and the latter proper- 
ties. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and smell 
are piroperties of body. 

Faculty imjjlies understanding and vrill, and so is applicable 
only to mind. We speak of the prop)erties of bodies, but not 
of their faculties. Of mind we may say will is a faculty or 
property; so that while 2i\\ faculties are j^roperiies, aM proper- 
ties are not faculties. 
PE.OPEETY (Generic) is the property of a subaltern genus, 
and which may be predicated of all the subordinate species. 
"Voluntary motion" is the generic property of " animal." 
PE,OPEE,TY (Specific) is the property of an iiifima species, and 
which may be predicated of all the individuals contained 
under it. " Hisibility " is the specific property of " man." 
PROPOSITION'. — A judgment of the mind expressed in words 
is a proposition. 

'■^ A jjroposition, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein 
one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy 
to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the 
predicate, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, 
which is called the subject; and these two are called the terms 
of the proposition." ' 

As to their substance, propositions are Categorical (sub- 
divided into pure and modal), and Hypothetical (subdivided 
into co?iditional and disjunctive). 

A Categorical proposition declares a thing absolutely, as, "I 
love," or " Man is not infallible." These are pin-e categoricals, 
asserting simply the agreement and disagreement of sub- 
ject and predicate. Modal categoricals assert the manner of 

' Keid, Account nf Aristotle's Logic, chap. 2, sect. 6. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 407 

PSOPOSITIOH — 

agreement and disagreement between subject and predicate; 
as, " The wisest man mnj possibly be mistaken." "A preju- 
diced historian will probably misrepresent the matter." 

A Hypotlietical proposition asserts, not absolutely, but under 
a hypothesis. Such propositions are denoted by the conjunc- 
tions used in stating them. " If man is fallible, he is imper- 
fect." This is called a conditional proposition, denoted by the 
conjunction " if." "It is either day or night." This is a 
disjunctive hypothetical, and is denoted by the disjunctive 
conjunction "either." 

As to their quality, propositions are either affirmative or 
negative, according as the predicate is said to agree or not to 
agree with the subject. "Man 'is' an animal." "Man 'is 
not' perfect." As to their quantity, propositions are universal 
or particular, according as the predicate is affirmed or denied 
of the ivJiole of the subject, or only o{ part of the subject. 
"All tyrants are miserable." " No miser is rich." " Some 
islands are fertile." " Most men are fond of novelty." 

Another division of propositions having reference to their 
quantity is into singular and indefinite. A singidar proposition 
is one of which the subject is an individual (either a proper 
name, a singular pi'onoun, or a common noun with a singular 
sign). "Caesar overcame Pompey." "I am the person." 
" This fable is instructive." But as these propositions predi- 
cate of the loJiole of the subject, they fall under the rules that 
govern iiniversals. An indefinite or indesig?iate proposition is 
one that has no sign of universality or particularity affixed to 
it, and its quantity must be ascertained by the matter of it, 
that is, by the nature of the connection between the extremes. 

As to their matter, propositions are either necessary, or im- 
possible, or contingent. In necessary and in impossible matter, 
an indefinite is understood as a universcd ; as, "Birds have 
wings;" i.e., all. "Birds are not quadrupeds ; " i.e., none. 
In contingent matter, that is, where the terms sometimes 
agree and sometimes not, an indefinite is understood as parti- 
cidar; as, "Food is necessary to life;" i.e., some kind of food. 
"Birds sing;" i. e., some birds sing. "Birds are not carnivo- 
rous;" i. e., some birds are not; or, all are hot. — V. Judgment. 
Opposition. 



408 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

PROPRIETY {■to ripsTiov, that which is fit or congruous to the 
agent, and the relations in which he is placed). — This, accord- 
ing to some, is that which characterizes an action as right, 
and an agent as virtuous. "According to Plato, to Aristotle, 
and to Zeno, virtue consists in the propriety of conduct, or in 
the suitableness of the aiFection from which we act, to the 
object which excites it." 

Adam Smith' treats of those systems which make virtue 
consist in propriety. 

PROPRIUM (The) or Property is a predicable which denotes 
something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species.* 
Proprium is applied, — 1. To what belongs to some one but 
not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2. To 
what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as blackness in 
respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the species, 
and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary in respect 
of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of it, to it only, 
and always, as laughter in respect of man. This last is truly 
the proprium. Quod speciei toti, soli et semper convenit? 

"There is a proprium which belongs to the wliole species, 
but not to the sole species, as sleeping belongs to man. There 
is a proprium which belongs to the sole species, but not to the 
wliole species, as to be a magistrate. There is a proprium 
which belongs to the whole species, and to the sole species, 
but not alioays, as laughing ; and there is a proprium which 
always belongs to it, as to be risible, that is, to have the 
faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laughing when he repe- 
sents to himself these poor things, uttered with a mouth made 
venerable by a long beard, or repeated by a trembling and 
respectful disciple?"^ 

PROSYLLOGISM. — F. Epicheirema. 

PROVERB. — The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's Proverbs 
says, "A proverb is usually defined, an instructive sentence, 
or common and pithy saying, in which more is generally 
designed than expressed ; famous for its peculiarity and 
elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as 

' Theory of Mot. Sent., part vii., sect. 2, chap. 1. 

^ Whately, Log., book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3. 

^ Derodon, Log., p. 37. 

* Crousaz, Art of Thinking, part i.. sect. 3, chap. 5. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 409 

PHOVERB — 

the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, 
which want such authority." 

Lord John Russell's definition of a proverb is, " the wit of 
one, the wisdom of many." ' 

Proverbs embody the current and practical philosophy of an 
age or nation. Collections of them have been made from the 
earliest times. The book of Scripture called the Proverbs 
of Solomon, contains more than one collection. They have 
always been common in the East. Burckhardt made a collec- 
tion of Arabian proverbs, which was published at London in 
1830. Seller published at Augsburg, in 1816, The Wisdom 
of the Streets, or, the Meaning and Use of German Proverbs. 
Ray's Proverbs, Allan Ramsay's Proverbs, Henderson's Pro- 
verbs, have been published among ourselves. 

Backer (Geo. de) has Le Dictionnaire de Proverbes Francais,"^ 
rare and curious. Panckouke published his Dictionnaire des 
Proverbes in imitation of it. 
PEOVIDENCE. — " What in opposition to Fate," said Jacobi, 
" constitutes the ruling principle of the universe into a true 
God, is Providence." 

Providence is a word which leads us to think of conservation 
and superintending, or upholding and governing. Whatever 
is created can have no necessary nor independent existence ; 
the same power which called it into being must continue to 
uphold it in being. And if the beauty and order which appear 
in the works of nature prove them to be the efi"ects of an intel- 
ligent designing cause, the continuance of that beauty and 
order argues the continued operation of that cause. So that 
the same arguments which prove the existence of God imply 
his providence. With regard to the extent of providence, some 
have regarded it as general, and reaching only to things re- 
garded as a whole, and to great and important results, while 
others regard it as particular, and as embracing every indivi- 
dual and every event. But the same arguments which prove 
that there is a providence, prove that it must be particular ; or 
rather, when properly understood, there is no inconsistency 
between the two views. The providence of God can onh^ be 



' Moore. Diary, vol. vii., p. 20i. 

36 



410 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

PROVIDENCE — 

called general from its reaching to .every object and event, and 
this is the sense in which we are to understand a particular 
providence. But while the providence of God estends to every 
particular, it proceeds according to general laws. And while 
these laws are fixed and stable, they may be so fixed as to 
admit of what we think deviations ; so that both what we call 
the law, and what we call the deviation from the law, may be 
embraced in the plan of providence. As to the way in which 
this plan is carried forward, some have had recourse to the 
supposition of a plastic nature, intermediate between the Crea- 
tor and the creature, — others to an energy communicated from 
the Creator to the creature. But the true view is to regard all 
things and all events as upheld and governed by the continual 
presence and power of God. There is a difficulty in recon- 
ciling this view with the freedom and responsibility of man, 
but it is not impossible to do so. ^ 

PRUBENCE {prudeniia, contracted for provideniia, foresight or 
forethought) is one of the virtues which were called cardinal 
by the ancient ethical writers. It may be described as the 
habit of acting at all times with deliberatfon and forethought. 
It is equally removed from rashness on the one hand, and 
timidity or irresolution on the other. It consists in choosing 
the best ends, and prosecuting them by the most suitable 
means. It is not only a virtue in itself, but necessary to give 
lustre to all the other virtues. 

"The rules oil prudence in general, like the laws of the stone 
tables, are for the most part prohibitive. Thou slialt not is 
their characteristic formula : and it is an especial part of 
Christian priidence that it should be so. Nor would it be diffi- 
cult to bring under this head all the social obligations that 
arise out of the relations of the present life, which the sensual 
understanding (-z^o ^^ovrjixa tiji cfapxoj, Rom. viii. 6) is of itself 
able to discover, and the performance of which, under favour- 
able circumstances, the merest worldly self-interest, without 
love or faith, is sufficient to enforce ; but which Christian pru- 
dence enlivens by a higher principle and renders symbolic and 
sacramental (Ephes. v. 32)." 

1 Sherlock, On Providence; M-'Cosh, Mdh. of JHv. Govern., b. ii., ch. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 411 

PEUBEI^CE — 

» " Moi^aliii/ msbj he compared to the consonant; prudence to 

the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to prac- 
tice) but by means of the hitter. 

" The Platonic division of the duties of morality commences* 
with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose proceeding 
from enlightened self-interest {qui animi imperio, corporis ser- 
vitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui commodum et sihi prooidiis 
utitur, liunc esse prudentem statuimiis) ; ascends to the moral, 
that is, to the purifying and remedial virtues ; and seeks its 
summit in the imitation of the divine nature. In this last 
division, answering to that which we have called the spiritual, 
Plato includes all those inward acts and aspirations, waitings, 
and watchings, Avhich have a growth in godlikeness for their 
immediate purpose, and the union of the human soul with the 
supreme good as their ultimate object."' — V. Morality. 

PSYCHISM (from 4-1)^^, soul) is the word chosen by Mons. 
Quesne^ to denote the doctrine that there is a fluid, diffused 
throughout all nature, animating equally all living and or- 
ganized beings, and that the difference which appears in their 
actions comes of their particular organization. The fluid is 
general, the organization is individual. 

This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held that 
the soul of a man passed individually into the body of a brute. 
He (Mons. Quesne) holds that while the body dies the soul 
does not ; the organization perishes, but not the psychal or 
psychical fluid. 

PSYCHOLOGY {-^vxri, the soul; ?u)yof, discourse.) — The name 
may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the 
saying ascribed to Socrates — Know thyself. The recommen- 
dation is renewed in the Cogito ergo sum of Descartes ; and 
in the writings of Malebranche, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume, psychological inquiries held a prominent 
place. Still further prominence was given to them by the 
followers of Kant and Reid, and psychology, instead of being 
partially treated as an introduction to Logic, to Ethics, and to 
Metaphysics, which all rest on it, is now treated as a separate 

' Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. i., pp. 13, 21, 22. 
^ Lettres sur U Psychisme,_ Svo, Paris, 1852. 



412 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PSYCHOLOGY - 

department of science. It is that knowledge of the mind and « 
its faculties which we derive from a careful examination of 
the facts of consciousness. Life and the functions of our or- 
' ganized body belong to -physiology ; and, although there is a 
close connection between soul and body, and mutual action 
and reaction between them, that is no reason why the two 
departments of inquiry shovild be confounded, unless to those 
who think the soul to be the product or result of bodily orga- 
nization. Broussais said, he could not understand those phi- 
losophers who shut their eyes and their ears in order to hear 
themselves think. But if the capacity of thinking be ante- 
rior to, and independent of, sense and bodily organs, then the 
soul which thinks, and its faculties or powers of thinking, 
deserve a separate consideration. ^ 

Mr. SteAvart^ objects to the use of the term p)sycliology, 
though it is sanctioned by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie, as 
implying a hypothesis concerning the nature or essence of the 
sentient or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with 
our conclusions concerning its phenomena and general laws. 
The hypothesis implied is that the sentient or thinking prin- 
ciple is different in its nature or essence from matter. But 
this hypothesis is not altogether unconnected with its pheno- 
mena. On the contrary, it is on a difference of the pheno- 
mena which they present that Ave ground the distinction be- 
tween mind and matter. It is true that the reality of the 
distinction may be disputed. There are philosophers who 
maintain that there is but one substance — call it either matter 
or mind. And the question, when pushed to this extremity, 
cannot be solved by the human intellect. God only knows 
whether the two substances which Ave call matter and mind 
have not something which is common to both. But the phe- 
nomena which they exhibit are so different as to lead us to 
infer a difference in the cause. And all that is implied in 
using the term, psychology is, that the phenomena of the sen- 
tient or thinking principle are different from the p)henomena 

' See Memoire. par Mons. Jouffroy, De la LegitimiU et de la Distinction de la Psycho- 
logieetde la Pliysiologie. (published in bis Nouveaux Melanges, and also in the 11th 
to), of Mf.moiresde I' Acad, des Scieticcs Morales et Politiques). 

2 Prelim. Piss, to Philosoph. Essays, p, 24. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 413 

PSYCHOLOGY — 

of matter. -^Ind, notvritlistanding the objection of Mr. Stew- 
art, the term is now current, especially on the continent — to 
denote the science of the human mind as manifested by con- 
sciousness. 

Dr. Priestley at one time maintained the materiality of 
mind, and at another the spirituality of matter. The apostle 
speaks of a spiritual body. A body which is spirit sounds to 
us contradictory. 

Coleridge, in his Treatise upon Method, employs the word 
psychological, and apologizes for using an insolens verhum. 
" Goclenivis is remarkable as the author of a work, the title of 
which is •l^/vxo'Koyia. (Mai'burg, 1597). This I think the first 
appearance of psychology, under its own name, in modern 
philosophy. Goclenius had, as a pupil, Otto Casmann, who 
wrote Psychologia Anthropologica, sive animce humance docirina 
(Hanau, 1594)." i 

Psychology has been divided into two parts — 1. The empiri- 
cal, having for its object the phenomena of consciousness and 
the faculties by which they are produced. 2. The rational, 
having for its object the nature or substance of the soul, its 
spirituality, immutability, &c. 

Rational psychology, which had been chiefly prosecuted be- 
fore his day, was assailed by Kant, who maintained that apart 
from experience we can know nothing of the soul. But even 
admitting that psychology rests chiefly on observation and 
experience, we cannot well separate between phenomena and 
their cause, nor consider the cause apart from the phenomena. 
There are, however, three things to which the psychologist 
may successively attend. 1. To the phenomena of conscious- 
ness. 2. To the faculties to which they may be referred. 
3. To the Ego, that is, the soul or mind in its unity, individu- 
ality, and personality. These three things are inseparable ; 
and the consideration of them belongs to psychology. Sub- 
sidiary to it are inquiries concerning the mutual action and 
reaction of soul and body, the effect of organization, tempera- 
ment, age, health, disease, country, climate, &c. 

Nemesius, De Natura Hominis ; Buchanan (David), Historia 

' Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philos., translated by Wright, vol. ii., p. 45. 

36* 



414 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PSYCHOLOGY- 

Anirnce Humance; Casmannus, Psycliologia; Carus, History 
of PsycJiologtj,'^ in German. 

PSYCHOPANUYCHISM {^vxn, soul ; and ,t6.v, all ; vv%, night 
— the sleep of the soul) is the doctrine to which Luther 
among divines, and Formey, among philosophers, were in- 
clined — that at death the soul falls asleep and does not awake 
till the resurrection of the body. 

PYRKHONISM. — V. Scepticism, Academics. 



aUABRIVIUM. — F. Trivium. 

UlTALITY (rtotoj, rtotoT')/?, qualis qualitas, suchness) is the differ- 
ence which distinguishes substances. 

" There may be substances devoid of qnantity, such as the 
intellective and immaterial ; but that there should be sub- 
stances devoid of quality, is a thing hardly credible, because 
they could not then be characterized and distinguished from 
one another." ^ 

" Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the imme- 
diate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I 
call idea: and the power to produce any idea in our mind I 
call the quality of the subject wherein that power is."'' 

" We understand by a quality that which truly constitutes 
the nature of a thing — what it is — what belongs to it per- 
manently, as an individual, or in common with others like it 
— not that which passes, which vanishes, and answers to no 
lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an accident: it 
is heavy, that is a quality. Every fact, every accident, every 
phenomenon, supposes a quality by which it is produced, or 
by which it is undergone : and reciprocally every quality of 
things which we know by experience manifests itself by cer- 
tain modes or certain phenomena ; for it is precisely in this 
way that things discover themselves to us."^ 

Descartes^ says, — " Et hie quidem per modos plane idem iu' 

• 8vo, Leipsig, 1808. ^ Harris, Phil. Ar7-ange., chap. 8. 
' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 8. sect. 8, 

* Diet, des Sciences PhUosoph. 

' Princip. Philosoph., pars prima, sect. 66. 



Vocabulary of philosophy, 415 



ielligimus, qiiod alibi per attributa vel qualitates. Sed cum con- 
sideramus substantiam ab illis affici, ml variari, vocamus modos ; 
cmn ab ista variatione talem posse denominare, vocamiis quali- 
tates ; ac denique, cum generalius specia7nus tantum eu subsfantice 
inesse, vocamus attributa. Ideoque in Deo non lyroprie modos 
aid qualitates sed attributa tantum esse dicimiis, quia nidla in eo 
variatio est intelligenda. Et etiam in rebus creatis, ea qiice nun- 
quam in its diverso modo se Jiabent, ut existentia et duratio in re 
existente et durante, non qualitates aut modi, sed attributa did 
debent." 

"As qualities help to distinguish not only one soul from an- 
other soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more 
general way) every soul from everybody, iti'olloMvs that quali- 
ties, by having this common reference to both, are na'^'irally 
divided into corporeal and incorporeal." ' 

Hutcheson also^ reduces all qualities to two genera. Thought, 
— proper to mind. Motion, — proper to matter. 

Qualities are distinguished as essential, or such as are inse- 
parable from the substance — as thought from mind, or exten- 
sion from matter; and non-essential, or such as we can separate 
in conception from the substance — as passionateness or mild- 
ness from mind, or heat or cold from matter. 

" With respect to all kinds of qualities, there is one thing 
to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always 
requisite ; else they are not so properly qualities as incidental 
affections. Thus we call not a man passionate, because he has 
occasionally been angered, but becau'se he is prone to frequent 
anger ; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy com- 
plexion, because he is red by immediate exercise or pale by 
sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness may be called 
constitutional."" 

On the question, historical and critical, as to the distinction 
of the qualities of matter as primary or secondary, see Eeid's 
Works, by Sir W. Hamilton.* 

"Another division of qualities is into natural and acquired. 
Thus in the mind, docility may be called a natural quality; 
science an acquired one : in the human body, beauty may be 

' Harri?, Phil. Arrange.., chap. 8. * 3fetaphys., part, i., cap. 6. 

" Harris, FIdl. Arra.nge., chap. 8. * Note D. 



416 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



called a natural qiialitij ; gentility (good carriage) an acquired 
one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To 
transmit objects of vision is equality natural to crystal; but to 
enlarge them vrhile transmitted, is a character adventitious. 
Even the same quality may be natural in one substance, as 
attraction in the magnet; and acquired in another, as the same 
attraction in the magnetic bar." ' — V. Attribute, Proposition. 
QiUality (Occult). — "It was usual with the Peripatetics, when 
the cause of any phenomena was demanded, to have recourse 
to their /acuities or occult qualities, and to say, for instance, 
that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty {quality) ; and 
senna purged by its purgative."''* 

"Were I to make a division of the qualities of bodies as they 
appear to our senses, I would divide them first into those that 
are manifest, and those that are occult. The manifest qualities 
are those which Mr. Locke calls primary ; such as Extension, 
Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity. 
The nature of these is manifest even to sense ; and the busi- 
ness of the philosopher with regard to them is not to find out 
their nature, which is well known, but to discover the effects 
produced by their various combinations ; and, with regard to 
those of them which are not essential to matter, to discover 
their causes as far as he is able. 

" The second class consists o^ occult qualities, which may be 
subdivided into various kinds ; as, first, the secondary qualities ; 
secondly, the disorders we feel in our own bodies ; and thirdly, 
all the qualities which we call powers of bodies, whether me- 
chanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable : or if there 
be any other powers not comprehended under these heads. 
Of all these the existence is manifest to sense, but the nature 
is occidt; and here the philosopher has an ample field." ^ 

QrlTANTITY (rtoffof, quantum, how much) is defined by mathe- 
maticians to be " that which admits of more or less." 

"Mathematics contain properly the doctrine of measure; 
and the object of this science is commonly said to be quantity; 



* Harris, Phil. Arrange.., chap. 8. 

"^ Hume, Dial, on Nat. Rdig., part iv. 

* Reid, Intell. Pow., essay ii., chap. 18; Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 611. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 417 

aUANTITY — 

therefore, qumUiii/longht to be defined, ivhat may be measured. 
Those who have defined quantity to be whatever is capable of 
more or less, have given too wide a notion of it, which, it is 
apprehended, has led some persons to apply mathematical rea- 
soning to subjects that do not admit of it. Pain and pleasure 
admit of various degrees, but who can pretend to measure 
them V 1 

"According to the common definition, quantity is that which 
is susceptible of augmentation or diminvition. But many 
things susceptible of augmentation or diminution, and that 
even in a continuous manner, are not qjtaniities. A sensation, 
painful or pleasing, augments or diminishes, and runs through 
different phases of intensity. But there is nothing in common 
between a sensation and quantity." ^ 

"There are some quantities which may be called jyroper, 

and others improper That properly is quantity 

which is measured by its ovjii kind; or which, of its OAvn nature, 
is capable of being doubled or tripled, without taking in any 
quantity of a different kind as a measure of it. Improper quan- 
tity is that which cannot be measured by its oivn kind; but to 
which we assign a measure by the nieanis of some pi-oper 
quantity, that is related to it. Thus velocity of motion, when 
we consider it by itself, cannot be measured." We measure 
it by the space passed in a given time.* 

Quantity (Discrete and Continuons). — "In magnitude and 
multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and com- 
prehensive species, into which the genus of quctntity is divided ; 
magnitude, from its union, being called quantity continuous ; 
multitude, from its separation, quantity discrete. Of the con- 
iinuous kind is every solid ; also the bound of every solid ; that 
is, a superficies ; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a 
, line ; to ■which may be added those two concomitants of every 

body, namely, time and place. Of the discrete kind are 
fleets and armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articu- 
late, &c."* 

" Discrete quantity is that of which the parts have no con- 
tinuity, as in number. The number, e. g., of inches in a foot- 

' Reid, Essay on Qaantily. ">■ Did. dcs Sciences P/dlosoph. 

=» Reid, Essay on Quantity. * Harris, Phil. Arrange., chap. 9. 

2c 



418 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

aUANTITY — 

rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain continuous, 
or are cut asunder and flung about the world ; hut they do not 
constitute a foot length (which is a continuous quantity), un- 
less they are so joined together that the bounding lines of one 
coincide with those of another. Of continuous quantities there 
are two kinds ; one, of which the parts are co-existent, as in 
extension ; another, in which the parts are successive, as in 
duration. Discrete and continuous quantities are sometimes 
called mnltitude and magnitude." ' 

According to Derodon^ quantity \s either — 1. Permanent, 
when its parts arS together ; or 2. Successive, -when they exist 
some after others. Time and motion are quantity successive. 
Permanent quantity is — 1. Contimious, as a line which is 
length ; superficies, which is length and breadth ; and mathe- 
matical body, which is length, breadth, and depth. 2. Dis- 
crete, as number and speech. 

Hutcheson" notices magnitude, time, and number, as three 
genera of quantity. 

Quantity is called discrete when the parts are not connected, 
as number ; continuous, when they are connected, and then it 
is either successive, as time, motion ; or permanent, which is 
what is otherwise called space or extension, in length, breadth, 
and depth ; length alone constitutes lines ; length and breadth, 
surfaces; and the three together, solids.'* — V. Proposition. 
aUIDBITY or aUIDITY [qnidditas, from quid, what). — This 
tei-m was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent to 
the "to -ti tjv ilvat of Aristotle, and denotes what was subse- 
quently called the substantial form. It is the answer to the 
question. What is it? quid est? It is that which distinguishes 
a thing from other things, and makes it what it is, and not 
another. It is synonymous with essence, and comprehends 
both the substance and qualities. For qualities belong to sub- 
stance, and by qualities substance manifests itself. It is the 
kn^v^'n essence of a thing ; or the complement of all that 
makes us conceive of anything as we conceive of it, as dif- 
ferent from any or every other thing. 



' Fitzgerald, Notes to AristotWs Ethics, 8vo, Dublin, 1850, p. 151. — See Aristotle In 
Categor., c. 6. 
^ PhyS: Tiars 1, cap. 5. * Metaphys., part i., cap. 5. 

* Port Roy. Log., part i., ch. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 419 

QUIETISM [quies, rer^t) "is the doctrine that the highest charac- 
ter of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation and love 
of supreme excellence." ' 

The two following propositions from Fenelon's Maxims of the 
Saints, were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699. 1. There 
is attainable in this life a state of perfection in which the ex- 
pectation of reward and the fear of punishment have no place. 
2. Souls may be so inflamed with love to God, and so resigned 
to his will, that if they believed that God had condemned them 
to eternal pain, they would absolutely sacrifice their salvation. 

Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by which 
souls might be carried to such a state of perfection, that a con- 
tinual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for 
all other acts of religion. 

A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on 
the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, De la Contro- 
verse de Bossuet et Fenelon, sur le Qui6tisme ;''■ Upham, Life of 
Madame Guyon. 



EACE. — F. Species. 

HATIO. — When two subjects admit of comparison with reference 
to some quality which they possess in common, and which may 
be measured, this measure is their ratio, or the rate in which 
the one exceeds the other. With this term is connected that 
oi proportion, which denotes the portions, or parts of one mag- 
nitude which are contained in another. In mathematics, the 
term ratio is used for proportion ; thus, instead of the propor- 
tion which one thing bears to another, we say, the rp,tio which 
one bears to the other, meaning its comparative magnitude. 

In the following passage ratio is used for reason or cause. 
" In this consists the ratio and essential ground of the gospel 
doctrine."' — F. Reason. 

HATIOCIl'ATIOK'. — "The conjunction of images with affirma- 
tions and negations, which make up propositions, and the 
conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of con- 
clusions upon them, is ratiocination or discourse. 

■ Sumner, Records of Creatmi, toI. ii., p. 239. 

* 8vo, Macon, 1S50. " Waterland, Works, vol, is:>, ssrm. i. 



420 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EATIOCIITATIOF — 

" Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently con- 
nexed to, or found in, the premises, that the conclusion is at- 
tained quasi per saUu?n, and without anything of ratiocinutlve 
process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately and with- 
out any previous discourse." ' 

" The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they 
call ratiocination, and we may style it the generation of a 
judgment from others actually in our understanding."^ 

"When from a general proposition, by combining it with 
other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree 
of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a 
proposition merely individual, the process is ratiocination (or 
syllogism)."^ — V. Reasoning. 
RATIONALE. — " The chairs of theology and philosophy (during 
the scholastic ages) were the oracular seats from which the 
doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the rationale of 
theological and moral truth."* 

" There cannot be a body of rules without a rationale, and 
this rationale constitutes the science. There were poets before 
there were rules of poetical composition ; but before Aristotle, 
or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could write their arts of poetry 
and criticism, they had considered the reasons on which their 
precepts rested, they had conceived in their own minds a 
theory of the art. In like manner there were navigators 
before there was an art of navigation ; but before the art of 
navigation could teach the methods of finding the ship's place 
by observations of the heavenly bodies, the science of astro- 
nomy must have explained the system of the world." ^ 

Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a work 
entitled, A Rationale iipon the Book of Common Prayer.^ — F. 
Science, Art. 
E-ATIOE'ALISM, in philosophy, is opposed to sensualism, sen- 
siiism, or sensism, according to all which, all our knowledge is 
derived from sense. It is also opposed to empiricism, which 

' Hale, Prim. Orig. of Mankind, pp. 50, 51. 

* Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. i., part i., c. 11, sect. 13. 
3 Mill, Log., 2d edit., vol. i., p. 223. 

* Hampden, On Scholastic Pldlosophy, lect. i., p. 9. 

5 Sir Or. C. Lewis, Method of Observ. in Politics, chap. 19, sect. 2, 
« 12mo, Lond., 1668. 



\ VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 421 

RATIONALISM — 

refers all oiir knowledge to sensation and reflection, or expe- 
rience. According to rationalism, reason furnishes certain 
elements, without which experience is not possible. The phi- 
losophy of Condillac is of the former kind, — that of Royer 
Collard of the latter. The philosophy of Locke and Reid have 
been contrasted in the same manner, but not quite correctly. 
— F. Sensism, Sensuism, Sensualism. 
HATIOHALISM, in religion, as opposed to supernaiuraUsin , 
means the adoption of reason as our-sufficient and only guide, 
exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in his Trac- 
iatus Theologico-Politicns, tried to explain all that is super- 
natural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in 
modern Germany have carried this line of speculation much 
farther. 

EATIOIJALISTS. — " The empirical philosophers are like pis- 
mires ; they only lay up and use their store. The rationalists 
are like the spiders ; they spin all out of their own bowels. 
But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle 
faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is. 
gathered by his own virtue." ' 

REAL (The). — " There is no arguing from ideal to real existence, 
unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must have their 
objective realities, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass 
within, except it be by supposing such and such real exist- 
ences, ad extra, to answer them." ^ 

The term real always imports the existent. It is used - 

1. As denoting the existent, as opposed to the non-existent, 
something, as opposed to nothing. 

2. As opposed to the nominal or verbal, the thing to the 
name. 

3. As synonymous with actual, and thus opposed — 1. To 
potential, and 2. To possible, existence. 

4. As denoting the ahsohite in opposition to the phenomenal, 
things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear to 
us, relatively to our faculties. 

5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to a 
representation in thought, ens reale, as opposed to ens rationis, 

' Bacon, Apophthegms. . ^ Waterland. Works, toI. iv.. p. 435, 

37 



422 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

EEAL — 

6. As opposed to logical or rational, a thing which in itself, 
or really, re, is one, may logically, ratione, be considered as 
diverse or plural, and vice versa? — V. Virtual. 

HEALISM, as opposed to idealism, is the doctrine that in per- 
ception there is an immediate or -intuitive cognition of the 
external object, vrhile according to idealism our knovrledge of 
an external world is mediate and representative, i. e., by means 
of ideas. — V. Idea, and Idealism.^ 

REALISM, as opposed to nominalism, is the doctrine that genus 
and species are real things, existing independently of our con- 
ceptions and expressions ; and that as in the case of singular 
terms, there is some real individual. corresponding to each, so, 
in common terms also, there is something corresponding to 
each; which is the object of our thoughts, when we employ 
the term." 

Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development 
of a phrase of Porphyry,* which has been thus translated by 
Boethius — Max de generibus et speciebjis ilhid quidem sive suh- 
sisiant, sive in solis nudis intelleciibus posita Mnt, sive stibsistan- 
tia corporalia sint an inco7-poralia, et utruin separata a sensibi- 
libus an in sensibilibus posita et citra ha;c consistentia, dicere 
recusabo. — V. Conceptualism, Nominalism. — See Chretien, 
Log. Meth.;^ Thomson, Outline of Laws of TliougM.^ 

REASON [Ratio, from reor, to think). — " The word reason in the 
English language has different significations ; sometimes it is 
taken for true and clear principles ; sometimes for clear and 
fair deductions from these principles ; and sometimes for the 
cavise, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration 
I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all 
these ; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that 
faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from 
beasts,'' and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them."^ 

' Sir William Hamilton, Reid's WorTcs, note B. 

'^ Ibid., note o; Edin. Rev.. Yol. lii., pp. 175-181. 

^ Whately, Log., book iv., ch. 5, § 1. * Isagoge, cb. 1. 

° Ch. 3. ^ Part i., sect. 23. 

' La Raison, dans sa definition la plus simple, est la faculty de eomprendre, qu'il ne 
faut pas a confondre aveo la facvilte de connaitre. En effet les animaux eonnaisseut ils 
ne paraissent pas eomprendre, et c'est la qui les distingue de I'homme. — Jouffroy, Droit. 
Nat., torn, i., p. 38. 

" Locke, Essay on Sum. UAderstand,. book iv., chap. 17. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 423 

SEASOIJ — 

"All the operations of the mind when it thinks of the 
qualities of things separately from the things to which they 
belong ; or when it forms general notions, and employs gene- 
ral terms; or when it judges of the agreement or disagree- 
ment of different things ; or when it draws inferences ; are 
comprehended under the term reason. Reason seems chiefly 
to consist in the power to keep such or such thoughts in the 
mind ; and to change them at pleasure ; instead of their flow- 
ing through the mind as in dreams : also in the power to see 
the difference between one thought and another, and so com- 
pare, separate, or join them together afresh. Though animals 
seem to have some little power to perform these operations, 
man has so much more of it, that he alone is said to be en- 
dowed with reason." ' 

" This word is used to signify — 1. All the intellectual powers 
collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which 
man differs fi'om brutes. 3. The faculty of carrying on the 
operation of reasoning. 4. The premiss or premises of an 
argument, especially the minor premiss ; and it is from reason 
in this sense that the word reasoning is derived. 5. A cause, 
as when we say that the reason of an eclipse of the sun is,^ 
that the moon is interposed between it and the earth." * 

" In common and popular discourse, reason denotes that 
power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right 
from wrong ; and by which we are enabled to combine means 
for the attainment of particular ends." * 

"Reason is used sometimes to express the whole of those 
powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute 
his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellectual 
powers; sometimes to express the power of deduction or argu- 
mentation." ^ 

Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement 

* Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

* The idea of the reason is higher than that of cause. The ground or reason of all 
existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, nothing could 
ever have existed. But God is the cause only of such things as he has created in time ; 
while he is the ground or reason of everything possible. 

^ Whately, Log., Appendix i. 

* Stewart, Elements, vol. ii., chap. 1. 

■■ Ibid., Outlines, part ii., chap. 1, sect. 6. 



424 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON — 

of faculties, Sir W. Hamilton' says, ^^ Reason has been em- 
ployed to denote — 

" 1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from 
the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and me- 
mory ; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including 
— 1. Conception ; 2. Judgment ; 3. Reasoning ; 4. Intelli- 
gence ; j/ovj. 

" 2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties. 

"3. The dianoetic and noetic functions of reason, as by 
Reid.2 

" The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in his 
Inquiiy? 

" 5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant 
and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending 
the other functions of thought." 

REASON (Spontaneity of). — "I call spontaneity of reason, the 
development of reason anterior to reflection, the povrer which 
reason has to seize at first upon truth, to comprehend it and 
to admit it, without demanding and rendering to itself an 
account of it." * 

REASOl" KED UNDERSTAIirBIKG. — " Pure reason or intui- 
tion holds a similar relation to the understanding that percep- 
tion holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only stihjective 
facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the 
objective world around us ; so with regard to higher truths 
and laws, the understanding furnishes merely the subjective 
forms in which they may be logically stated, while intuition 
brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of 
truth itself."'^ 

" The faculty of thought manifests itself both as understand- 
ing and reason. By the understanding we inquire after and 
investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions of our repre- 
sentations, feelings, and desires, and of those objects standing 
in immediate connection with them ; by reason we inquire 

* Reid's WorJcs, note A, sect. 5. 

* Iniell. Pow., essay vi., chap. 2. 

^ Introd., sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7. 

* Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Pliilos., vol. i., p. 113. 
5 Movell, Philos. of Relig., p. 19. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 425 



after idfimaie grounds, causes, and conditions. By the under- 
standing we evolve rules for the regulation of our desiring 
faculty ; by reason vre subordinate these rules to a higher law, 
to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest 
end of acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our 
knowledge, both theoretical and practical, is comprehended in 
unity, connection, and in being." ' 

" By the understanding, I mean the faculty of thinking and 
forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, ac- 
cording to certain rules existing in itself, which rules consti- 
tute its distinct nature. By the pure reason, I mean the power 
by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal veri- 
ties of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (?«. b., not images), 
as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics ; and 
of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in morals. Hence in works 
of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reason- 
ing ; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion." ^ 

" The definition and proper character of man — that, namely, 
which should contradistinguish him from other animals, is to 
betaken from his reason rather than his understanding; in 
regard that in other creatures there may be something of 
understanding, but there is nothing of reason." ^ 

In the philosophy of Kant the understanding is distinguished 
from the reason — 

1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the under- 
standing is coincident with the sensible world, and cannot 
transcend it ; but the reason ascends to the super-sensuous. 

2. By the objects and results of their exercise. The under- 
standing deals with conceptions, the reason with ideas. The 
kpowledge obtained by the understanding is particular and 
contingent, the product of the reason is necessary and univer- 
sal knowledge or truth.* 

" The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, and 
so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has been called 
the binder standing. It is an energy of the mind as intelligent. 

• Tenneman, Grundriss, sect. 41. * Coleridge, Friend, pp. 150, 151. 
' Harrington, quoted in Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. lfi'2. 

* Grit, of Pure Reason, see Englisli translat., pp. 7, 20, 57, 268, 7, 277, Prolegomena, 
sect. 59. See also Morell, Philos. of Relig., chap. 2 ; and Philos. Tendencies, p. 71 ; Cole- 
ridge, Aids to Reflection. 

37* 



426 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON — 

It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, that the mind is conseioua 
of itself as unity, of the world as diversity. The outward 
world is seen as diverse through the various sensations, but is 
bound in certain relations — those of space — which are inde- 
pendent of the perceiving subject. The mind requires a cause 
external to itself, of the constant representation of unity in 
diversity, no less than of the representation of diiferent quali- 
ties. The reason, therefore, in virtue of its causal principle, 
refers these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelli- 
gence refers the single perception to an external cause, so it 
refers the combination of perceptions to one object. The 
understanding is thus the same faculty with the reason, but in 
certain particular applications." ' 

" The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it appre- 
hends tiuth, which faculty is higher than the discursive rea- 
son, as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere demon- 
strative truth, agrees with the doctrine taught and insisted on 
by the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so far as he was 
the means of inculcating this doctrine, which is the doctrine of 
Plato, and, I might add, of Aristotle, and of many other philo- 
sophers, let him have due honour. But in his desire to impress 
the doctrine upon men's minds, he combined it with several 
other tenets, which will not bear examination. He held that 
the two faculties by which these two kinds of truth are appre- 
hended, and which our philosophical writers call the intuitive 
reason, and the discursive reason, may be called, and ought to 
be called respectively, the reason and the imderstanding ; and 
that the second of these is of the nature of the instinct of 
animals, so as to be sordething intermediate between reason 
and instinct. These opinions, I may venture to say, are alto- 
gether ei'roneous. The intuitive reason and the discursive 
reason are not, by any English writers, called the reason and 
the understanding ; and accordingly, Coleridge has had to alter 
all the passages, viz., those taken from Leighton, Harrington, 
and Bacon, from which his exposition proceeds. The under- 
standing is so far from being especially the discursive or rea- 
soning faculty, that it is, in universal usage, and by our best 
writers, opposed to the discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus 

' R. A. Thomson, Christian Theism, book i., chap. 3. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 427 

SEASON — 

this is expressly declared by Sir -John Davies in his poem 
' On the Immortality of the Soul.' He says of the soul : — 

'When she rates things, and moves from ground to ground, 

The uume of reason {ratio) she acquires from this; 
But when by reason she the truth hath found, 
And standeth fixt, she understanding is.' 

" Instead of the reason being fixed, and the understanding 
discursive, as Mr. Coleridge says, the reason is distinctively 
discursive ; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from one 
point to another. This is what is meant by discursus ; or 
taking the full term, discursus rationis, discourse of reason. 
Understanding is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one view of a 
subject, and not upon the steps by which that view is obtained. 
The verb to reason implies the substantive, the reason, though 
it is not co-extensive with it ; for, as I have said, there is the 
intuitive reason as well as the discursive reason. But it is 
by the faculty of reason that we are capable of reasoning ; 
though undoubtedly the practice or the pretence of reasoning- 
may be carried so far as to seem at variance with reason in the 
more familiar sense of the term; as is the case also in French. 
. . Moliere's Crisale says (in the Femmes Savantes) — 

'Kaisonner est I'emploi de toute ma maison 
Et le raisonnement en tiannit la Maison.' 

" If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true that the understand- 
ing is the discursive and the reason the fixed faculty, we 
should be justified in saying that the under sta7iding is the 
faculty by which we reason, and the reason is the faculty by 
which ive understand. But this is not so. . . . 

"Mr. Coleridge's object in his specitlations is nearly the 
same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher 
kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning ; and also to 
claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain fundamental 
doctrines of morality. Among these Mr, Coleridge places the 
authority of conscience, and Plato the supreme good. Mr. 
Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the reason of man in 
its highest and most comprehensive form, is a portion of a 
supreme and universal reason ; and leads to truth, not in virtue 
of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature. 



428 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 



EEASOK" — 

" The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge 
which Phito and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as 
being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first principles, 
will enable us to explain some expressioiKS which might other- 
wise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the concluding part of 
the Sixth Book of the Repuhlic, says, that this kind of know- 
ledge is 'that of which the reason (Tioyoj) takes hold,' in virtue 
of its power of reasoning.' Here we are plainly not to under- 
stand that we arrive at first principles by reasoning ; for the 
vei'y opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first prin- 
ciples are not what we reason to, but what we reason from. 
The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles 
are those of which the reason takes hold in virtue of its power 
of reasowMQ : they are the conditions which must exist in 
order to make any reasoning possible ; they are the proposi- 
tions which the reason must involve implicitly, in order that 
we may reason explicitly ; they are the intuitive roots of the 
dialectical power. 

" Plato's views may be thus exhibited : — 





Intelligible World, vonrov. 


Visible World, hpardv. 


Object 


Ideas. 
liiai. 


Conceptions. 
Sidvoia. 


Things. 
^(Sa, K.T.X. 


Images. 
elKdfes. 


Process.... 
Faculties. 


Intuition. 

J'OT/O'iJ. 


Demonstration. 
i-mariifiri. 


Belief. 


Conjecture. 
UKaaia. 


Intuitive 
Reason. 

VOVi. 


Discursive 
Reason. 
Xoyog. 


Sensation. 
aiadriais. 

1 



From a paper by Dr. Whewell, On the Intellectual Powers 
according to Plato.''' — V. Understanding. 
Reason (Impersonal). — Reason, according to Cousin and other 
French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have know- 
ledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is impersonal. 
^^ Licet enim intellectus 7neus sit individuus et separatus ah 

' TTi Tov SiaXiycadai Svvdjxei, 

* lu the Cambridge Fhilos. Trans., 1855. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 429 

REASOF — 

intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet 
universale in ipso, et ideo non indivlduatur id quod est in intel- 
lectu. . . . Sic igitur universale ut universale est uhique et 
semper idem oninino et idem in animabus omnium, non recipiens 
iiidividuationem ah anima." 

These words are quoted from Averhoes, by Mons. Ilaureau,' 
■who exclaims, " Voila la thfese de I'intelligence ou de la raison 
impersonelle 1 " But the truth is, that the root and germ of 
this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that 
human reason is a ray of the Divine reason. 

•'He the great Father! kindled at one flame 

The world as rational — one spirit pour'd 

From spirit's awful fountain, poured Himself 

Through all their souls, but not in equal stream: 

Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God, 
• As His wise plan demanded; aud when past 

Their various trials in their common spheres 

(If they continue rational as made) 

Resorbs them all into himself again. 

His throne their centre, and His smile their crown." — YoDNO. 

" In truth," observes Fenelon,^ "my reason is in myself, for 
it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon my- 
self in order to find it ; but the higher reason which corrects 
me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does 
not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may 
■ seem most our own, and to be the foundation of our being, I 
mean our reason, is that which we are to believe most bor- 
rowed. We receive at erery moment a reason superior to our 
own, just as we breathe an air which is not ourselves. There 
is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither 
acquire outwardly for himself, nor learn of other men who 
live by alms like himself." 

"While we reflect on our own idea oi reason, we know that 
our souls are not it, but only partake of it ; and that we have 
it xara /.LsOs^iv, and not xai-a ova^rjv. Neither can it be called 
a faculty, but rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source 
of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to 
be denominated mine."^ 

• In his Examen de la Philos. Scolastique, torn, i., p. 69. 

^ Existence of God, chap, iv., sect. 3. 

' John Smith, Posthumous Tracts, 1660. See Coleridge, Liter. Rem., vol. iii.. p. 464. 



.430 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 



" Reason is impersonal in its nature," says Cousin,' " it is 
not ■n'e who make it. It is so far from being individual, that 
its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, 
viz., universality and necessity ; since it is to reason that vre 
owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of prin- 
ciples vrhich we all obey and cannot but obey." . . . . "It 
descends from God and approaches man ; it makes its appear- 
ance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of 
an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and 
awakens the want. If reason were personal it would have no 
value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject. 
. Reason is a revelation, a necessary and universal 
revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens 
every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the neces- 
sary mediator between God and man, the ?toyoj of Pythagoras 
and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpre- 
ter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the 
same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic 
individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth ; it 
is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the 
human race."^ 

"Reason or intelligence is not individual, is not ovirs, is not 
even human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to 
us is our free and voluntary activity ; what is not free and not 
voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an 
integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant 
with truth ; truth as necessary and viniversal is not the crea- 
ture of my volition ; and reason, which, as the subject of truth 
is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. 
We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours ; and reason is 
a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are con- 
scious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence." — Sir 
Will. Hamilton," giving the views of Cousin. 

This doctrine of the impersonal reason is regarded by Bouil- 
lier* and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit 
the personality of reason and man becomes the measure of all 

' Expos, of Eclecticism, translated by Ripley, p. 69. ^ Ibid., p. 79. 

^ Discussions, &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8. 

* Theorie d.e lo, Raison impersondle, 8to, Paris, 1846. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 431 

EEASON — 

things — truth is individual. But the truths of reason are* 
universaL No one, says Malebranche, can feel the pain which 
I feel ; but any one or every one can contemplate the truth 
which I know. The scepticism of Kant, as to the relative 
nature of our knowledge, is thus demolished. 

EEASON (Betermining or Sufficient). — " There are two great 
principles of reasoning : the one is the principle of contradic- 
tion, which means that of two contradictory propositions, the 
one is true, the other false : the other is the principle of 
raison determinante, which is that nothing happens without a 
cause, or at least a reason determining, that is, something 
which may serve to render a reason a pjriori, why that thing 
is as it is rather than otherwise." ' 

" A^othing is done without a sufficient reason, that is, nothing 
happens without its being possible to him who knew things 
sufficiently to render a reason which is sufficient to determine 
why it is so, and not otherwise."^ — V. SufficielVT Reason. 

REASONING, "in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, 
or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from 
generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is 
simplj^ to infer any assertion, from assertions already ad- 
mitted : and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be 
called reaso7iitig as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers 
on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of 
the term ; the latter and more extensive signification is that in 
which I mean to use it." ^ 

"Reasoning is that operation of the mind through which it 
forms one judgment from many others ; as when, for instance, 
having judged that true virtue ought to be referred to G-od, 
and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him, 
we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not 
true virtue." "^ 

" Some appear to include under the title of reasoning every 
case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of 
his believing another thing, however far he may be from 
having any grounds to warrant the inference ; and they ac- 

' Leibnitz, Theodicee, partie 1, sect. 44. 

"^ Ibid., Principles de la Ifat. et de la Grace, sect. 7. 

» Mill, Log., 2d edit., vol. i., p. 3. " Port Boy. Log. 



432 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASONIITG- 

cordingly include tliose processes which take place in the 
minds of infants and of brutes ; which are apt to associate with 
the appearance of an object before them the remembered im- 
pression of something that formerly accompanied it. Such a 
process is attended to in the familiar proverbs that ' a burnt 
child dreads the fire ;' or, as it is expressed in another form, 
* the scalded cat fears cold water ;' or again in the Hebrew 
proverb, ' he who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a 
rope.' Most logical writers, however, have confined the name 
of reasoning to valid argument ; which cannot exist without a 
universal premiss, implied, if not expressed."^ 

Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end is 
to reason. 

RECOLLECTION. — F. Remembrance. 

RECTITUDE.— "iieciJtVMcZe of conduct is intended to express the 
term xatopOi^aii, which Cicero translates recta effectio : xa^top- 
Oiofia he translates rectum factum.- Now the definition of 
xa.'e6pOix>ixa was vofx-ov 7ip6sta,yy.a, 'A thing commanded by law' 
(that is, by the law of nature, the universal law). Antoninus, 
speaking of the reasoning faculty, how, without looking far- 
ther, it rests contented in its own energies, adds, ' for which 
reason are all actions of this species called rectitudes (xafop- 
OuiOiH, xatd opOo;, right onwards), as denoting the directness 
of their progression right onwards." '"^ 

"Goodness in actions is like unto straightness ; whei-efore 
that which is done well we term rigid, for as the straiglit way 
is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he 
cometh soonest to his journey's end : so in action, that which 
doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, must 
needs be the fittest for our use."* 

If a term is to be selected to denote that in action and in 
disposition of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the 
most precise and appropriate is rectitude or riglitness. Dr. 
Adams ^ has remarked, " The man who acts virtuously is said 
to act rightly. This appears more proper than to say that he 
acts according to truth ; and more clear and distinct than to 



' Whately, Log., lutrod. 4. * De Fin., lib. iii., cap. 4. 

" Harris, Dialogue on Happiness, p. 73, note. ■* Hooker, Eccles. Pol., b. i., s. 

^ Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue. 



YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 433 

aiCTITUBE — 

say that he acts according to the nature and reason of things ; 
the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only 
this — that he acts according to what reason, in the present 
circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to 
the objects before him, pronounces to be right." In like 
manner, Dr. Eeid' has said, "Prudence is a virtue, benevo- 
lence is a virtue ; but the essence and formal nature of virtue 
must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every 
other virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the 
rectitude of such conduct and turpitude of the contrary, which 
is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous 
as he pursues the former and avoids the latter." Rectitude, 
then, is that in action and in disposition of which the moral 
faculty approves. The contrary of what is right is wrong. 
Eightness and wro7igness, then, are the characteristics of action 
and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the 
foundation of moYals, the ground upon which moral distinc- 
tions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is 
right and what is wrong. 

" There are other phrases which have been used, which I 
see no reason for adopting, such as, acting contrary to the rela- 
tions of things — contrary to the reason of things — to the fitness 
of things — to the truth of things — to absolute fitness. These 
phrases have not the authority of common use, which, in mat- 
ters of language, is great. They seem to have been invented 
by s6me authors with a view to explain the nature of vice ; 
but I do not think they answer that end. If intended as defi- 
nitions of vice, they are improper ; because, in the most favour- 
able sense they can bear, they extend to every kind of foolish 
and absurd conduct, as well as to that which is vicious." ^ 

But what is rectitude or rightness as the characteristic of an 
action ? According to Price and others, this term denotes a 
simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained. It might 
as well be asked, what is truth, as the characteristic of a pro- 
position ? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and 
acknowledge truth ; but we cannot define what truth is. We 
call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. 



' Act. Pow., essay v., chap. 5. * Ibid., essay v., ch. 7. 

38 2d 



434 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PvECTITUDE — 

But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes tho 
nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, y/^.me 
explain rectitude by saying that it consists in a congruity be- 
tween an action and the relations of the agent. It is the 
idea we form of an action, when it is, in every way, conform- 
able to the relations of the agent and the circumstances in 
which he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we 
approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circum- 
stances, and in such relations, we should be under an obliga- 
tion to perform it. Now the circumstances and relations in 
which man is placed arise from his nature and from the 
nature of things in general : and hence it has been said, that 
reciittide is founded in the nature and fitness of things ; that is, 
an action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the rela- 
tions and circumstances of the agent ; and of this fitness 
conscience or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason 
does not constitute the relations ; these must arise from the 
nature of man and the nature of things ; but conscience or 
reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions 
to these relations; and these relations arising necessarily from 
the very nature of things, the conformity with them which 
constitutes rectitude, is said to be eternal and immutable. — V. 
Right. 

REDINTEGEATION. — F. Train or Thought. 

REDUCTION IN" LOGIC— The first figure of syllogism is called 
perfict ; because, 1. It proceeds directly on the Dictum, and, 
2. It arranges the terms in the most natural order. AH argu- 
ments may be, in one way or other, brought into some one of 
the four moods in the first figure : and a syllogism is, in that 
case, said to be reduced {i. e., to the first figure). These four 
are called the perfrct moods, and all the rest imperfoct. The 
mood to be reduced is called the reducend, and that to which 
it is reduced the reduct. Reduction is of two kinds. 1. Direct 
or ostensive, which consists in bringing the premisses of the 
reducend to a corresponding mood in the first figure, by trans- 
position or conversion of the premisses, and from the premisses 
thus changed deducing either the original conclusion, or one 
from which it follows by conversion. 2. Indirect, or rednctio 
per impossibile or ad absurdam, by which we prove' (in the first 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 435 

EEDUCTIOX — 

figure) not, directly, that the original conclusion is true, but 
that it cannot he false ; i. e., that an absurdity would follow 
from the supposition of its being false.' 

EEFLECTIOU [re-flecto, to bend back).— "By reflection I would 
be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its 
own operations, and the manner of them ; by reason whereof 
there come to be ideas of these operations in the understand- 
ing. Those two, viz., — external material things, as the objects 
of sensation; and the operations of our own minds within, as 
the objects of reflection, are to me the only originals from 
whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term opera- 
tions here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely 
the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of pas- 
sions arising sometimes from them, such as in the satisfaction 
or uneasiness arising from any thought.^'- 

" When we make our own thoughts and passions, and the 
various operations of our minds, the objects of our atten- 
tion, either while they are present, or when they are recent 
and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called reflec- 
tion."^ 

He* gives a more extensive (but less proper) signification to 
reflection. 

Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards things 
present. Reflection has to do with things past and the ideas 
of them. Attention may employ the organs of the body. Re- 
flection is purely a mental operation. It is not a simple act. 
In reflection we may analyze and compound, abstract and 
generalize. These operations of mind so arranged as to gain 
some end, constitute a method. And a method is just the act 
of reflecting or properly employing the energies of the mind 
on the objects of its knowledge. 

"Reflection creates nothing — can create nothing; everything 
exists previous to reflection in the consciousness, but every- 
thing pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity ; it is the 



» Whately, Log., h. ii., ch. 3, §§ 5, 6. 

^ Locke, Essay on Sum. Understand., book ii., chap. 1. 

^ Reid, Intell. Poxv., essay i., chap. 2. Also chap. 5, and essay vi. 

* Ibid., essay iii,, chap. 5. Also essay vi , chap. 1, 



436 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EEFLECTIOM — 

work of reflection in adding itself to consciousness, to illumi- 
nate that which was obscure, to develop that which was en- 
veloped. Reflection is for consciousness what the microscope 
and the telescope are for the natural sight : neither of these 
instruments makes or changes the objects ; but in examining 
them on every side, in penetrating to their centre, these instru- 
ments illuminate them, and discover to us their characters 
and their laws."^ — V. Observatiox, Speculation. 

EEELEX SEHSES. — F. Sense, Idea. 

REGrlTLATIVE (German, Regidativ) does not a x^riori determine 
how sumething must be or is to be, but how something must 
be sought. — V. Constitutive. 

RELATIOiN' [re-fero, relafiim, to bear back). — "When the mind 
so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and 
set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, 
this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the de- 
nominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, 
and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject 
itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we 
call relatives; and the things so brought together related. 
Thus, when the mind considers Cains as such a positive being, 
it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Cains ; 
V. g., when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my 
mind but the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, 
when I say Cains is a white man, I have nothing but the bare 
consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when 
I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other per- 
son ; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some 
other thing ; in both cases my thought is led to something 
beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consider- 
ation." - The two things thus brought into consideration are 
called relatives or correllatives, as father and son, husband and 
wife. 

"In all relation there must be a subject whence it com- 
mences, as snow; another where it terminates, as a sivan; the 
relation itself, similitude ; and lastly, the source of that rela^ 

' Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Phil., vol. i., p. 275. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 25. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 437 

RELATION — 

tion, whiteness; the swan is related to the snow by both of 
them being white." ' 

This is called predicamental relation, and forms one of the 
categories (rtpoj -tL) of Aristotle. 

"Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined 
between two or more things ; or any comparison which is 
made by the mind, is a relation. When we look at these two 
lines rr=^==:i we do not merely think of them separately, 
as this straight line and that straight line ; bvit they are im- 
mediately connected together by a comparison which takes 
place in the mind as soon as they meet the eye. We perceive 
that these two lines are alike ; they are both straight ; and we 
call the notion that is formed by the compai'ison, the relation 
of sameness. We may then think of them as the same in 
length; this comparison gives ns the notion which we call the 
relation of equalitij. We think of them again as equally dis- 
tant from each other, from end to end, and then we say they 
are parallel lines ; this word parallel represents nothing exist- 
ing in the lines themselves, but only the notion formed by 
measuring the distance between them. All these notions 
spring up in the mind from the comparison of the two objects; 
they belong entirely to the mind, and do not exist in the things 
themselves." ^ 

"Another way," says Dr. Reid,^ "in which we get the no- 
tion of I'elations (which seems not to have occurred to Mr. 
Locke), is when, by attention to one of the related objects, we 
perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain 
relation to something else, which before, perhaps, we never 
thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects 
produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation 
between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, 
I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist 
without a substance ; that is, something which is coloured, 
figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be quali- 
ties, I should never have had any notion of their subject, or 
of their relation to it. By attending to the operations of 
thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there 

' Harris, Phil. Arrange., chap. 16. * Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

^ Intell. Pow., essay vi., cliap. 2. 

38* 



4.38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

REIATIOIf-- 

must be something which thints, remembers, and reasons, 
which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that 
happens in nature, judgment informs us that there must be a 
cause of this change which had power to produce it ; and thus 
we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the relation be- 
tween them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it 
cannot exist without space ; hence we got the notion of space 
(which is neither an object of sense nor of consciousness), and 
of the relation which bodies have to a certain portion of un- 
limited space, as their place." — See also Reid.^ Buffier calls 
relation, in this view, Occasio qtiam prcebet objectinn cogitandi 
de alio. — V. Suggestion. 

Although relations are not real entities, but merely mental 
modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our ideas of 
relation are not vague nor arbitrary, but are determined by the 
known qualities of the related objects. We cannot at will see 
relations for which there is no foundation in the nature of the 
related objects. Of all relations, the relations of number are 
the clearest and most accurately appreciated. 

RELATIVE is opposed to absolute — q.v. — V. Term. 

RELIGION [relego, religo). — This word, according to Cicero,^ is 
derived from, or rather compounded of, re and legere, to read 
over again, to reflect upon or to study the sacred books in 
which 7'eligion, is delivered. According to Lactantius,^ it comes 
from re-ligare, to bind back — because religion is that which 
furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. Augustine^ gives 
the same derivation of the word. But he gives another origin 
of it,^ where he says, "Deum, qui fons est nostra; beatitudinis, 
et oninis desiderii nostri finis, eligentes, immo potiiis religentes, 
ar)iiseramus enim negligentes ; hunc, inquam, religentes, unde 
et religio dicta est, ad eum dilectione tendamus, lit perveniendo 
quiescamus." 

' "As it is natural for man to review the train of his past ac- 
tions, it is not incredible that the word religion is derived from 
relegere; and that its primary reference is to that activity of con- 
/ science which leads us to review the past actions of our lives." ^ 

• Inquiry, chap. 1, sect. 7. ^ De JYat. Dtorum, ii., 28. 

' Dm. Insfit., 4. * De Vera. Relig., c. 55. 

' De Civit. Dei, lib. x., c. 3, ^ Gellius, JVocl.. Attic., No. 9. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 439 

HELIGIOH — 

"Belligio, according to its primary signification, is perpetu- 
ally thoughtful, save in regard to some object affecting the 
conscience." ' 

MllUer, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a Disserta- 
iion on this word in 1834. 

Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or that 
knowledge of God and of our duty which, is derived from the 
light of nature or reason — and that knowledge of God and of 
our duty which comes to us from positive revelation. 

The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as 
applied to religion, inasmuch as all knowledge of God is super- 
sensuous. — V. Theology. 

In all forms of religion thei-e is one part, which may be 
called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by faith ; 
and the cnlfus, or worship, which is the outward expression or 
mode of manifesting the religious sentiment. 

REMEMBRAIfCE, EEMINISCENCE, EECOLLECTION (re- 
colligo, to gather together again ; or remiiiiscor, to remember). 
— " The perception which actually accompanies, and is an- 
nexed to any impression on the body, made by an external 
object, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call 
sensation ; which is, as it Avere, the actual entrance of any idea 
into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when 
it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the 
external sensory, is remembrance ; if it be sought after by the 
mind, and with pain and endeavour found and brought again 
into view, it is recollection ; if it be held there long under 
attentive consideration, it is contemplation." "^ 

" In other cases, the various particulars which compose our 
stock of knowledge are recalled in consequence of an effort of 
our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the 
same name (memory), but is more properly distinguished by 
the word recollection."^ 

^^Reminiscence is the act of recovering, and recollection the 
act of combining remembrances. Those eminences to which 
we attach the subordinate parts of an object come first into 



* Donaldson, Varroniamcs, p. 407, 2d edit. 

'^ Locke, Esaay on Hum. Understand., book ii.. chap. 19. 

^ Stewart, Elements, chap. 6, sect. 1. 



440 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



reminiscence; wKen the intervening portions present them- 
selves in order, the recollection is complete." ' 

EEMINISCEKTCE. — Memory is knovrledge of some former con- 
sciousness. Reminiscence is the act by which vre endeavour 
to recall and reunite former states of consciousness. It is a 
kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present con- 
sciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the 
whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. It is 
peculiar to man, while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by 
the brutes. "When we have a reminiscence," said Aristotle,'^ 
"we reason to the eifect that we formerly experienced some 
impression of such or such a kind, so that in having a remi- 
niscence we syllogise." 

" There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with 
the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the 
present backward, from thought of the place where we miss at, 
to the thought of the place from whence we came last ; and 
from the thouglit of that to the thought of a place before, till 
we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we 
miss: and this is called reminiscence."^ — V. Contemplation, 
Memory, Retention. 

EEMINISCENCE according to Plato. 

" Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that 
every man is born with a certain reminiscence, and that when 
we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we 
knew in a former state." ^ 

The term employed by Plato was avdiivtjat,^, which may be 
translated " knowing up." He did not apply it to every kind 
or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous movement of 
the mind by which it ascended from mere opinion (86|a) to 
science (srtitfT'j^fu;). On such occasions the appearances of 
truth and beauty suggested or evolved the ideas of the true 
and the beautiful ; which seemed to belong to the soul and to 
have been formerly known. There was a stirring up or calling 
into act what was in the soul potentially. That they had been 
known in that former state of existence which Plato, in a 

' Taylor, Synonyms. ^ De Mem. et Beminucentia, c. 2. 

'■* Hobbes, Bttm. Nat., chap. 4. 

* Bolingbroke, esaav ii., Presumption of Philosophers. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 441 

REMINISCENCE — 

myth, represented^ the soul to have enjoyed, and were now 
merely recalled or remembered, is the view commonly given.' 
But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by the 
use of this word was, that all science or certainty is intui- 
tive, and belongs to the reason, which gives knowledge in 
the last and highest degree. Conjecture [slxaaua), belief 
(rttWtj), which, when conjoined, give opinion {86^a), and rea- 
soning (Stctvota), which are the other degrees of knowledge, 
according to Plato, being unable to give ground for science or 
certainty."^ 

Olympiodox'us, in a Commentary on the PJuedo of Plato, 
quoted by Harris,^ says : — "Inasmuch as the soul, by contain- 
ing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform repre- 
sentation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense 
it recollects those principles which it contains within, and 
bi'ings them forth." 

" Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of reminiscence 
as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the mind has 
to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, universal ideas, 
and the raanuer in which it rises to them resembling the 
manner in which is awakened all at once within us the re- 
membrance of what we have dreamed."^ 

It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a mid- 
wife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth truths 
with which the mind was big and in labour. He unfolded 
what was infolded. 

' BoetKius^ says, the mind by teaching is only excited to 
know. And Aquinas, De Magistro, says, "Omnis disciplina 
jit ex pre-exiatenti cognitione. . . . Ex homine docente cer- 
titudinem scientice non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitiido 
principiorum." 

According to Mons. Chastel,^ Thomas Aquinas in his trea- 
tise, De Magistro, maintains the following points : — 

1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pre- 

* Cicero, Tuscul., i., 24. 

^ Heusde, Init. Philosoph., Platon., Svo, 1827, torn, i., pp. 33, 34. 
' Hermes, p. 282. 

* Manuel de Philosophie, Svo, Paris, 1846, p. 139. 
^ Da Consol. 

" Les Eo.tionalisies et Us Traditionalistes, 12mo, Paris, 18-50, p. 150, 



442 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EEMmiSCEirCE— 

existent in us the knowledge of general principles, evident of 
themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames 
immediately to itself by the aid of the first sensations ; for 
all teaching supposes, in him who learns, some anterior know- 
ledge. 

2. But these first-truths, conditions pre-requisite for all 
teaching, these general principles, these principles which are 
native and not taught, are known to us by that light of reason 
which God hath put in us as the image of that uncreated truth 
which is reflected in our mind. They are given to us by 
nature as the germ of all the cognitions to which we ulti- 
mately attain. 

There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a man 
to be ignorant. 

3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he 
who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other truths 
connected with these. His teaching consists in showing us 
this connection. Properly speaking, it is the knowledge of 
these principles and not teaching which gives us secondary 
knowledge, although teaching is the mediate cause. It would 
be impossible for us to learn of a man the knowledge which he 
wishes to teach us, if there were not in us beforehand those 
principles to which he connects his knowledge ; and all the 
certainty of that knowledge comes to us from the certainty of 
those principles, and ultimately from God, who has given us 
the light of reason to know them. 

4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from teach- 
ing, although teaching may give secondary truths connected 
with them. 

5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject accord- 
ing to their conformity with the truth that is in us. 

6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there 
are many which the mind may discover by its own force, as 
there are many diseases which cure themselves. 

Augustine also has a treatise, De Magistro, in which, from 
a different point of view, he comes to conclusions substantially 
the same. " The certainty of science comes to us from God, 
who has given to us the light of reason. For it is by this light 
that we know principles, and it is from principles that we 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 443 

REMmiSCENCE — 

derive the certainty of science. And yet it is true, in a certain 
sense, that man produces in us knowledge. The pupil, if 
interrogated before teaching, could answer as to those princi- 
ples by aid of which all teaching proceeds ; but he could not 
answer upon those things which are taught, which are the 
consequences of those principles. So that he does not learn 
principles but only the consequences of them. 

D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart," says, "It should 
seem that everything we learn from a good metaphysical 
book is only a sort of reminiscence of what the mind previously 
knew. 

Sir Walter Scott and others have alluded to a mental affec- 
tion which they designate the sense of pre-esistence. When 
the mind is in this state the scenes and events which are pre- 
sent and passing appear to have formerly been objects of con- 
sciousness.^ 

On the Reminiscence of Plato, see Piccolomineus.' 
REPEESENTATIVE. — F. Knowledge. 

RESEEVATIOSr or RESTEICTIOIir (as it is caUed by casuists) 
has reference to the duty of speaking what is true ; and is 
distinguished as real and mental. 
E,eal Restriction takes place when the words used are not true 
if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from truth if 
the circumstances be considered. One man asks another, Have 
you dined ? and the answer given is, No. The party giving 
this answer has dined, times without number. But his answer 
is restricted by the circumstances to to-day; and in that sense 
is true. 
Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying so far 
what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some 
qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor asked by 
his creditor for payment of his debt, says, — "I will certainly 
pay you to-morrow" adding to himself — "in part," whereas 
the words audibly uttered referred to the whole amount. 

There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, A Treatise of 

• Vol. ii., p. 23. 

^ See quotations and references on this curious phenomenoTi in Notes and Queries, 
17th January, 1857, p. 50. 
■* Bhilosoph. De Moribus, Francof., 1583, p. 400. 



444 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

RESEEVATIOH — 

Equivocation, from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, written 
about 1600. It was referred to in tlie trials on the Gunpow- 
der Plot. 

The following occurs at p. 17: — "A farmer hath come to 
sell corn. He selleth all that he can sell, because he reserveth 
the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh one and 
desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and swear (if it be 
needful) that he hath none ; for the circumstance of the person 
)nterpreteth the meaning to be that he hath none to sell." — 
This is Reservation or Restriction, rather than Equivocation. 

At p. 29: — " If I be asked whether such a one be in my 
house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, ' Non est 
hie,' meaning he doth not eat in my house." — This is Equivo- 
cation — q. V. 

EETEMTIOF {reti7ieo, to keep hold of). 

"The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes 
a power of retention (out of consciousness). To this conser- 
vative power I confine exclusively the term Memory." ' 

'* There seems good reason for confining the appellation of 
memory to the simple power of retention, which undoubtedly 
must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irresolva- 
ble into any other. The power of recalling the preserved 
impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to be only a 
modified exercise of the suggestive or reproductive faculty." - 
— V. Memory. 

E.IGHT. — "Right and duty are things very different, and have 
even a kind of opposition ; yet they are so related that the one 
cannot even be conceived without the other ; and he that 
understands the one must understand the other. They have 
the same relation which credit has to debt. As all credit sup- 
poses an equivalent debt, so all rigJtt siipposes a corresponding 
duiy. There can be no credit in one party withoiit an equi- 
valent debt in another party : and there can be no right in 
one party, without a corresponding dzity in another party. 
The sum of credit shows the sum of debt ; and the sum of 
men's rights shows, in like manner, the sum of their duty to 
one another. 

» Sir WDl. Hamilton, JReid's Works, p. 912. « Dr. Tulloch, Theism, p. 206. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 445 

RIGHT - 

" The word right has a very different meaning, according 
as it is applied to actions or to persons. A rigM action 
[rectum) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we 
speak of the rights of men [jus], the word has a very different, 
and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and 
signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may law- 
fully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of 
any other person. 

"We can be at no loss to perceive the duties corresponding 
to the several kinds of rights. What I have a right to do, it 
is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing. What 
is my property or real right, no man ought to take from me ; 
or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And what I 
have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to perform. 
Between the right on the one hand, and the duty on the other, 
there is not only a necessary connection, but, in reality, they 
are only different expressions of the same meaning, just as it 
is the same thing to say, I am your debtor, and to say, you are 
my creditor ; or as it is the same thing to say, I am your 
father, and to say, you are my son." 

"As there is a sti'ict notion of justice, in which it is distin- 
guished from humanity and charity, so there is a more exten- 
sive signification of it, in which it includes those virtues. The 
ancient moralists, both Greek and Roman, under the cardinal 
virtue of Justice, included Beneficence ; and in this extensive 
sense, it is often used in common language. The like may be 
said of light, which in a sense not uncommon, is extended to 
every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the 
claims of strict justice. But, as it is proper to distinguish 
these two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natu- 
■ ral jurisprudence have given the name of perfect rights to the 
claims of strict justice, and that of imperfect rights to the 
claims of charity and humanity. Thus all the duties of 
humanity have imperfect rights corresponding to them, as 
those of strict justice have perfect rights." ' 

" The adjective right has a much wider signification than 
the substantive right. Everything is right which is conform- 

' Reid, Act. Pow., essay t., chap. 3. 

39 



446 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

RIGHT- 

able to the supreme rule of human action ; but that only is a 
right which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized 
in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two 
words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a 
poor man has no 7'ight to relief, but it is right he should have 
it. A rich man has a right to destroy the harvest of his fields, 
but to do so would not be right. 

" To a right, on one side, corresponds an obligation on the 
other. If a man has a rigJit to my horse, I have an ohligation 
to let him have it. If a man has a right to the fruit of a 
certain tree, all other persons are under an ohligation to 
abstain from appropriating it. Men are obliged to respect 
each others' rights. 

" My obligation is to give another man his right; my duty 
is to do what is right. Hence duty is a wider term than 
obligation ; just as right, the adjective, is wider than right the 
substantive. 

"Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the correlative 
right. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is 
right, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, 
however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the 
discharge of our duties, as having a moral claim upon us. A 
distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in 
which it is our duty to relieve him. 

" The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed 
by using the terms perfect ohligation and imperfect obligation 
for obligation and duly respectively ; and the terms perfect 
right and imperfect right for right and moral claim respectively. 
But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as 
if our duties arose from the rights of others ; and as if duties 
were only legal obligations, with an inferior degree of binding 
force."' — V. Jurisprudence, Rectitude. 
ROSICE.UCIAK'S, a name assumed by a sect of Hermetical phi- 
losophers, who came into notice in Germany towards the close 
of the fourteenth century. Christian Rosenkreuz, from whom, 
according to some, the name is derived, was born in 1378, 
travelled to the East, and after keeping company with magi- 

• Whewell, ElemenU nf Morality, book i., ? 84-89. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 447 

EOSICJRUCIANS- 

cians aud cabalists, i-eturned to Germany with their secrets, 
which he communicated to three of his friends, or sons, and 
shutting himself up in a cave, died at the age of 106 in 1484. 
Tlie secrets of the fraternity of the Rosy Cross, which gradually 
increased in numbers, had reference to four points — the trans- 
mutation of metals, the prolongation of life, the knowledge of 
what is passing in distant places, and the application of the 
Cabala aud the science of numbers to discover the most hidden 
things. They assumed the signatvire F.R.C., or Fratixs Boris 
Cocti, it being pretended that the matter of the philosopher's 
stone was dew concocted. Or, according to Mosheini, the 
name is compounded of Ros, dew ; and crux, the cross. In 
the language of alchemy, the figure of the cross signifies light, 
and dew was reckoned the most powerful dissolvent of gold ; 
so that a Rosicrucian meant one who, by the assistance of . 
dew, sought for light or the philosopher's stone.' 
RULE, — " Rectitude is a law, as well as a rule to us ; it not only 
directs, but binds all, as far as it is perceived."^ 

A rule prescribes means to attain some end. But the end 
may not be one which all men are to aim at ; and the rule may 
not be followed by all. A law enjoins something to be done, 
and is binding upon all to whom it is made known. 

"A ride, in its proper signification, is an instrument, by 
means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to 
another, which for this very reason is called a straight line. 

" In a figurative and moral sense, a ride imports nothing 
else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure 
and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes."" 



SABAISM (from i<3^f , signifying a host, or from tsaba, in Syriac, 
to adore ; or from Saha the son of Cush, and grandson of Seth) 
means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, which 

* Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., vol. iv. ; Louis Figuier, VAlcIdmie et Les Alchimistes. Par., 
1856. 
^ Price, Mev. of Morals, chap. 6. 
'^ Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. Tmw, part i., chap. 5. 



448 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SABAISM — 

prevailed from an early period in the East, especially in Syi'ia, 
Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia. The Sabseans are not mentioned 
by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the Arabian authors 
they are called Nabatheans, as if descendants from Nebaioth, 
son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are expounded by Moses 
Maimonides in the third part of his Avork, De More Nevochim. 
There was a popular and a philosophic creed with them. Ac- 
cording to the former the stars were worshipped ; and the sun, 
is supreme God, ruled over heaven and earth, and the other 
heavenly bodies were but the ministers of bis will. According 
to the philosophic creed, the stars consisted of matter and 
mind. God Is not the matter of the universe, but the spirit 
which animates it. But both are eternal, and will externally 
exist, for the one cannot pass into, or absorb the other. 

Pocock, Specimen Hist. Arab. ; ' Hyde, Veterinn Persarum 
Historia;^ Spencer, De Legihtis Hehraorum.'^ 

SAME, in its primary sense, denotes identity — g. v. 

In a secondary sense it denotes great similarity, and in 
popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two 
things being nearly the same. To this ambiguity, Whately 
refers much of the error of realism; of Plato's theory of 
ideas; of the personification and deification in poetical my- 
thology, &C.'' 

SANCTION [sancio, to ratify or confirm). — "I shall declare the 
sanction of this law of nature, viz., those rewards which God 
hath ordained for the observation of it, and those punishments 
He hath appointed for its breach or transgression."* 

" The sanctions of rewards and punishments which God has 
annexed to his laws have not, in any proper sense, the nature 
of obligation. They are only motives to virtue, adapted to the 
state and condition, the weakness and insensibility of man. 
They do not make or constitute duty, but presuppose it."^ 

The consequences which naturally attend virtue and vice are 
the sanction of duty, or of doing what is right, as they are 
intended to encourage us to the discharge of it, and to deter 



■■ 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. J38. = Svo, Oxf.. 1766. 

3 2 vols., fol., Camb., 1724. * Whately, Log., App. i. 

5 Tyrell, On the Law of Nature, p. 125. 

8 Adams, Sermon on Nature and Obligation of Virtue. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 449 

SA^CTIOF- 

iis from the breach or neglect of it. And these natural con- 
sequences of virtue and vice are also a declaration, on the part 
of God, that He is in favour of the one and against the other, 
and are intimations, that His love of the one and His hatred of 
the other may be more fully manifested hereafter. By Locke, 
Paley, and Bentham, the term sanction, or enforcement of 
obedience, is applied to reward as vrell as to punishment. But 
Mr. Austin' confines it to the latter ; perhaps, because human 
hiAYS only punish, and do not reward. 
SAVAGE and BARBAROUS.— Ferguson'^ states that the his- 
tory of mankind, in their rudest state, may be considered 
under two heads, viz., that of the savage, who is not yet ac- 
quainted with property, and that of the barbarian, to whom 
it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of 
care and desire. 

The distinction here made between the savage and the bar- 
ba7'ous states of society, resolves itself into the absence or 
presence of political government ; for without political govern- 
ment, property cannot exist. The distinction is an important 
one ; and it would be convenient to apply the term savage to 
communities which are permanently in a state of anarchy, which 
ordinarily exist without government, and to apply the term 
barbarous to Communities, which, though in a rude state as 
regards the arts of life, are nevertheless subject to a govern- 
ment. In this sense, the North American Indians would be 
in a savage, while the Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic 
nations, would be in a barbarous state. Montesquieu's'' dis- 
tinction between savages and barbarians, is different in form, 
but in substance it is founded on the same principle. Hugh 
Murray"* laj'^s it down that the savage form of society is with- 
out government. 

According to many ancient and modern philosophers, the 
savage state was the primitive state of the human race. But 
others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, having maintained 
that the nations now found in a savage state have accidentally 



• Province of Jurispr. Ddermined, p. 10. 

^ Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, part ii., sect. 2. ' Esprit des Lens, xviii. 11. 

* Enquiries respecting the. Character of Nalimis, and. the Progress of Society, Edin., 
1808, p. 230. 

39- 2e 



450 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SAVAGE — 

degenei'ated from the primitive state, ■which was a state of 
knowledge and civilization. 
SCEPTICISM {sxETfto/A-ai, to look, to seek) is used as synony- 
mous with doubt — q. v. But doubt may be removed by evidence, 
and give way to conviction or belief. The characteristic of 
scepticism is to come to no conclusion for or against — tftoxri, 
holding off, and consequent tranquillity— di'ttpalta. Absolute 
obj ective certainty being unattainable, scepticism holds that in 
the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side 
as on the other — ovhsv fidjo^ov. It was first taught by Pyrrho, 
who flourished in Greece about 340 B.C. Hence it is some- 
times called Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a 
bad sense, as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the 
following passages it means, more correctly, the absence of 
determination. 

"We shall not ourselves venture to determine anything, in 
so great a point ; but sceptically leave it undecided." ' 

"That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley's) are, in reality, 
merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no 
answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to 
cause that momentary -amazement, and irresolution, and con- 
fusion, which is the result of scepticism."^ 

Scepticism is opposed to dogmatism — q.v. 

"The writings of the best authors among the ancients being 
full and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost they 
will. He that I am reading seems always to have the most 
force ; and I find that every one in turn has reason, though 
they contradict one another." 

This is said by Montaigne,^ in the true spirit of scepticism. 

" Que scais-je f was the motto of Montaigne, 
As also of the first academicians; 
That all is dubious which man may-attain, 
Was one of their most favourite positions. 
There's no such tiling as certainty, that's plain 
As any of mutality's conditions; 
So little do we know what we're about in 
This world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting." 

Byron.* 

'■ Cudworth, InttU. Syst, p. 806. 

^ Hume, Essays, note, p. 369, 4to edit. 

^ Book ii., chap. 12. * Doti Juan, Canto ix., xvii. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 461 

SCEPTICISM — 

Glanvill (Joseph) has a work which he entitled Scepsis 
Scientifica, or the Folly of Dogmatising ; StaucUin wrote the 
History and Spirit of Scepticism;^ Sanchez (Fr,) or Sanctius 
wrote a Tractatus de multum nohili et prima loniversali scientia, 
quod nihil sciiur;^ Crousaz has Examen du Pyrrhonisrne An- 
cienne et Moderne. 

SCHEMA {(^XW'^' shape), "termed by Mr. Semple effigiation, is 
the representation of a universal proceeding of the imagination 
to procure for a conception its image. To all conceptions an 
obj ect must be given, and obj ects are given to us only through 
the modification of the sensibility. Pure conceptions c^ priori 
must contain a priori formal conditions of the sensibility (of 
the internal sense especially), under which alone the pure 
understanding-conception d piHori can be applied to any object 
d pi'iori. This formal and pure condition of sensibility, and 
to which the pure understanding-conception is restricted in its 
use, is termed by Kant the transcendental schema of this under- 
standing-conception. The procedure with these schemata, or 
the sensible conditions under which pure understanding alone 
can be used, he also termed the schematismus of the pure 
understanding. The schema is only in itself a product of the 
imagination, but it is still to be distinguished from an image 
in this respect, that it is a single intviition. Five dots in a line, 
for example, are an image of the number five ; but the schema 
of a conception, for instance, of a number in general, is more 
the representation of a method of representing a multitude 
according to a certain conception, for instance a thousand, in 
an image, than this image itself." ^ 

SCHOLASTIC. — Scholasticus, as a Latin word, was first used by 
Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to the rhetori- 
cians in his day: and we read in Jerome, that Serapion, having 
acquired great fame, received as a title of honour the surname 
Scholasticus. When the schools of the Middle Ages were opened, 
it was applied to those charged with the education of youth. 

" We see the original sense of the word scholastic," says Dr. 
Hampden,^ "in the following passage: — Omnes enim in scrip- 

» 2 vols., Leipsio, 1794-5. ^ 4to., Lyons, 1583. 

^ Haywood, Explan. of Terms in Crit. nf Pure Reason. 
* Banipioii Led., i., p. 7. 



452 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

SCHOLASTIC — 

lis suis causas iantum egerunt suas ; et proprits magis laudibus 
quani aliorum utilitatibus consulentes, non idfacere adnisi sunt 
uf salvbres et salutiferi, sed ut schoiastici ac diserii haherentur." 
— Salvianus.' 

Scholastic Pliilosophy. — This phrase denotes a period rather 
tlian a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was 
taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle 
Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the six- 
t/centh century. What has been called the Classic Age of the 
scholastic philosophy/, includes the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of Aristotle were 
introduced into France by Latin translations, and terminates 
Avith the Council of Florence and the taking of Constantinople. 
The only philosophy that was taught during that period, was 
taught by the clergy ; and was therefore very much mixed up 
with theology. The only way of teaching was by lectures or 
dictates ; and hence the phrase, legere in philosophia. There 
was no one system uniformly taught ; but different and con- 
flicting opinions were held and promulgated by different doc- 
tors. The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was 
taught by proalections on Donatus and Priscian, and rhetoric 
by praelections on some parts of Cicero or Boethius. But logic 
shared most of their attention, and was taught by preelections 
on such of the ATorks of Aristotle as were best known. The 
Timceus of Plato also occupied much of their attention ; and 
they laboured to reconcile the doctrines of the one philosopher 
with those of the other. ♦ 

Mr. Moreir^ says, "It has been usual to divide the whole 
scholastic periods into three eras.^ — 1. That which was marked 
by the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, that 
is, authority. 2. That which was marked by the friendly alli- 
ance of philosophy with dogmatic theology. 3. The commence- 
ment of a separation between the two, or the dawn of the 
entire independence of philosophy. 

The first years of scholastic philosophy were marked by 
aidhority. In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigena 



> D& GuUrn. Dei, Prmfat. ^ Phil, of Religion, p. 369. 

' Tenneman makes four periods of scholastic philosophy, according to the prevalence 
of Realism or Nomiualism. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 453 

SCHOLASTIC - 

attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred years 
after, the first era was brought to a close by Abelard. The 
second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and 
Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Roger Bacon, followed by 
Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third and declining 
era. 

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the invention 
of printing, and the progress of the Reformation, put an end 
to the scholastic philosophy. Philosophy was no longer con- 
fined to the schools and to prjelections. The press became a 
most extensive lecturer, and many embraced the opportunities 
ofi"ered of extending knowledge. 

In addition to general histories of philosophy, see Rousse- 
lot, Etudes siir la Philosophie clans le Mot/en Age;^ Haureau, 
Be la Philosophie Scholastique ; ^ Cousin, Fragmens Philoso- 
phiques? Also his Introduction to (Euvres inedites d' Abelard. 
SCIENCE {scieniia) means knowledge, emphatically so called, 
that is, knowledge of principles and causes. 

Science (iTtiatrifii^) has its name from bringing us {erti 
otdaiv) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away 
from the unbounded nature and mutability of particulars ; for 
it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable. 
This etymology given by Nicephorus (Blemmida), and long 
before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from 
Plato, as may be seen in his Cratylus. 

""O-tv scientice fundamentum est, Bioin fastigium." * 

" Sir Will. Hamilton, in his Lectures on Logic, defined 
science as a ' complement of cognitions, having, in point of 
form, the character of logical perfection, and in point of mat- 
ter, the character of real truth.' "^ 

Science is knowledge evident and certain in itself, or by the 
principle from which it is deduced, or with which it is cer- 
tainly connected. It is subjective as existing in a mind — ob- 
jective, as embodied in truths — specidalive, as resting in at- 
tainment of truths, as in physical science — practical, as lead- 
ing to do something, as in ethical science. 

» 3 torn., 8vo, Paris, 1S40-2. * 2 torn., 8to, Paris, 1850. 

* Tom. iii., Paris, 1840. * Trendelenburg, Ekmenta Log. Arist, p. 76. 

' DoTe, Political Science, p. 76. 



451 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SCIENCE - 

Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater,' as 
follows : — 

Science consists in an infallible and unchanging knowledge 
of phenomena. 

Art is a system formed from observation, and directed to a 
useful end. 

Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of 
previous practice. 

Art is of three kinds — theoretic, practical, and mixed. 

" No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. 
The examples given are of science, not art. It is a part of 
grammatical science to say that all words with a certain termi- 
nation have a certain accent. When this is converted into a 
rule, it becomes part of an art."^ 

" In science, scimns ut sciamus; in art, scimus ut produca- 
tnus. And, therefore, science and art may be said to be inves- 
tigations of truth:" but one, science, inquires for the sake of 
knowledge : the other, art, for the sake of production : * and 
hence science is more concerned with the higher truths, art 
with the lower : and science never is engaged as art is in pro- 
ductive application.^ And the most perfect state of science, 
therefore, will be the most high and accurate inquiry ; the 
perfection of art will be the most apt and efficient system of 
rules: art always throwing itself into the form of rules."® — 
Kar slake.'' 

" Science and art differ from one another, as the understand- 
ing differs from the will, or as the indicative mood in grammar 
differs from the imperative. The one deals in facts, the other 
in precepts. Science is a collection of truths ; art a body of 
rules, or directions for conduct. The language of science is, 
This is, or. This is not ; This does, or does not happen. The 
language of art is. Do this. Avoid that. Science takes cogniz- 

' On Hermogenes, apud Rhet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Walz. 
^ Sir G. C. Lewis, On Methods of Observ. in Politics, chap. 19, sect. 2. 
■■• This is, speaking logically, "the Genus" of the two. 
■• These are their differentia, or distinctive characteristics. 
1 These are their specific properties. 

s This distinction of science and art is given in Aristotle. — See Posiei: Analyt., i., 
194, ii., 13. 

' Aids to Log., b. i., p. 24. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 455 

SCIEHCE — 

ance of & phenomenon, and endeavours to discover its law; art 
proposes to itself an end, and looks out for means to effect it." ' 
— V. Akt, DejMONSTRATION. 

SCIEJf CES (The Occult) are so called (from occnlto, to hide or 
conceal) because they have reference to qualities or powers 
which are not such as are common or commonly known. The 
belief in beings having superhuman powers, as fairies, familiars, 
dsemons, &c., in augury, oracles, witchcraft, &c., in dreams and 
visions, &c., in divination and astrology, &c., and in talismans 
and amulets, &c., leads to the prosecution of what has been 
called the Occult Sciences. — See a vol. under this title in the 
cabinet edition of the Encyclopcedia Metropolitana. 

SCIENTIA (Media).— "According to Molina, the objects of the 
divine knowledge are the possible, the actual, and tL:; condi- 
tional. The knowledge of the possible is simple intelligence ; 
of the actual, scientia visionis ; and of the conditional, scientia 
media, intermediate between that of intelligence and vision. 
An example of scientia media is that of David asking the 
oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he 
meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid 
siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon 
David took a different course." ^ 

Leibnitz^ has said, " Scientia media might rather be under- 
stood to mean the science not only of future conditionals, but 
universally of all future contingents. Then science of simple 
intelligence would be restricted to the knowledge of truths 
possible and necessary ; scientia visionis to that of truths con- 
tingent and actual. Scientia media would thus have it in 
common with the first that it concerned truths possible ; and 
with the second, that it applied to truths contingent." * 

SCIOLIST {sciolus, one who thinks he knows much and knows 
but little). — " Some have the hap to be termed learned men, 
though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge here 
and there, though they be but smatterers and mere sciolists."^ 

SCIOMACHY ((JxKx, a shadow; and ^idxri, a fight). — "But pray, 

' J. S. Mill, Essays on Pol. Econ. 

* Leibuitz, Sur la Bontc de Dieu, partie 1, sect. 40. 
^ In La Cause de IHeu, &c., sec. 17. 

* See Reid, Act. Pow., essay iv., chap. H. ' Howell, Letters, b. iii., let. 8. 



456 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SCIOMACHY- 

countryman, to avoid this sciomacliy, or imaginary combat with 
Avords, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name of tyrant." ' 

SECULARISM is the Latin for this-world-ism, and means, " attend 
to the world that you are now in, and let the next alone." ^ 

Its capital principles are — 1. That attention to temporal 
things should take precedence of considerations relating to a 
future existence. 2. That science is the providence of life, 
and that spiritual dependency in human affairs may be at- 
' tended with material destruction. 3. That there exist, inde- 
pendently of scriptural religion, guarantees of morality in 
human nature, intelligence, and utility. 

The aim of secularistn is to aggrandize the present life. For 
eternity, it substitutes time ; for providence, science ; for 
fidelity to the Omniscient, usefulness to man. Its great advo- 
cate is Mr. Holyoake. 

SECUNDUM Q,iriB (ro xa.B o) is opposed to Secundum ipsum {to 
xad av fo) as the relative to the non-^-elaiive or the limited to 
the tinlimited. Mr. Maurice illustrates Secundum qiiid by a 
passage from "As you like it:" "In respect that it is of the 
country it is a good life, but in respect it is not of the court it 
is a vile life."'' — V. Fallacy. 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. — V. Apperception. 

SELEISHNESS "consists not in the indulging of this or that 
particular propensity, but in disregarding, for the sake of any 
kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the 
feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a negative quality ; 
that is, it consists in not considering what is due to one's neigh- 
bours, through a deficiency of justice or benevolence. And 
selfishness, accordingly, will show itself in as many different 
shapes as there are different dispositions in men. 

"You may see these differences even in very young children. 
One selfish child, who is greedy, will seek to keep all the cakes 
and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is idle, will not care 
what trouble he causes to others, so he can save his own ; an- 
other, who is vain, will seek to obtain the credit which is due 
to others ; one who is covetous, will seek to gain at another's 

' Cowley, On the Govej-ninent of Olive)' Cromwell. 
^ Arnot, lllust. of Proverbs, p. 368. _^ 
^ Arist., Metaphys., lib. ir., o. 20. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 457 

SELFISHNESS - 

expense, &c. In short, each person ' has a self of his own.' 
And, consequently, though you may be of a character very 
unlike that of some selfish person, you may yet be, in your 
own way, quite as selfish as he. And it is possible to be sel- 
fish in the highest degree, without being at all too much ac- 
tuated by self-love, but unduly neglectful of others when your 
own gratification, of whatever kind, is concerned."^ 

Selfishness exists only in reference to others, and could have 
on place in one who lived alone on a desert island, though he 
might have, of course, every degree of self-love; for selfish- 
ness is not an excess of self-love, and consists not in an over- 
desire of happiness, but in placing your happiness in some- 
thing which interferes with, or leaves you regardless of that 
of others. Nor are we to suppose that selfishness and^want 
of feeling are either the same or inseparable. For, on the 
one hand, I have known such as have had very little feeling, 
but felt for others as much nearly as for themselves, and were, 
therefore, far from selfish ; and, on the other hand, some, of 
very acute feelings, feel for no one but themselves, and, in- 
deed, are sometimes among the most cruel." ^ 
SELF-LOVE is sometimes used in a general sense to denote all 
those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own 
good, just as those principles which lead us to seek the good 
of others are all comprehended under the name of benevolence. 
All our desires tend towards the attainment of some good or 
the averting of some evil — having reference either to ourselves 
or others, and may therefore be brought under the two heads 
of benevolence and self-love. 

But besides this general sense of the word to denote all 
those desires which have a regard to our own gratification or 
good, self-love is more strictly used to signify " the desire for 
our own welfare as such." In this sense, " it is quite distinct 
from all our other desires and propensities," says Dr. Whately,' 
"though it may often tend in the same direction with some 
of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water 
because he is thirsty; and another may, without thirst, drink 
— suppose from a mineral spring, because he believes it will 

' Whately, Lessons mi Morals, p. 143. 

■^ Whately, On Bacon, p., 221. ^ Lessens on Morals, p. 142. 

40 • 



458 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 

SELF-LOVE — 

be good for 'his liealtJi. This latter is impelled by self-love, but 
not the other. 

" So again, one person may pursue some course of study in 
order to qualify himself for some profession by which he may 
advance in life, and another from having a taste for that study, 
and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though 
he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not 
, acting from self-Jove. For as the object of thirst is not hap- 
piness, bvit drink, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, 
but knoAvledge. And so of the rest." 

Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cherished 
and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. But within 
due bounds it is allowable and right, and by no means incom- 
patible with benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness 
of others. And Dr. Hutcheson, who maintains that kind af- 
fection is what constitutes an agent virtuous, has said, that 
he who cherishes kind affection towards all, may also love him- 
self; may love himself as a part of the whole system of ra- 
tional and sentient beings ; may promote his own happiness 
in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of 
his love ; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, 
while he is wisely benevolent towards all.' 

The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who 
maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim is 
to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is any an- 
tagonism between benevolence and self-love. So long as self- 
love does not degenerate into selfishness, it is quite compatible 
with true benevolence. 

In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish school 
of philosophers, see Butler, Sermons;^ Turnbvill, Natvre and 
Origin of Laws ;^ Hume, On General Principles of Morals;* 
Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil;^ Haz- 
litt, Essay on Principles of Hum. Action;^ Mackintosh, View 
of Ethical Philosophy? 
SEMATOLOGY [syma., a sign ; and ^oyoj, discourse), the doctrine 
of signs — q. v. 

' Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil. sect. iii. 

■^ On Hum. Nat., on. Compassion, &c. ^ Vol. ii., p. 25S. 

" Sect, 2. 5 Sect. 2. <= P. 239. ■■ P. 192. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 459 

SENSATION. — "The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes 
perceptible is corporeal sensation. 

"Without this general innate sensation we should not 
possess the certainty that our body is our body ; for it is 
as much an object for the other senses as anything else that 
we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general in- 
nate sensation is necessary to the existence of all other parti- 
cular sensations, and may exist independently of the nervous 
system. Polypi, animals of the simplest structure, with- 
out a nervous system distinct from the rest of the organic 
mass, show traces of innate sensation. The light by means 
of which we see, acts not only on the visual nerves, but also 
on the fluids of the eye, and the sensations of sight partly de- 
pend on the structure of the eye. This sensibility, therefore, 
appears to be a necessary attribute of animated organic >:"'atter 
itself. 

"All the perceptions of sense are rooted in the general 
sensation. The child must be conscious of his senses before 
he applies them. This sensation, however, is very obscure ; 
even pain is not clearly felt by it at the place where it exists. 
Equally obscure is the notion which it entertains of an object. 
Though Brach, therefore, is right in ascribing something ob- 
jective, even to the general sensation, since conditions cannot 
communicate themselves, without communicating (though 
ever so obscurely) something of that which produces the con- 
dition — nay,- strictly speaking, as even in the idea ' subject,' 
that of an ' object' is involved, yet it is advisable to abide by 
the distinction founded by Kant, according to which, by in- 
nate sensation, we especially perceive our own personality 
(subject), and by the senses we specially perceive objects, and 
thus in the ascending line, feeling, taste, smell, hearing, and 
sight. 

" The next step from this obscure original innate sensation 
is particular sensation through the medium of the nervous 
system, which, in its more profound, and yet more obscure 
sphere, produces common sensation (C(Enesthesis), and in a 
higher manifestation, the perceptions of the senses. Coenes- 
thesis, or common feeling, is referred to the ganglionic nerves. 
It may be called subjective, inasmuch as the body itself gives 



460 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY, 

SE^SATIOJf — 

the excitement to the nerve concerned.' By the Coenesthesis, 
states of our body are revealed to us which have their seat in 
the sphere of the vegetative life. These states are — 

"1. General: — corporeal heaviness and buoyan,cy, atony, 
toniety. 

"2. Special: — hunger, thirst, sexual instinct, &c. 

" The sensations of pain, titillation, itching, &c., which are 
generally cited here, belong, in their more common accepta- 
tion, to the general corporeal feeling ; in their more local 
limitation, with distinct perception of the object exciting, to 
the sense of touch ; but when they arise from the nervous 
system allotted to the vegetative sphere of the body, they 
certainly belong to the Coenesthesis in the more limited sense 
of the word. 

" To this class belongs especially the anxiety arising from 
impediment in respiration, and from nausea. 

" In the analysis of the psycho-physical processes proceed- 
ing outwards from sensation to perception, we encounter 
after the organs of the Coenesthesis, the organs of sense." ^ 
Sensation and Perception. — "A conscious presentation, if it 
refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of our own 
being, is = sensation. The same if it refers to an object, is 
^= perception." ^ 

Rousseau distinguished sensations as affectioes, or giving 
pleasure or pain ; and representatives, or giving knowledge of 
objects external. 

Paffe* distinguishes the element affectif and the element 
instructif. 

In like manner Dr. Reid regards sensation not only as a 
state of feeling, but a sign of that which occasions it. 

Bozelli-'^ calls sensations, in so far as they are representative, 



' However subjective this sensation is, there is always in it the indication of an object, 
as Brach shows : hence illustrating the instinct of animals. Presentiment, too. chiefly 
belongs to this system. 

^ Feuchtersleben, Med. Psychology, 1847, p. 83. 

"Coleridge, Church and State — quoted by Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 
p. 104. 

■* Sur la Sensibilite. 

' De V Union de la Philosoph. avec la Morale. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 461 

SENSATION - 

in their philosophical form, in so far as they give pleasure or 
pain, in their moral form or character. 

" To sensation I owe all the certainty I have of my exist- 
ence as a sentient being, to perception a certainty not less 
absolute, that there are other beings besides me." ' 

Sensation properly expresses t?iat change in the state of the 
mind which is pi'oduced by an impression upon an organ of 
sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be con- 
scious, without any knowledge of external objects) : perception, 
on the other hand, expresses the knoioledge or the intimations 
we obtain, by means of our sensations, concerning the qualities 
of matter ; and consequently involves, in every instance, the 
notion of externality or outness, which it is necessary to exclude 
in order to seize the precise import of the word sensatio\ . 

Sensation has been employed to denote — 

1. The process of sensitive apprehension, both in its subjec- 
tive and its objective relations ; like the Greek cesthesis. 

2. It was limited first in the Cartesian school, and there- 
after in that of Reid, to the subjective phasis of our sensitive 
cognitions.^ 

" Sensation proper, is not purely a passive state, but implies 
a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on 
the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention 
which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism. 
This description may at first sight appear to be at variance 
with the facts of the case, inasmuch as every severe affection 
of the body produces pain, quite independently of any know- 
ledge we may possess of the cause or of any operation of the 
will being directed towards it. Facts, however, rightly 
analyzed, show us, that if the attention of the mind be 
absorbed in other things, no impulse, though it amount to 
the laceration of the nerves, can produce in us the slightest 
feeling. Extreme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of any 
kind, can make us altogether insensible even to physical 
injury. For this reason it is that the soldier on the. field of 
battle is often wounded during the heat of the combat, without 
discovering it till exhausted by loss of blood. Numerous facts 

* Thurot, De V EnUndement, &c., torn, i., p. 43. 
^ Sir W. Hamilton, Raid's Works, note D*. 

40* 



462 VOCABULARY OT PHILOSOPHY. 

SEESATION- 

of a similar kind prove dcmonstrately, that a certain applica- 
tion and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to the 
existence of sensation, as the occurrence of physical impulse, 
on the other." — Morell, Psychology ;^ Stewart, Phil. Essays;^ 
see also Outlines;^ Reid, Essays, Intell. Pow.;^ Morell, Phil, 
of Religion.^ 

SENSE, in psychology, is employed ambiguously — 1. For the 
faculty of sensitive apprehension. 2. For its act. 3. For its 
organ. 
Sense and Idea. — In the following passage from Shaftesbury,® 
sense is used as equivalent to idea; "Nothing surely is more 
sti-ongly imprinted on our minds, or more closely interwoven 
with our souls than the idea or sense of order and proportion." 
In like manner Dr. Hutcheson has said, " There is a natu- 
ral and immediate determination to approve certain affections 
and actions consequent upon them ; or a natural sense of im- 
mediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality 
perceivable by our senses or by reasoning." We speak of a 
determination of blood to the head. This is a physical deter- 
mination or tendency. Now, there may be a mental ten- 
dency, and this, in Dr. Hiitcheson's philosophy, is called de- 
termination or sense. He defined a sense in this apj^lication 
of it "a determination to receive ideas, independent of our 
will," and he enumerates several such tendencies or determi- 
nations, which he calls reflex senses. 

SENSES (REFLEX). — Dr. Hutcheson seems to have been in 
some measure sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke's 
account of the origin of our ideas, and maintained, that in 
addition to those which we have by means of sensation and 
reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers 
of perception, which he called internal and reflex senses. 
According to his psychology, our powers of perception may 
be called direct or antecedent, and consequent or reflex. We 
hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which operate 
directly on their objects ; and do not suppose any antecedent 
perception. But we perceive the harmony of sound, and the 

' p. 107. ^ Note F (it is Q in last edit.) ^ Sect. 14. 

" Ess.ay i.. chap. 1. ^ p 7_ e Jloralists. part iii., sect. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 463 

SENSES - 

beauty of colour, by means of faculties which operate refiexly, 
or in consequence of some preceding perception. And the 
moral sense was regarded by him as a faculty of this kind. 
Reflection, from which, according to Mr. Locke, we derive the 
simple ideas of the passions and aifections of mind, was con- 
sidered by Hutcheson as an internal sense or faculty, operating 
directly. But that faculty by which we perceive the beauty 
or deformity, the virtue or vice, of these passions and affec- 
tions, was called by Hutcheson, a reflex, internal sense. — lllvs- 
trations of the Moral Sense ;^ Inqim'y concerning Moral Good 
and Evil;'' Mor. PhU.^ 

SENSIBILITY or SENSITIVITY (rb a.i^eri^ix6v) is now used 
as a general term to denote the capacity of feeling, as distin- 
guished /rom intellect and will. It includes sensations fjoth 
external and internal, whether derived from contemplating' 
outward and material objects, or relations and ideas, desires, 
affections, passions. It also includes the sentiments of the 
sublime and beautiful, the moral sentiment and the religious 
sentiment ; and, in short, every modification of feeling of 
which we are susceptible. By the ancient philosophers the 
sensibility under the name of appetite was confounded with the 
will. The Scotch philosophers have analyzed the various forms 
of the sensibility under the name of active principles ; but they 
have not gathered them under one head, and have sometimes 
treated of them in connection with things very different. 

SENSIBLES, COMMON and PKOPER [sensile or sensibile, that 
which is capable of affecting some sense ; that which is the 
object of sense). 

Aristotle* distinguished sensibles into common and p?'oper. 
The common, those perceived by all or by a plurality of senses, 
were magnitude, figure, motion, rest, number. To these five, 
some of the schoolmen (but out of Aristotle) added place, dis- 
tance, position, and continuity.^ Aristotle® admitted, how- 
ever, that the common sensibles are not properly objects of 



' Sect. 1. » Sect. 1. 

^ Book i., chap. 4, sect. 4, and also sect. 5. 

" De Aninia, lib. ii., c. 2; lib. iii., c. 1. De Sensu et Sensili, c. 1. 

5 Sir W. Hamilton, JReid's WorJcs, p 124, note. 

" De Anima, lib. iii., chaps. 1, 4. 



464 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SEHSIBLES- 

sense; butmerely con-coinitants or con-sequents of the per- 
ception of the proper sensibles. This is noticed by Hutcheson,' 
commended by Price,- by Mr. Stewart,* and by Royer Col- 
lard." 

" Sensibile commune dicitur qriod vel percipUnr phtribiis sen- 
sibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel imaginatioiu 
desumitur occasio, ex variis sensibns ; lit sunt figura, niotus, 
iibicatio, duratio, mdgnitudo, disiantia, numerus,"^ &c. 

The 2}roper sensibles are those objects of sense which are 
peculiar to one sense ; as colour to the eye, sound to the ear, 
taste to the palate, and touch to the body. 

SENSISM, SENSUALISM, or SENSUISM, is the doctrine 
that all our knowledge is derived originally from sense. 

It is not the same as empiricism, though sometimes con- 
founded with it. Empiricism rests exclusively on experience, 
and rejects all ideas which are a priori. But all experience 
is not that of sense. Empiricism admits facts and nothing 
but facts, but all facts which have beerf observed. Sensism 
gives the single fact of sensation as sufficient to explain all 
mental phenomena. Locke is empirical, Condillac is sensual. 

Sensuism, "in the emphatic language of Fichte, is called 
- 'the dirt-philosophy.'"® — V. Empiricism, Ideology. 

SENSORIUM {alaOrjtripiov) , is the organ by which, or place in 
which, the sensations of the several senses are reduced to the 
unity of consciousness. According to Aristotle it was in all 
warm-blooded animals the heart, and therefore so in man. 
According to modern philosophers the central organ is the 
brain, the pineal gland according to Descartes, the ventricles 
or the corpus callosum according to others. 

Sensoriuni signifies not so properly the organ as the place 
of sensation. The eye, the ear, &c., are organs ; but they are 
not sensoria. Sir Isaac Newton does not say that space is a 
sensoriitm ; but that it is (by way of comparison), so to say, 
the sensorium, Sm!' 



• Mor. Phil., "book i., chap. 1. ^ Review, p. 56, first edit. 

^ Philosoph. Essays, pp. 31, 46. 551, 4to. ■* (Euvres de Reid, torn, iii., p. 431. 

5 Compton C.irleton, Phil. Univ. De Anima, diss. 16, lect. ii., sect, 1. 

" Sir Will. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 38, see also p. 2. 

' Clarke. Second Reply to LeihniU. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. ' 465 

SSHSOEIITM — 

Leibnitz ' adopted and defended the explanation of Rudol- 
phus Goclenius, who, in his Lexicon PhilosopMcum, under 
Sensitorium, says, " Barbarum scholasticorum, qui interdum 
sunt simiae Grcecorum. Hi dicunt Aiadf]tripwv . Ex quo illi 
fecerunt sensitorium pro sensorio, id est, organum sensationis." 
SENSUS COMMUNIS {xo^v^ Ma9?ja^i). — This latter phrase was 
employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics "to denote the 
faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are 
reduced to the unity of a common apperception." ^ 

This faculty had an organ which was called Sensorium Com- 
mune — g. V. 

Mr. Stewart' says : — The sensus commxmis of the school- 
men denotes the power whereby the mind is enabled \,o repre- 
sent to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensa- 
tion which it has formerly experienced. Its seat was sup- 
posed to be that part of the brain (hence called the sensorium 
or sensorium commune) where the nerves from all the organs 
of perception terminate. Of the peculiar function allotted to 
it in the scale of our intellectual faculties, the following ac- 
count is given by Hobbes : — "Some say the senses receive 
the species of things and deliver them to the common sense ; 
and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy ; and 
the fancy to the memory ; and the memory to the judgment 
— like handling of things from one to another, with many 
words making nothing understood."* 

Mr. Stewart says the sensus communis is perfectly syno- 
nymous with the word conception, that is, the power by 
which we represent an object of sense, whether present or 
absent. But it is doubtful whether sensus communis was ap- 
plied by the schoolmen to the reproduction of absent objects 
of sense. 
SENTIMENT implies an idea (or judgment), because the will is 
not moved nor the sensibility aifected without knowing. But 
an idea or judgment does not infer feeling or sentiments 

' Ansiuer to the Second Reply of Clarke. 

2 Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 757, note. 

" Note D, to part ii. of Elements. 

* Of Man, part i., chap. 2. 

'' BuflSer, Log. ii., art. 9. . 

2p 



466 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SENTIMEI^T — 

" The word sentiment, in the English language, never, as I 
conceive, signifies mere feeling, hui judgment accompanied with 
feeling.^ It was wont to signify opinion or judgment of any 
kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an opinion or 
judgment that strikes, and produces some agreeable or un- 
easy emotion. So we speak of sentiments of respect, of es- 
teem, of gi'atitude ; but I never heard the pain of the gout; 
or any other severe feeling, called a sentiment." ^ 

" Mr. Hume sometimes employs (after the manner of the 
French metaphysicians) sentiment as synonymous with feel- 
ing ; a use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue."" 

" There are two sensibilities — the one turned towards nature 
and transmitting the impressions received from it, the other 
hid in the depths of our organization and receiving the im- 
pression of all that passes in the soul. Have we discovered 
truth — we experience a sentiment. Have we done a good 
deed — we experience a sentiment. A sentiment is but the echo 
of reason, but is sometimes better heard than reason itself. 
Sentiment, which accompanies the intelligence in all its move- 
ments, has, like the intelligence, a spontaneous and a reflec- 
tive movement. By itself it is a source of emotion, not of 
knowledge. Knowledge or judgment is invariable, whatever 
be our health or spirits. Sentiment varies with health and 
spirits. I always judge the Apollo Belvidere to be beautiful, 
but I do not always feel the sentiment of his beauty. A bright 
or gloomy day, sadness or serenity of mind, aifect my senti- 
ments, but not my judgment. 

" Mysticism would suppress reason and expand se^iti- 
ment."* 

Those pleasui'es and pains which spring up in connection 
with a modification of our organism or the perceptions of the 
senses, are called sensations. But the state of our mind, the 
exercise of thought, conceptions purely intellectual, are the 
occasion to us of high enjoyment or lively sufi"ering; for these 



• " This is too unqualifled an assertion. The term sentiment is in English applied to 
the higher feelings." — Sir William Hamilton. 

^ Reid, Act. Pow., essay v., chap. 7. 

* Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, last ed., note E. 
^ See Cousin, (Euvres, tom. ii.. p. 96. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 467 

SENTIMENT — 

pleasures and pains of a different kind is reserved the name 
of sentiments} 

" The word sentiment, agreeably to the use made of it by 
our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very hap- 
pily those complex determinations of the mind which result 
from the co-operation of our rational powers and our moral 
feelings. We do not speak of a man's sentiments concerning 
a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, or con- 
cerning any speculative question whatever, by which the feel- 
ings are not liable to be roused or the heart aiBfected. 

" This account of the meaning of the word corresponds, I 
think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr. Smith in the 
title of his Theory [of Moral Seniijnenl^-)."^ 
Sentiment and Opinion. — Dr. Beattie^ has said, "that the true 
and the old English sense of the word-' sentiment, is a formed 
opinion, notion, or principle." Dr. Reid, in his Essays on the 
Intell. Powers, speaks of the sentiments of Mr. Locke concern- 
ing perception ; and of the sentiments of Arnauld, Berkeley, 
and Hume concerning ideas. 

The title of chap, 7, essay ii., of Reid on Intell. Poivers, is 
Sentiments of Philosophers, &c., on which Sir W. Hamilton's 
note,* is, "Sentiment, as here and elsewhere employed by 
Reid, in the meaning of opinion (senientia), is not to be 
imitated." 

" By means of our sensations we feel, by means of our ideas 
we think : now a sentiment (from sentire) is properly a judg- 
ment concerning sensations, and an opinion (from opinari) is a 
judgment concerning ideas : our sentiments appreciate external, 
and our opinions, internal, phenomena. On questions of feel- 
ing, taste, observation, or report, we define our sentiments. 
On questions of science, argument, or metaphysical abstrac- 
tion, we define our opinions. The sentiments of the heart. 
The opinions of the mind. It is my sentiment that the wine 
of Burgundy is the best in the world. It is my opinion that 
the religion of Jesus Christ is the best in the world. There is 
more of instinct in sentiment, and more of definition in opinion. 

' Manuel de, Pliilosophie, 8to, Paris, 1846, p. 142. 

* Stewart, Philoscph. Essays, note d. 

" Essay on Truth, part ii., chap. 1, sec. 1. * P. 269 



4b5 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SEUTIMEl'T — 

The admiration of a work of art which results from first im- 
pressions, is classed with our sentiments ; and wlien we have 
accounted to ourselves for the approbation, it is classed with 
our opiyiions." ' 
SIGK^ [signum, a mark). — The definition of a sign is " that which 
represents anything to the cognitive faculty." We have know- 
ledge by sense and by intellect, and a sigii may be addressed 
to either or to both — as smoke, which to the eye and to the 
intellect indicates or signifies fire ; so that a sign has a twofold 
relation — to the thing signified and to the cognitive faculty. 

" Signs are either to represent or resenible things, or only 
to intimate and suggest them to the mind. And our ideas 
being the signs of what is intended or supposed therein, are 
in such sort and so far right, as they do either represent or 
resemble the object of thought, or as they do at least intimate 
it to the mind, by virtue of some natural connection or proper 
appointment." '^ 

Signs are divided into natural and conventional. A natural 
sign has the power of signifying from its own nature, so that 
at all times, in all places, and with all people it signifies the 
same thing, as smoke is the sign of fire. A conventional sign 
has not the power of signifying in its own nature, but sup- 
poses the knowledge and remembrance of what is signified in 
him to whom it is addressed, as three balls are the conven- 
tionally understood sign of a pawnbroker's shop. 

In his philosophy Dr. Reid makes great use of the doctrine 
of natural signs. He arranges them in three classes, — 1. 
Those Avhose connection with the thing signified is established 
by nature, but discovered only by experience, as natural causes 
are signs of their effects ; and hence philosophy is called an 
interpretation of nature. 2. Those wherein the connection 
between the sign and thing signified is not only established by 
nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle without 
reasoning or experience. Of this class are the natural signs of 
human thoughts, purposes, and desires, such as modulations of 
the voice, gestures of the body, and features of the face, which 
may be called natural language, in opposition to that which ia 

' Taylor, Sxjnonynis. ^ Oldfield, Essay on Hmson. p. 184. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 469 

SIGN — 

spoken or written. 3. A third class of natural signs compre- 
hends those which, though we never before had any notion or 
conception of the thing signified, do suggest it and at once 
give us a conception and create a. belief of it. In this way 
consciousness, in all its modifications, gives the conception 
and belief of a being who thinks — Cogito ergo sum. 

" As the first class of natural signs is the foundation of true 
philosophy, so the second is the foundation of the fine arts or 
of taste, and the last is the foundation of common sense." ' 

The doctrine or science of signs has been called Sematology. 
And as the signs which the mind makes use of in order to 
obtain and to communicate knowledge are words ; the proper 
and skilful use of words is in different ways the object' of — 1. 
Orammar ; 2. Logic; and 3. Rhetwic? 

See Berkeley, Minute Phil.;^ New Theory of Vision;* 
Theory of Vision Vindicated.^ Hutcheson, Synopsis Meta- 
phys.;^ Mor. Phil!' De Gerando, Des Signes et de I' Art de 
Penser; Adam Smith, Oji the Formation of Language. 
SIMILE.— F. Metaphor. 
Sm. — F. Evil. 

• SINCERITY implies singleness and honesty. — The Latin word 
sincerum signifies what is without mixture, and has been 
thought to be compounded of sine cera, without wax, as pure 
honey is. 

" Sincerity and sincere have a twofold meaning of great 
moral importance. Sincerity is often used to denote ' mere 
reality of conviction ;' that a man actually believes what he 
professes to believe. Sometimes, again, it is used to denote 
' unbiassed conviction,' or, at least, an earnest endeavour to 
shake off all prejudices, and all undue influence of wishes and 
passions on the judgment, and to decide impartially."^ 
SINGULAR. — F Term. 
SOCIALISM. — In the various forms under which society has 

' Keid, Inquiry, chap. 5, sec. 3. 

^ Smart, Sematology, Svo, Loncl., 1839. 

^ Dial, iv,, sect. 7, 11, 12. * Sect. 144, 147. 

' Sect. 38-43. a part ii., chap. 1. 

■" B. i., eh. 1, p. 5. 8 VThately, Log., Append, i. 

41 



470 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SOCIALISM — 

existed, private property, individual industry and enterprise, 
and the rights of marriage and of the family, have been re- 
cognized. Of late years several schemes of social arrange- 
ment have been proposed, in which one or all of these prin- 
ciples have been abandoned or modified. These schemes may 
be comprehended under the general term of socialism. The 
motto of them all is solidarite. 

Communism demands a community of goods or property. 
Fourierism or Phalansterism. would deliver men over to the 
guidance of their passions and instincts, and destroy all do- 
mestic and moral discipline. Saint Simonism or Humanita- 
rianism holds that human nature has three great functions, 
that of the priesthood, science, and industry. Each of these 
is represented in a College, above which is the father or head, 
spiritual and temporal, whose will is the supreme and living 
law" of the society. Its religion is pantheism, its morality 
materialism or epicurism, and its politics despotism.' 
SOCIETY (Desire of). — " God having designed man for a soci- 
able creature, made him not only with an inclination, and 
under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own 
kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be 
the great instrument and common tie of society."^ 

That the desire of society is natural to man, is argued by 
Plato in the Second Book of his Republic. It is also hinted at 
in his dialogue entitled Protagoras. The argument is unfolded 
by Harris in his Dialogue Concerning Happiness.^ Aristotle 
has said at the beginning of his Politics, — " The tendency to 
the social state is in all men by natiire." The argument in 
favour of society from our being possessed of speech is in- 
sisted on by him.'' Also by Cicero.^ 

In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally 
an enemy to his fellow-men, and that society is a device to 
defend men from the evils which they would bring on one 
another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when 



' Diet, des Sciences Philosopli. 

^ Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iii., chap. 1. 

" Sect. 12. ■* Polit., lib. i., cap. 2. 

5 De Legibus, lib. i., cap. 9 ; De Officiis, lib. i., cap. 16 ; Be Nat. Dcorim, lib. ii., 
cap. 59. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 471 

SOCIETY — 

admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in oppo- 
sition to Hobbes.' 

Man is a social animal, according to Seneca.^ Lactantius 
says that he is a social animal by nature,^ in which he follows 
Cicero.* " Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed 
or quarrelled, in troops and companies."^ "La nature de 
riiomme le porte h. vivre en soci6t6. Quelle qu'en soit la 
cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout oii I'on 
a rencontr^ des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en 
corps de nation. Peut-etre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour 
leur stirete commune ; peut-etre afin de pourvoir plus aisement 
k leur besoins ; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nrture de 
I'homme de se reunir en societe, comma font les abeilles et 
plusieurs espfeces d'animaux ; on remarque des traits communs 
dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du monde 
qu'ils habitent."® 

This gregarious propensity is different from the political 
capacity, which has been laid down as the characteristic of man. 
Society (Political, Capacity of), — Command and obedience, 
which are essential to government, are peculiar to mankind. 
Man is singular in commanding not only the inferior animals, 
but his own species. Hence men alone form a political com- 
munity. It has been laid down by Aristotle'' and others, that 
this difference is owing to the exclusive possession of reason 
and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating be- 
tween justice and injustice. Animals, says Cicero,* are un- 
fitted for political society, as being " rationis et orationis ex- 
pertes." Separat licec nos a grege mutorum.^ 
SOMATOLOGY. -F. Nature. 

SOPHISM, SOPHISTEE, SOPHISTICAL {X6^cafia, from so^'a, 
wisdom). — " They were called sophisters, as who would say, 
Counterfeit wise men." ^° 



' De Naturali Hominum Socialitaie, 4to, Glasg., Typis Academ., 1730. 
i De Clem., i., S. ^ Div. Inst., yi., 10. * De Offic, i., U. 

' Ferguson, Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, p. 26. See also Lord Karnes, Hist, of Man, 
book ii., sketch 1 ; Filangieri, Scienza delta Legislazione, lib. i., e. 1. 
" Say, Cours d^Econ. Polit., torn. ti. Compare Comte, ibid, torn, iv., p. 54. 

Polit, i., 2. 8 De Offic, i., 16. 

» Juvenal, xv., 142-158. »» North, Plidarch, p. 96. 



472 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SOPHISM — 

"For lyke wyse as though a Sophy ster woulde with a fonde 
argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two egges were 
three, because that ther is one, and that therbe twayne, and 
one and twayne make three ; yt symple unlearned man, though 
he lacke learnying to soyle hys fonde argument, hath yet wit 
ynough to laugh thereat, and to eat the two egges himself, 
and byd the Sopliyster tak and eat the thyrde." ' 

" Sophis7it is a false argument. This word is not usually 
applied to mere errors in reasoning ; but only to those erro- 
nenis reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who 
maintains them is, in some degree, conscious ; and which he 
endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty, and by 
some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of words." ^ 

According to Aristotle, the sophism is a syllogismus conten- 
iiosus, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving the 
truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to seem to 
warrant the conclusion, but does not, and is faulty either in 
form or argument.* 

See Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic^ 

On the diiference of meaning between ^aduo^oj and ao^iatrii, 
see Sheppard, Characters of Theophrastus? See also Grote, 
Hist, of Greece^ and the Cambridge Journal of Philosophy.'' — 
V. Fallacy. 
SORITES (stopdj, a heap) is an argument composed of an inde- 
terminate number of propositions, so arranged that the predi- 
cate of the first becomes the subject of the second, the predi- 
cate of the second the subject of the third, and so on till you 
come to a conclusion which unites the subject of the first with 
the predicate of the last. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E, 
therefore A is E. 

This is the Direct or Common form of the Sorites. The 
Reversed form is also called the Goclenian, from Goclenius of 
Marburg, who first analyzed it about the end of the sixteenth 
century. It differs from the common foi-m in two respects. 



» Sir T. More, Wwks, p. 475. 

^ Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

2 Trendelenburg, Lineamenta Log. Arist, sect. 33, 8vo., Berol., 1842. 

' Chap. 5, sect. 3. » 8to., Lond., 1852, p. 81, and p. 269. 

" Vol. viii., pp. 434-486. ' No. 2. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 473 

SORITES — 

1. Its premises are reversed ; and, 2. It begins with the 
.prernise containing the two terms which have the greatest 
extension, while the common form starts with the premise 
containing the terms which have the greatest comprehen- 
sion. Thus — D is E, C is D, B is C, A is B, therefore A 
isE. 

SOUL {■^vx^i anima, soul). 

This word had formerly a wider signification than now. 
In the Second Book of his Treatise Ilspt ^vxi^i, Aristotle 
has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he calls 
it " the Entelechy, or first form of an organized body which 
has potential life." The word 'Ej^r f7t6';^£[,a, which Dr. Reid 
begged to be excused from translating, because ha did not 
know the meaning of it, is compounded of tvtsTn^, perfect; 
£;^£n/, to have ; and ifsxos, an end. Its use was revived by 
Leibnitz, who designated by it that which possesses in itself 
the principle of its own activity, and tends towards its end. 
According to his philosophy, the universe is made up of 
monads or forces, each active in itself, and tending by its 
activity to accomplish its proper end. In the philosophy of 
Aristotle, tk-fe word Entelechy, or first form, had a similar 
meaning, and denoted that which in virtue of an end consti- 
tuted the essence of things, and gave movement to matter. 
When the soul then is called the Entelechy of an organized 
body having potential life, the meaning is, that it is that force 
or power by which life develops itself in bodies destined to 
receive it. 

Aristotle distinguished several forms of soul, viz., the nutri- 
tive or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had 
growth and reproduction. The sensitive, which was the cause 
of sensation and feeling. The motive, of locomotion. The 
appetitive, which was the source of desire and will ; and the 
rational or reasonable, which was the seat of reason or in- 
tellect. These powers or energies of soul exist all in some 
beings ; some of them only in other beings ; and in some 
beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses all ; 
brutes possess some ; plants one only. In the scholastic phi- 
losophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded as simple 
powers or energies — and only the nutritive or vegetative soul, 

41*. 



474 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SOUL— 

the sensitive or animal, and the rational or human were recog- 
nized. 

In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of soul 
were assigned to man. The rational, which had its seat in the 
head and survived the dissolution of the body — -the irascible, 
which had its seat in the heart and was the spring of acti- 
vity and movement, and the appetitive or concupiscihle, which 
was the source of the grosser passions and physical instincts, 
and which died with the bodily organs with which it was 
united. A similar distinction between the forms or energies 
of the soul has been ascribed to Pythagoras, and traces of it 
are to be found in several of the philosophical systems of the 
East. 

Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction is 
taken between ^vxri (Seele) and xvsvixa (Geist), or soul and 
spirit. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at Munich, 
and a follower of Schelling, the soul is the inferior part of our 
intellectual nature — that which shows itself in the phenomena 
of dreaming, and which is connected with the state of the brain. 
The spirit is that part of our nature which tends to the purely 
rational, the lofty, and divine. The doctrine of the natural and 
the spiritual man, which we find in the writings of St. Paul, 
may, it has been thought, have formed the basis upon which this 
mental dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been main- 
tained that the dualism of the thinking principle is distinctly 
indicated by the apostle when he says of the Word of God that 
it is able to " divide asunder soul and spirit." The words in 
the original are ■^vxr; and Ttvsifia, and it is contended that by the 
former is meant the sentient or animal soul, and by the latter 
the higher or rational soul. A similar distinction has been 
traced in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where 
one word is employed to denote the life that is common to man 
with the inferior animals, HT^; ^"^^ another word, nOSJ^jj 
to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which giveth him 
understanding, and makes of him a rational soul. It may 
be doubted, however, whether this distinction is uniformly 
observed, either in the Scriptures of the Old or of the New 
Testament. And it may be better for us, instead of attempting 
to define the soul a priori by its essence, to define it rather 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 475 

SOUL- 

d posteriori by its operations. This also has been done by 
Aristotle, in a definition which has been generally adopted. 
He says, " The soul is that by which we live, feel, or perceive 
[will], move and understand." This is a full enumeration of 
all the energies which Aristotle assigned to the soul, and they 
are all manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of 
them, however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually 
treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the psychologist. 
At the same time, life and movement are not properties of 
matter ; and therefore they were enumerated by Aristotle as 
the properties of soul — the soul nutritive, and the soul motive. 
" The animating form of a natural body is neither its organi- 
zation, nor its figure, nor any other of those infevor forms 
which make up the system of its visible qualities ; but it is 
the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure, 
nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to 
employ them." ' This is what is now called the principle of 
life, and the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist — 
for, although in the human being life and soul are united, it 
is thought they may still be separate entities. In like man- 
ner some philosophers have contended that all movement im- 
plies the existence of a soul, and hence it is that the various 
phenomena of nature have been referred to an anima mundi, 
or sotd of the universe. A modern philosopher of great name^ 
enumerated among the energies of the human soul a special 
faculty of locomotion, and the power of originating move- 
ment or change is ascribed to it when we call it active. The 
same view is taken by Adolphe Garnier.'' Still, life and lo- 
comotion are not usually treated of as belonging to the soul, 
but rather as belonging to the bodies in which they are mani- 
fested. Hence it is that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the 
human soid, does not enumerate the special energies by which 
we live and move, but calls it that by which we think. " By 
the mind of a man," says he,* "we understand that in him 
which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. . . . We are 



' Harris, Phil. Arrange., p. 279. 

2 Joutfroy, In his Cours Professe a la FacuUe des Lettres in 1837. 
^ In his Traite des FaeuUes de I'ame, iii. torn., 8to, Par., 1852. 
■* Jntell. Pow.. essay i., chap. 1. 



476 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SOUL — 

conscious that we think, and that we have a variety of thoughts 
of diiferent kinds — such as seeing, hearing, remembering, de- 
liberating, resolving, loving, hating, and many other kinds of 
thought — all which we are taught by nature to attribute to 
one internal principle ; and this principle of thougld we call 
the mind or soul of man." ' It will be observed that Dr. Reid 
uses the word soul as synonymous with mind. And, perhaps, 
no very clear nor -important distinction can be taken between 
them. The plainest and most common' distinction taken in 
the use of these words is, that in speaking of the mind of 
man we refer more to the various powers which it possesses, 
or the various operations which it performs : and in speaking 
of the soul of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny 
of the human being. Thus we say the immortality of the soid, 
and the poioers of the mindJ^ A difference of meaning is 
more observable in our language between the terms spirit and 
mind than between soul and mind. Both the latter terms 
may be and are applied indifferently to the mental principle 
as living and moving in connection with a bodily organism. 
But the term spirit properly denotes a being without a body. 
A being that never had a body is a pure spirit. A human 
soul when it has left the body is a disembodied spirit. Body 
is animated matter. Mind or soul is incorporated spirit. 

Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary to 
enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries the 
tei'm mi7id is commonly employed to denote that by which we 
feel, know, will, and reason — or in one word the principle of 

* Dr. Keid's is the psychological definition. But the soul is something different from 
the ego, from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have placed its 
essence in thought, as the Cartesians — in sensation, as Locke and Condillao- — or in the 
■will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, distinguished 
from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. The soul then is 
a force, one and identical. It is, as defined hy Plato {De Leg., lib. 10), a self-moving 
force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aristotle has argued against 
this definition. — De Anima, lib. i. cap. 3. But Plato probably meant self-active to be 
the epithet characteristic of the mind or soul. — KivT](ns iavTriv Ktvovaa. 

' Mind and the Latin mens were probably both from a root which is now lost in Europe, 
but is preserved in the Sanscrit mena, to know. The Greek voo; or vovs, from the verb 
voce, is of singular origin and import. Mind is more limited than soul. Soul, besides 
the rational principle, includes the living principle, and maybe applied to animals and 
vegetables. A'oluntary motion should not be denied to mind, as is very generally done. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 477 

SOUL- 

thought. We know this inward principle as manifested 
through a system of bodily organization with which it is 
united, and by which it is in many ways affected. But "we 
are taught by nature," says Dr. Reid, " or it is a primitive 
belief, that the thinking principle is something different from 
the bodily organism, and when we wish to signalize its pecu- 
liar nature and destiny, we call it soul or spirit." 
Spirit, Mind, and Soul. — " The first denoting the animating 
faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, the 
spring of energy and the prompter of exertion ; the second is 
the recording power, the preserver of impressions, the storer 
of deductions, the nvirse of knowledge, and the ^parent of 
thought ; the last is the disembodied, etherial, self-conscious 
being, concentrating in itself all the purest and most refined 
of human excellences, every generous affection, every benevo- 
lent disposition, every intellectual attainment, every ennobling 
virtue, and every exalting aspiration." i 

^'Animus, Aninia, rtvsvjA.ai, and ■^vxri are participles. Anima 
est ab Animus. Animus vero est a Grgeco 'Aj/s^uos quod 
dici volunt quasi 'Asjitoj, ab 'Ao sive 'Asfic, quod est Ttvloi ; et 
Latinis a Spirando, Spiritus. Immo et -^vxri est ■^vx'^ quod 
Hesychius exponit rtj/sco." — Vossius — quoted from Home 
Tooke in Stewart's Fhilosopli. Essays, essay v. 

"Indulsit mundi communis condltor illis 
Tantum Animas; nobis Animiim quoque." — Juv., Sat. 9, v. 13i. 

Anima, which is common to man and brutes, is that by 
which we live, move, and are invigorated ; whilst Animus is 
that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we reason. 

The triple division of man into vovi, •^vxr}, ai^fj-a, occurs fre- 
quently in ancient authors. Plato, Timceus; Aristotle, Pol. 1. 
The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term Ttvsiifia to 
denote what the Greeks called vov^, with an allusion to Gen. 
ii. 7. Josephus, Ant. Jud., i., c. 2. Thence in the New Test, 
we have, 1 Thess. v. 23, rtvsiifM, '^x^' tfwjua. — Heb. iv. 12, 
and Grotius, Note on Matthew xxvi. 41.^ 

''Pvxyj, soul, when considered separately, signifies the prin- 

' The Purpose of Existence, 12mo, 1850, p. 79. 
2 Fitzgerald, Notes on Aristotle's Ethics, p. 179. 



478 VOCABULARY OF THlLOSOPIiy. 

SOUL - 

ciple of life ; NoCj, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, 
according to Plutarch, soul is the cause and beginning of 
motion, and mind of order and harmony with respect to 
■motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul (fVvovj 
^vxri) which is sometimes called a rational soul {■^vxvi 
J^ojiXYi). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in ques- 
tion, the word ■\vxri is used to express both. Thus in the 
Phcvdo the soul (^I'A;^) is said sometimes to use the body for 
the examination of things ; at which times, according to Plato, 
it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, and is in- 
volved in error. But, when it examines things by itself, it 
arrives at what is pure and always existing, and immortal, and 
uniform, and is free from error. Here the highest operations 
of vovi "mind" are indisputably attributed to '^x'h^ "soul." 
Aristotle ' describing '\vxri, says that during anger, confidence, 
desire, &c., it participates with the body ; but that the act of 
understanding belongs peculiarly to itself."^ 

SOUL OF THE WORLD. — Anima Mundi — g. t^. 

SPACE [spatium). — "■ S^yace, taken in the most general sense, 
comprehends whatever is extended, and may be measured by 
the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. In this sense 
it is the same with extension. Now, space, in this large signi- 
fication, is either occupied by body, or it is not. If it be not, 
but is void of all matter, and contains nothing, then it is space 
in the strictest signification of the word, and as it is commonly 
used in English philosophical language, being the same with 
what is called a vacuum." " 

Mr. Locke^ has attempted to show that we acquire the idea 
of space by sensation, especially by the senses of touch and 
sight. But according to Dr. Reid,^ "space is not so properly 
an object of sense as a necessary concomitant of the objects 
of sight and touch. It is when we see or touch body that we 
get the idea of space; but the idea is not furnished by sense 
— it is a conception, d prio7'i, of the reason. Experience fur- 
nishes the occasion, but the mind rises to the conception by 

' De Anima, lib. i., cap. i. 

* Morgan, On Trinity of Plato, p. 54. 

^ Monboddo, Anc. Metaphys., b. iv., ch. 2. 

* Book ii., ch. 4. s Jntell. Pow., essay ii., ch. 19. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 479 

SPACE — 

its native energy. This view has been supported by Cousin, 
Cours d'Histoire de la Philosopliie au xviii. Siecle ; ' and by 
Royer Collard.^ 

"In the philosopliy of Kant space and time are mere forms 
of the sensibility. By means of the external sense we repre- 
sent to ourselves everything as in space ; and by the internal 
sense all is represented in the relationship of time.'''' 

According to Kant, space is a subjective condition of the 
sensibility, the form of all external phenomena ; and as the 
sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real in- 
tuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is in 
the mind d priori. There can, then, be no question about 
space or extension but in a human or subjective poiixt of view. 
It may well be said of all things, in so far as they appear 
existing without us, that they are enclosed in space ; but not 
that space encloses things absolutely, seen or not seen, and by 
any subject whatsoever. The idea of space has no objective 
validity, it is real only relatively to phenomena, to things, in 
so far as they appear out of us ; it is purely ideal in so far as 
things are taken in themselves, and considered independently 
of the forms of the sensibility.^ 

" Space (German, Raum) is a pure intuition which lies at 
the foundation of all external intuitions, and is represented as 
an infinitely given quantity. It is the formal condition of all 
matter, that is, without it, no matter, and consequently no 
corporeal world, can be thought. Space and time have no 
transcendental objectivity, that is, they are in themselves non- 
existing, independent of our intuition-faculty ; but they have 
objectivity in respect of the empirical use, that is, they exist 
as to all beings that possess such a faculty of intuition as our- 
selves."^ 

"According to Leibnitz, space is nothing but the order of 
things co-existing, as time is the order of things successive — 
and he maintained, 'that, supposing the whole system of the 

' 2 tom., 17 legoa. 

^ In Jouffroy's (Euvres du Rdd, tom. iii., fragmen 4, p. 424 ; tom. iv., fragmen 9, p. 338. 

^ Analysis of Kant's Oritick of Pure Reason, 8vo, Lond., 1844. p. 9. 

■^ Willm, Hist, de la Philosoph. Allemande, tom. i., p. 142. 

* Haywood, Ch-it. of Pure Reason, p. 603. 



480 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPACE — 

visible world to be moved out of the place vrhich it presently 
occupies, into sorae other portion of space, beyond the limits 
of this universe, still it would be in the same space, provided 
the order and arrangement of the bodies, with respect to one 
another, was continued the same.' Now, it is true, that bodies 
placed in any kind of order, must necessarily be in space; 
but the order in which bodies are placed, and the space in 
which they are placed, must necessarily be distinct." ' 

" 1. Space is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capacity; 
but space has the capacity of receiving body. 

"2. It is not an ens rationis, for it was occupied by heaven 
and earth before the birth of man. 

"3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, i. e., body, 
for body changes its place, but space is not moved with it. 

"4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding an- 
other, because superficies is an accident; and as superficies is 
a quantity it should occupy space ; but space cannot occupy 
space. Besides, the remotest heaven occupies space, and has 
no superficies surrounding it. 

"5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain 
fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the whole 
world were round, bodies would change place and not their 
order, or they may change their order and not their place, if 
the sky, with the fised points, were moved by itself. 

" 6 and 7. It is not body, nor spirit. 

"8. It may be said with probability that space cannot be 
distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore from 
God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. He is the 
place of all being, for no being is out of Him. And although 
difi'erent beings are in difi'erent places externally, they are all 
virtually in the divine. immensity."^ 

Bardili argued for the reality of time and space from the 
fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of them. 
Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, are not 
subject to the forms or laws of the human mind. 

But if space be something to the mind, which has the idea 



• Monboddo, Anc. Metaphys., book iv., chap. 1. Letters of Clarice and Leibnitz. 
2 Derocjon, Physic, pars. 1, ch. 6. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 481 

SPACE — 

of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it? " Per- 
haps," says Dr. Reid {ut supra), " we may apply to it what the 
Peripatetics said of their first matter, that whatever it is, it is 
potentially only, not actually." This, accordingly, is the view 
taken of it by a great admirer of the Peripatetic philosophy. 
"Space," says Lord Monboddo,^ "is but a relaiive ; and it is 
relative to body, and to body only, and this in three respects, 
Jirst, as to its capacity of receiving body ; secondly, as to its 
connecting or limiting body; and lastly, as to its being the 
distance between bodies that are separated. . . . Place is 
space occupied by body. It is diiferent from body as that 
which contains is different from that which is contained. 
. - . Space, then, is place, potentially ; and when it is filled 
with body, then it is place, actually." 

Space, as containing all things, was by Philo and others* 
identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) ■ 
which says that " in God we live, and move, and have our 
being," was interpreted to mean that space is an afi"ection or 
property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained that God 
by existing constitutes time and space. "Nbn est duratio vel 
spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper et ubique, spatium. 
et durationem constituit." Clarke maintained that sjjace is an 
attribute or property of the Infinite Deity. Reid and Stewart, 
as well as Cousin and Royer Collard, while they regard space 
as something real and more than a relation, have not posi- 
tively said what it is. 

As space is a necessary conception of the human mind, as 
it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality. Dr. 
Clarke 2 thought that from these views we may argue the exist- 
ence of an infinite substance, to which this quality belongs. 

Stewart, Act. and 3for. Pow. ; Pownall, Intellectual Physics ; 
Brougham, Nat. Theology. 
SPECIES (from the old verb, specie, to see) is a word of different 
signification, in difterent departments of philosophy. 

In Logic, species was defined to be, "Id quod predicatur de 
pluribus numero differ entibiis, in qucestione quid est?'^ And 

' Anc. Melaphys., book iv., chap. 2. 

* See his Dcmonstratirin of the Being and. Attributes of God, with Butler's Letters to 
him and the Answers. 

42 2g 



482 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SPECIES — 

ggius was defined to be, ^'Id quod predicatur deplnribiis differ- 
entibus specie, in qiicestione quid est?" According to Derodon,' 
the adequate definition of genus is, "i?es similes eodem nomine 
suhstantivo donatce, et identificaicE cum omnibus inferioribus 
diverse nomine substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incom- 
municabili distinctis." And of species, "Res similes eodem 
nomine suhstantivo donatce, et identijicatce cum omnibus inferi- 
oriHis diverso nomine sid)stantivo donatis et omnes jJroprietates 
ita similes liabentibus, tit quodlibet possit habere attributa alio- 
rum, nullum tamen Tiabeat actii. idem sed tantum, simile." 

In the process of classification {q-v.), the first step is the 
formation of a species. A species is a group of individuals 
agreeing in some common character, and designated by a 
common name. When two or more species are brought to- 
gether in the same way, they are called a genus. 

" In Logic, genus and sp>ecies are relative terms ; a concep- 
tion is called in relation to its superior, species — to its inferior, 
genus. The summum genus is the last result of the abstracting 
process, the genus which can never in turn be a species. The 
infima species is the species which cannot become a genus; 
which can only contain individuals, and not other s])ecies. 
But there can only be one absolute summum genus, whether 
we call it ' thing,' ' substance,' or ' essence.' And we can 
scarcely ever ascertain the infima species, because even in a 
handful of individuals, we cannot say with certainty that there 
are no distinctions on which a further subdivision into smaller 
classes might be founded."^ 

In Mathematics, the term species was used in its primitive 
sense of appearance ; and when the form of a figure was given, 
it was said to be given in species. 

Algebra, in which letters are used for numbers, was called, 
at one time, the specious notation. 

In Mineralogy, species is determined by perfect identity of 
composition ; the form goes for nothing. 

In the organized kingdoms of nature, on the contrary, species 
is founded on identity of form and structure, both external 
and internal. The principal characteristic ot species in animals 

• Log., p. 293. 

* Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, eecojid edition, sect. 27. 



VOOABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 483 

SPECIES — 

and vegetables, is the power to produce beings like them 
selves, vrho are also productive. A species may be modified 
by external influences ; and thus give rise to races or varie- 
ties ; but it never abandons its own proper character to assume 
another. 

In Natural History, species includes only the following 
conditions ; viz., separate origin and distinctness of i-ace, 
evinced by a constant transmission of some characteristic 
peculiarity of organization. ^ 

"Species," according to Dr. Morton (author of Crania 
Americana), " is a primordial organic form." See a descrip- 
tion of species in Lyell's Geology.'^ 

" By maintaining the unity of the human species, ^^ys A. v. 
Humboldt,'' we at the same time repel the cheerless assump- 
tion of superior and inferior races of men." " This eminent 
writer appears in the passage quoted to exaggei'ate the extent 
of uniformity implied in a common species. It is unques- 
tionable that mankind form one species in the sense of the 
natural historian ; but it does not follow from this fact that 
there are no essential hereditary differences, both physical 
and mental, between different varieties and races of men. 
The analogy of animal species would make it probable that 
such essential differences do exist ; for we see that, although 
all horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, &c., form respectively one spe- 
cies, yet each species contains varieties or races, which pos- 
sess certain properties in different degrees, — whfch are more 
or less Targe, active, gentle, intelligent, hardy, and the like. 
If we are guided by the analogy of animal species, it is aa 
probable that an Englishman should be more intelligent than 
a negro, as that a greyhound should be more fleet than a mas- 
tiff', or an Arabian horse than a Shetland pony."* 

Species in Perception. 

In explaining the process of external perception, or how we 
come to the knowledge of things out of and distant from us, 
it was maintained that these objects send forth species or 
images of themselves, which, making an impression on the 



» Dr. PricLard. "^ Chap. 37. 

" Cosmos, vol. i., p. 3-55, Engl, traus. 

■* Sir G. C. Lewis, On Politics, chap. 27, sect. 10. 



484 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPECIES - 

bodily organs, next imprinted themselves on the mind and 
issued in knowledge. 

The species considered as the vicarious representative of the 
object, was called intentional. And as it affected both the 
intellect and the sense, was distinguished as sensible and 
intelligible. 

Species, as seiisible, was distinguished as species impressa, as 
making an impression upon the sense — and species expressa, 
in consequence of the sense or imagination, from the impres- 
sion, elaborating another species of the object. 

Species, as intelligible, was also distinguished into species 
impressa and species expressa. The species intelligibilis was 
called impi-essa, as it determined the faculty to the apprehen- 
sion of this object, rather than of that. And it was called 
expressa,, as in consequence of the operation of the faculty, 
knowledge of the object was attained to. 

According to some, the species as intelligible were conge- 
nite, and according to others they were elaborated by the in- 
tellect in the presence of the phantasms. 

The process of perception is thus described by Tellez.' 
Socrates by his figure, &c., makes an impression upon the 
eye, and vision follows — then a species is impressed upon, the 
phantasy, pJtantasma impressum ; the phantasy gives ihephan- 
tasma expressum, the intellectus agens purifies and spiritualizes 
it, so that it is received by the intellectus patiens, and the 
knowledge of the object is elicited. 

" The philosophy schools teach that for the cause of vision, 
the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species 
(in English), a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being 

seen, the receiving of which into the eye is seeing 

Nay, fof the cause of understanding also the thing understood 
sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible 
being seen, which, coming into the understanding, makes it 
understood."^ 

For the various forms under which the doctrine of species 
has been held, see Reid.'' 



• Summa Phil. Arist., Paris, 1645, p. 47. 

^ Hobbes, Of Man, part i., chap. 1. 

3 Jntell. Pow., essay ii., chap. S, with notes by Sir W. Hamiltou, and nota ». 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 485 

SPECIES — 

The doctrine was not universally received during the Mid- 
dle Ages. 

" Scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior 
bodies, placed before us, and the mind of man, there are 
images which belong to the exterior bodies, and make more 
or less a part of them, as the «t6w?;.a. of Democritus, images 
or sensible forms which represent external objects by the 
conformity which they have with them. So the mind was 
supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the 
medium of intelligible species. Occam destroyed these chime- 
ras, and maintained that there is nothing real but spiritual or 
material beings, and the mind of man, which directly con- 
ceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam (born\at Spire, 
and died 1495), exhibited with much sagacity and clearness 
the theory of his master. Occam renewed, without knowing 
it, the warfare of Arcesilas against the Stoics ; and he is in 
modern Europe the forerunner of Reid and of the Scotch 
school." ' 

Mens. Haureau^ says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he 
not only rejected intelligible species, but that he would not 
admit sensible species. To feel, to think, said he, are simple 
acts which result from the commerce of mind with an external 
object ; and this commerce takes place directly without any- 
thing intermediate. 

SPECIFICATION (The Principle of) is, that beings the most 
, like or homogeneous disagree or are heterogeneous in some 
respect. It is the principle of variety or difference. 
Specification (Process of) "is the counterpart of generaliza- 
tion. In it we begin with .the most extensive class, and 
descend, step by step, till we reach the lowest. In so doing 
we are thinking out objects, and thinking in attributes. In 
generalization M^e think in objects and think out attributes."^ 

SPECULATION {specular, to regard attentively). — " 1l:o speculate 
is, from premisses givei^ or assumed, but considered unques- 
tionable, as the constituted point of observation, to look 
abroad upon the whole field of intellectual vision, and thence 

' Cousin, Hist, nf Mod. Phil., vol. ii., p. 26. 
^ Exam, de Phil. iScholast., torn, i., p. 416. 
' Spalcliug, Log., p. 15. 

42* 



486 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

SPECULATION- 

to decide upon the true form and dimension of all ■whicli meets 
the view." * 

"Speculation stands opposed to reflection, a method of 
thought which has to do with something given, and appro- 
priates the same by continued analysis and synthesis of its 
elements. If speculative stand thvis opposed to reflective think- 
ing, it must necessarily belong to the former not to set out 
from anything given as its subject, but from determinations 
which thought finds in itself as the necessary and primary 
ground of all being as of all thinking. In this sense, all 
speculative thinking is of an a priori, and all reflective think- 
ing of an d piosteriori nature."^ 

It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical nor 
experimental. The speculative part of philosophy is meta- 
physics. The speculative part of mathematics is that which 
has no application to the arts. 
SPIEITUALISM {spiritus, spirit) is not any particular system 
of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded on reason, 
sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or beings which 
are not cognizable by the senses, and which do not reveal 
themselves to us by any of the qualities of matter, and which 
we therefore call immaterial or spiritual. Materialism denies 
this. But spiritimlism does not deny the existence of matter, 
and, placing itself aboVe materialism, admits both body and 
spirit. Hence it is called dualism, as opposed to the denial 
of the existence of matter. The idealism of Berkeley and 
Malebranche may be said to reduce material existences to 
mere phenomena of the mind. Mysticism, whether religious 
or philosophical, ends with resolving mind and matter into 
the Divine substance. Mysticism and idealism tend to pan- 
theism, materialism to atheism. Spiritualism, groiinded upon 
consciousness, preserves equally God, the human person, and 
external nature, without confounding them and without iso- 
lating the one from the other.^ • 
SPONTANEITY. — Leibnitz^ explains "spontaneity to mean the 
true and real dependence of our actions on ourselves." Hei- 

• Marsh, Prelim. Essay to Aids to Reflection, p. 13. 

' Miiller, Doctrine, of Sin, Introd. 

^ Did. des Sciences Pkilnsoph. * Oxtera, torn, i., p. 459, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 487 

SPONTANEITY — 

neccius calls it " the faculty of directing one's aim to a cer- 
tain end." ' It is a self-active causality. 

SPONTANEOUS is opposed to reflective. Those operations of 
mind which are continually going on without any eftbrt or 
intention on our part are spontaneous. When we exercise a 
volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our mental 
energy in any particular way, or towards any particular ob- 
ject, we are said to reflect, or to observe. 

STANDARD OF VIETUE. — Standard is that by which other 
things are rated or valued. " Labour alone, therefore, never 
varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real stand- 
ard by which commodities can at all times and places be es- 
timated and compared."^ \ 

A standard is something set up by which to measure the 
quantity or quality of some other thing. Now rectitude is the 
foundation of virtue. The standard of virtue is some law or 
rule by which rectitude can be measured. To the law of God, 
and to the testimony of an enlightened conscience, if they 
agree not, it is because there is no truth nor rightness in them. 
Now the will of God, as declared by the constitution and 
course of nature, or as revealed by His Word, is. a standard 
by which we may measure the amount of rectitude, in action 
or disposition. According as they agree, in a greater or less 
degree, with the indications of the divine will, in the same 
proportion are they right, or in accordance with rectitude. 
The standard of virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared 
in His Word, or some law or rule deduced from the constitu- 
tion of nature and the course of providence. The foundation 
of virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule 
rests. — V. CriteriojST. 

STATE (States of Mind). — " The reason why madness, idiotism, 
&c., are called states'^ of mind, while its acts and operations 
are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind 
to be passive in the former and active in the latter."* 



« Turnbull, Trans., vol. i., p. 35. * Smitb, Wealth of Nat., b. i., c. 5. 

' " The term state has, more especially of late years, and principally by Necessitarian 
philosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently." — Sir William 
Hamilton. 

* Keid's Correspondence, p. 85. 



488 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY, 

STATE — 

Such were the view.? of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a 
change has passed oA^er the language of Scottish psychology. 
No change of phraseology, because no change of doctrine, is 
to he found in the writings of Mr. Stewart. But in those of 
Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speaking of 
the mind as operating, or as acting, or as energizing, he de- 
lights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, and as 
passing through, or existing in, different states. This phrase- 
ology has been by many accepted and applauded. It is 
thought that by adopting it, we neither afBrm nor deny the 
activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its mani- 
festations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the way in 
which these manifestations are brought about. But it may 
be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question, as to the 
activity of the mind, entire and untouched. 

If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he 
would not, probably, have disturbed the language that was 
previously in common use ; although it must be admitted that 
he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all events, 
the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the mind in all 
its manifestations as passive — the mere recipient of changes 
made upon it from without. Indeed, his system of philosophy, 
Avhich is sensational in its principles, may be said to take the 
bones and sinews out of the mind, and to leave only a soft and 
yielding mass, to be magnetized by the palmistry of matter. 
That the mind in some of its manifestations is passive, rather 
than active, is admitted ; and in reference to these, there can 
be no objection to speak of it as existing in certain states, or 
passing into these states. ' But in adopting, to some extent, 
this phraseology, we must not let go the testimony which is 
given in favour of the activity of mind, by the use and structure 
of language. Language is not the invention of philosophers. 
It is the natural expression of the human mind, and the expo- 
nent of those vieAvs which are natural to it. Noav, the phrase 
operations of mind, being in common use, indicates a common 
opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion may be 
erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show, if they can, 
that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Reid is, that " until 
it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 489 

STATE — 

passive, the common language with regard to its operations 
ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology 
invented hj philosophers, which implies its being merely 
passive." 

And in another place,' he says, " There may be dis- 
tinctions that have a real foundation, and which may be ne- 
cessary in philosophy, which are not made in common lan- 
guage, because not necessary in the common business of 
life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinc- 
tion made in all languages, which has not a just foundation 
in nature." 

If any change of jDhraseology were expedient, the phrase 
" matufostations of mind" would touch less upon tlie question 
of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid — " The mind 
is from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything 
we know of it implies life and active energy ; and the reason 
M^hy all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that 
in all or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, 
but is really and properly active. In all ages, and in all lan- 
guages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking 
have been expressed by words of active signification, such as 
seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems, 
therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the 
mind is active in its various ways of thinking ; and for this 
reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by 
active verbs." 

One proof of the mind being active in some of its operations 
is, that these operations are accompanied with elfort, and 
followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of eifort ; 
and the result of long continued attention is languor and ex- 
haustion. This could not be the case if the mind was alto- 
gether passive — the mere recipient of impressions made — of 
ideas introduced. — V. Operations of Mind. 
STATISTICS. — "The observation, registration, and arrange- 
ment of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced 
to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the 
subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the de- 

' InteU. Pom.) essay i-; chap. 1. 



490 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

STATISTICS - 

signation of statistics. Both the name and the separate treat- 
ment of the subject were due to Acheuwall,' who died in 
1772.2 This science, it is there remarked, does not discuss 
causes, nor reason upon probable effects ; it seeks only to 
collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which alo7ie 
(?) can form the basis of correct conclusions with resyject to 
social and political government. ... Its peculiarity is, 
that it proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison 
of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . 
The statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabular 
exhibitions.'" 
STOICS (from (T-foa, a porch). — Zeno opened a school at Athens, 
in the " variegated porch," so called from the painting ■ of 
Polygnotus, with which it was adorned, whence his adhert its 
were called " philosophers of the porch." — Stoics.'* 

" From the Tusculan Questions,", says Bentham,^ " I leant' 
that pain is no evil. Virtue is of itself sufficient to confer 
happiness on any man who is disposed to possess it on these 
terms. 

" This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to 
amvise themselves with talking, while parading backwards and 
forwards in colonnades, called porches: that is to say, the 
Stoics, so called from S'tod, the Greek name for a porch. In 
regard to these, the general notion has been, that compared 
with our cotemporaries in the same ranks, they were, generally 
speaking, a good sort of men ; and assuredly, in all times, 
good sort of men, talking all their lives long nonsense, in an 
endless variety of shapes, never have been wanting ; but that 
from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they or their 
successors have, in any way or degree, been the better, this 
is what does not follow." 



* Godefroy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, 
Halle, and Leipsic, established himself at Marburg in 1746, and in 174S, where he soon 
afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and Statis- 
tics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations, 

° Upon the nature and province of the science of statistics, see the Introduction to 
the Journal of the London Statistical Society, vol. i., 1839. 

* Sir G. C. Lewis, Method of Observ. in Polit., chap. 5, sect. 10, 

* Schwcgler, Hist, of Phil., p. 138. 
^DeontoL, vol. i., p. 302. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 491 

STOICS — 

Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto 
assigned to them — Hihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in 
sensu. Yet, along with this, they held that the mind had the 
powei" of framing general ideas, but these were derived from 
experience. Zeno compared the hand open to sensation ; half 
closed upon some object to judgment ; fully closed upon it to 
^ai^fatrta xa,-ta%*i7t'tt,xYj, comprehensive judgment, or synthesis 
of judgment. And when the one hand grasped the other to 
enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal and definitive 
synthesis or science. In physics they said all things were 
made of cause and matter. In morals their maxim was " to 
live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to gove|*n matter. 
And the great struggle of life was, to lift the soul' above the 
body, and the evils incident to it. Their two great rules were 
avixov and aftex°v — snstine, abstine.^ 

Heinsius (Dan.), PMlosoph. Stoica ;^ Lipsius (Justus), 
Manudndio ad Stoicam Philosoph. ;^ Gataker (Thomas), Dis- 
sertatio de Disciplina Stoica, prefixed to his edition of An- 
ioninns^ 

SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OB JECTIVE. — " We 

freqviently meet," says Dr. Reid, " with a distinction between 
things in the viind and things external to the mind. The powers, 
faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. 
Everything is said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the 

subject Excepting the mind itself and things in 

the mind, all other things are said to be external." 

By the term subject Dr. Reid meant substance, that to which 
powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. The 
distinction, therefore, which he takes between things in the 
mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to that 
which is expressed among continental writers by the ego and 
the non ego, or seZ/" and not self. The mind and things in the 
mind constitute the ego. "All other things," says Dr. Reid, 
"are said to be external." They constitute the nan ego. 

"In the philosophy of mind, siibjective denotes what is to be 
referred to the thinking subject, ih.% ego ; objective, what be- 
longs to the object of thought, the non ego."^ 

• Diet, des Sciences Plnlosoph. '^4to, Leyd., 1627. 

3 4to, Antw., 1664. <■ 4to, Camb., 1643. 

' Sir W._ Hamilton, Discussions, Lond., 8vo, 18-52, p. .5, note. 



492 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SUBJECT— 

"The subject is properly, id in quo; the object, id circa quod. 
Hence, in psychological language, the subject absolutely is the 
mind that knows or thinks, i. e., the mind considered as the 
subject of knowledge or thought — the object, that which is 
known or thought about. The adjectives subjective and 06- 
jective are convenient, if not indispensable expressions." ' 

Sir Will. Hamilton^ explains how these terms should have 
come into common use in mental philosophy. 

" All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that which 
knows (in scholastic language, the subject in which knowledge 
inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic language, the 
object about which knowledge is conversant) ; and the contents 
of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regu- 
lated by laws, proceeding partly from its object and partly from 
its subject. Now, philosophy proper is principally and primarily 
the science of knowledge — its first and most important problem 
being to determine, What can we know? that is, what are the 
conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of 
the object, or in the nature of the subject of knowledge. 

" But philosophy being the science of knowledge ; and the 
science of knowledge supposing, in its most fundamental and 
thorough -going analysis, the distinction of the subject and 
object of knowledge ; it is evident that to philosophy the subject 
of Icnowledge would be by pre-eminence, the subject, and the 
object of knowledge, the object. It was therefore natural that 
the object and objective, the subject and subjective, should be 
employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to 
denote the grand discrimination, about which philosophy was 
constantly employed, and which no others could be found so 
precisely and promptly to express." 

For a disquisition on subject, see Tappan.'' — V. Objective. 
SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human know- 
ledge is merely relative ; or rather that we cannot prove it 
to be absolute. Axjcording to him, we cannot objectify the 
subjective; that is, we cannot prove that what appears true to 

' Sir Will. Hamilton, jReid's Works, p. 221, note. 
^ In note B to Reid's Works, p. 108. 
^ Log., sect. 4. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 493 

SUBJECTIVISM — 

us must appear true to all intelligent beings ; or that with 
different faculties what now appears true to us might not 
appear true. But to call our knowledge relative is merely 
calling it human or proportioned to the faculties of a man ; 
just as the knowledge of angels may be called angelic. Our 
knowledge may be admitted to be relative to our faculties of 
apprehending it ; but that does not make it less certain. ^ 
SUBLIME (The). — " In reflecting on the circumstances by which 
sublimitt/ in its primitive sense is specifically distinguished, 
the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the tlioughts in 
a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal 
law of terrestrial gravitation operates."^ 

A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized as 
one of the reflex senses belonging to man. It is different from 
the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied to it. Beauty 
charms, sublimity moves us, and is often accompanied with a 
feeling resembling fear, while beauty rather attracts and 
draws us towards it. 

There is a sublime in nature, as in the ocean or the thunder 
— in moral action, as in deeds of daring and self-denial — and 
in art, as in statuary and painting, by which what is sublime 
in nature and in moral character is represented and idealized. 

Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity and 
beauty in his Critique du Judgment ; Cousin, Sur le Beau, le 
Vrai, et le Bon; Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful; Addison.^ 
Dr. Parr addressed an Essny on the Sublime to D. Stewart. 
SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular nature, 
and constituting a supposiium along with it. It means, 1. The 
thing itself, the supposiium ; hence we call the three persons 
of the Trinity three hypostases or subsistences. 2. The mode ' 
added to the singular nature to complete its existence ; this is 
the metaphysical sense. 3. The act of existing per se. 

" Subsistentia est ' snbstantiai completio;' qua carent rerum 
naturaliimi partes a reliqiiis divnlsce. Subsistens dicitur sup- 
positum aiit hypostasis. Persona est supposiium ratione prce- 
ditum."* 



» Reid's Works, by Sir W. Hamilton, p. 513. 

" Stewart, Phil. Essays, Essay cm the. Sublime. 

^ Spectator, vol. vi. -• HutchesoD, Metaphys., pars 1, cap. 5. 

43 ■ . ' 



494 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SUBSTANCE is " that which is and abides." 

It may be derived from suhsistens [ens per se suhsistens), that 
which subsists of or by itself; or from subsians {id quod sub- 
siat), that which lies under qualities — the vrtoxti/j-svov of the 
Greeks. But in Greek, substance is denoted by ovata- — so that 
which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper meaning of 
substance. It is opposed to accident; of which Aristotle has 
said ' that you can scarcely predicate of it that it is anything. 
So also Augustine^ derives substance from siibsistendo ra.thQY 
than from subsfando. "Sicut ab eo quod est esse, appellaiur 
essentia ; ita ah eo quod est subsistere, substantiam dicimus." 
But Locke prefers the derivation from substando. He says:^ 
" The idea, then, we have, to which we give the name of sub- 
stance, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support 
of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot 
subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, 
we call that support substantia ; which, according to the true 
import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or 
upholding." 

Dr. Hampden^ has said, ^^ Substance, in its logical and meta- 
physical sense, is that nature of a thing which may be con- 
ceived to remain when every other nature is removed or ab- 
stracted from it — the ultimate point in analyzing the complex 
idea of any object. Accident denotes all those ideas which the 
analysis excludes as not belonging to the mere being or nature 
of the object." 

Substance has been defined, ens jper se existens ; and accident, 
ens existens non in se sed in alio. 

Our first idea o{ substance is probably derived from the con- 
sciousness of self — the conviction that, while our sensations, 
thoughts, and purposes are changing, toe continue the same. 
We see bodies also remaining the same as to quantity or ex- 
tension, while their colour and figure, their state of motion or 
of rest, may be changed. 

Substances, it has been said, are either primary, that is, sin- 
gular, individual substances ; or secondary,^ that is genera and 



' Metapliys., lib. vii. ^ De Trinitate, lib. vii., c. 4. 

^ Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., ch. 23. * Bampton Lect, vii., p. 337. 

' Haureau {Phil. Scholast., torn, i., p. 60), says that what has been called second sub- 
'.ance is just one of its modes or a species. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 495 

SUBSTANCE — 

species of substance. Substances have also been divided into 
complete and incomplete, finite and infinite, &c. But these are 
rather divisions of being. Substance may, however, be pro- 
perly divided into matter and spirit, or that vrhich is extended 
and that which thinks. — V. Essence. 
Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human 
mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred to a 
substance. In everything which we perceive or can imagine as 
existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities variable and mul- 
tiplied, and a being one and identical ; and these two are so 
united that we cannot separate them in our intelligence, nor 
think of qualities without a substance. Memory recalls to 
us the many modes of our mind ; but amidst all th(jse modes 
we believe ourselves to be the same individual being. So in 
the world around us the phenomena are continually varying ; 
but we believe that these phenomena are produced by causes 
which remain, as substances, the same. And as we know our- 
selves to be the causes of our own acts, and to be able to 
change the modes of our own mind, so we believe the changes 
of matter to be produced by causes which belong to the sub- 
stance of it. And underlying all causes, whether of finite 
mind or matter, we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, 
one substance, in itself persistent and upholding all things. 
SUBSUMPTIOK" {sub, under ; sumo, to take). — " When we are 
able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the 
existence of that thing is not a primary datum of conscious- 
ness, but a subsumption under the cognition or belief which 
affords its reason." ' 

To subsume is to place any one cognition under another 
as belonging to it. In the judgment, " all horses are animals," 
the conception " horses" is subsumed under that of " animals." 
The minor proposition is a subsumption under the major when 
it is placed first. Thus, if one were to say, " No man is wise 
in all things," and another to respond, " But you are a man," 
this proposition is a subsumption under the former. And the 
major being assumed ex concesso, and the minor subsumed as 
evidence, the conclusion follows, " You are not wise in all 
things." 

• Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a. 



496 , VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 

SUCCESSION. — "By reflecting on the appearance of varioua 
ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the notion 
of succession." ' He traces our notion of duration or time to 
the same origin ; or rather he confounds succession and dura- 
tion, the measure with the thing measured. According to 
Cousin and otliers, the notion of time is logically antecedent 
and necessary to the notion of succession. Events take place 
in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philosophy of Kant, 
time is not an empirical notion, but like space, a form of the 
sensibility. — V. Duration, Time. 

SUFFICIENT EEASON (Doctrine of). — " Of the principle of 
the sufficient reason, the following account is given by Leib- 
nitz, in his controversial correspondence with Dr. Clarke: 

— ' The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of 
contradiction or identity ; that is, that a proposition cannot be 
true and false at the same time. But, in order to proceed 
from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle is 
requisite (as I have observed in my Theodiccea), I mean, the 
principle of the sufficient reason; or, in other words, that 
nothing happens without a reason why it should be so, rather 
than otherwise. And, accordingly, Archimedes was obliged, 
in his book De Eqtiilibrio, to take for granted, that if there 
be a balance, in which everything is alike on both sides, and 
if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, 
the whole will be at rest. It is because no reason can be 
given why, one side should weigh down rather than the other. 
Now by this single principle of the sufficient reason, may be 
demonstrated the being of a God, and all the other parts ^of 
metaphysics or natural theology ; and even, in some measure, 
those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, 
such as the dynamical principles, or the principles of forces.' "- 

— V. Reason (Determining). 

The principle of sufficient reason as a law of thought is 
stated by logicians thus — " Every judgment we accept must 
rest upon a sufficient ground or reason." From this law follow 
such principles as these : — 1. Granting the reason, we must 
grant what follows from it. On this, syllogistic inference 
depends. 2. If all the consequents are held to be true, the 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii,, ch. 14. 
^ See Reid, Act. Pow., essay iv., chap. 9. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 497 

SUFFICIENT— 

reason must be true. 3. If we reject the consequent we must 
reject the reason, 4. If we admit the consequent, we do not 
of necessity admit the reason, as there may be other reasons 
or causes of the same effect. 

Thomson, Outline of Laivs of Thought.^ But according to 
Mr. Mansel,^ " The principle of sufficient reason is no law of 
thought, but only the statement that every act of thought 
must be governed by some law or other." 
SUGGESTIOE" [suggero, to bear or place under, to prompt). 

"It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our no- 
tions of relations can only be got by comparing the related 
ideas : but it is not by having first the notions of mind and 
sensation and then comparing them together, that wr perceive 
the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and 
the other that of an act or operation: on the contrary, one of 
the related things, viz., sensation, suggests to us both the 
correlate and the relation. 

"I beg leave to make use of the word suggestion, because I 
know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, 
which seems entirelj^ to have escaped the notice of philoso- 
phers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which 
are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original 
principles of belief."'' 

To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or 
principles of common sense. Mr. Stewarf^ has expressed sur- 
prise that Reid should have apologized for introducing a word 
which had already been employed by Berkeley, to denote 
those intimations which are the results of experience and 
habit. And Sir W. Hamilton^ has shown that in the more 
extensive sense of Reid the word had been used by Tertullian ; 
who, speaking of the universal belief of the soul's immortality, 
has said,® " Natura pleraque suggeruntur, qitasi de publico 
sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est." 

The word suggestion is much used in the philosophy of 
Dr. Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that as- 
signed to association, by other philosophers. He calls judg- 

' p. 296. a ProUgom. Log., p. 198. 

" Reid, Enquiry, ch. 2, s. 7. * Dissert., p. 167, second ed. 

' Reid's Works, p. 3, note. ^ De Anima, c. 2. 

43* 2h 



498 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SUGGESTION— 

ment, relative suggestion. Hutcheson' says, " Sensus est in- 
ternus qui suggerit prcecipue intellectiones pnras ; qiue consci- 
entia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur." It is not so properly con- 
sciousness or reflection which gives the new ideas, but rather 
the occasion on which these ideas are suggested. It is when 
we are conscious and reflect on one thing, some other thing 
related to it, hut not antecedently thought, is suggested. 

Locke ^ said, " Simple ideas, the materials of all our know- 
ledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only hij those 
two ways mentioned above, viz., Sensation and Reflection. 
Cumberland'' had said before him, "Utrobique inteUigimus 
propositiones qiiasdam immutahilis veritaiis. Hvjiismodi ali- 
quot veritates a rerum liominumque natura meniihus h,umanis 
necessario suggeri, hoc est quod a, nobis qffirmatur, hoc idem 
ab adversariis non jninus diserte denegatur." 

SUICIDE [sui and ccedes, self-murder) is the voluntary taking 
away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it was not wrong 
to do so, when the pains and inconveniences of our lot ex- ' 
ceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But the command, 
"Thou shalt not kill," forbids suicide as well as homicide. It 
is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of our nature, 
that of self-preservation — and at variance with the submission 
which we owe to God, and the duties incumbent upon us to- 
wards our fellow-creatures. All the apologies that can be 
offered for it are futile. 

Aristotle;^ Hermann, Disputatio de Autocheiria et philoso- 
phice et ex legibus Romanis considerata ;^ Madame de Stael, 
Reflexions sur le Suicide ; Stoeudlin, Hist, des Opinions et des 
Doctrines sur le Suicide;^ Tissot, Manie du Suicide; Adams, 
On SeJf-miirder ; Donne, Biathanatos. 

SUPERSTITION" (so called, according to Lucretius, quod sit 
superstantium rerum, i. e., ccelestium et divinarum quce supra 
nos stant, nimis et superfluus timor, Aulus Gellius,'') is not 
a^ "excess of religion" (at least in the ordinary sense of 
the word excess), "as if any one coidd have too much of true 



' Log. Compend., cap. 1. ^ Essay on Bum. Understand., h. ii., ch. 2, g 2. 

' De Legg. Nat, c. i., sect. 1. ■* Ethic, lib. iii., cap. 7, lib. t., cap. 11. 

6 4to, Leips., 1809. ^ g^o, Goetting., 1824. 
■■ Nod. Attic, lib. 10. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 499 

SUPERSTITION - 

religion, but any misdirection of religious feeling ; mani- 
fested either in showing religious veneration or regard to 
objects which deserve none; that is, properly speaking, 
the worship of false gods ; or, in the assignment of such a 
degree, or such a kind of religious veneration to any object, 
as that object, though worthy of some reverence, does not 
deserve ; or in the worship of the true God through the me- 
dium of improper rites and ceremonies." ' 

" Superstition," says Dr. Hartley, "may be defined a mis- 
taken opinion concerning the severity and punishments of 
God, magnifying these in respect to ourselves or others. It 
may arise from a sense of guilt, from bodily indisposition, or 
from erroneous reasoning." 
SUPRA-NATURALISM [supra, above ; natura, nature) is the 
doctrine that in nature there are more than jDhysical causes in 
operation, and that in religion we have the guidance not 
merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus opposed to 
Naturalism and to Rationalism — q. v. In Germany, where 
the word originated, the principal Supra-naturalists are Tho- 
luck, Hengstenberg, Guericke, &c. 
SYLLOGISM {ovVKoyiCjj.o';, a putting together of judgments, or 
propositions or reasonings). 

This word occurs in the writings of Plato, in the sense .of 
judging or reasoning ; but not in the technical sense assigned 
to it by Aristotle. 

AccOi'ding to Aristotle,^ " a syllogism is a speech (or enun- 
ciation) (xoyoj) in which certain things (the premises) being 
supposed, something dilferent from what is supposed (the con- 
clusion) follows of necessity ; and this solely in virtue of the 
suppositions themselves." 

' ' A syllogism is a combination of two j udgments necessitating 
a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation."' 

Euler likened the syllogism to three concentric circles, of 
which the first contained the second, which in its tui'n con- 
tained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and B 
of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C. 

' Whately, On Bacon, p. 155. 

^ Prior. Analyt., lib. i., cap. 1, sect. 7. 

^ Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 61. 



500 VOCABULAKY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SYLLOGISM — 

In a syllogism, the first tAvo propositions are called the pre- 
mises; because they are the things premised or put before ; 
they are also called the antecedents: the first of them is called 
the inajor and the second the minor. The third proposition, 
which contains the thing to be proved, is called the con- 
clusion or consequent: and the particle which unites the 
conclusion with the premises is called the consequentia or con- 
sequence.^ 

In a syllogism, " the conclusion having two terms, a subject 
and a predicate, its predicate is called the major term, and its 
subject the minor term. In order to prove the conclusion, each 
of its tei-ms is, in the premises, compared with the third term, 
called the middle term. By this means one of the premises 
will have for its two terms the major term and the middle 
term ; and this premise is called the major premise, or the 
major proposition of the syllogism. The other premise must 
have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term ; 
and it is called the minor proposition. Thus the syllogism 
consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of 
the JHff/or, the minor, and the conclusion ; and although each of 
these has two terms, a svibject and a predicate, yet there are 
only three different terms in all. The major term is always the 
predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or 
predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always 
the svibject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or 
predicate of the minor proposition.' The middle term never 

' Thus : — 

Every virtue is laudable; 
Diligence is a virtue; 
Wherefore diligence is laudahle. 
" The two former propositions are the premises or antecedents, the last is the conclit- 
sion or consequent, and the particle wherefore is the consequentia or consequence. 
" The consequent may be true and the consequence false. 
"What has parts is divisible; 
The human soul has parts; 
Wherefore the human soul is divisible. 
"The consequent may be true although the consequence is false. 
" Antichrist will be powerful, 
Therefore he will be impious 
" His impiety will not flow from his power." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 501 

SYLLOGISM- 

enters into the conclusion, but stands in both premises, either 
in the position of subject or of predicate."^ 

According to the various positions which the middle term 
may have in the premises, syllogisms are said to be of various 
figures. And as all the possible positions of the middle term 
are only four, the regular figures of the syllogisms are also four ; 
and a syllogism is said to be drawn in the first, second, third, 
or iouvth. Jigure according to the position of its middle term. 

There is another division of syllogisms according to their 
moods. The mood of a syllogism is determined by the quality 
and quantity of the propositions of which it consists. There 
are sixty-four moods possible in every figure. And the theory 
of the syllogism requires that we show what ure the par- 
ticular moods in each figure, which do or do not form a just 
and conclusive syllogism. The legitimate moods of the first 
figure are demonstrated from the axiom called Dictum de omni 
et de nullo. The legitimate moods of tlie oth.^^ figures are 
proved by reducing them to some mood of the first.'^ 

According to the diiferent kinds of propositions employed 
in forming them, syllogisms are divided into Categorical and 
Hypothetical. Categorical syllogisms are divided into Pure 
and Modal. Hypothetical syllogisms into Conditional and 
Disjunctive. 

In the Categorical syllogism, the two premisses and the con- 
clusion are all categorical propositions. 

One premiss of a conditional syllogism is a conditional pro- 
position ; the other premiss is a categorical proposition, and 
either asserts the antecedent or denies the consequent. In 
the former case, which is called the modus jjojieris, the conclu- 
sion infers the truth of the consequent; in the latter case, 
which is called the modus iollens, the conclusion infers the 
falsity of the antecedent. The general forms of these two 
cases are, " If A is, B is ; but A is, therefore B is ; and if A 
is, B is not ; but B is, therefore A is not." " If what we learn 
from the Bible is true, we ought not to do evil that good may 
come ; but what Ave learn from the Bible is true, therefore we 
ought not to do evil that good may come." 

' Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic, chap. 3, sect. 2. 
" Christian Wolf, Smaller Lo.c/ic, eh. 6. 



502 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SYLLOGISM — 

111 the Disjunctive syllogism, we commence with a disjunc- 
tive judgment, and proceed either by asserting the truth of 
one member of the division, and thence inferring the falsity 
of all the rest, which is called the modus ponens, or else by 
asserting the falsity of all the members but one, and hence 
inferring the truth of that one, which latter method is called 
the modus tollens. The general form of these two cases will 
be, "Either A is, or B is, or C is; but A is; therefore nei- 
ther B is, nor C is." - And " Either A is, or B is, or C is ; but 
neither B is, nor C is ; therefore A is." Either the Pope is 
infallible, or there is at least one great error in the Romish. 
Church ; but the Pope is not infallible, therefore there is at 
least one great error in the Romisli Church.' 

Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.;^ Aldrich, Wallis, 
Watts, and other authors on Logic. 

SYMBOL. -F. Myth. 

SYMPATHY [svnTidena, fellow-feeling). 

"This mutual affection which the Greeks call sympathy, 
tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone." ^ 

" These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing 
from the soul itself, but comjMssion (sj^mpathy) with the 
body."" 

" Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our 
fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though 
its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, how- 
ever, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote 
our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever."^ 

Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is compassion ; sympathy 
with joy or prosperity is congratulation. — V. Antipathy. 

SYNCATEGOHEMATIC. — F. Categorematic. 

SYNCRETISM (cTDi'xpjjT'KT^oj, from aw, together, and xpj^i't^M, 
to behave like a Cretan). — "The Cretans are herein very 
observable, who, being accustomed to frequent skirmishes 
and fights, as soon as they were over, were reconciled and 



' Solly. Syll. of Logic. = B. iv., chap. 17. 

^ Holland, Pliny, b. xx.. Proem. 

■• Cudwortb, Immut. Mor., book iii., chap. 1, p. IS. 

' Smith, Theory of Mvr. Sent, part i., sect. 1. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 603 

SYNCRETISM — 

went together. And this was it which they commonly called 
a Syncretism.^ 

Syncretism is opposed to Eclecticism in philosophy. Eclec- 
ticism {c[.'0.) while it takes from various systems, does so on ' 
the principle that the parts so taken, when brought together, 
have a kind of congruity and consistency with one another. 
Syncretism is the jumbling together of different systems or 
parts of systems, without due regard to their being consistent 
with one another. It is told of a Roman consul that, when he 
arrived in Greece he called before him the philosophers of the 
different schools, and generously offered to act as moderator 
between them. Something of the same kind was proposed by 
Charles V.- in reference to the differences between Protestants 
and Papists ; as if philosophy, and theology which is the 
highest philosophy, instead of being a search after truth, were 
a mere matter of diplomacy or compromise — a playing at pro- 
tocols. But Syncretism does not necessarily aim at the recon- 
ciling of the doctrines which it brings together ; it merely 
places them in juxtaposition. 

Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of synci^etism, 
in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the 
Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doc- 
trines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theologian, 
attempted to set down in one common creed the belief of the 
Papists and the Protestants ; but succeeded only in irritating 
both. To him and his partizans the name Syncretist seems to 
have been first applied.* Similar efforts were made to unite 
the metaphysics of Aristotle with those of Descartes. And 
the attempts which have frequently been made to reconcile 
the discoveries of geology with the cosmogony of Moses, 
deserve no name but that of syncretism, in the sense of its 
being "a mixing together of things which ought to be kept 



' Plutarch, Of Brotherly Love. 

^ After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in con- 
structing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of maliing their movements 
synchronous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to the attempt to reconcile Pro- 
testants and Papists, " How could I dream of making two great hodies of men think 
alike when I cannot make two clocks to go alike ! " 

^ See Walch's Introduction- to Controversies of Lutheran Cliurch. 



504 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SYNCRETISM — 

distinct." On the evils oi syncretism, see Sewell,' who quotes 
as against it the text, Deut. xxii. 9, '■'Thou shall not sow thy 
vineyard with divers seeds" &c. 

SYNDERESIS {avv Stacpsco, to divide, to tear asunder) was used 
to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which the 
mind was when comparing what it had done with what it 
ought to have done.^, 

SYNEIDESIS {nvviibriaii, joint knowledge; from avv and stSw). 
— Conscience, as giving knowledge of an action in reference 
to the law of right and wrong, was called the Witness who 
accused or excused. The operations of conscience were repre- 
sented by the three members of a syllogism ; of which the 
first contained the law, the second the testimony of the wit- 
ness, and the third the decision of the judge. But conscience 
not only pronounces sentence ; it carries its sentence into 
effect. — V. Synderesis. 

He who has transgressed any of the rules of which con- 
science is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his 
own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted and 
rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-approbation. — 
V. Synteresis. 

SYNTERESIS (uwT'^pj^tJts, the conservatory; from wvtyipiui). — 
Conscience, considered as the repository of those rules, or 
general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in 
morals, was called by this name among the early .Christian 
moralists, and was spoken of as the law or lawgiver. 

SYNTHESIS (ow^EOTj, a putting together, composition) "consists 
in assuming the causes discovered and established as princi- 
ples, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from 
them and proving the explanation."" 

" Every synthesis which has not started with a complete 
analysis ends at a result which, in Greek, is called hypothesis ; 
instead of which, if synthesis has been preceded by a sufBcient 
analysis, the synthesis founded upon that analysis leads to a 
result which in Greek is called system. The legitimacy of 
every synthesis is directly owing to the exactness of analysis; 

' Christ. Morals, chap. 9. 

"^ Aquinas, Surnmce TJienlog., pars prima., qusest. 79, articulu.s 12. 

" Newton, Optics. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 505 

SYNTHESIS — 

every system which is merely an hypothesis is a vain system ; 
every synthesis which has not been preceded by analysis is a 
pure imagination : but at the same time every analysis which 
does not aspire to a synthesis which may be equal to it, is an 
analysis which halts on the way. On the one hand, synthesis 
without analysis gives a false science ; on the other hand, 
analysis without synthesis gives an incomplete science. An 
incomplete science is a hundred times more valuable than a 
false science ; but neither a false science nor an incomplete 
science is the ideal of science. The ideal of science, the ideal 
of philosophy, can be realized only by a method which com- 
bines the two processes of analysis and synthesis." ' — V. Ana- 
lysis, Method, System. 
SYSTEM [avafyijj.a ; from cwim;yiy.b, to place together) is a full and 
connected vicAV of all the truths of some department of know- 
ledge. An organized body of truth, or truths arranged under 
one and the same idea, which idea is as the life or soul which 
assimilates all those truths. No truth is altogether isolated. 
Every truth has relation to some other. And we should try 
to unite the facts of our knowledge so as to see them in their 
several bearings. This we do when we frame them into a 
system. To do so legitimately we must begin by analysis and 
end with synthesis. But system applies not only to our knoAV- 
ledge, but to the objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak 
of the planetary system, the muscular system, the nervous 
system. We believe that the order to which we would reduce 
our ideas has a foundation in the nature of things. And it is 
this belief that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of 
things into systematic order. The doing so is attended with 
many advantages. At the same time a spirit of systematizing 
may be carried too far. It is only in so far as it is in accord- 
ance with the order of nature that it can be useful or sound. 
Condillac has a Traits cles Systemes, in which he traces their 
causes and their dangerous consequences. 
System, Economy, or Constitution. — "A System, Economy, or 
Constitution, is a one or a whole, made up of several parts, 
but yet that the several parts even considered as a whole do 

•• Cousin, Hist. Mod. Phil., vol. i., pp. 277, 278. 
44 _ 



506 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

SYSTEM — 

not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you 
include the relations and respects which these parts have to 
each other. Every work, both of nature and of art, is a 
system ; and as every particular thing, both natural and arti- 
ficial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, 
one may add to what has been already brought into the 
idea of a system, its conduciveness to this one or more ends. 
Let us instance in a watch — suppose the several parts of it 
taken to pieces, and placed apart from each other ; let a man 
have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless he 
considers the respects and relations which they have to each 
other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. 
Suppose these several parts brought together and any how 
united : neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an 
idea which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But 
let him view these several parts put together, or consider them 
as to be put together in the manner of a watch ; let him form 
a notion of the relations which these several parts have to each 
other — all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, 
showing the hour of the day ; and then he has the idea of a 
watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. 
Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, 
considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, 
do not give us an idea of the system or constitution of this 
nature ; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not 
yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which 
these several parts have to each other, the chief of which is 
the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from consider- 
ing the relations which the several appetites and passions in 
the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the 
supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of 
the system or constitution of human nature. And from the 
idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, i. e., 
constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch 
it appears that its nature, i. e., constitution or system, is 
adapted to measure time." ' — V. Method, Theory. 



Butler, Pr^ace to Sermons. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 507 

TABULA E.ASA (a tablet made smooth). — The ancients were in 
use to write upon tablets covered with soft wax, on which the 
writing was traced with the sharp point of the stylus, or iron 
pen. When the writing had served its purpose, it was effaced 
by the broad end of the stylus being employed to make the 
was smooth. The tablet was then, as at first, tabula rasa, 
ready to receive any writing which might be put upon it. 
In opposition to the doctrine of innate ideas [q. v.) the mind 
of man has been compared to a tabula rasa, or a sheet of 
white paper — having at first nothing written upon it, but 
ready to receive what may be inscribed on it by the hand of 
experience. This view is maintained by Hobbes, Locke, and 
others. On the other hand. Lord Herbert of Cherbury com- 
pares the mind to a book all written over within, but the 
leaves of which are closed, till they are gradually opened by 
the hand of experience, and the imprisoned truths or ideas 
set free. Leibnitz, speaking of the difference between Locke 
and him, says: — "The question between us is whether the 
soul in itself is entirely empty, like a tablet upon which 
nothing has been written {tabula rasa), according to Aristotle,' 
and the author of the Essay on Hum. Under, (book ii., ch. 1, 
sect. 2) ; and whether all that is there traced comes wholly 
from the senses and experience ; or whether the soul originally 
contains the principles of several notions and doctrines, which 
the external objects only aAvaken upon occasions, as I believe 
with Plato." Professor Sedgwick, instead of likening the 
mind to a sheet of white paper, would rather liken it to what 
in the art of dyeing is called a " prepared blank," that is, a 
piece of cloth so prepared by mordaunts and other appliances, 
that when dipped into the dyeing vat it takes on the colours 
intended, and comes out according to an expected pattern. 

" The soul of a child is yet a white paper unscribbled with 
observations of the world, wherewith, at length, it becomes a 
blurred note-book."^ 

" If it be true that the mind be a blank apart from the 
external creation, yet how elaborately must that apparent 
blank be prepared, when by simply bringing it into the light 
and warmth of the objective, it glows with colours not of earth, 

• De Anima, lib. Hi., cap. 4, sect. 14. 
^ Bishop Earle. 



508 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TABULA RASA — 

and shows that from the first it ha;d been written over with a 
secret writing by the hand of God." ' 
TACT. — " By tact we mean an inferior degree of talent — a skill 
or adroitness in adapting words or deeds to circumstances, 
involving, of course, a quick perception of the propriety of 
circumstances. It is also applied to a certain degree of me- 
• chanical skill." ^ 
TALEXT. — "By talent, in its distinctive meaning, we understand 
the power of acquiring and adroitly disposing of the materials 
of human knowledge, and products of invention in their already 
existing forms, without the infusion of any new enlivening 
spirit. It looks no farther than the attainment of certain 
practical ends, which experience has proved attainable, and 
the dexterous use of such means as experience has proved to 
be efficient. 

" Talent values effort in the light of practical utility; genius 
always for its own sake, labours for the love of labour. Talent 
may be acquired. . . . Genius always belongs to the 
individual character, and may be cultivated, but cannot be 
acquired."'' 

' ' Talent describes power of acquisition, excellence of m emory ; 
genius describes power of representation, excellency of fancy; 
intellect describes power of inference, excellence of reason."^ 

" Talent lying in the understanding is often inherited ; genius 
being the action of reason and imagination, rarely, or never." ^ 

TASTE (POWEES, OR PRmCIPLES OE).- 

"His tasteful mind enjoys 
Alike the complicated charms, which glow 
Thro' the wide landscape." — Cowper, Power of Harmony, b. ii. 

" That power of the mind by which we are capable of dis- 
cerning and relishing the beauties of nature, and whatever 

is excellent in the fine arts, is called Taste Like 

the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted 
with others ; with regard to many" is indiff'erent or dubious ; 



' Harris, Man Primeval, chap. 3. * Mofifat, Study of JEsthetics, p. 206, 

' Ibid, p. 204. ^ Taylor, Synonyms. 

« S. T. Coleridge. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 509 

TASTE — 

and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and 
by opinion. . . . 

" By the objects of Taste, I mean those qualities and attri- 
butes of things which are, by nature, adapted to please a good 
taste. Mr. Addison' and Dr. Akenside'^ after him, has re- 
duced them to three — to wit, Novelty, Crrandeur, and Beauty." ^ 
— q. V. 

The best definition of Taste was given by the editor of 
Spenser (Mr. Hughes), when he called it a kind of extem- 
pore judgment. Burke explained it to be an instinct which 
immediately awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. 
Akenside is clear as he is poetical on the question : — 

"What, then, is Taste but those internal powers, 
Active, and strotig, and feelingly alive 
To each fine impulse? ti discerning sense 
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust 
From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross, 
In species ? This, nor gems, nor stores of gold, 
Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow. 
But God alone, when first his sacred hand 
Imprints the secret bias of the soul." 

Pleasures of Imagin., b. iii., 1. 523. 

" We may consider Taste, therefore, to be a settled habit of 
discerning faults and excellencies in a moment — the mind's 
independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that 
faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the pic- 
turesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature." * 

The objects of Taste have also been classed as the Beauti- 
ful, the Sublime, and the Picturesque — q. v. The question is 
whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities which 
may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing emotions 
by suggesting or recalling certain pleasing feelings formerly 
experienced in connection or association with these objects. 
The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Alison in his 
Essay on Taste, and by Lord Jeffrey in the article " Beauty " 
in the Encyclopcedia Britannica. 

Lord Jeffrey has said, "It appears to us, then, that objects 



• Spectator, vol. vi. ^ Pleasures of Imagination. 

' Reid, Intell. Povi., essay viii., chap. 1 and 2. 
■ * Pleasures, die, of Literature, 12mo, London, 1851, pp. 55, 56. 

44* 



510 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHy, 

TASTE — 

are sublime or beautiful — first, when they are the valvral 
signs andi perpetual cojicomitants of pleasurable sensatic-r.s, as 
the sound of thunder, or laughter, or, at any rate, of some 
lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sen- 
tient beings; or secondly, when they are the arbitrary or ac- 
cidental concomitants of such feelings, as ideas of female 
beauty ; or thirdly, when they bear some analogy or fancied 
resemblance to things Ynih. which these emotions are neces- 
sarily connected. All poetry is founded on this last — as 
silence and tranquillity — gradual ascent and ambition — gra- 
dual descent and decay. 

Mr. Stewart' has observed that "association of ideas can 
never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentially dif- 
ferent from all others." 

Gerard, Essay on Taste; Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses 
before Royal Society; Burke, On Sublime and Beautiful; 
Payne Knight, Enquiry into Principles of Taste; Hume, 
Essay on Standard of Taste; Brown, Lectures;^ Stewart, PM- 
losopJi. Essays,^ Relative to Taste; Sir T. L. Dick, Essay on 
Taste, prefixed to Price on the Picturesque.^ — V. Esthetics. 

TELEOLOGY {■tixo^, an end ; Jidyoj, discourse) is the doctrine 
of Final Causes — q. v. It does not constitute a particular 
department of philosophy ; as the end or perfection of every 
being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philo- 
sophy in which it is included. But teleology is the philoso- 
phical consideration of final causes, generally. 

TEMPERAMENT {tempera, to moderate, to season). — " There 
are only two species of temperament. The four well-knoAvn 
varieties, and the millions which are less known, are merely 
modifications of two species, and combinations of their modi- 
fications. These are the active and the passive forms ; and 
every other variety may be conveniently arranged under 
them." 5 



' Elements, ch. 5, part ii., p. 364, 4to. 

■•^ 77. ' Part ii. " Svo, 1842. 

' Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The 
autlior of the treatise on " Diet," included among the works of Hippocrates, takes the 
same view of temperaments ; as lil^ewise the Brunonian school, which maintained two 
antagonist, sthenic and asthenic, states. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 511 

» 

TEMPEEAMENT — 

"As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated 
"will, so temperament is nothing else than the sum of our natural 
inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the material of the 
will, developing itself, when controlled, into character, and when 
controlling, into passions. Temperament is, therefore, the root 
of our passions ; and the latter, like the former, may be dis- 
tinguished into two principal classes. Intelligent psycholo- 
gists and physicians have always recognized this fact ; the 
former dividing temperaments into active and passive, the 
latter classifying the passions as exciting and depressing. 

" We would apply the same statement to the affections or 
emotions. The temperament commonly denominated sanguine 
or choleric is the same as our active species ; and that known 
as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our passive 
one." ' 

Bodily constitutions, as affecting the prevailing bias of the 
mind, have been called temperaments; and have been dis- 
tinguished into the sanguine, the choleric, the mekmcholic, 
and the phlegmatic. To these has been added another, called 
the nervous temperament. According as the bodily constitu- 
tion of individuals can be characterized by one or other of 
these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the 
general state or disposition of the mind ; and there will be a 
bias, or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action 
rather than by others. 

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a 
constitution, and as containing certain primary elements ; and, 
according as these elements are combined and balanced, there 
may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, 
just as there are differences of bodily temperaments ; and these 
differences may give rise to a disposition or bias, in the one 
case, more directly than in the other. According as intellect, 
or sensitivity, or will, prevails in any individual mind, there 
will be a correspondent bias resulting. 

But, it is in reference to original differences in the Primary 
desires, that differences of disposition are most observable. 
Any desire, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies 

' Feuchtersleben, Dietetics of the Soul, 12mo, Lon., 1852, p. 85. 



512 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TEMPEEAMENT— 

of the mind to its side ; gives a colour to the whole character 
of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his 
temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, 
without his being sensible that they do so, except by the 
result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continu- 
ally within him, which only manifests itself by the direction 
in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.^ Dis- 
position is the sum of a man's desires and feelings. 

In the works of Gralen^ is an essay to show. Quod animi 
mores corporis temperamenta sequimtur. 

See also Feuchtersleben, Nedical Psychology. 

TEMPERAHCE (tempera^itia) is moderation as to pleasure. 
Aristotle'' confined it chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of 
taste in a slight degree. Hence, perhaps. Popish writers in 
treating of the vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much 
on those connected with the senses of touch and taste. By 
Cicero the Latin word temperantia was used to denote the 
duty of self-government in general. Temperantia est quce ut 
in rebus expetendis autfugiendis rationem sequamur monet. 

Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal 
virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regu- 
lation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and affec- 
tions, and may thus give birth to many virtues, and restrain 
from many vices. As distinguished from fortitude, it may be 
said to consist in guarding against the temptations to pleasure 
and self-indulgence ; while fortitude consists in bearing xip 
against the evils and dangers of human life. 

TENDENCY {tendo, to stretch towards). — " He freely moves and 

acts according to his most natural tendence and inclination."^ 

"But if at first the appetites and necessities, and tendencies 

of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be done 

when the body is miserable and afilicted."^ — F. Inclination. 

TERM (oipoj, terminus, a limit). — A term is an act of appre- 

' The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's 
natural temper. — Reid, Act. Pow., essay iii., part ii., chap. 8. 
2 Tom. iv., Leips., 1822. " Ethic, lib. iii., cap. 10. 

* Scott, Christ. Life, pt. i., c. 1. 
' Taylor, Of Repent, c. 7, g 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 513 

TEEM — 

hension expressed in language ; also the subject or predicate 
of a proposition. " I call that a term into which a proposition 
is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it 
is predicated." ' 

" As lines terminate a plane and constitute figure, so its 
terms are the limits of a proposition. A proposition consists 
of two te7'ms; that which is spoken of is called the subject; 
that which is said of it the predicate ; and these are called the 
terms (or extremes), because logically the subject is placed 
Jirst and the predicate last. In the middle is the copula, 
which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is 
aflirmed or denied, of the subject." — Whately. — V. Propo- 
sition, Syllogism. 

Term (An Absolute or K"on-Relative), one that is considered 
by itself, and conveys no idea of relation to anything of which 
it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. Ab- 
solute terms are also named non-connotatiiie, as merely denoting 
an object without implying any attribute of that object ; as 
"Paris," "Romulus." 

Term (An Abstract) denotes the quality of a being, without 
regard to the subject in which it is; as "justice," " wisdom." 
Abstract terms are nouns substantive. 

Term (A Common), such as stands for several individuals, 
which are called its significates ; as "man," "city." Such 
terms, and such only can be afiirmatively predicated of seve- 
ral others, and they are therefore called predicables. 

Terms (Compatible or Consistent) express two views which 
can be taken of the same object at the same time ; as " white 
and hard." 

Term (A Complex) is a proposition — q. v. 

Term (A Concrete) denotes the quality of a being, and either 
expresses, or must be referred to, some subject in which it is ; 
as "fool," "philosopher," "high," "wise." Concrete terms 
are usually, but not always, nouns adjective. 

Terms (The Contradictory Opposition of) is, when they diifer 

only in respectively wanting and having the particle "not," 
or its equivalent. One or other of such terms is applicable to 
every object. 



' Arist., Prior. Analyt., lib. i., cap. 1. 

2i 



514 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TERM - 

Terms (Contrary) come both under some one class, but are the 
most different of all that belong to that class; as "wise" and 
" foolish," both coming under the class of mental qualities. 
There are some objects to -which neither of such terms is 
applicable ; a stone is neither wise nor foolish. 

Term (A Definite), one which marks out an object or class 
of beings ; as /' Caesar," " corporeal." Positive terms are 
definite. 

Term (An Indefinite), one which does not mark out, but only 
excludes an object; as, " not-Csesar," " incorporeal." Priva- 
tive and negative terms are called indefinite. 

Term (A If egative) denotes that the positive view coidd not be 
taken of the object; it affirms the absence of a thing from 
some subject in which it could not be present;- as, "a dumb 
statue" (you would not say "a speaking statue"). "A life- 
less corpse" (you would not say "a living corpse"). The 
same term may be negative, positive, or privative, as it is 
viewed with relation to contrary ideas. Thus "immortal" is 
privative or negative viewed with relation to death, and posi- 
tive viewed with relation to life. 

Terms (Opposite) express two views which cannot be taken of 
one single object at the same time ; as "white and black." 

Term (A Positive) denotes a certain view of an object, as being 
actually taken of it; as "speech," "a man speaking." 

Term (A Privative) denotes that the positive view might con- 
ceivably be taken of the object, but is not; "dumbness," "a 
man silent" (you might say, "a man speaking"). "An un- 
buried corpse" (you might say, "a buried corpse"). 

Term (A Relative), that which expresses an object viewed in 
relation to the whole, or to another part of a more complex 
object of thought; as "half" and "whole," "master and ser- 
vant." Such nouns are called correlative to each other ; nor 
can one of them be mentioned without a notion of the other 
being raised in the mind. 

Term (A Simple) expresses a completed act of apprehension, 
but no more ; and may be used alone either as the subject 
or predicate of a proposition. "Virtue is its own reward." 
Virtue is a simple term, and its own reward is also a simple 
term. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 515 

TEEM — 

Term (A Singular), such as stands for an individual; as "So- 
crates," "London," "this man," "that city." Such terms 
cannot be predicated affirmatively of anything but tliemselves. 
But general terms, as "fowl," "bird," may be truly affirmed 
of many. 
TERMimSTS. — F. Nominalism. 

TESTIMONY " is the declaration of one vrho professes to know 
tlie trutli of that which he affirms." 

"The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common 
experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with 
the oi'dinary course of nature, or with one another." ' 

If testimony were not a source of evidence, we must lose all 
benefit of the experience and observation of others. Much of 
human knowledge rests on the authority of testimony. 

According to Dr. Reid,^ the validity of this authority is 
resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He main- 
tains that we have a natural principle of veracity, which has 
its counterpart in a natural principle of credulity — that is, 
while we are naturally disposed to speak the truth, we are 
naturally disposed to believe what is spoken by others. 

But, says Mr. Locke,^ ^^ Testimony maybe fallacious. He 
who declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 
2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive." 

The evidence of testimony is, therefore, only probable, and 
requires to be carefully examined. 

The nature of the thing testified to — whether it be a matter 
of science or of common life — the character of the person 
testifying — vrhether the testimony be that of one or of many — 
whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily, hastily or 
deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be attended to. 

Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monu- 
ment, and other material proofs have also been called testi- 
mony. So that testimony includes tradition and history. 

Mr. Hume maintained that no amount of testimony can be 
sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to him 



' Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 16. 

^ Inquiry, ch. 6, sect. 24. 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., ch. 15, 16. 



516 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TESTIMONY - 

hj Dr. Adams,' in his Essay on Miracles, and Dr. Campbell on 
Miracles, and Dr. Douglas on Miracles. 

It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated English geometri- 
cian, and by Petersen, that the value of testimony decreases 
by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some measure, favoured 
this vievr. But if the matter of fact be vs^ell authenticated in 
the first instance, lapse of time and continued belief in it may 
add to the validity of the evidence. — V. Evidence. 
THEISM (0eos, God) is opposed to atheism. It is not absolutely 
opposed, by its derivation, to Pantheism, or the belief that the 
universe is God; nor to Polytheism, or the belief that there 
are many Gods ; nor to Ditheism, or the belief that there are 
two divine principles, one of good and another of evil. But 
usage, penes quern est arhitrium. et norma loquendi, has re- 
stricted this word to the belief in one intelligent and free 
spirit, separate from his works. "To believe that everything 
is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best, by a designing 
principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a 
perfect Theist."^ 

" These are they who are strictly and properly called Theisfs, 
who affirm that a perfectly conscious, understanding being, or 
mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all other things ; 
and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless 
matter, as the first original, and deny that there is. any con- 
scious, understanding being, self-existent or unmade, are those 
that are properly called Atheists." ' 

"Though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists 
who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole 
original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of 
anything else ; yet it seems reasonable that such consideration 
should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to 
extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it 



' " Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to he introduced to 
as many of the persons who had written against him as could he collected; and re- 
quested Caddell to bring him and them together. According]}', Dr. Douglas, Dr. 
Adams, &c., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet Hume. They 
came; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assured me that they were all delighted 
with Dayid."— Rogers's TahU Tall: 

3 Shaftesbury, Inquiry, book i., pt. i., sect. 2. 

' Cudworth, Intdl. Syst., book i., ch. 4, sect. 4. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 517 

THEISM — 

those also who assert one intellectual self-existent from eter- 
nity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not 
the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned 
for absolute Atheists merely because they hold eternal uncre- 
ated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, 
ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the 
sole original of all things." ' 

Theist and Deist both signify simply one who believes in 
God ; and about the beginning of last century both were 
employed to denote one who believes in God independently of 
revelation. "Averse as I am to the cause of Theism or 
name of Deist, when taken in a sense exclusive of revelation, 
I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is Theism; 
and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first 
of all a good Theist."^ But from about the time of Shaftes- 
bury, the term Deist has generally been applied to such as 
are indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Bal- 
guy's First Letter to a Deist was against Lord Shaftesbury. 
His Second Letter to a Deist was against Tindal. All the 
Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to reve- 
lation. 

" The words Deist and Tlieist are, strictly speaking, perhaps 
synonymous ; but yet it is generally to be observed that the 
former is used in a had, and the latter in a good sense. Cus- 
tom has appropriated the term Deist to the enemies of revela- 
tion and of Christianity in particular ; while the word Theist 
is considered applicable to all who believe in one God."* 

" Theistae generatim vocantur, qiu Deum esse tenent, sive recte 
sive prave cceteroquin de Deo sentiant. Deistse vocahantiir prce- 
sertim sceculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui Deum quidem esse 
affirmabant, providentiam vero, revelationem, miracula, nno 
verba, quidquid siipernaturale audit, toUebant.'"^ 
THEOCRACY (0foj, God; xpa-to?, rule). — Government under the 
Mosaic dispensation is called theocracy. 

" It will easily appear," says Lowman,^ " that the general 

' Cudworth, IntcU. Syst., sect. 7. 

^ Shaftesbury, The Mcralisis, part i., sect. 2. 

^ Irons, On Final Causes, App., p. 207. 

TTbaghs, Theodicece Elementa, p. 11. 

' On Civil Government of the Hebrews, chap. 7. 

45 



518 VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 

THEOCRACY — 

union of the tribes as one body may be conceived after this 
manner — that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people 
enacted by themselves or their representatives ; that the great 
council advised, consulted, proposed; that the judge presided 
in their councils, and had the chief hand in executing what 
was resolved in them ; and that Jehovah, by the oracle, was 
to assent to and approve what was resolved, and authorize the 
execution of it in matters of the greatest importance to the 
whole state, so that the general union of the whole nation 
may not improperly be thus expressed. It was by the com- 
mand of the people and advice of the senate, the judge pre- 
siding and the oracle approving." 

Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests 
in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were 
regarded as the children of the sun. Mahomet, speaking in 
the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that of the 
Grand Lama in Thibet is similar. 

" In the Contrat Social of Rousseau, the sovereignty of 
number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental prin- 
ciple of the work. For a long time he follows out the con- 
sequences of it with inflexible rigour ; a time arrives, how- 
ever, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great 
effect ; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitu- 
tion, to the rising society ; his high intellect warned him that 
such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from 
the numerical majority, from the multitude : ' A God,' said 
he, ' must give laws to men.' It is not magistracy, it is not 
sovereignty It is a particular and supe- 
rior function, which has nothing in common with human 
empire." ■ 

The term theocracy has been applied to the power wielded 
by the Pope during the Middle Ages ; and Count de Maistre, 
in his work Du Pape, has argued strenuously in support of 
the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign 
pontiff. But the celibacy of the Romish priests is an obstacle 
to their theocratical organization. " Look at Asia, Egypt ; all 
the great theocracies are the work of a clergy, which is a com- 

* Guizot, Hist, of OhnKaaiion. vol. i., p. 387. Contrat Social, \>. ii., ch. 8. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 519 

THEOCRACY— 

plete society within itself, which suffices for its own wants, 
and borrows nothing from without." * 
THEODICY (0SOJ, God ; 8Cx^, a pleading or justification), a 
vindication of the ways of God. — This word was employed by 
Leibnitz, who^ maintained that the existence of moral evil 
has its origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphy- 
sical evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in 
the essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical 
and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are 
designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of en- 
joying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection of 
the whole, which, of the many worlds that were possible, is 
the very best. On this account it has been called the theory 
of optimism — q^. v. 

In Manuals of Philosophy the term theodicy is applied to 
that part which treats of the being, perfections, and government 
of God, and the immortality of the soul. 

In the Manuel de Philosophie, d l' usage des Colleges,^ Theo- 
dic6e, which is written by Emille Saisset, is called rational 
theology, or the theology of reason, independent of revelation. 
" It proposes to establish the existence of a being infinitely 
perfect, and to determine his attributes and essential relations 
to the world." It treats of the existence, attributes, and 
providence of God, and the immortality of the soul — which 
were formerly included under metaphysics. 

According to Kant, the objections which a theodicy should 
meet are : 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the 
holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his good- 
ness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and the pun- 
ishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He approves 
of the vindication adopted by Job against his friends, founded 
on our impei'fect knowledge of God's ways. 

" When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and endea- 
voured to produce dialectic proofs, its theodicean philosophy, 
or justification of God, stopped, in the book of Job, at the 
avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of mankind." •* 

* Guizot, Hist, of Ciiilization, vol. i., p. 182. 

^ In his JSssais de Theodicee, sur la botiU de Dieu, la liberie de I'komme et I'origine du 
mal, published in 1710. 

•' 8vo, Paris, 1846. * Bunsen, Hippolytus, vol. ii., p. 7. 



520 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THEOBICY— 

Butler, Analogy, part i., ch. 7, treats of the government of 
God ; considered as a scheme or constitution imperfectly com- 
prehended, part ii., ch. 4. 
THEOGONY (©soj, God ; yovri, generation) is that part of Pagan 
theology which treats of the genealogy and filiation of their 
deities. It is the title of a celebrated Greek poem by Hesiod, 
which has been commented on by M. J. D. Guigniaut.^ Tiie 
Works and Days, and Theogony of Hesiod were translated 
from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas Cooke.^ 

THEOLOGY (©td?, God; ?.dyoj, discourse). — "ITieoZo^?/, what 
is it ]jut the science of things divine? What science can be 
attained unto without the help of natural discourse and rea- 
son ?"" 

" I mean theology, which, containing the knowledge of God 
and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow-creatures, 
and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehen- 
sion of all other knowledge directed to its true end, i. e., the 
honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of 
mankind. This is that noble study which is every man's duty, 
and every one that is a rational creature is capable of."'* 

The word theology as now used, without any qualifying 
epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to 
him which we derive from express revelation. In this re- 
stricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided into 
speculative or dogmatic — and moral or practical, according as 
it is occupied with the doctrines or the precepts which have 
been revealed for our belief and guidance. But the Greeks 
gave the name of {OtoT^yoi) to those who, like Hesiod and 
Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than that of the poet, 
sang of the nature of the gods and the origin of all things. 
Aristotle^ said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, 
mathematics, and theology — the last was the highest, as treat- 
ing of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, 
from the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, 
the knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient 

' De la Theogonie d'Hesiode, Paris, 1835. 

" 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728. « Hooker, Eccles. Pol, b. iii., sect. 8. 

* Locke, On the Cond. of the Uhdei'stand., sect. 22. 

5 Metaphys., lib. xi., ch. 6. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 521 

THEOLOGY- 

to the interests of the state. So that, according to Augustin,' 
there were three kinds of theology — the poetical, or that of the 
poets — the physical, or that of the philosophers — and the po- 
litical, or that of the legislator. 

Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine 
revelation, the distinction between faith and reagon was not 
taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any satis- 
factory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of the 
relations between Him and his creatures, could be had inde- 
pendently of revelation. And it was not till after Descartes 
that the distinction of theology, as vatural, and positive or 
revealed, was commonly taken. The distinction is rather 
obscured in the Essais de Theodicee of Leibnitz, but clearly 
expressed by AVolf in the title of his work, Theologia Natu- 
ralis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata? He thinks it is demon- 
strative, and calls it' " The science which has for its object 
the existence of God and his attributes, and the consequences 
of these attributes in relation to other beings, with the refu- 
tation of all errors contrary to the true idea of God ; in short, 
all that is now commonly included under natural theology or 
theodicy, or both. 
Natural Theology. — This phrase has been very commonly em- 
ployed, but it has been challenged. 

" The name natxtral theology, which ever and anon we still 
hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the Divine 
Being and his existence, ought carefully to be avoided. Such 
a designation is based on a thorough misconception and total 
inversion of ideas. Every system of theology that is not super- 
natural, or at least that does not profess to be so, but pre- 
tends to understand naturally the idea of God, and regards the 
knowledge of the divine essence as a branch of natural science, 
or derives the idea simply from nature, is even on that account 
false. Missing and entirely mistaking its proper object, it 
must, in short, prove absolutely null and void. Properly, 
indeed, this inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special divi- 
sion, and scientific designation. The name generally of phi- 
losophy, or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly 

* De Civitate, lib. vi., c. 1. 

^ 2 vols., 4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37. ' ProUgom., sect. 4. 

45* 



522 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THEOLOGY- 

suiEcient to designate the investigation into science and faitli, 
and their reciprocal relation — their abiding discord, or its 
harmonious reconciliation and intrinsic concord." ' 

In Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, natural is opposed to 
spiritual, as sensuous to super-sensuous or super-natural. 

Thisapbjection might be obviated by calling that knovrledge 
of God and of his attributes and administration vrhich the 
light of reason furnishes, rational theology. But this phrase 
has been of late years employed in a different sense, especially 
in Germany. Natural theology confines itself exclusively to 
that knowledge of God which the light of nature furnishes, 
and does not intermeddle with the discoveries or the doctrines 
of positive or revealed theology. It prosecutes its inquiries by 
the unassisted strength of reason within its own sphere. But 
rational theology carries the torch or light of reason into the 
domain of revelation. It criticises and compares texts — ana- 
lyzes doctrines — examines traditions — and brings all the in- 
struments of philosophy to bear upon things divine and spi- 
ritual, in order to reduce them to harmony with things human 
and rational. — V. Rationalism. 

THEOPATHY {®m, Deity ; ndeo^, suffering or feeling).— A word 
used by Dr. Hartley as synonymous with piety, or a sense of 
Deity. 

THEORY [Bsupia, contemplation, speculation). — Theory 'and 
theoretical are properly opposed to practice a,n(i practical. 
Theory is mere knowledge ; practice is the application of it. 
Though distinct they are dependent, and there is no opposi- 
tion between them. Theory is the knowledge of the i3rinciples 
by which practice accomplishes its end. Hypothetical and 
theoretical are sometimes used as synonymous with conjectu- 
ral. But this is unphilosophical in so far as theoretical is con- 
cerned. Theory always implies knowledge — knowledge of a 
thing in its principles or causes. 

" Theory is a general collection of the inferences drawn from 
facts and compressed into principles." ^ 

" With Plato, Biio^ilv is applied to a deep contemplation of 



' Schlegel, PhUosoph. of Life, Ac, Bohn's edit., p. 194. 
* Parr, Sequel to a Printed Paper. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 523 

THEORY- 

the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to ritid't'tsi.v, and 
to Tioislv, so that he makes philosophy theoretical, practical, and 
artistical. The Latins and Boethius rendered Ba^^ilv hj specii- 
lari. With us it means a learned discourse of philosophers 
of speculative use."i 

" Theory denotes the most general laws to whicli certain 
facts can be reduced." — Mackintosh;^ and' the distinctions 
between hypothesis and theory are thus stated : — 

1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the phe- 
nomena) should be known really to exist ; in which consists 
the main distinction between hypothesis and theory. Gravity 
is a principle universally known to exist ; ether and a nervous 
fluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles should be 
known to produce effects like those which are ascribed to them 
in the theory. This is a further distinction between hypothesis 
and theory ; for there are an infinite number of degrees of 
likeness, from the faint resemblances which have led some to 
fancy that the functions of the nerves depend on electricity, to 
the remarkable coincidences between the appearances of pro- 
jectiles on earth, and the movements of the heavenly bodies, 
which constitute the Newtonian system ; a theory now perfect, 
though exclusively founded on analogy, and in which one of 
the classes of phenomena brought together by it is not the 
- subject of direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not 
with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a 
majority of them as to render it highly probable that means 
will in time be found of reconciling it to all. It is only on 
this ground that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title 
of a legitimate theory during that long period when it was 
unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the 
labours of a century and the genius of Laplace at length com- 
pleted the theory, by adapting it to all the phenomena. A 
theory may be just before it is complete. 

'^Theory and hypothesis may be distinguished thus: a hypo- 
thesis is a guess or supposition, made concerning the cause of 
some particular fact, with the view of trying experiments or 
making observations to discover the truth. A theory is a com- 

' Trendelenburg, Elementa Log. Arist., p. 76. 

» Prel. Diss.; p. 61, Whewell's edit. " At p. 367. 



524 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 

THEORY— 

plete system of suppositions put together for the purpose of 
explaining all the facts that belong to some one science. For 
example — -astronomers have suggested many hypotheses, in 
order to account for the luminous stream which follows comets. 
They have also formed many theories of the heavens ; or in 
other words, complete explanations of all the appearances of 
the heavenly bodies and their movements. When a theory has 
been generally received by men of science, it is called a system ; 
as the Ptolemaic system ; the Copernican system ; the New- 
tonian system." ' 

See a paper on Theory in Blackwood's Mag. for August, 
1830. — F. Hypothesis. 

THEOSOPHISM or THEOSOPHY (©.o?, God; oo^ia, know- 
ledge). 

" The Theosophists, neither contented with the natural light 
of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture 
understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal 
supernatural light superior to all other illuminations, from 
which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philoso- 
sophy manifested only to the chosen favourites of heaven." ^ 

See Tholuck (F. A. D.), Theosophia Persarvm Pantheistica.^ 

Theosophia seems at one time to have been used as synony- 
mous with theologia. Thus in John Major's Commentary on 
the First Book of tlie Sentences, published in 1510, Mr. David 
Cranston is styled In Sacra Theosophia Baccalaureus. 

The theosophists are a school of philosophers who would 
mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, 
metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form 
cf mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus at the 
opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in Saint 
Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob 
Boehm, and Saint Martin, may be called popular, while Cor- 
nelius Agrippa, V,alentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, and Van 
Helmont, are more philosophical in their doctrines. The Rev. 
Will. Law was also a theosophist. But they all hold different 
doctrines ; so that they cannot be reduced to a system. 

• Taylor, Elements of Thought. 
= Enfield, Hist, of Phil., vol. il. 
= 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App. 1838. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 525 

THEOSOPHISM — 

" The theosophist is one who gives you a theory of God, or 
of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration 
of his own for its basis." ' 

"Both the politics and the iheosopliy of Coleridge were at 
the mercy of a discursive genius, intellectually bold, educa- 
tionally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to bring 
conviction and speculation together, mooting all points as it 
went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights on many, 
ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding nothing." ^ 
THESIS {9eGc<;, from tldyifiv, to lay down) is a position or propo- 
sition, the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but 
requires evidence, or explanation, or proof. In the schools it 
was especially applied to those propositions in theology, philo- 
sophy, law, and medicine, which the candidates for degrees 
were required to defend. 

THOUGHT ANB THIHKIBTG " are used in a more, and in a 
less restricted signification. In the former meaning they are 
limited to the discursive energies alone; in the latter, they are 
co-extensive with consciousness." ' 

Thinking is employed by Sir Will. Hamilton* as compre- 
hending all our cognitive energies. 

By Descartes,^ cogitatio, pens6e, is used to denote or com- 
prehend "all that in us of which we are immediately con- 
scious. Thus all the operations of the will, of the imagination 
and senses, are tlioughts." Again, in reply to the question, 
What is a thing which thinks? he says,* "It is a thing which 
doubts, understands, conceives,- affirms, desires, wills, and 
does not will, which imagines, also, and feels." 

" Though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper 
action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it 
should be always thinking, always in action."^ 

" Thought proper, as distinguished from other facts of con- 



* Vaughan, Hours with Mystics, vol. i., p. 45. 

^ Hvitit, Imagination and Fancy, 12mo, 1844, p. 276. 
" Sir Will. Ilamiltou, Meid's WorJcs, p. 222, note. 
'' Discussioi2S, &o.. Append, i., p. 678. 
» Hesp. ad See. Obj., p. 85, Ed., 1663. 

* Medit. li., p. 11. 

' Locke, Essay on Hum. XTndirsland., book ii., ch. 1, 



526 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THOUGHT— 

sciousness, may be adequately described as the act of knowing 
or judging of tJiings hy means of concepts."^ — V. Train of 
Thottght. 

TIME {tempus). — Continuation of existence is duration; duration 
unlimited is eternity ; duration limited is time. 

By Aristotle, time was defined to be " the measure of mo- 
tion, secundum prius- et posterius. We get the idea of time on 
the occasion when we observe first and last, that is succession. 
Duration withovit succession would be timeless, immeasurable. 
But how are we to fix what is first and last in the motion of 
any body ? By men in all ages the motions of the heavenly 
bodies have been made the measure of duration. So that the 
full definition of time is — 'It is the measure of the duration 
of things that exist in succession, by the motion of the hea- 
venly bodies.' "^ 

"As our conception of space originates in that of body, and 
our conception of motion in that of space, so our conception 
of time originates in that of motion ; and particulaidy in those 
regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the 
parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are 
correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity 
called time, with which they are conceived to co-exist. Tivie, 
therefore, may be defined the perceived number of Successive 
movements ; for as number ascertains the greater or lesser 
quantity of things numbered, so time ascertains the greater 
or lesser quantity of motion performed." * 

According to Mr. Locke,* " Reflection upon the train of ideas, 
which appear one after another in our minds, is that which 
furnishes us with the idea of succession ; and the distance 
between any two parts of that succession, is that we call du- 
ration." Now by attending to the train of ideas in our minds 
we may have the idea of succession — but this presupposes the 
idea of duration in which the succession takes place. "We 
may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the 
mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion 



' Mansel, Prolegom. Log., p. 22. 

^ Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book iv., chap. 1. 

' GiDiea, Analysis of Aristotle, chap. 2. 

* Essay on Hum. Understand., hook ii., chap. 14. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 527 

TIME — 

or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of 
it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being mea- 
sured." 1 

See also Cousin (On Locke) Cours de Philosoph. ;^ Stewart, 
Phil. Essays;^ see also the Fragments of Royer Collard.'' 

Dr. Reid* says, " I know of no ideas or notions that have a 
better claim to be accounted simple and original than those 

of space and time The sense of seeing, by itself, 

gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of 
extension, but the sense of touch discovers three ; and reason, 
from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us neces- 
sarily to the belief of an immensity that contains them. 

" In like manner, memory gives us the conception and 
belief of finite intervals of duration. Froin the contemplation 
of these, reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an eternity 
which connprehends all things that have a beginning and an 
end." In another passage of the same essay,* he says, "We 
are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to 
refer them. They are not beings, but rather the receptacles 
of every created being, without which it could not have had 
the possibility of existence. Philosophers have endeavoured 
to reduce all the objects of human thought to these three 
classes, of substances, modes, and relations. To which of 
them shall we refer time, space, and number, the most common 
objects of thought?" 

In the philosophy of Kant, " Time is a necessary repre- 
sentation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. Time 
is given, a priori — it is the form of the internal sense, and 
the formal condition, a priori, of phenomena in general. 
Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the re- 
presentation of phenomena ; that the things we see or en- 
visage are not in themselves what they are taken for ; that if 
we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or sub- 
jective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we 
discover in time and space, and even time and space them- 
selves, would disappear. What objects maybe in themselves. 



' Reid, Intell. Pow., essay ii., chap. 5. 

'' Lemons, 17, 18. ^ Essay ii., ch. 2. 

'' At the end of torn. iv. of (Euvres de Reid. 

" Ut supra. ^ Chap. 3. 



528 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TIME — 

separated from the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite un- 
known to us." ' 

" One of the commonest errors is to regard time as an agent. 
But in reality, time does nothing, and is nothing. We use it 
as a compendious expression for all those causes which ope- 
rate slowly and imperceptibly ; but unless some positive cause 
is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of 1,000 years: 
e. g., a drop of water encased in a cavity of silex."^ — V. 
Space. 

TOPOLOGY.— F. Memoria Technica. 

TRADITION" {irado, to hand down) " is any way of delivering 
a thing or word to another." — Bp. Taylor.^ "Tradition is 
the Mercury (messenger) of the human race." — Tiberghien.* 

" Tradition ! oh tradition ! thou of the seraph tongue, 
The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young." 

Adam Mickiewitz. 

Nescire quid antea qiiam natus sis accident, id est semper 
esse puerum} 

When we believe the testimony of others not given by them- 
selves directly, but by others, this is tradition. It is testimony 
not written by the witness, nor dictated by him to be written, 
but handed down memoriter, from generation to generation. 

"According to the principle of tradition (as the ground of 
certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted truth 
to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the para- 
disiacal state, and during the whole period from the first man 
down to the Christian era, it is said by these philosophers 
there was a channel of divine communication almost perpe- 
tually open between the mind of man and God. Here accord- 
ingly, it is thoiaght we lay hold upon a hind of truth which 
is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and which 
coming down to us by verbal or documental tradition from 
the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis for 
all truth, and a final appeal against all error." ^ 

' Analysis of KanVs Criticism of Pure Reason. By the Translator, 8vo, Lend., 
1844, p. 10. 
^ Coplestone, Remains, p. 123. ' Dissuasive from Popery. 

* Essai des Connaiss. Humaines, p. 50. ' Cicero. Orator., cap. 14. 

° Morell, Philosoph. Tenden., p. 17. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 529 

TRADITION — 

See Molitor (J. F.), PhilosopJiie de la tradition.^ 

On the necessity of Tradition, see Irenoius.^ 
TRAIN OF THOUGHT. — " The subject of the association of 
ideas," says Mr. Stewart,'' "naturally divides itself into two 
parts. The first related to the influence of association in re- 
gulating the succession of our thoughts ; the second, to its in- 
fluence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, 
by the more indissoluble combinations which it leads us to 
form in infancy and early youth." — V. Combination op 
Ideas. 

While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is 
passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the con-sequence 
or train of imaginations, the train of thouglits and mental dis- 
course. He says it is of two sorts. The first is unguided, 
without design, and inconstant. The second is more constant, 
as being regulated by some desire and design. That is, it is 
spontaneous or intentional. 

In the Train of Thought, or the succession of the various 
modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they succeed 
in some kind of order. "Not every thought to every thought 
succeeds indiS"erently," says Hobbes. And it has long been 
matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect the law or 
laws according to which the train or succession of thought is 
determined. 

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either 
7iece3sary or habitual. By the necessary consecution of thoughts, 
it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence 
subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought 
without our thinking the other ; as cause and eti"ect, means 
and end, quality and substance, body and space. This conse- 
cution or connection of thoughts admits of no further expla- 
nation, than to say, that such is the constitution of the human 
mind. 

The habitual consecution of thoughts difi"ers in difi'erent in- 
dividuals : but the general laws, according to which it is regu- 
lated, are chiefly three, viz.: — The law of similars, the law 
of contraries, and the law of co-adjacents. From the time of 

» 8vo, Paris, 1837. ' I., 10. 

* Elements, vol. i., chap. 5. 

46 2k 



530 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

TEAIN OF THOUGHT - 

Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all 
writers on the subject. But it has been thought that these 
may be reduced to one supreme and universal law ; and Sir 
James Mackintosh ' expresses his surprise that Dr. Brown 
should have spoken of this as ^ discovery of his own, when 
the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid 
down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and 
Condillac. 

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his Treatise on 
Memory and Reminiscence, has been explained as containing 
the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts.^ It is 
proposed to call this the law of Bedintegration. " Thoughts 
which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other 
in the relation of co-existence or immediate consecution, do, 
when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." 
In other words, " The parts of any total thought, when sub- 
sequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, imme- 
diately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and 
mediately, the whole of which they were constituent." 

Hobbes, Leviathan;^ Human Nat.;* Reid, Intell. Pow.^ 
TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENDENTAL {transcendo, to go 
beyond, to surpass, to be supreme). 

"To be impenetrable, discerptible, and unactive, is the 
nature of all body and matter, as such ; and the properties 
of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indis- 
cerptible, and self-motive ; yea, so different they are in all 
things, that they seem to have nothing but being and the 
transcendental attributes of that in common."^ 

■ Transcendental is that which is above the pra^dicamental. 
Being is transcendental. The prcBdicamental is what belongs 
to a certain category of being ; as the ten summa genera. As 
being cannot be included under any genus, but transcends them 
all, so the properties or affections of being have also been 
called transcendental. The three properties of being commonly 
enumerated are nnum, verum, and bonum. To these some add 



» Dissert., p. 348, Edit. Whewell. 
"^ Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 897. 
^ Part i., chap. 3. " P. 17. 

* Glanvill, Essa]/ i. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 531 

TRANSCENBENT— 

aliquid and res : and these, with ens, make the six iranscen- 
dentals. But res and aliquid mean only the same as ens. The 
first three are properly called transcendentals, as these only 
are passions or affections of being, as being. — V. Unitt, 
Truth, Good. 

"In the schools, transcendentalis and transcendens were 
convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion 
which transcended, that is, which rose above, and thus con- 
tained under it, the categories or summa genera of Aristotle. 
Such, for example, is being, of which the ten categories are 
only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these 
old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distin- 
guished them from each other. Transcendent (transcendens) 
he employed to denote what is wholly beyond experience, 
being neither given as an d posteriori nor a priori element 
of cognition — what therefore transcends every category of 
thought. I\-anscendental [transcendentalis) he applied to sig- 
nify the d priori or necessary cognitions which, though mani- 
fested in, as affording the conditions of, experience, transcend 
the sphere of that contingent or adventitious knowledge which 
we acquire by experience. Transcendental is not therefore 
what transcends, but what in fact constitutes a category of 
thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, 
has found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange 
the expression principles of common sense, for, among other 
names, that of transcendental truths." • 

In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of knowledge 
which are original and primary, and which are determined d 
priori are called transcendental. They involve necessary and 
universal truths, and thus transcend all ti'uth derived from 
experience which must always be contingent and particular. 
The principles of knowledge, which are pure and transcen- 
dental, form the ground of all knowledge that is empirical or 
determined d posteriori. In this sense transcendental is op- 
posed to empirical. 

" There is a philosophic (and inasmuch as it is actualized by 
an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness which lies 
beneath, or (as it were) behind the spontaneous consciousness 

' Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sect. 5. 



532 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOniY. 

TEANSCENDENT — 

natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distin- 
guished their northern provinces into Cis- Alpine and Trans- 
Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knovrledge 
into those on this side, and those on the other side of the 
spontaneous consciousness; cib-a et trans conscientiam commu- 
nem. The latter is exclusively the domain oi pure philosophy, 
VFhich is, therefore, properly entitled transcendental in order 
to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and 
representation on the one hand, and on the other from those 
flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by all dis- 
tinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and 
purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned as 
transcendent." ' 

Transcendent is opposed to immanent — q. v. 
Transcendental is opposed to empirical — q. v. 

TRANSFERENCE and TRANSLATION are terms employed 
by the author of the Light of Nature Pursued, to denote the 
fact that our desires are often transferred from primary objects 
to those which are secondary or subservient; as from the 
desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secondary way, 
the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or power.^ — V. 
Desire. 

TRANSMIGRATION. — V. Metempsychosis. 

TRANSPOSITION. — F. Conversion. 

TRIVIUM. — The seven Liberal Arts were Grammar, Rhetoric, 
Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music. 

Lingua, Tropvis, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra 
Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, constituted the Trivium — tres 
vice in unum, because they all refer to words or language. 
Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy, constituted the 
Quadrivium — quattior vice in unum, because they all refer to 
quantity. 

"Gramm. loquitur, Dia. verba docet, Rhet. vertia colorat; 
Mus. canit., Ar. numerat, Geo. ponclerat, Ast. edit astra." 

The Mechanical Arts were Rus, Nemus, Arma, Faber, Vul- 
nera, Lana, Rates ; or, Agriculture, Propagation of Trees, 

- . '■ Coleridge, Biograph. Liter., p. 143. , 

2 Tucker, Light of Nature ; chapter on Transference, or Translation. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 533 

TRIVIUM — 

Manufacture of Arms, Carpenters' work, Medicine, Weaving, 
and Ship-building. 
TRUTH has been distinguished by most metapliysical writers, 
according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into 
Veritas entis, cognitionis, et signi. By others, truth has been 
distinguished as entitative, objective, and formal, the truth of 
signs being included under the last. 
Veritas entis — Transcendental or Metaphysical Truth. 

The pillar and ground of all truth is in truth of being — that 
truth by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own 
nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but 
reality of being. Thus gold has truth of being, ?'. e., is real 
gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all the pro- 
perties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge 
of being, and if there were no real being, that is, if truth 
could not be predicated, of things, there could be no know- 
ledge. But things exist independently of being known. 
They do not exist because they are known, nor as they are 
known. But they are known because they are, and as they 
are, when known fully. 
Veritas Cognitionis. 

Truth, as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our 
knowledge with the reality of the object known — for, as know- 
ledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known 
as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is 
hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of 
the thing or object known with true knowledge. But there 
seems to be little difference whether we say that trtith consists 
in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known 
or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to 
true knowledge. 
Veritas Signi. 

The truth of the sign consists in its adequateness or con- 
formity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which 
imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so 
far as they cannot imitate it or represent it adequately or 
fully, so the truth of a representation or sign consists in its 
being adequate to the thing signified. The truth and ade- 
quacy of signs belongs to enunciation in logic. 

46* 



534 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY- 

TRUTH — 

" Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity 
of thoughts to things, called scie7itific—&.nd of that which lies 
in the correspondence of words with thougths, called moral 
truth — there is a truth called logical, depending on the self- 
consistency of thoughts themselves. .... Thought is 
valueless' except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of 
things ; a higher truth than the merely logical, in subser- 
vience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason 
that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding 
two contradictory propositions is, that we believe one of them 
to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the 
other we should admit a falsehood, which is always abhorrent 
to the mind. If we call the logical truth, subjective, as con- 
sisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may 
call this higher metaphysical truth, objective, because it de- 
pends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that 
give rise to them." ' 

Veritas est adcequatio intellectus et ret, secundum quod intel- 
lectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est." ^ 

Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions and 
to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity of the declara- 
tion made to the actual state of the case ; agreeably to Al- 
drich's definition of "a true" proposition — vera est quae quod 
res est dicit. 

In its etymological sense, timth signifies that which the 
speaker " trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymology 
of the word aj^rjdii. To firj %rj6ov, seems to be similar ; denoting 
non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a lie; 
and may be called moral, as the other may be called logical 
trtith. 

" Truth is not unfrequently apjolied, in loose and inaccurate 
language, to arguments ; when the proper expression would be 
' correctness,' ' conclusiveness,' or ' validity.' 

" Truth again, is often used in the sense of reality, to ov. 
People speak of the truth ov falsity of facts; properly speaking, 
they are either real or fictitious : it is the statement that is 



' Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, sect. 81, 82. 
" Aquinas. Contra. Gent., i., -19. 



YOCABULARY OF nilLOSOPHY. 535 

TEUTH- 

'true' or 'false.' The 'ti-ue' cause of anything, is a common 
expression ; ' meaning that which may with ti'uth be assigned 
as the cause.' The senses o^ falsehood correspond."' 

"Necessary truths are such as are known independently of 
inductive proof. They are, therefore, either self-evident pro- 
positions, or deduced from self-evident propositions."'' 

Necessary truths are those in which we not only learn that 
the proposition is true, but see that it must be true ; in which 
the negation is not only false, but impossible ; in which we 
cannot, even by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposi- 
tion, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The relations 
of numbers are the examples of such truths. Two and three 
make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise. 

"A necessary truth or law of reason, is a truth or law the 
opposite of which ia inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical, 
impossible ; more shortly, it is a truth, in the fixing of which 
nature had only one alternative, be it positive or negative. 
Nature might have fixed that the sun should go round the 
earth, instead of the earth round the sun; at least we see 
nothing in that supposition which is contradictory and absurd. 
Either alternative was equally possible. But nature could not 
have fixed that two straight lines should, in any circumstances, 
enclose a space ; for this involves a contradiction.'"* 

Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to 
reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say "Grass is 
green," " Socrates was a philosopher," I assert propositions 
which are true, but need not have been so. It might have 
pleased the Creator to make grass blue — and Socrates might 
never have lived. 

"There are tniths of reasoning (reason) and truths oi fact. 
Truths of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is im- 
possible — those oi fact are contingent, and their opposite is 
possible. When a truth is necessary you can find the reason 
by analysis, resolving it into ideas and truths more simple, till 
you come to what is primitive."* 



' Whately, Log., Appendix i. 

^ Kidd, Principles of Reasoning, chap. 7. 

" Ferriei', Inst, of Metaphys., p. 19. 

* Leibnitz, Nouwaux Essais, iv., 2; Monadologie, sect. 33. 



636 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TRUTH- 

" Though the primary truths of fact and ihe primary truths 
of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of Reid) 
form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intui- 
tions of our consciousness, there appears no sufficient ground 
to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distin- 
guished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable 
to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his Elements, vol. ii., chap. 1, 
and his Account of Reid, supra, p. 27, b." ' 

^^ Truth implies something really existing. An assertion 
respecting the future may be probable or improbable, it may 
be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or imprudent, it may 
have any relation we please to the mind of the person who 
makes it, or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation 
at all to a thing which is not. The Stoics said, Cicero will 
either be Consul or not. One of these is true, therefore the 
event is certain. But truth cannot be predicated of that which 
is not.''^ 

"Truth implies a report of something that is; reality denotes 
the existence of a thing, whether affirmed and reported of or 
not. The thing reported either is or is not; the report is 
either true or false. The things themselves are sometimes 
called truths, instead o^ facts or realities. And assertions con- 
cerning matters of fact are called facts. Thus we hear of 
false facts, a thing literally impossible and absurd.'^* 

'* No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the van- 
tage-ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where 
the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and 
wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below ; so 
always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling 
or pride."* — V. Falsity, Reality. 
TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. 
They carry evidence in themselves. They are assented to as 
soon as they are understood. The assent given to them is so 
full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize it, it can 
scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that no pi-oposition 

' Sir William Hamilton, Reicfs Works, note a, p. 743. 

* Coplestone, Enquiry into Necessity, Preface, p. 15 
^ Ibid., Remains, p. 105. 

* Bacon's Essay on Truth. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 537 

TEUTHS — 

contradicting them can be admitted as more clear. That a 
whole is greater than any of its parts ; that a change implies 
the operation of a cause ; that qualities do not exist without a 
substance ; that there are other beings in the world besides 
ourselves; may be given as examples oi first truths. These 
truths are and must be assented to by every rational being, as 
soon as the terms expressing them are understood. They 
have been called xowoa hvoiai, communes notitice, natural judg- 
ments, primitive beliefs, fundamental laws of the human 
mind, principles of common sense, principles of reason, prin- 
ciples of reasoning, &c. 

. . . "To determine how great is the number of these 
propositions is impossible ; for they are not in the soul as pro- 
positions ; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind awaking 
out of nothing into being, and presented with particular ob- 
jects, would not fail at once to judge concerning them accord- 
ing to, and by the force of, some such innate principles as 
these, or just as a man would judge who had learnt these ex- 
plicit propositions ; which indeed are so nearly allied to its 
own nature, that they may be called almost a part of itself. 
. . . . Therefore I take the mind or soul of man not to be 
so perfectly indiiferent to receive all impressions as a rasa 
to6j<Za, or white paper. . . . " Hence there may be some 
practical principles also innate in the foregoing sense, though 
not in the form of propositions." ' 

"From the earliest records of time, and following the course 
of history, we everywhere find the principles of common sense, 
as universal elements of human thought and action. No vio- 
lence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They steadily 
and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruc- 
tion of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid 
glance through the long vista of ages amid the sanguinary 
conflicts, the territorial aggrandizements, and chequered fea- 
tures of states and kingdoms ; and from the wreck of all that 
is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognize the great 
and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes 
away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They 
are the life-blood of human nature ; the intellectual air we 

'■ Watts, Philosoph. Essays, sect, i and 3. 



538 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

TRUTHS - 

breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour 
subsist ; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the man- 
ners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their 
universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the 
daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men ; 
and must ever f(,rm the basis of all systems of philosophy; 
for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an 
unmeaning assemblage of words." — Van de Weyer. 

On the nature, origin, and validity of Jirsi truths, the fol- 
lowing authors maj^ be consulted: — Lord Herbert, De Veri- 
tate ; Buffier, Treatise of First Truths; Reid, Inquiry and 
Essays on Intell. Poiv. ; Sir Will. Hamilton, Beid's Works J — 
V. Common Sense, Reminiscence. 
TYPE (fvrtof, typus, from rvrtrw, to strike). 

" Great father of the gods, when for our crimes 
Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times, — 
Some tyrant king, the terror of his age. 
The type and true vicegerent of thy rage ! 
Thus punish him." — Dryden, Persitis, sat. 3. 

" So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the type of his 
blood." 2 

Among the Greeks the first model which statuaries made in 
clay of their projected work was called fvrtoj. Type means 
the first rude form or figure of anything — an adumbration or 
shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according to it was 
the ectype, and the iijpe in contrast the protype. But archetype 
was applied to the original idea, model, or exemplar, not 
copied, but of which other things were copies. 

"A type is an example of any class, for instance, a species 
of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the 
characters of the class." ^ 

For the meaning of a type in the arts of design, see Sir 
Edmund Head, Hist, of Painting.^ — V. Homottpe. 

* Appendix, note A. 

"^ Bishop Taylor, Of Real Presence, sect. 6. 
' Whewell, Induct. Sciences, viii., ii., 10. 
' Preface, p. 39. 



VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 539 

UBIETY {ubi, where) is the presence of one thing to another, or 
the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen distinguished 
ubiety as — 

1. Circumscriptive, by which a body is so in one place that 
its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, 
and exclude every other body. 

2. Definitive, as when a human spirit is limited or defined 
in its presence to the same place as a human body. 

3. Eepletive, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through 
every portion of space. 

This last is sometimes called ubiquity, and means the 
Divine Omni2:)resence.^ 

UNCONDITIONED. — " This term has been employed in a two- 
fold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all 
restriction, or more widely, the entire absence of all relation. 
The former we regard as its only legitimate application."^ 

In the philosophy of Kant it is that which is absolutely and 
in itself, or internally possible, and is exempted from the con- 
ditions circumscribing a thing in time or space. — V. Abso- 
lute, Infinite. 

UNDERSTANDING. — " Perhaps the safer use of the term, for 
general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the 
man himself considered as a concipient as well as a percipient 
being, and reason as a power supervening.'"' 

" In its wider acceptation, understanding is the entire power 
of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensibility ; the 
power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing 
them into wholes according to a law of unity ; and in its most 
comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. 
Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the repre- 
senting mind ; that which puts together the multifarious 
materials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure re- 
ceptivity. But we may consider the understanding in another 
point of view, not as the simple faculty of thought, which pro- 
duces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and comes into 
play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind ; but as a 



' Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais, liv. ii., chap. 23, sect. 21. 

* Calderwood, Phil, of the Infinite, p. 36. 

3 Coleridge, Statesman's Manual, App. b, p. 264. 



540 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

UNDERSTANDING — 

power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, 
which does not simply think and reflect, but which examines 
its thoughts, arranges and compares them ; and this for scien- 
tific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize 
upon religion, and to receive it by means of the understanding 
are two diiferent things, and the common exertion of this 
faculty should of coui-se be distinguished from that special 
use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason 
of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement 
of them by exercise." ' 

" The understanding is the medial faculty, or faculty of 
means, as reason on the other hand is the source of ideas or 
ultimate ends. By reason we determine the ultimate end ; by 
the understanding we are enabled to select and adopt the 
appropriate means for the attainment of, or approximation to, 
this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end 
must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not repre- 
sentable by the senses, and has no correspondent in nature, or 

the world of the senses Understanding and sense 

constitute the natural mind of man, mind of the flesh, ^povj^^tta 
<jap«oj, as likewise •^vxi^xri avvioii, the intellectual power of the 
living or animal soul, which St. Paul everywhere contradis- 
tinguishes from the spirit, that is, the power resulting from 
the union and co-influence of the will and reason — oo^ta or 
wisdom." ^ 

" The reason and the understanding have not been steadily 

distinguished by English writers To understand 

anything is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas 
and rules ; we do not include in the meaning of the word an 
examination of the ground of the ideas and rules by reference 
to which we understand the thing. We understaiid a language, 
when we apprehend what is said, according to the established 
vocabulary and grammar of the language ; without inquiring 
how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the 
ground of the grammatical rules. We understand the sense 
without reasoning about the etymology and syntax. 

" Reasoning may be requisite to understanding. We may 

' Coleridge, Aids to Sejlecticm, vol. ii., p. 88. 
2 Ibid., Notes on English Div., vol. ii., p. 338. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 541 

UNBERSTANDING- 

have to reason about the syntax in order to understand the 
sense. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning. 
Also we may understand what is not conformable to reason ; 
as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them 
unfounded in reason. 

"We reason in order to deduce rules from first principles, 
or from one another. But the rules and principles which 
must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when 
we understand. We may understand the sense of a speech 
without thinking of rules of grammar. 

" The reason is employed both in understanding and in 
reasoning ; but the principles which are explicitly asserted in 
reasoning, are only implicitly applied in understanding . The 
reason includes both the faculty of seeing first principles, and 
the reasoning faculty by which we obtain other principles. 
The iinderstanding is the faculty of applying principles, how- 
ever obtained." ' 

Anselm considered the facts of consciousness under the 
fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and Intel- 
ligence ; and showed that the two last are not identical.^ 

" ' There is one faculty,' says Aristotle,'' ' by which man 
comprehends and embodies in his belief first principles 
which cannot be proved, which he must receive from some 
authority ; there is another by which, when a new fact is 
laid before him, he can show that it is in conformity with 
some principle possessed before. One process resembles the 
collection of materials for building — the other their orderly 
arrangement. One is intuition, — the other logic. One j/oij, 
the other iftidTfrifit].' Or to use a modern distinction, one is 
reason in its highest sense, the other understanding." ^ 

" I use the term understanding, not for the noetic faculty, 
intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the dianoetic, 
or discursive faculty in its widest signification, for the faculty 



* Whewell, Ekments of Morality, Introd., sect. 11. 

^ Matter. Hist, de la Philosoph. dans ses Rapports avec Religion, p. 148. Paris, 
1854. 
a Eth., lib. 6. 

* Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 21. 

47 



542 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

UNDERSTANDING — 

of relations or comparisons ; and thus in the meaning in 
which Versiand is now employed by the Germans." ' 

'^Understanding, intellect [Vcrstand] is the faculty which 
conjoins the diversity which is furnished us by the senses, 
and forms into a whole .the sensible representations which 
are given to us. The word Verstmid is used occasionally as 
being synonymous with Vernunft (reason), and is the faculty 
of cognition in general, and in this sense the critic of pure 
reason might be termed also the critic of pure understanding. 
The discursive understanding is the faculty of cognizing ob- 
jects, not immediately, but through conceptions. And as 
intuition belongs to cognition, and as a faculty of a complete 
spontaneousness of intuition, or which perceives the intuition 
not passively, but produces spontaneously from itself, a cog- 
nition-faculty different from, and independent of, what is the 
sensibility, would be, consequently, understanding in the 
widest sense ; we might think such an intuitive, envisaging 
understanding {intellectus intuitivus) negatively, as a non- 
discursive understanding. The gemeiner Mensclien Verstand 
and the Gemeinsinn are sensus communis logicus, or common 
sense ; and the gesunder Verstand, sound sense. Sir J. Mack- 
intosh prefers the term intellect to that of understanding as 
the source of conceptions."^ — V. Reason, Intellect. 

UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another 
as to form one being. Unification with God was the final aim 
of the Neo-Platonicians. And unijication with God is also 
one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu. 

UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in 
meaning as Monotheist. In this large sense it is applicable 
to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the Divine 
nature ; and also to Jews and Mahommedans. It may even 
include Deists, or those who believe in God on grounds of 
reason alone. But the name is commonly opposed to Trini- 
tarian, and is applied to those who, accepting the Christian 
revelation, believe in God as existing in one person, and 
acknowledge Jesus Christ as his messenger to men. 

UNITY or ONENESS [umim, one) is a property of being. If 
anything is, it is one and not many. Omne ens est umim. 

* Sir W. Hamilton, Discussimis, &c., 8vo., Lond., 1852, p. 4, note. 
^ Haywood, Crit. of Pure Reason, p. 605. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 543 

UNITY— 

Unity is defined to be that property, qua ens est indivisum 
in se et divisum ah omni alio. 

Locke ' makes unify synonymous with number. But Aris- 
totle^ more correctly makes imity the element of number, and 
says that unity is indivisibleness. That which is indivisible, 
and has no position, is a monad. That which is indivisible, 
but has a position, is a point. That which is divisible only 
in one sense is a line. That which is divisible in two senses 
is a plane. And that which is divisible in three senses is a 
body in respect of quantity. 

According to Aristotle,^ the modes of tmity are reducible to 
four, that of continuity, especially natural continuity, which 
is not the result of contact or tie^ — -that of a whole naturally, 
which has figure and form, and not like things united by vio- 
lence — that of an individual or that which is numerically 
indivisible — and that of a universal, which is indivisible in 
form and in respect of science. 

Unity has been divided into transcendental or entitative, by 
which a being is indivisible in itself — logical, by which things 
like each other are classed together for the purposes of science 
— and moral, by which many are embodied as one for the pur- 
poses of life, as many citizens make one society, many soldiers 
one army. 

Unity is opposed to plurality, which is nothing but plures 
entitafes aut unitates. 

Unity is specific or numerical. The former may rather be 
called similitude, and the latter identity.'^ 

" The essential diversity of the ideas ^lnity and sameness was 
among the elementary principles of the old logicians ; and the 
sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms have been 
ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on Wissowatius.''^ — 
V. Distinction, Identity. 

TINIVERSALS. — "The same colour being observed to-day in 
chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, 
it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative 

' Essay on Hum. Understand., b. ii., ch. 16. 

^ Mttaphys., lib. iv., cap. 6, lib. x., cap. 1. 

" Ibid., lib. X., cap. 1. * Hutcheson, Metaphys., pars 3, cap. 3. 

6 Coleridge, Second Lay Sermon, p. 367. See also, Aids to Reflection, p. 167. 

43 



544 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

UmVERSALS — 

of all of that kind, and having given it the name of vrhiteness, 
it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be 
imagined or met with, and thus universals, whether ideas oi 
terms, are made." ' 

Universal terms may denote, 1. A mathematical universality, 
as all circles (no exception) have a centre and circumference. 
2. A physical viniversality, as all men use words to express 
their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 3. A moral univer- 
sality, as all men are governed by aifection rather than by 
reason. 
Universal [umim versus alia) means, according to its composi- 
tion, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle,^ "that 
which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many." And^ 
" that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in 
many." It implies unity with community, or unity shared in 
by many. 

Universals have been divided into, 1. Metaphysical or imi- 
versalia ante rem. 2. Physical, or universalia in re. 3. Logical, 
or universalia post rem. 

By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according to 
which all things were created. As existing in the Divine 
mind and furnishing the pattern for the Divine Avorking, these 
may be said to correspond with the ideas of Plato. 

By universals in the second sense are meant certain common 
natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or shared 
in by many — as rationality by all men. 

By universals in the third sense are meant general notions 
framed by the human intellect, and predicated of many things, 
on the ground of their possessing common properties — as 
animal, which may be predicated of man, lion, horse, &c. 

Realists give prominence to itniversals in the first and second 
signification. Nominalists hold that the true meaning of uni- 
versals is that assigned in the third sense. While concep- 
tualists hold an intermediate view.* 

In ancient philosophy the universals were called prcedicahles 



» Locke, Essay on Sum. Under stand., book il., ch.'6. 

' Lib. de Interpret., cap. 5. s Metaphys., lib. v., cap. 13. 

* Reid, Intdl. Pow., essay v., chap. 6; Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2d edit., 
sect. 23. 



VOCABULARY Or PHILOSOPHY. 545 

UmVESSALS- 

{q. v.), and were arranged in five classes, genus, species, dif- 
ferentia, proprium, and accidens. It is argued that there can 
be neither more nor fewer. For whatever is predicated of many 
is predicated essentially or accidentally ; if essentially, either of 
the whole essence, and then it is a species ; of a common part 
of the essence, and then it is a genus ; or of a proper part of the 
essence, and then it is the differentia essentialis ; if accidentally, 
it either flows from the essence of the subject, and is its pro- 
prium, or does not flow from its essence, and is its accidens. 

Or it may be argued thus — universality is a fitness of being 
predicated of many, which implies identity or sameness, or at 
least resemblance. There will therefore ]!fe as many classes of 
universals as there are kinds of identity. Now, when one thing 
is said to be the same with another, it is so either essentially 
or accidentally ; if essentially, it is so either completely or in- 
completely ; if completely, it gives a species ; if incompletely, it 
is so in form, and gives the differentia, or in matter and gives 
the genus; \i accidentally, it is the same either necessarily and 
inseparably, and constitutes the proprium, — or contingently 
and separably, and is the accidens. — Tellez.' But the fivefold 
classification of universals is censured by Derodon.^ 
TJNIVOCAL WORDS {tma, one ; vox, word or meaning) " are 
such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing ; 
the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called 
univocal words, for I know not that they signify anything else 
but those ideas to which they are generally afiixed."' 

" I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same 
word may be applied to difi'erent things in three ways : uni- 
vocally, analogically, and equivocally. Univocally, when the 
things are species of the same genus ; analogically, when the 
things are related by some similitude or analogy ; equivocally, 
when they have no relation but a common name."* 

In Logic a common term is called univocal in respect of those 
things or persons to which it is applicable in the same signifi- 
cation, as the term " man." Whately observes that the " usual 

' Summa, pars 1, dis. v., sect. 1. 

* Log., pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thmight, sect. 37. 

=" Watts, Log., b. i., c. i. 

■' Kcid, Correspondence, p. 75. 

47* 2l 



546 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

UNIVOCAL - 

division of nouns into univocal, equivocal, and analogous, and 
into nouns of the Jirst and second intention, are not, strictly 
speaking, divisions of vrords, but divisions of the manner of 
employing them; the same word may be employed either imi- 
vocally, equivocally, or analogously ; either in the first inten- 
tion or the second." ' 

V. Analogous, Equivocal, Intention. 

UTILITY, said Kant,^ " is nothing scarcely but a frame or case 
which may serve to facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw 
to it the attention of those who are not connoisseurs ; but 
cannot recommend it to true lovers of the art, or determine 
its price. 

" What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives all 
its merit from the end for w'hich it is useful.'"' 

^^ Utility is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a 
higher term."'' 

The doctrine of utility in morals is, that actions are right 
because they are useful. It has been held under various forms. 
Some who maintain that utility or beneficial tendency is what 
makes an action right, hold that a virtuous agent may be 
prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by benevolence (as Ru- 
therforth), or partly by both (as Hume). And the beneficial 
tendency of actions has by some been viewed solely in refer- 
ence to this life (as Hume and Bentham), while by others it 
has been extended to a future state (as Paley), and the obli- 
gation to do such actions has been represented as arising from 
the rewards and punishments of that future state, as made 
known by the light of nature and by revelation (as Dwight), 

The fundamental objection to the doctrine of utility in all 
its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid,^ viz., "that 
agreeableness and utility are not moral conceptions, nor have 
they any connection with morality. What a man does, 
merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the 
Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best 
moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to 
substitute another principle in its room ; and this system is 

' Whately, Log., b. ii., ch. 5, g 1. ^ Mitaphys. des Mcears, p. 15. 

' Reid, Act. Pow., essay v., ch. 5. ■* Manuel de Philosoph,., p. 334. 

^ Act. Pow., essay v., ch. 5. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 547 

UTILITY — 

liable to the same censure." " Honesitnn, igitiir, id irdelligi- 
mus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitaie, sine ullis premiis 
fructihusve, per seipsiim jure possit laudari." ' 



VELLEITY [volo, to will) is an indolent or inactive wish or 
inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic effort 
to obtain it, as when it is said, " The cat likes fish but will 
not touch the water." 

" The wishing of a thing is not properly the icilling it, but 
it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect velleity, 
and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency 
in, and desire of the end, without any consideration of the 
means." ^ 

"A volition which cannot carry itself into execution." — 
MllUer. — V. VoLiTioisr. 

VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conver- 
sation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to 
believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr. Reid 
enumerates an instinct of veracity and a corresponding instinct 
of credulity as principles of human nature. Children do not 
distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or passion prompts 
men, that they conceal or disguise the truth. The means 
employed for this purpose are either saying what is false, or 
equivocation and reservation — q v. 

VEHBAL is opposed to real {q. v.), 1. As name is opposed to 
thing; and 2. As insincere is opposed to sincere. "Great 
acclamations and verbal praises and acknowledgments, without 
an honest and sincere endeavour to please and obey him, are 
but pieces of mockery and hypocritical compliment."* 

" Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent 
of the terms employed ; sometimes on the things signified by 
them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite 
sides of a certain question may be held by parties not differing 
in their opinion of the matter in hand, then that question 



' De Finihus, ii., 14. ' South. 

' Hale, Cont. Of Afflictions. 



548 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

VERBAL - 

may be pronounced verbal; or depending on the different 
senses in which they employ the terms. If, on the contrary, 
it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but 
still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, 
then it may be pronounced that the question is real — that 
they differ as to the opinions they hold of the tilings or 
questions."^ 

VIRTUAL is opposed to actual. — " It is not, in this sense, the 
foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all ; not 
only in general, but in special ; not only virtual, but actual; 
not mediate, but immediate ; for a few lines would have served 
for a foundation general, virtual, and mediate." ^ 

A thing has a virtual existence when it has all the con- 
ditions necessary to its actual existence. The statue exists 
virtually in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The 
cause virtually contains the effect. In the philosophy of 
Aristotle, the distinction between hvva[iii, and ivti'i^x^'-O'^ or 
fvlpyfta, i. e., potentia or virtus, and actns is frequent and 
fundamental. 

" A letter of credit does not in reality contain the sum which 
it represents ; that sum is only really in the coffer of the 
banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, 
since it holds its place. This sum is in still another sense, 
contained ; it is virtually in the credit of the banker who 
subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the 
language of Descartes, the sum is contained formally in the 
coffer of the banker, objectively in the letter which he sub- 
scribed, and eminently in the credit which enabled him to 
subscribe ; and thus the coffer contains the reality yb?'maZ of 
the Slim, the letter the reality objective, and the credit of the 
banker the reality eminent."^ 

VIRTUE. — " For if virtue be an election annexed unto our nature, 
and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by reason, and 
that mean is the very myddes of two things vicious, the one is 
surplusage, the other in lacke,"'* &c. 

' Whately. '^ Bp. Taylor, Dissuas. from, Popery, sect. 3. 

' Koyer CoUard, CEin'res de Reid, torn, li., p. 356. 
* Sir T. Elyot, The Governour, h. ii., c. 10. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 549 

VIETUE — 

Virtus, in Latin, from vir, a man, and apftrj in Greek, from 
"Ap}^5, Mars, give us the primary idea of manly strength. 
Virtue then implies opposition or struggle. In man, the 
struggle is between reason and passion — between right and 
wrong. To hold by the former is virtue, to yield to the latter 
is vice. According to Aristotle, virtue is a practical habit 
acquired by doing virtuous acts. He called those virtues intel- 
lectual, by which the intellect was strengthened, and moral, 
by AA'hich the life was regulated. Another ancient division 
was that of the cardinal virtues — which correspond to the 
moral virtues. The theological virtues were faith, hope, and 
charity. 

The opposite of virtue is vice. 

Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book Of the Ad- 
vancement of Learning, as saying, 

"As beasts cannot be said to have vice or virtue, so neither 
can the gods ; for as the condition of the latter is something 
more elevated than virtue, so that of the former is something 
different from vice." ' 

As virtue implies trial or difficvilty, it cannot be predicated 
of God. He is holy. 

Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between virtue 
and holiness. In a holy being, the will is uniformly and 
Avithoui struggle in accordance with the moral law. In a 
virtuous being, the will is liable to the solicitations of the 
sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of reason. 
This is the only state of which man is capable in this life. But 
he ought to aim and aspire to the attainment of the higher or 
holy state, in which the will without struggle is always in 
accordance with reason. The Stoics thought the beau ideal 
of virtue, or the complete subjection of sense and appetite 
to reason, attainable in this life. — V. Dutt, Merit, Obliga- 
tion, Rectitude, Standard, Nature of Things. 
VOLITION {vol.0, to will) "is an act of the mind knowingly 
cxCi ting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of 
the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any par- 
ticular action."^ 



' Moffet, Trans., p. 200. 

* Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., chap. 21, sect. 15. 



550 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

VOLITION— 

" There is ati error which lies under the word volition. 
Under that word you include both the Jinal perception of the 
understanding AA^hich is passive, and also the first operation or 
exertion of the active faculty of self-motive jjower. These 
two you think to be necessarily connected. I think there is 
no connection at all between them ; and that in their not 
being connected lies the difference between action and pas- 
sion ; which difference is the essence of liberty." ' 

Things are sought as ends or as means. 

The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, circa finem, 
Velleity, Intention, and Fruition. Gen. iii. 6: — When the 
woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was 
pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one 
wise (this is velleity), she took thereof (this is intention) and 
did eat (this is fi'uition). There are also three acts, circa, 
media, viz., consent, approving of means — election, or choosing 
the most fit, and application, use, or employing of them. — V. 
Election, Will. 



WELL-BEING.—" This is beyond all doubt, and indisputable," 
says Leighton in his Theological Lectures, "that all men wish 
well to themselves ; nor can the mind of man divest itself of 
this propensity, without divesting itself of its being. This is 
what the schoolmen mean when in their manner of expression 
they say that ' tlie will [voluntas, not arbitrium) is carried 
towards happiness, not simply as Avill, but as nature.' ' No 
man hateth his own flesh.' " 

"One conclusion follows inevitably from the jDreceding posi- 
tion," says Coleridge,^ "namely, that this propensity can never 
be legitimately made the principle of morality, even because 
it is no part or appurtenance of the moral will : and because 
the proper object of the moral principle is to limit and control 
this propensity, and to determine in what it may be, and in 
what it ought to be, gratified ; while it is the business of 



• Dr. Sam. Clarke, Second Letter to a Gentleman, p. 410. 
2 Aids to Reflection, toI. i., p. 20, edit. 1848. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 551 

WELL-BEING - 

philosophy to instruct the understanding, and the office of re- 
ligion to convince the whole man, that otherwise than as a 
regulated, and of course therefore a subordinate, end, this 
propensity, innate and inalienable though it be, can never be 
realized or fulfilled." — V. Happiness. 
WHOLE {oiioi). — "There are wJioIes of different kinds ; for, in the 
Jii'st place, there is an extended whole, of which the parts lie 
contiguous, such as bodrj and space. Secondly, There is a 
whole, of which the parts are separated or discrete, such as 
number, which, from thence, is called quantity discrete. Thirdly, 
There is a whole, of which the parts do not exist together, but 
only by siTCcession, such as time, consisting of minutes, hours, 
and days, or as many more parts as we please, but which all 
exist successively, or not together. Fourthly, There is what 
may be called a logical whole, of which the several specieses 
are parts. Animal, for example, is a whole, in this sense, and 
man, dog, horse, &c., are the several parts of it. And Jifthly, 
The different qualities of the same substance, may be said to 
be parts of that substance." ' 

A whole is either divisible or indivisible. 

Every whole as a whole is one and undivided. But though 
not divided, a whole may be divisible in thought, by being 
reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether 
indivisible even in thought. This latter is what metaphysicians 
call Totum perjectionale, and it is only applicable to Deity, who 
is wholly in the universe, and wholly in every part of it. 

A divisible whole is distinguished as potential, or that which 
is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, as animal 
may be divided into man and brute, but is not constituted 
by them ; and actual, or that which is divisible into parts by 
which it is constituted, as man may be divided into soul and 
body. 

An actual whole is either physical or metaphysical. A 
physical whole is constituted by physical composition, and is 
integral when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or 
essential when composed of matter and form. A metapihysical 
whole is constituted by metaphysical composition, which is 

' Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., hook ii., chap. 12. 



552 VOCABULARY OP PHILOSOPHY. 

WHOLE - 

fourfold : 1. A whole made up of genus and differentia is an 
essential specific whole — as man, in so far as he is a species of 
animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the differentia 
(rational). 2. A whole made up of the specific nature and the 
individual differentia, is an essential numerical whole. 3. A 
ivhole of existence contains a singular essence and existence 
added. 4. A whole of subsistence has subsistence added to 
existence.' 

According to Derodon,^ an essential whole is that from which 
if any part be taken the being perishes — as man in respect 
of his body and soul. An integral whole is that from which, 
if any part be taken, the being is not entire but mutilated. 
Man with all his members is an integral whole; cut off a limb, 
he is not an integral, but still an essential whole. 

"A whole is composed of distinct parts. Composition may 
hG physical, metaphysical, or logical. 

"A physical lohole is made up of parts distinct and sepa- 
rate, and is natural, as a tree, artificial, as a house, moral, or 
conventional, as a family, a city, &c. 

"A metaphysical ichole arises from metaphysical composi- 
tion, as potence and act, essence and existence, &c. 

"A logical whole is composed by genus and differentia, and 
is called a higher notion, which can be resolved into notions 
under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. 
Thus, animal is divided into rational and irrational, knowledge 
into science, art, experience, opinion, belief. 

" Of the parts into which a whole is divisible, some are es- 
sential, so that if one is wanting the being ceases, as the head 
or heart in man ; others are integral, of which if one or more 
be wanting the being is not entire,^s in man, an eye or arms ; 
others are constituent, such as concur to form the substance 
of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen in water." ^ 
WHY? — As an interrogative, this word is employed in three 
senses", viz., — " By what proof (or reason) V " From what 
cause ?" " For what purpose V This last is commonly called 
the "final cause," — e. g., "Why is this prisoner guilty of the 
crime?" "Why does a stone fall to the earth?" "Why 

' Baronius, MetapJiys. Generalis, sect. 15. ^ Loff., 3 pars., p. 70. 

" Peemans, Introd. ad Philosnph., p. 72. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 653 

WHY? — 

did you go to London?" Much confusion has arisen from 
not distinguishing these different inquiries.' 
WILL. — Some modern philosophers, especially among the French, 
have employed the term activity as synonymous with loill. 
But the former is of voider signification than the latter. Acti- 
vity is the power of producing change, whatever the change 
may be. Will is the power of producing acts of willing. — V. 

VOLITIOK. 

"Everyman is conscious of a power to determine," says 
Dr. Reid,^ "in things which he conceives to depend upon his 
determination. To this power we give the name of will." 

" Will is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for the 
faculty of willing ; sometimes for the ad of that faculty, 
besides other meanings. But volition always signifies the act 
of willing, and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is opposed 
to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to do what he 
has no aversion to do, or what he has some desire to do, though 
perhaps he has not the opportunity ; and I think this is never 
called volition."^ 

" By the term will I do not mean to express a more or less 
highly developed faculty of desiring ; but that innate intellec- 
tual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces 
of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the 
whole sphere of our activity — a faculty which we are better 
able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most 
appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of 
man."^ 

"Appetite is the will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's 
controller ; what we covet according to the one, by the other 
we often reject."^ 

On the difference between desiring and loilling, see Locke, 
Essay on Hnm. Understand. ;^ Reid, ^c<. Pow.;'' Stewart, Act. 
and Mar. Poio.^ 

By some philosophers this difference has been overlooked, 
and they have completely identified desire and volition. 

• Whately, Log., Appendix 1. '^ Act. Potv., essay ii., ch. 1. 

^ Correspondence of J)r. Reid, p. 79. " Feuchtei-sleben, Dietetics of the Soul. 

' Hooker, Mccles. Pol., book i. " Book ii., cti. 21. 

■■ Essay ii., ch. 2. * Append,, p. 471. 



f)5-t VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

WILL- 

"What is desire," says Dr. Priestley/ "besides a wish to 
obtain some apprehended good ? And is not every wish a voli- 
tion? Every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz., a 
desire to accomplish some end, which end may be considered 
as the object of the passion or affection." 

"Volition," says Mr. Belsham, "is a modification of the 
passion of desire." Mr. James Mill, in his Analysis of the 
Mum. Mind, holds that the will is nothing but the desire that 
is most powerful at the time. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his Lec- 
tures on Mor. Philosophy, has not spoken of the faculty of will 
or of acts of volition as separate from our desires. And in his 
Essay on Cause and Effect,^ he has said, " Those brief feelings 
which the body immediately obeys are commonly termed voli- 
tions, while the more lasting wishes are simply denominated 
desires." 

The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the follow- 
ing passage: — "We regard it as of great moment that the 
will should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the 
mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart 
from all other faculties ; on the contrary, it blends itself with 
every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual 
decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments on 
the other, bat contains an important element which cannot 
be resolved into either the one or the other, or into both com- 
bined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, the reason, 
the conscience, may influence the will, but they cannot consti- 
tute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We have only by 
consciousness to look into our souls, as the loill is working, to 
discover a power, which, though intimately connected with 
the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related 
to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with 
its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that 
there cannot be an undertaking more perilous to the best inte- 
rests of philosophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve 
the icill into anything inferior to itself. In particular it 
may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it 
has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man's 
nature." 

" Philnsoph. Necess., p. .?o. ^ Sect. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 555 

WILL — 

According to Ritter,' " it was a principle with the Stoics that 
will and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved 
into it." Hence their saying, Omne adem est in intellectu. 
And hence they maintained that passion was just an erro- 
neous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are 
distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the sen- 
sitivity we feel or desire, and by the will we determine to do 
or not to do, to do this or to do that. 

Intellectus est prior vohmiate, non enim est voluntas nisi cle 
bono intellecto. — Thomas Aquinas.'^ 

Ea quce sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quce sunt in 
affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellecium movet affectum? 

In what sense the understanding moves the will is shown 
by Aquinas.^ 

" Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly 
command and draw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, 
it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love 
upon anything till his judgment reports it to the will as 
amiable." ^ 

On the question, whether the connection between the intel- 
lect and the will be direct or indirect, see Locke, Essay on 
Hum. Understand.;^ Jonathan Edwards, Jngj/iV?/;^ Dr. Turn- 
bull, Christ. Philosoph.^ 
Will (Freedom of). — " This is the essential attribute of a will, 
and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the 
will acquires this power from a previous determination of the 
toill itself. The toill is ultimately self-determined, or it is no 
longer a toill under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature 
under the mechanism of cause and effect." '•' 

" We need only to reflect on our own experience to be con- 
vinced that the man makes the motive, and not the motive the 
man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all 
to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what 
determines the man to a good and worthy act, we will say, or 
a virtuous course of conduct? The intelligent will, or the 
self-determining power ? True, in part it is ; and therefore 

' Hist, of Anc Philosoph., vol. iii., p. 555. ^^ Sum. Theol., ii., 1. qusest. 83. 

3 Ibidem, ii., 2, qutest. 7, art. 2. ■« Ihid., ii., 1, qurest. 0, art. 1. 

6 South, Sermon on Matt, x., 37. " B. i., ch. 21. ' Part i., .sect. 2. 

' P. 196. 3 Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. 227. 



556 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

WILL- 

the will is pre-eminently, the spiritual constituent in our being. 
But will any man admit, that his own tvill is the only and 
suflBcient determinant of all he is, and all he does? Is no- 
thing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which 
it belongs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects 
and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as act- 
ing on the will, though, doubtless, with it likewise? a process 
which the co-instantaneous, yet reciprocal action of the air 
and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to 
render intelligible."^ 

" It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of self- 
determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of motives 
or impulses — my ivill may be moved ; but this does not exclude 
the power of origination, for the consent even to the outward 
inducement or stimulus, still requires this unique act of self- 
determination in order to the energy requisite to the fulfilment 
of the deed. That it is so, who shall doubt who is conscious 
of the power ? or if he believes that he has not this conscious- 
ness he belies his own nature. The actuation of the individual 
will not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies 
it — implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because 
already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under the 
law of outward causation. How often do we not see that a 
stern resolve has produced a series of actions, which, sustained 
by the inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete 
achievement ? Contrast this with the life and conduct of the 
wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impossible not 
to find the inward conviction strengthened and confirmed, that 
the ivill is the inward and enduring essence of man's being." ^ 

" The central point of our consciousness — that which makes 
each man what he is in distinction from every other man — 
that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind 
apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is the will. 
Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting in- 
dependently and for ourselves."' 

" Will may be defined to be the faculty which is apprehended 
in the consciousness, as the originating power of the personal 

' Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. •44. 

a Green, Menial Dynamics, p. 54. ' Blorell, Phil, of Relig., p. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 557 

WILL- 

self. Not that it can be seen to be an absolute power of self- 
origination ; it is possible that it may always be determined 
by subtile forces which do not fall within the sphere of con- 
sciousness. But so far as apprehension can reach, the phe- 
nomena of the will appear to have their origin in an activity 
of the personal self."^ — F. Nature, Free-will, Liberty, 
Necessity. 
WISDOM, says Sir W. Temple, "is that which makes man judge 
what are the best ends, and what the best means to attain 
them." 

"Wisdom,^' says Sir J. Mackintosh, "is the habitual em- 
ployment of a patient and comprehensive understanding in 
combining various and remote means to promote the happi- 
ness of mankind." 

Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and diiFers 
from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power or faculty 
differs from the power or faculty itself. 

Proverbs ch. xv., v. 2, The tongue of the wise useth know- 
ledge aright. Knowledge puifeth up. Knowledge is proud 
that he hath learned so much. Wisdom is humble that he 
knows no more. 

The word corresponding to wisdom was used among the 
Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of 
the Scriptures, the word wisdom frequently denotes the reli- 
gious sentiment, or the fear and love of God. 
WIT {wite, to know) originally signified kuowledge or wisdom. 
We still say, in his tvits, out of his wits, for in or out of a sound 
mind. Mr. Locke ^ says, " Wit lies most in the assemblage of 
ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, 
wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby 
to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable visions in the 
fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other 
side, in separating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein 
can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being mis- 
led by similitude, and by af&nity to take one thing for another. 
This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and 
allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment 
and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, 

' Thompson, Christ. Theism, book j., ch. 3. " Essay, b. li., ch. 11. 



558 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

WIT- 

and therefore is so acceptable to all people ; because its bea,uty 
appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of 
thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it." 

" This," says Mr. Addison,' "is, I think, the best and most 
philosophical account that I ever met with of wit, which gene- 
rally, though not always, consists in such a resemblance and 
congruity of ideas as this author mentions. I shall only add 
to it, by way of explanation, that every resemblance of ideas 
is not that which we call wit, unless it be such an one that 
gives delight and surprise to the reader : these two properties 
seem essential to wit, more particularly the last of them. . , . 
Mr. Locke's account of wit, with this short explanation, com- 
prehends most of the species of wit, as meta^^hors, similitudes, 
allegories, enigmas, mottoes, parables, fables, dreams, visions, 
dramatic writings, burlesques, and all the methods of allu- 
sion ; as there are many other pieces of wit, how remote soever 
they may appear at first sight, from the foregoing description, 
which, upon examination, will be found to agree with it." 

" It is the design of wit," says Dr. Campbell,^ "to excite in 
the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising, not from 
anything marvellous in the subject, but solely from the 
imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related 
ideas presented to the mind. This end is efi"ected in one or 
other of these three ways : first, in debasing things pompous 
or seemingly grave : I say seemingly grave, because to vilify 
what is truly grave, has something shocking in it, which 
rarely fails to counteract the end ; secondly, in aggrandizing 
things little and frivolous ; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects, 
by means not only remote but apparently contrary, in a par- 
ticular and uncommon point of view." 

Dr. Barrow," speaking of Jacetiousness, says, "Sometimes it 
lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable appli- 
cation of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: 
sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage 
from -the ambiguity of their sense, or the afiinity of their 
sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous 
expression ; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude ; 

» Spectator, 62. a pkil. of Rhet., b. j., ch. 2, sect. 1. 

^ Sermon against Foolish Talking. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 559 

WIT- 

sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in 
a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly 
diverting or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is 
couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty 
hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling 
of contradictions, or in acute nonsense : sometimes a scenical 
representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a 
mimical look or gesture passeth for it: sometimes an affected 
simplicity : sometimes a presumptuous bluntness givetli it 
being ; sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting upon what is 
strange : sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to 
the purpose : often it consisteth in one knows not what, and 
springeth up one can hardly tell how." 

"True wit is like the brilliant stone 
Dug from the Indian mine; 
Which boasts two various powers in one — 
To cut as well as shine. 

"Genius, like that, if polished bright. 
With the same gifts abounds, 
Appears at once both keen and bright. 
And sparkles while it wounds." — Anon. 

WIT and HUMOUR commonly concur in a tendency to provoke 
laughter, by exhibiting a curious and unexpected affinity ; the 
first generelly by comparison, either direct or implied, the' 
second by connecting in some other relation, such as causality 
or vicinity, objects apparently the most dissimilar and hetero- 
geneous ; which incongruous affinity gives the true meaning 
of the word oddity, and is the proper object of laughter." ^ 

" The feeling of the ludicrous seems to be awakened by the 
discovery of an unexpected relation between objects in other 
respects wholly dissimilar."^ 

Dr. Trusler says i\\a,i wit relates to the matter, humour to the 
manner ; that our old comedies abounded with wit, and our old 
actors with humour; that humour sdwajs excites laughter, but 
icit does not ; that a fellow of humour will set a whole company 
in a roar, but that there is a smartness in wit, which cuts while 
it pleases. Wit, he adds, always implies sense and abilities, 

• Campbell, Pliil. of Rhet., b. i., chap. 2, sect. 2. 
^ M'Cosh, Typical Forms, b. iii., chap. 2, g 5. 



560 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

WITandHUMOUE — 

while humour does not ; humour is chiefly relished by the 
vulgar, but education is requisite to comprehend wit} 

Lord Shaftesbury has an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and 
Humour? 



ZOONOMY [l^ov, animal; vofioi, law). — That department of 
knowledge which ascertains the laws of organic life. Dr. 
Darwin published a well-known work under this title, in 
which he classifies the facts belonging to animal life, and by 
comparing them seeks to unravel the theory of diseases. 

' Taylor, Synonyms. * Characteristic's, toI. i. 



APPENDIX. 



A VOCABULARY OP SOME PRINCIPAL KANTIAN AND OTHER META- 
PHYSICAL TERMS. 

[From Morell's Edition of Tennemann's ManuaL London, 1852.] 

The most remarkable division of the human mind, in Kant's 
system is that into ; 

Vernunft. The Intuitional Faculty, or Reason, which he divides into theore- 
tical and practical, and which gives birth to Ideas (Ideen), the highest 
perceptions of the mind, which are innate, but stimulated into action by 
Experience. 

Verstiind. Understanding or Intellect; also divided into theoretical and 
practical; the parent of Conceptions or Notions {Begriffe), which are 
the generalizations of Thought, and mediate representations of things. 
They are divided into conceptions derived from Experience, and concep- 
tions derived from the Understanding itself. 

Under the operations of the mind we find the following terms : 

Anschauung, rendered, in this edition, by Intuitional and Sensational Percep- 
tion, gives immediate representations of things. 

Vorstellung. Representation (the Greek <pavTaaia), applies to Intuitional and 
Sensational Perceptions,, and also to conceptions which are their gene- 
ralizations. 

Erkenntniss. Cognition, representing the active co-operation of the Intel- 
lect bearing on the object presented by Sensational and Intuitional 
Perception. 

Gefilhl has been translated Emotion and Feeling. 

Wisseii. Science; sometimes Knowledge, but never Cognition. 

A marked feature of Kant's, and indeed of all modern German 
philosophy, is the division of the universe of things into Subjective 
and Objective. 

The Subjective implies the internal individual element, in perception, feeling, 
and knowledge. It must be referred to its centre and source ; — Das Ick, 
translated the Bgo, I or Me, implying the Percipient Self-hood. 

2 M (5G1) 



562 APPENDIX. 

The Objective is the externally-caused element in our perception and know- 
ledge, derivable from the Nicht-Ich — Non-Ego; or in plain English, 
from without. 

Another broad distinction in the Transcendental School is that 
between 

T)as Seyn, translated Este, or Being, and signifying bare, empty Existence, 

admitting of no predicates ; and 
Das Wesen. Real concrete Existence, or Essence manifested in Qualified or 

Conditional Nature. 
Das Werden. The Esse in a state of action, i. e. active Existence; differing 

from it as dynamical from static electricity. 
Daa Absolute, the Absolute, explains itself as the contrast to the Relative, 

and implies the Ground and Real Principal and Basis of all things. 

The editor has also been reduced to the necessity of coining a 
few words, in order to give an adequate rendering of the author's 
thoughts. Thus he has translated — 

DenJcbarkeit. Thinkableness ; Capacity of being thought. 

Erkennt. Cognized; (a word for which we have the sanction of Sir William 
Hamilton.) 

Teleologisch = Teleological. The science of the adaptation of means to ends. 
Pinal Causes. 

Apodiktik= Apodiktih. Demonstration. 

P'ddagogik = Pcedagogik. The Science of Education. 

^sthetik = Esthetics. Theory of the Fine Arts. 

Prop'ddeutik = Propimdeutik. Introductory Preparation. 

Moment = 3fo7nentiim. This term was borrowed from Mechanics by Hegel 
(See his Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. 3, p. 104, ed. 1841). He employs 
it to denote the two contending forces which are mutually dependent, 
and whose contradiction forms an equation. Hence his formula Esse = 
Nothing. Here Esse and Nothing are momentums, giving birth to 
Werden, i. e. Existence. Thus the momentum contributes to the same 
oneness of operation in contradictory forces that we see in Mechanics, 
amidst contrast and diversity, in weight and distance, in the case of the 
balance. 

Potenz. Potency or degree. (Schelliug's term for the Serial Order). 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 

[From Tennemann) with a few additions. 



B.C. 


Rome 


Olymp. 


640 


114 


35,1 


630 


116 


35,8 


629 


125 


38 


6U 


143 


42,2 


608 


146 


43,1 


598 


156 


45,3 


597 


157 


45,4 


584 


170 


49 


561 


193 


55,1 


557 


197 


56 


548 


206 


58,1 


547 


207 


58,2 


543 


211 


57,2 


540 


214 


60 


536 


218 


61 


504 


250 


69 


500 


254 


70,1 


496 


258 


71,1 


494 


260 


71,8 


490 


264 


72,3 


489 


265 


72,4 


480 


274 


75,1 


472 


282 


77 


470 


284 


77,3 


469 


285 


77,4 


460 


284 


80 


456 


298 


81 


450 


804 


82,3 


444 


310 


84 



Thales born, ac. to Apollodorus. 

Solon born. 

Thales born, ac. to Meiners. 

Anaximander born. 

Pythagoras born, ac. to Larcher. 

Solon published his laws. Pherecydes born about 

the same time. 
Thales foretold an eclipse. 
Pythagoras born, ac. to Meiners. 
Solon died. 

Anaximenes flourished. 
Thales died. 
Anaximander died. 

Thales died, ac. to some. Pherecydes died. 
Pythagoras founded a school at Croto. 
Xenophanes settled at Elea. 
Pythagoras died. Parmenides flourished, ac. to 

some. 
Anaxagoras and Philolaus born. Heraclitus and 

Leucippus flourished. 
Anaximenes died. 

Ocellus Lucanus flourished. ' 

Democritus born. 
Battle of Marathon. 
Pythagoras died, ac. to some. 
Battle of Salamis. 
Diogenes of Apollonia flourished. 
Democritus born, ac. to Thrasyllus. 
Socrates born. Parmenides flourished% 
Parmenides came from Elea to Athens with Zeno. 
Democritus born, ac. to Apollodorus. 
Empedocles flourished, ac. to some. 
Anaxagoras repaired to Athens. 
Xenophon born. 
Melissus. 
Gorgias wrote his treatise IIe^h ^ia^Mi 

(563) 



564 



APPENDIX. 



B.C 

442 
432 
431 
430 
429 
428 
427 
414 
407 
404 
400 

389 
384 
880 



364 
361 
360 
356 
348 
343 
340 

339 
337 
836 
335 
324 
323 

322 
320 

316 
814 
313 
305 
300 



288 
286 



285 



Piome 


Olymp. 


312 


86 


322 


87,1 


323 


87,2 


324 


87,3 


325 


87,4 


326 


88,1 


327 


88.2 


340 


91,3 


347 


93,2 


350 


94,1 


354 


95,1 


365 


97,4 


370 


99,1 


374 


100 




102 


390 


104,1 


393 


104,4 


394 


105 


398 


106 


406 


108,1 


411 


109,2 


414 


110,1 


415 


110,2 


417 


110,4 


418 


111,1 


419 


111,2 


430 


114,1 


431 


114,2 


432 


114,3 


434 


115 


438 


116,1 


440 


116,3 


441 


116,4 


449 


118,3 


454 


120,1 


466 


123,1 


468 


123,3 


469 


123,4 


474 


125,1 


482 


126,4 



Protagoras and Prodicus flourished. 

Beginning of the Peloponnesian war. 

Anaxagoras accused. 

Plato born, ac. to Corsini. 

Plato born, ac. to Dodwell. Pericles died. 

■Anaxagoras died. 

Gorgias sent ambassador to Athens. Diagoras fl. 

Diogenes of Sinope born. 

Democritus died, ac. to Eusebius. 

Close of the Peloponnesian war. 

Socrates died ; his disciples retired to Megara. 

Euclid and Archytas flourished. 

Plato's first voyage to Syracuse. 

Aristotle born. Pyrrho born. 

Antisthenes and Aristippus flourished. 

Aristotle repaired to Athens. 

Eudoxus flourished. 

Plato's second voyage to Syracuse. 

Plato's third voyage to Syracuse. 

Xenophon died. 

Alexander born. 

Plato died; Speusippus succeeded him. 

Aristotle became preceptor to Alexander. 

Diogenes and Crates (the Cynics) Pyrrho and Anax- 

arclius flourished. Zeno of Cittium born. 
Speusippus died. Xenocrates began to teach. 
Battle of Cheronsea. Epicurus born. 
Philip, king of Macedon, died. 
Aristotle opened his school at the Lycseum. 
Diogenes the Cynic died. 
Alexander the Great died. Ptolemy, the son of 

Lagus, succeeded him in Egypt. 
Aristotle died ; Theophrastus succeeded him. 
Demetrius Phalereus, and Dicsearchus of Messana 

flourished. 
Arcesilaus born (or later). 
Xenocrates died ; Polemo succeeded him. 
Theophrastus became celebrated. Crates. 
Epicurus opened his school at Athens, 
Stilpo, and Theodorus the Atheist, flourished. 
Zeno founded a school at Athens. 
Diodorus and Philo. 
Pyrrho died. 
Thi. ^nhrastus died. Pyrrho died about the same 

timt ; succeeded by Strato. 
Ptolemy Philadelphus became king of Egypt. 
Chrysippus born. 
Tiraon flourished. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



565 



B. C. Rome 



270 
269 
264 

260 
241 
217 
212 



185 
155 

146 

142 
135 

129 
115 

107 
or 
106 



84 

86 

69 
63 
50 

48 
441 
or 
43j 
30 
27 



484 
485 
490 

494 
513 
537 
542 
546 

569 
599 

608 

612 
619 
625 
639 



647 

666 

667 

685 
691 

711 

724 

727 



Olymp. 



127,2 
127,3 
128,3 

130 

134,1 

141,3 

143 

144 

148,4 
156,3 

158,3 

159,3 
161,2 
162,4 



167,2 
170 

171,1 

171,2 

178 

172,2 

182,2 

183,1 

184,2 

187,3 

188,2 



Epicurus died. 

Strato died ; succeeded by Lyco. 

Zeno, the Stoic, died (or later) ; succeeded by 
Cleanthes. 

PersEeus. — Aristo of Chios. — Herillus flourished. 

Arcesilaus died (or later). 

Carneades born. 

Zeno of Tarsus flourished. 

Chrysippus died, ac. to Menage. Diogenes of 
Babylon. 

Panagtius born (ac. to some, later). 

Embassy from the Athenians to Rome. (Critolaus, 
Carneades the Stoic, and Diogenes of Babylon). 

Greece and Carthage subjected to Rome. 

Antipater of Tarsus. 

Macedon became a Roman province. 

Posidonius born. 

Carneades died ; succeeded by Clitomachus. 

Pansetius accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alex- 
andria. 

Cicero born. 

Clitomachus died; succeeded by Philo. Posidonius 

flourished. 
Sylla took Athens. Philo retii-ed to Rome. 
Antiochus. 
Lucretius boi'n (ac. to others, earlier). Posidonius 

died. 
Antiochus died. 

Judsea became a Roman province. 
Posidonius died ; succeeded by Jason. 
Lucretius died. 
Cratippus, the Peripatetic, flourished. 

Cicero died. 

Egypt became a Roman province. 

Augustus became Emperor. Philo the Jew born. 



49 



566 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


Roman Emperors. 




1 


Augustus. 


Birth of Christ. 


3 




Seneca the philosopher born. 
Sextus the Pythagorean. 
Nicolaus of Damascvis, and Xenarchus flou- 
rished. 
Athenodorus the Stoic. 


14 


Tiberius. 




15 




' Sotion. 


33 




Crucifixion of Jesus Christ. 


34 




Philo the Jew flourished. 


37 


Caligula. 


Flavius Josephus born. 


41 


Claxidius. 




50 




Plutarch of Chseronea born. 


54 


Nero. 




65 




Seneca died. 


66 




Cornutus and Musonius exiled. 


69 


Galba, Otho, 






Vitellius. 


Apollonius of Tyana flourished. 


79 


Vespasian, Titus. 




81 




Musonius Rufus recalled fi'om exile. 


82 


Domitian. 


Domitian banished the philosophers and ma- 


89 




thematicians from Rome. 
Justin Martyr born. 
Epictetus flourished. 


90' 




Apollonius of Tyana died. 


95 






97 


Nerva. 


Plutarch flourished. 


99 


Trajan. 


Tacitus. 
Gnostics. 


118 


Adrian. 


Secundus of Athens. Plutarch died. 


120 






122 




Euphrates the Stoic died. 


131 




Galen Born. Favorinus. Basilides the 
Gnostic. 


134 




Arrian flourished. 


138 




Akibha the Rabbin died. 


139 


Antonins Pius. 


Calv. Taurus. Apollonius the Stoic, 
Basilides the Stoic. 


160 




Apuleius. 


161 


M. Aurelius Au- 
toninus. 


Alcinous. Numenius. 


165 




Peregrinus the Cynic, and Justin Martyr 

died. 
Lucian. 


170 




Athenagorus and Tatianus. Atticus the 

Platonist. 
Bardesanes. 


180 


Commodus. 


Maximus of Tyre. Death of Antoninus. 
Irenseus. Juda the Rabbi. The Talmud. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



567 



A.C. 


Roman Emperors. 




185 




Origen born. 


193 


Pertinax. 


Ammonius Saccas founded a school. 




Julianus. 


Clemens of Alexandria. Alexander of 




Sept. Severus. 


Aphrodisias. 
Galen died. 


200 




Plotinus born. Philostratus. 


205 






212 


Caracalla. 


Clemens of Alexandria died; 


218 


Macrinus. 


Tertullian died. 


220 


Antoninus Helio- 
gabalus. 




222 


Alex. Severus. 




232 
233 




Plotinus became a disciple of Ammonius. 
Porphyrins born. 


235 


Maximinus. 




238 
239 


Gordian. 
Gordian the son. 


Ulpianus. 


242 




Plotinus travelled into Persia. 


243 
244 
246 
253 


Philip. 
Trajanus Decius. 


Plotinus came to Rome. 

Amelius became a disciple of Plotinus. 


252 
252 


Trebonianus. 
Gallus and Vi- 

bius. 
Hostilianus. 


Longinus flourished. 


253 


^milius Valeria- 
nus. 


Origen died. 


269 


Flavius Claudius. 




270 
275 


Aurelian. 


Plotinus died. 
Longinus put to death. 


276 


Flavius Tacitus. 




277 


Aurel. Probus. 


The Manichaeans. 


282 


Aurelius Carus. 




284 


Diocletian. 


Arnobius. 


304 


Constantine and 


Porphyrins died. 




Maximianus. 




806 


Constantine the 






Great. 




321 


Constantine con- 


lamblichus flourished. 




verted to Chris- 






tianity. 




326 




Arnobius died. 


330 




Lactantius died. 


333 




lamblichus died. Themistius. 


337 
340 


Constantius and 
Constans. 


Eusebius bishop of Caesarea died. 



568 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


Roman Emperors. 




354 




Augustine born. 


355 




Themistius taught at Constantinople. 


360 


Julian. 


Sallustius. 


363 


Jovianus. 




364 


Valentinianus 
and Valens. 




379 


Theodosius the 
Great. 


Eunapius. 


380 




Nemesius flourished. 


384 




St. Jerome flourished. 


391 




Gregorius of Nazianzus died. 


394 




Gregorius of Nyssa. 


395 


Arcadius and 
Honorius. 


The Roman empire divided. 


398 




St. Ambrosius died. 


400 




Nemesius died. 


401 


Greek Emperors. 


Plutarch the son of Nestorius flourished. 


402 


Arcadius. 




408 


Theodosius II. 




409 




Macrobius. Pelagius. 


410 




Synesius. 


412 




Proclus born. 


415 




Death of Hypatia. 


418 




Pelagius condemned. 


4;'.0 




St. Augustine, and Plutarch the son of Nes- 
torius, died. 


434 




Syrianiis flourished. 


450 


Marcianus. 


Hierocles and Olympiodorus flourished. Sj'ri- 
anus died. 


457 


Led. 




470 




Claudianus Mamertinus flourished. Boethius 
born. 


474 


Leo IL 

Zeno Isauricus. 


Marcianus Capella flourished. 


476 


End of the Wes- 
tern Empire. 




480 




Salvanius. Cassiodorus born. 


485 




Proclus died. Ammonius the son of Her- 
mias. Hierocles. 


487 




iEneas of Gaza flourished. 


490 




Marinus died. 


491 


Anastasius. 


Marinus succeeded by Isidorus. 


518 


Justin I. 




526 




Boethius beheaded. 


527 


Justinian. 




529 




The Schools of philosophy closed at Athens. 


533 




Philoponus flourished. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



569 



A.C. 


Gi-eek Emperors. 




539 




Cassiodorus retired to a convent. 


549 




Damascius and Simplicius flourished. 


563 


Justinian II. 




575 


Tiberius II. 


Cassiodorus died. 


582 


Mauritius. 




602 


Phocas. 




604 




Gregory the Great died. 


010 


Heraclius. 




622 




Flight of Mahomet. 


636 




Isidorus of Seville died. 


641 


Constantine III. 

and IV. 
Constans II. 




668 


Constantine V. 




073 




The venerable Bede born. 


685 


Justinus II. 




694 


Leontius. 




698 


Tiberius III. 




711 


Philippicus. 




713 


Anastasius II. 




716 


Theodosius III. 




717 


Leo III. Isauricus 




735 




Bede died. 


736 




Alcuin born. 


741 


Constant. VI. 




753 


Almanzour the 
Khalif. 




754 




John of Damascus died. 


776 




Rhabanus Maurus born. 


796 


Irene. 

Emperors of 
Germany. 




800 


Charlemagne. 


Haroun al Raschid. 
Alkendi flourished. 


804 


Louis the Pious. 


Alcuin died. 


814 


Lothaire. 




840 


Louis II. 




855 






856 




Rhabanus died. 


875 


Charles the Bald. 


J. Scot Erigena came to France. 


877 


Louis III. 




879 




Alfred the Great. 


880 


Charles the Fat. 




886 




Erigena died. 


887 


Arnolphe. 




891 




Photius died. 


899 


Louis IV. 




912 


Com-ad. 
49* 





570 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 


■ 


919 


Henry the Fowler. 




937 


Otho the Great. 




954 




Alfarabi died. 


974 


Otho II. 




980 




Avicenna born. 


987 


Otho III. 




999 




Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II. 


1002 


Henry II. 




1003 




Sylvester II. died. 


1020 




Mich. Const. Psellus born. 


1025 


Conrad II. 




1034 




Anselm born. 


1036 




Avicenna died. 


1039 


Henry III. 




1042 




Lanfranc entered the convent of Bee. 


1055 




Hildebert of Lavardin born. 


1056 


Henry IV. 




1060 




Anselm became prior of Bee. 


1072 




P. Damianus died. Algazel born. 


1079 




Abelard born. 


1080 




Berengarias of Tours died. 


1089 




Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, died. 


1091 




Bernard of Clairvaus died. 


1092 




Roscellin found guilty of heresy at Soissons. 


1096 




Hugues of St. Victor born. 


1100 




Psellus died (later, ac. to some). 
Eustrachius of Nicsea. 


1107 


Henry V. 




1109 




Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, died. 
Alghazali d. at Bagdad (ac. to Hammer). 


1114 




Alanus of Ryssel born. 


1117 




Anselm of Laon died. 


1118 




Abelard taught at Pai-is. 


1120 




Abelard became monk of St. Denis. 
William of Champeaus, bishop of Chalons, 
died. 


1126 


Lothaire. 




1127 




Algazel died at Bagdad. 


1134 




Hildebert died. 


1138 






1139 


Conrad III. 


Moses Maimonides born. 


1140 




Hugo of St. Victor died. 


1141 




Gilbertus Porretanus became bishop of Poic- 
tiers. 


1142 




Abelard died. 


1146 




Assembly of ecclesiastics at Paris and Rheims 
to oppose Gilbertus Porretanus. 


1150 




Lombardus wrote his Sentences. 

Will, of Conches died. Rob. Pulleyn died. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



^71 



A. C. 


German Emperors. 




1153 




Bernard of Clairvaux died. 


1154 


Fred. Barbarossa. 


Gilbertus Porretanus died. 


11G4 




Peter Lombardus and Hugo of Amiens died. 


1173 




Richard of St. Victor and Robert of Melun 
died. 


1180 




John of Salisbury died. Walter of St. Victor. 


1190 




Thophail died. 


1193 


Henry VI. 


Albert the Great born, according to some. 


1198 






lii03 


Otho IV. 


Abuius of Ryssel died. 


1205 




jMoses Mainionides and Peter of Poictiers 

died. 
Albert the Great born, according to others. 


1206 




Peter of Poictiers and Averroes died. 


1209 




David of Dinant. Amalric of Chartres died. 


1214 




Roger Bacon born. 


1217 




Averroes died, according to some. 
Michael Scot at Toledo. 


1218 






1221 


Frederic II. 


Bonaventura born. 


1224 




Thomas Aquinas born. 


1234 




Raymond LuUi born. 


1236 




Albert the Great, doctor of theology at Paris. 


1245 




Alexander of Hales died. 


1247 




Thomas Aquinas went to Paris, ^gidius 
Colonna born. 


1248 




Will, of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, died. 
Thomas Aquinas began to lecture on Lom- 
bardus. 


1250 




Peter of Abano born. 


1251 


Conrad IV. 




1252 




Foundation of the Sorbonne. 


1253 




Robert Grossetete died. 


1254 




Niceph. Blemmydes flourished. 


1256 




Thom. Aquinas became Doctor of Theology. 


1264 




Vincent of Beauvais died. 


1273 


Rodolphus I. 




1274 




Thomas Aquinas died. Bonaventura died. 


1275 




J. Duns Scotus and Walter Burleigh born. 


1277 




John XXI. (Petr. Hispanus) died. 


1280 


Adolphus of Nas- 
sau. 


Albert the Great died. 


1292 


Roger Bacon died, according to Wood. 


1293 


Albert I. 


Henry of Ghent died. 


1294 




Roger Bacon died, according to some. 


1300 




Richard of Middleton died. 


1308 


Henry VII. 


J. Duns Scotus died. 


1310 




Georgius Pachymeres died about this time. 


1314 


Louis V. 





572 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 


]?,15 




1316 




1322 




1323 




1325 




1330 




1332 




1337 




1343 




1346 


Charles IV. 


1847 




1349 




1350 




1357 




1358 




1361 




1363 




1374 




1379 


Wenceslaus, 


1380 




1382 




1395 




1396 




1397 




1400 


Robert. 


1401 




1408 




1410 


Sigismund. 


1415 




1419 




1425 




1429 




1430 




1435 




1436 




1438 


Albert II. 


1440 


Frederic III. 


1448 





Raymond Lulli died. 

Franc. Mayron introduced disputes in the 

Sorborine. 
iEgidius Colonna died. 
Peter of Abano died. 
Occam resisted the Pope. 
Herv^ (Hervseus Natalis) died. 
Franc. Mayron died. 
Occam sought the protection of the emperor 

Louis. 
Will. Durand of Saint Pour5ain, died. 
Theodoras Metochita died. 
Walter Burleigh died. 
Occam died. 

Occam died, according to others. 

Thomas of Bradwardine and Robert Holcot 

died. 
Peter d'Ailly born. 
Thomas of Strasburg died. 
.J. Buridan still alive. 
Gregory of Rimini died. 
J. Tauler died. 
J. Gerson born. 
Petrarch died. 

Nic. Orami;s, or Oresmius, died. 

Thomas a Kempis born. 

Bessarion and George of Trebisond born. 

Marsilius of Inghen died. 

Henry of Hesse died. 

Nicolas Cusanus born. 

Laur. Valla died. 

Matthasus of Cracow died. 

Emmanuel Chrysoloras died. 

J. Wessel Gansfort born. 

Peter D'Ailly died. 

J. Gerson died. 

Theodorus Gaza arrived in Italy. 

Marsilius Ficinus born. 

Raymond de Sabunde taught at Toulouse. 

George Geiiysthus Pletho and Bessarion re= 

paired to Florence. 
Invention of Printing. Foundation of the 

Platonic Academy at Florence. 
Nicolas de Clemange died. 
Rodolphus Agvicola born. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



573 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 




1453 


Taking of Con- 
stantinople. 




1455 




Nicolas V. died. Reuchlin born. 


1457 




Laur. Valla died. 


1462 




P. Pomponatius born. 


1463 




John Pious of Mirandula born. 


1464 




Geo. Scholarius Gennadius and Nicolas Cu- 

sanus died. 
Cosmo de' Medici and Pius II. died. 


1467 




Erasmus born. 


1471 




Thomas a Kempis died. 


1472 




Bessarion died. 


1473 




Persecution of the Nominalists at Paris. 
Augustinus Niphus born. 


1478 




Theodorus Gaza died. 


1480 




Thomas More born. 


1481 




Franc. Philelphus died. 


1483 




Paulus Jovius born. 


1484 




Jul. Ca3S. Scaliger born. 


1485 




Rodolphus Agricola died. 


1486 




J. Argyropulus and George of Trebisond 

died, ac. to some. 
Agrippa of Nettesheim born. 


1489 




J. Wessel died. 


1492 


Maximilian I. 


Lorenzo de' Medici died. Louis Vives born. 


1493 


Discovery of 






America. 


Hermolaus Bai-barus died. Theophrastus 
Paracelsus born. 


1494 




J. Picus of Mirandula and Angelas Politianus 
died. 


1495 




Gabr. Biel died. 


1497 




Melancthon born. 


1499 




Marcilius Ficinus died. 


1500 




Dominicus of Flanders died. 


1501 




Jerome Cardan born. 


1508 




Bernardinus Telesius born. 


1509 




Andr. Csesalpinus born. 


1512 




Alex. Achillinus died. 


1515 




Petrus Ramus born. Macchiavelli flourished. 


1517 


Beginning of the 
Reformation. 




1520 


Charles V. 


Fr. Piccolomini born. 


1522 




J. Reuchlin died. 


1525 




P. Pomponatius died. Fr. Zorzi flourished. 


1527 




Nich. Macchiavelli died. 


1529 




Fr. Patritius born. 


1532 




Ant. Zimara died. Jac. Zabarella born. 


1533 




J. Fr. Picus of Mirandula killed. 



574 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 




1533 




Nic. Leonicus died. Val. Weigel and Mon- 
taigne born. 


1535 




H. Cornelius Agrippa died. Sir T. More 
beheaded. 


1536 




Erasmus died. Fr. Zorzi died. 


1537 




Jac. Faber died. 


1540 




Marius Nizolius and L. Vives died. 
Institution of the Jesuits. 


1541 




Theophr. Paracelsus died. Charron born. 


1542 




Gasp. Contarini died. 


1543 




Copernicus died. 


1546 




Augustinus Niphus died. 


1547 




Jac. Sadoletus died. Nic. Taurellus and 
Justus Lipsius born. 


1552 




Paulus Jovius died. Caes. Cremoninus born. 


1553 




Sim. Porta died. 


1555 


Ferdinand I. 




1560 




Phil. Melancthon died. 


1561 




Franc. Bacon born. 


1562 




Ant. Talgeus died. Fr. Sanchez born. 


1564 


Maximilian II. 




1568 




Thomas Campanella born. 


1569 




' 


1572 




P. Ramus died. Dan. Sennert born. 
J. Sepulveda died. 


1574 




Robert Fludd born. 


1575 




Jae. Bohm born. 


1576 


Rodolph II. 


Jer. Cardan died. 


1577 




J. P. Van Helmont born. 


1578 




Berigard born. Alex. Piccolomini died. 


1580 




Giordano Bruno quitted Italy. 


1581 




Lord Herbert of Cherbury born. 


1583 




Grotius born. 


1586 




Jac. Schegk died. Luc. Vanini and Le 
Vayer born. 


1588 




Bernardus Telesius born. Th. Hobbes born. 
Val. Weigel died. 


1589 




Jac. Zabarella died. 


1592 




Mich, de Montaigne died. Gassendi and 
Comenius born. 


1596 




R. Descartes born. J. Bodin died. 


1597 




Fr. Patritius died. 


1600 




Giord. Bruno burnt. 


1603 




P. Charron and And. Caesalpinus died. 


1604 




Fr. Piccolomini died. 


1606 




Nic. Taurellus and Just. Lipsius died. 


1614 


Matthias. 


Mart. Schoock born. Fr. Suarez died. 
Fr. Merc. Van Helmont boi-n. 


1619 


Ferdinand II. 


L. Vanini burnt. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



575 



AC. 


German Emperors. 




1621 




J. Barclay died. 


1623 




Blaise Pascal born. 


1624 




Jac. Bohm died. 


1625 




Clanherg, Geulinx, and Wittich born. 


1626 




Fr. Bacon died. 


1628 




Rud. Goclenius died. 


1630 




Huet born. Ctes. Cremoninus died. 


1632 




Fr. Sanchez died. 

Benedict Spinoza, J. Locke, Silv. Regis, 

Sam. Puffendorf, and Rich. Cumberland 

born. 


1634 




B. Becker born. 


1637 


Ferdinand III. 


Dan. Sennert and Robert Fludd died. 


1638 




Nic. Malebranche born. 


1639 




Th. Campanella died. 


1642 




Galileo died. Newton born 


1644 




J. Baptiste Van Helmont died. 


1645 




Grotius died. 


1646 




Leibnitz and Poiret born. 


1647 




Bayle born. 


1648 




Herbert of Cherbury and Mersenna died. 


1649 




Scioppius died. 


1650 




Descartes died. 


1651 




William of Tschirnhausen born. 


1654 




.J. Selden died. 


1655 




Gassendi died. Chr. Thomasius born. 


1657 


Leopold I. 




1659 




Adr. Heerebord died. Wollaston born. 


1662 




Blaise Pascal died. 


1663 




Berigard died. 


1665 




J. Clauberg and Mart. Schoock died 


1666 




J. De Sillion died. 


1669 




Geulinx and J. Coccejus died. 


1670 




Sorbiere died. 


1671 




Comenius died. Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury b. 


1672 




Le Vayer died. 


1675 




Sam. Clarke born. 


1676 




M. Von Kronland and Voetius died. 


1677 




Ben. Spinoza died. Th. Gale, Fr. Glisson, 
and Harrington died. 


1679 




Chr. Wolf born. Jer. Hirnhaym and Hobbes 
died. 


1680 




Jos. Glanville and La Rochefoucauld died. 


1684 




Berkeley born. Jac. Thomasius died. 


1685 




Lamb. Velthuysen died. 


1687 




Henr. More and Wittich died. 


1688 




Cudworth and Parker died. 


1094 




Ant. Arnault and Sam. Puffendorf died. 
Fr. Hutcheson and Voltaire born. 



576 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 




1695 




Nicole died. 


1698 




Balthasar Becker and J. Pordage died. 


1699 




Fr. Merc. Van Helmont died. 


1704 




J. Locke and Bossuet died. 


1705 


Joseph I. 


J. Ray died. 


1706 




Bayle died. 


1707 




Silv. Regis died. 


1708 




Tschiruhausen and Jacquelot died. 


1711 




Hume born. 


1712 




Crusius and Rousseau born. 


1713 


Charles VI. 


Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury died. 


1715 




Malebranche died. Condillac and Helvetius 

born. 
Gellert born. 


1716 




Leibnitz died. 


1718 




M. Aug. Fardella died. 


1719 




P. Poiret and Rich. Cumberland died. 


1720 




Bonnet born. 


1721 




Huet died. 


1722 




Boulainvilliers died. 


1723 




Adam Smith born. 


1724 




Wollaston died. Kant born. 


1727 




NeTvton died. 


1728 




Chr. Thomasius and Thiimmig died. 


1729 




Sam. Clarke, Collins, Gundling, and Fr. 

Buddeus died. 
And. Rudiger died. 


1731 




J. Priestley born. Mandeville died. 


1738 




W. Derham died. 


1735 




Le Clerc died. 


1736 


Charles VII. 




1740 


Frederic II, King 
of Prussia. 


, 


1742 




Garve born. 


1743 




Jacobi born. 


1744 




Baptist Vice and Joachim Lange died. 
Platner born. 


1746 


Francis I. 




1747 




Fr. Hutch eson died. 


1748 




De Crouzaz and Burlamaqui died. 


1750 




Bilfinger died. 


1751 




La Mettrie died. 


1752 




Hansch died. 


1754 




Berkeley and Christ. Wolf died. 


1755 




Montesquieu died. 


1756 






1757 




David Hartley died. Gall born. 


1758 




Ch. Reiuhold born. 


1759 




Maupertuis died. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



577 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 




1762 




Alex. Baumgarten died. Fichte born. 


1765 


Joseph II. 


Herm. Sam. Reimarus died. 


1766 




Thomas Abbt and Gottsched died. 


1769 




Gellert died. 


1770 




Winckler, D'Argens, and Formey died. 


1771 




Helvetius died. 


1772 




J. Ulr. Cramer died. Swedenborg died. 


1774 




Quesnay died. 


1775 




Crusius and Walch died. Schelling born. 


1776 




Hume died. Spurzheim born. 


1777 




Meier and Lambert died. 


1778 




Voltaire and Rousseau died. 


1779 




Sulzer died. 


1780 




Condillac and Batteux died. 


1781 




Ernesti and Lessing died. 


1782 




Henry Home and Iselin died. 


1783 




D'Alembert died. 


1784 




Diderot died. 


1785 




Baumeister and De Mably died. 


1786 




Mendelssohn died. 


1788 




Hamann and Filangieri died. 


1789 


French Revolu- 
tion. 




1790 


Leopold II. 


A. Smith, F. Hemstei-huys and Basedow d. 


1791 




Rich. Price, Daries, and Nettelbladt died. 


1792 


Francis II. 


Victor Cousin born. 


1793 




Bonnet, Moritz, and Beccaria died. 


1796 




Th. Reid died. Jouflfroy born. 


1798 




Garve died. 


1800 




Sol. Maimon died. 


1801 




Heidenreich and Irving died. 


1802 




Engel died. 


1803 




J. Beattie and Herder died. 


1804 




Kant, Jos. Priestley, and Saint-Martin d. 


1806 




Tiedemann died. 


1808 




Bardili died. 


1809 




J. A. Eberhard, Steinbart, and Thos. Payne, 
died. 


1812 




K. Chr. E. Schmid died. 


1813 




J. A. H. Ulrich died. 


1814 




Fichte died. 


1815 




Mesmer died. 


1816 


, 


Ferguson died. 


1817 




De Dalberg died. 


1818 




Platner and Campe died. 


1819 




Jacobi and Solger died. 


1820 




Wyttenbach and Klein died. Gall d. 


1821 




Feder and Buhle died. 


1822 




Eschenmayer died. 



50 



578 



APPENDIX. 



A.C. 


German Emperors. 


- 


1823 




Reinhold and Maass died. 


1828 




D. Stewart and Bouterwek died. 


1829 




Frederic Schlegel. 


1831 




Hegel. Whateley. 


1832 




Krause. Schulze. Spurzheim died. 


1834 




Sclileiermacher. 


1836 




Brownson. J. Mill died. Ritter. 


1837 


Ferdinand IV. 


Fourier. Whewell. 


1838 




Schopenhauer died. Day. 


1839 




Wayland. 


1840 




Krug. 


1841 




Herbart. Emerson. Upham. 


1842 




Degerando. Schmucker. 


1843 


Francis. 


Fries. Fr. Baader. J. S. Mill. 


1844 




Baynes. Bouvier. 


1846 




Rauch. 


1848 




W. A. Butler. Blakey. 


1849 




Hickok. 


1850 




Jouifroy. Chalybseus. M'Cosh. 


1851 


Joseph I. 


Oersted. 


1852 




Diction, des Sciences Philos. completed. 
Fortlage. Wight's Transl. of Cousin. 


1854 




Hamilton's Reid. Schelling died. 


1856 




Hamilton, Sir Wm., died. Schwegler's Hist. 
Philos., Transl. by Seelye. 


1857 




Haven. 


1859 




Mansell. Jamieson. 


1860 




Young. Dagg. 



GERMAN 



PHILOSOPHERS OF THE MOST RECENT ERA. 
Arranged hy Schools.* 





[. SCHOOL OF KANT. 




Kant. 


Neeb. 


Schwartz. 


Reinhold. 


Jacob. 


Schmalz. 


Mellin. 


Tieftrunk. 


Bergk. 


Schultz. 


Kiesewetter. 


Feuerbach. 


Schmid. 


Hoifbauer. 


Fiillebom. 


Heydenreich. 


Kiinhardt. 


Flugge. 


Beck. 


Berger (Emmanuel). 


Born. 


Ben David. 


Kern. 


Kinker. 


Dietz. 


Boethius. 


Matthiae. 


Mutschelle. 


Kindervater. 


Wendt. 


Snell. 


Soctier (Joseph). 


Stoeudhn. 


Schaumann. 


Fischhaber. 


Bahle. 


Schmidt-Phiseldek. 


Pcelitz. 


Tennemann. 


II. DISSENTE 


RS FROM THE SCHO 


OL OF KANT. 


Schulze. 


Maimon. 


Ruckert. 


Beck. 


Bouterweck. 


Krug. 


Berg. 


Bardili. 




II 


[. SCHOOL OF FICHT 


E. 


Ficlite. 


Schad. 


Reinhold. 


Forberg. 


Michaelis. 


Schelling. 


Niethammer. 






r\ 


T. SCHOOL OF JACOI 


.1. 


Jacobi. 


Ancillon. 


Salat. 


Kceppen. 


AVeiss (C.) 


Schmid (Theod.) 


Fries. 


Weiller. 





■ From the Diet, des Sciences Philosophiques. Tom. vi. 104:!. 

(579) 



580 



RECENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



Schelling. 

Hegel. 

Novalis. 

Weber. 

Ast. 



V. SCHOOL OF SCHELLING AND HEGEL. 



Kayssler. 
Klein. 
Risner. 
Abicht. 



Zimmer. 
Stutzmann. 
Berger (Eric). 
Suabedissen. 



VL MYSTICS AND DISSIDENTS. 



Hamann. 
Baader. 

Schlegel (Frederic). 
Weishaupt. 



Herder. 

Schleiermacher. 

Solger. 

Richter (Jean Paul). 



Schneller. 

Krause. 

Herbart. 



BIBLIOGEAPHICAL INDEX 

OF 

AUTHORS AND OF PROPER NAMES. 



Abelard, Peter (1079-1142). 

1. Opera {Paris, 1616) Cousin (1849). 

2. Recently discovered loorks (Sic et Non) (1831 Eheniwald, 1836 Cousin, 

1851 Hanke and LindenkoM). 
Belief. Scholastic Philosophy. 
AcADAMiE des Sciences Morales et Politiques. 

Ideology. 
ACHENWALL, G. (1719-1772). 
Jus. Natural, 1750-1781. 
Statistics. 
AcoNTius, or Concio, James. (XVTth Cent.) 
De Methodo investig. artium. 1558. 
Method. 
Adams, Dr. Wm. (1707-89). 

1. Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue. 1777. 
Obligation, Rectitude. Sanction. 

2. Essay on Miracles, in answer to Hume, 1752. 
Miracles. Testimony. 

3. Essay on Self-IIurder. 
Suicide. 

Addison, Joseph (1672—1719). 
Spectator, 1711-1714. 

Faculties of the Mind (Classification of). Fancy. Imagination, 
Physiognomy. Taste. Wit. 
^sop. (Vlth Cent. B. C.) 

Apologue. Fable. — 

Agonistes, or Philosophical Strictures, 

Consciousness and Feeling. 
AoRiPPA, Cornelius (de Nettesheim) (1486 — 1535). 

1. De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum. (1627.) 

2. Be Occulta Fhilosophia. (1533.) 

3. Opera (about 1550) in German. 1856. 
Anima Mundi. Archetype, Theosophism. 

50* " (581) 



582 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Ahrens, Heinrich. (b. 1808.) 

1. Coursde Psychologie. 2 vols. Paris. 1837-38. 

2. Organische Staatslehre auf 'pliilos.-anihropol. Grundlage. Vienna, 

(1850). 
Causality. Personality. 
Akenside, Mark (1721 — 1770). 

The Pleasures of the Imagination. 1744. 

Imagination and Memory. Laughter, Taste. 
Albisrtus, Magnus (d. 1280). 
Scholastic Philosophy, 
Albigenses, or Cathari. 

Manicheism. 
Alcuin, Flaccus Albinus. (736 — 804.) 

Opera (Frobenii) 1777. a. De Ratione Animas. 
Faculty. 
Aldrich, Henry, D.D. (1647—1710). 

a. Artia LogiecB Compendium. 1691. b. Transl. with Questions. 1825. 
Conceiving. Definition. Intention. Notions first and second. Syllo- 
gism. Truth. 
Aleiibert, D. (J. Le Rond). (1717-83). 
Jfelanges de Litterat. Amsterd. 1767. 
Metaphysics. Reminiscence. 
Alexandria, School of. 

Ifatter, Essai Historique sur Vecole d'Alexandrie. Paris. 1820. 

Anima Mundi. Eclecticism. Ecstasy. Emanation. Pneumatologj'. 
Unification. 
Alison, Archibald (1757—1828.) 

Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste. (1790.) 
Beauty. Taste. 
Alitheus, Theophilus (Lyser). 

Polygamia Trixunphatrix. 1682. 
Polygamy. 
z\lliot, Dr. 

Psychology and Theology. 12mo. Lond. 1855. 
Psychology. 
Ai.stedids, J. H. (1588-1638.) 

Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopcsdia. 1630. Four vols, folio. 
Archelogy. 
Ames, Wm. (1576-1633). 

Mysticism. 
Amjionius, Hermiae (filius) (ab. A. C. 500.) 

Commentaria in Prtzdicamenta (Gategor.) Aristotelis (1546) — Ed. Bran- 
dis (1836). 
Acroamatical. Organon. Preeprcedicamenta. 
AmpJire, a. M. (1775-1836). 
Nosology. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 683 

Anax^goras. (B. C. 500— 428). 

Fragments of his Works, ed. hy Schaubach (1827), Schorn (1829). On 
his Philosophy, Cams (1797), Schleiermacher (1815), Brcier 
(1840.) 
Atom. Criterion. 
Anaximander, of Miletus. (B. C. 610—546). 
Schleiermacher. (1811.) 
Mathematics. Potential. 
Anaximenes, (ab. B. C. 556). 
Grothe. (1689.) 
Atheism. 
Ancillon, J. P. F. (1767—1837). 

Essai sur I'Idee et le Sentim. de I'Infini. Melanges, (1809.) Esaais, 
(1817.) Noiiv. Essais. (1824.) 
Iniinite. 
Andre, Y, M. (1675—1764). 

1. Essai sur le Beau. (1741). 

2. (Euvres (Guyot). 1766. 
Beauty. 

Andronicus, (of Rhodes). (1st Cent. B. C*) 

Metaphysics. 
Anselm, of Canterbury. (1033—1109). 

Opera (Gerberon). 1675. 2d and best, (1721.) Of. Frank (1842.) Basite 
(1843). Bouchitte Remusat [Paris, 1853.) 
Belief. Optimism. Understanding. 
Ansblme, Anth. L'Abbe. (1652—1737). 

Sur le Sonverain Bien des anciens (in Mem. de I' Acad. d'Tnscr. et, B. L.) 
Good, the Chief. 
Antiochus, of Askalon. (B. C. 1st Cent.) 

Academics. 
Antisthenes, the Cynic. (B. C. 422.) 

Cynic. 
Antoninus, M. Aurelius. (121 — 180.) 

De Rebus suis, Lib. XII. Comment Perpet., etc. Studio Operaque Th, 
Gataker. Cambr. 1643. Bond. 1697. 
Rectitude. 
Apuleius, Lucius (ab. A. D. 160). 
Liber de Deo Socratis. (1625.) 

Demon. * 

Aquinas, Thomas, "the Angelic Doctor." (1227-1274). 

1. Opera. 1570. ( Venice, 1745-60.) 
Arbor Porphyriana. 

2. Summa Theologies. {Nicolai.) Paris, 1663. 

Analogy and Experience. Certainty, Negation. Privation. Syn- 
deresis. Will. 



584 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Aqdinas, Thomas. 

3. De Veritate CatholiccB fidei contra errores gentilium. (1475.) 
Certainty. Intellect. Truth. 

4. Opuscula, (Oper. xix.) 
Intention (First and Second). 

6. De Magistro. {Oj3tr. is. — xiii.) 

Reminiscence. Scholastic Philosophy. 
Aecesilaus, (ab. B. C. 316). 

Academics. Species. 
ARCHELAtrs, of Miletus, (ab. B. C. 460). 

Atom. 
Archimkdes. (B. C. 467-287). 

De Equilihrio, {Opera Torelli. Oxford. 1793). 

Sufficient Reason (Doctrine of). 
Archytas, of Tarentum. (Vth Cent. B. C.) 

Category. 
Argyeopolus, John. (XVth Cent.) 

Entelechy. 
Aristides. (lid Cent. A. D.) 

Apology. 
Aristippcs, of Cyrene. (PI. B. C. 380.) 

Hedonism. 
Aristotle. (B. C. 384-322). (Aristotelians and Peripatetics). 

1. Topica. 

Definition, Difference. 

2. 3fetaphi/8ica. (Bohn,) 

Contradiction. Criterion. Disposition. Element. Entelechy. Ex- 
eluded Middle. Form. Habit. Metaphysics. Method. Part. 
Power. Principle. Secundum Quid. Theology. Unity. Uni- 
versal. 

3. De Animn, ircpi ipv^rj;. 

Contraries. Intellectus patiens. Life. Sensibles common and pro- 
per. Soul. Spirit, mind and soul (under soul). Substance. Ta- 
bula Rasa. 

4. Organon. {Categor, Interpretat. Analyt. pr. and pios. Top. Soph.) 
Criterion. Demonstration. Organon. 

5. Prior Analyt. 

Deduction. Grammar. Induction. Logic. Syllogism. Term. 

6. Poster Analyt. 

Definition. Division. Experience. Grammar. Logic. Science. 
1. Ethica Nicom. 

Dreaming. Election. Ends. Equity. Ethics. Friendship. Habit. 
Happiness. Ignorance. Justice. Method. Motive. Person, 
Suicide. Temperament. Understanding. 
8. Pliysiea. 

Chance. Eclecticism. Esoteric. Privation. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 585 

Aristotle. 

9. Economics. 
Economics. 

10. Rhetorica. 

Ethology. Metaphor and Simile. 

11. Interpretatione, Liber de. Hepl ipjirjvdai. 
Grammar. Modality. Universal. 

12. De Memoria et Reininiscentia. 

Memory. Eeminiscence. Train of Thought. 

13. Poet. 
Metaphor. 

14. Be Oeneratione Animaliuni. 
Nature (Course or power of). 

15. Physiognomy (spurious). 
Physiognomy. 

16. Categor. 
Quantity. 

17. De Sensu et Sensili. 
Sensibles, Common and proper. 

18. Polit. 

Society (Desire of). Do. (Political, Capacity of). Spirit, mind and 
soul (under soul). 

19. Logic. (See Organon.) 
Sophism. Theory. 

Abduction. Accidental. Acroamatical. Actual. Amphibology. 
.Analytic. Apodeictic. A priori. Argument. Attribute. Auto- 
maton. Axiom. Being. Capacity. Categories. Ca.use. Causes 
(final doctrine of). Choice. Consciousness. Consent (argument 
from universal). Cosmogony. Discursus. Empirics. Enthusiasm, 
Enthymeme. Epicurean. Essence. Fallacy. Hypothesis. Idea. 
Intellect and Intelligence. Judgment. Mind. Monad. Motion. 
Noology. Number. Objective. Ontology. Opposed. Potential. 
Problem. Proposition. Propriety. Quiddity. Rationale. Reason. 
Relation. Scholastic Philosophy. Sensorium. Sensus Communis. 
Space. Syncretism. Transcendent. Univocal. Virtual. Virtue. 

Arminians. 

Metaphysics. 

Arnauld, Ant. (1623-1694). 

1. (Euvres, 43 vols. 4to. Paris. 1775-83. 

2. QHuvres Philosophiques de comprenant : 1. les Objects contre les Bleditat. 

de Descartes. 2. Logique de Port Royal. 3. Des Vraies et des 
Faiisses Idecs, (1683). {Jourdain, 1846.) 
Faculties of the Mind, (Classification of). Psychology. 
Arnobius. (326.) 

Disputation, adv. Gentes.{OreUius, 1816.) 
Immateriality. 



586 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

A KNOT. 

Illuatr. of Proverbs, 
Secularism. 
Arrian. (lid Cent. A. D.) 

1. Opera {Buhner and Miiller, Paris, 1846). 

2. De Expeditione Alexandri Magni. (KrUger, 1851.) 
Gymnosophist. 

Arthur, Archibald. (1744-1797.) 

Discourses on Theological and Literary Subjects. 1803. 

Chance. 
AscHAM. (1515-1568). 

The Schoolmaster (1570). {Upton, 1711). Works . {Bennet) 1761 and 

1815. 

Imitation. 
Atomists. 

Empiric. Impression. 
Augustine, Aurelius. (354-430). 

1. Opera, a. {Benedictine Edit. 1679-1700). 11 vols, folio. 

b. Edit. Parish Altera. 1836-1842. 11 vols. roy. Svo. 

c. Migne's Edit. 1841. 16 vols. 8vo. 

d. Caillau. 1842. 43 vols. Svo. 

2. De Civitate Dei. {Strange. 1852.) 

Essence. Evil. (Good the Chief). Idea. Religion. Theology. 

3. De Summo Bono. 
Bonum Summum. Error. 

4. De vera Religione. 
Certainty. Religion. 

5. De Spirit, et Litera. 
Prescience. 

6. De Magistro. 
Reminiscence. 

7. De Trinitate, lib. xv. 
Substance. 

.Esthetics. Belief. Blasphemy. Immateriality. 
Augustus. (B. C. 63— A. D. 14.) 

Apothegm. 
AuLus Gellius, or Agellus. (Ild Century.) 

Nodes AtticcB. Ex. Edit. Gronovii, &c. Land. 1824. 4 vols. Svo. 
Acroamatical. Esoteric. Religion. Superstition. 
Austin, John. 

The Province of Jitrisprttdence determined. Lond. 1832, {icith an ontline 
of a Course of Lectures on General Jurisprudence). 
Law. Sanction. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 587 

AtiTENRiETH, J. H. P. von. (1772-1835.) 

Uher den 3Tenschen nnd seme Hoffnung ehier Fortdauer. ( Tubing, 1825.) 
On Man and his Hope of Immortality. 
Immortality (of the Soul). 
AvERRHCES, (or Ibn Roschd.) (Xllth Century.) 
Reason. 

Baader, F. X. Von. (1765-1841). Cf. Hoffmann (1836). 
Traitesur I'Extase. 1817. 
Ecstasy. 
Bachmann, K. F. (1785-1855). 

System der Logik. 1828). Transl. into French and Russian. 
Enthymeme. 
Backer, Geo. de. 

Le Dictionnaire de Proverhes Francais. Svo. 1710. 
Proverbs. 
Bacon, Francis. (1560-1626). "Works (Montagu) 16 vols. 1825-34. 

1. Instauratio Magna {i. e. Novum Organum). 1620. {Bohn'a Scientific 

Library.) 
Acatalepsy. Anticipation of Nature, Aphorisms. Axiom. Causa 
lity. Error. Experimentum Crucis. Form. Interpretation of 
Nature. Method. Observation. Organon. 

2. Advancement of Learning. Transl. by Moffet. 

Acatalepsy. Category. Habit. Invention. Metaphysics. Perfec- 
tibility (the Doctrine of). Philosophy. Virtue. 

3. Sylva Sylvarum, or a Naturall Historie. 1627. 3Iontagu, vol. iv. 
Antipathy. 

4. De Dignitaie et Augmentis Seientiaruni. 1623. 
Causes final, doctrine of. Idol. Ma.gic. 

5. Gogitata et Visa, De Literpretat. Nature. {Montagu X.) 
Idol. 

6. On the Wisdom of the Ancients. (Montagu HI.) 
Myth and Mythology. 

7. Apophthegms. 
Rationalists. 

8. Essay on Truth. 
Truth. 

Art. Genius. Induction. Knowledge. Prejudice. 
Bacon, Roger. (1214-1292). ^ 

Scholastic Philosophy. 
Badham, David, M. D. 

Insect Life. Edinb. 1845. 

Instinct. 

Bailey, Samuel. (1787). 

1. Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Blind. 1851. 

Abstraction (Logical). Belief. Faculties of the Mind (Classification). 



588 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Bailey, Samuel. 

2. Discourses on Liter, and Philos. Subjects before Literary Societies. 

London, 1852. 
Analogy. Experimentum Crucis. 

3. Theory of Reasoning. Lond. l^b\, 8v^o. 
Inference and Proof. Observation. 

Bakewell, Fred. C. 

Natural Evidence of a Future Life. 1835. 
Immortality (of the soul.) 
Balguy, John. (1686—1748.) 

A Collection of Tracts. Letter to a Deist. Divine Rectitude. Land. 1734. 
Theism. 
Balquy, Thomas. (1716-95.) 

Divine Benevolence Asserted, Land. 1803. 
Innate. 
Ballantyne. 

Examin. of the Human Mind. 
Nominalism. 
Baptista, Porta. 

Treatise on Natural llagic. (1589 — 1591.) 
Magic. 
Barbeyrac, John. (1674—1729.) 

Notes on Grotius De Jiir. Bel. et Pads, 1720. 
Law. 
Barlow. 

Connection between Physiology and Litellectual Philosophy, 
Instinct. 
Baeonius (Baron) Robert. (XVIIth Century. Scotch.) 
Metaphysica Oeneralis. Lugd. Bat. 1657. 
Abstractive. Liberty. Whole. 
Barrow, Dr. Isaac. (1630—1677.) 

1. Works. (Tillotson). 1683-7. 

2. Sermons. 
Apprehension. Wit. 

3. Mathematical Lectures. 1734. 
Intellect. 

Barrow, Sir John. 

Autobiography. Lond. 1847. 
Memory. 
Barthez, p. J. 

ilechanique des Mouvemens. 1798. 

Life. 

Baumgarten, a. G. (1714—1762.) 

^sthetica. 2 vols. 8vo. FranJcf. 1750-58. Of. 3feier (1763.) 
Esthetics. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 589 

Baxter, Andrew. (1686—1750.) 

Immateriality of the Soul. 3d Ed. Loud. 1745. 

Materialism. , 

Bayer, John. (XVIth Cent.) 
Vranometria, 1603. 
Anima Mundi. 
Baynes. 

Essay on Analytic of Logical Forms. Edinh. 1850. 
Concept. Conception. 
Beattie, James. (1735—1803.) 

1. Essay on Truth. (1770.) 1th Edit. 1807. 

Analogy and Induction. Common Sense. Sentiment and Opinion. 

2. Dissertations, 3Ioral and Critical. 1783. 
Genius. Grammar. Imagination. Memory. 

3. Theory of Language. (1788). The first Ed. appeared with 2. 
Grammar. 

i. Elements of Moral Science. (1790-3.) 

Appetite. Inclination. 
5. Essays. Poetry and Music. Laughter and Ludicrous Composition. 
Intuition. Laughter. Psychology. 
Beausobre, Isaac. (1659-1738.) 
Histoire du Manicheisme. 1734, 
Manicheism, 
Becnius. 

Disputationes. Apatheia Sapientis Stoici, 4to. Gopenhag. 1695. 

Apathy. 

Belsham, Thomas. (1750—1829.) 

Moral Philosophy. 1801. 

Materialism. Will. 

Bentham, Jeremy. (1748—1832.) 

1. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 1780. 1823. 
Asceticism. 

2. Deontology, or the Science of Morality. (Boun-ing. 1834.) 
Deontology. Stoics. 

Sanction. Utility. 
Berard, F. (1789—1828.) 

Rapport, du Physique et du Moral. 1823. 

Life. 
Berkeley, George, Bp. (1684—1758.) 

1. Princijiles of Human Knowledge. 1734. 1776. 1820. 
Abstraction (Logical). Externality. Outness. Pneumatology. Sign. 

2. Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, in Seven Dialogues. 1732. 
Analogy. Beauty. 

51 



590 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Berkeley, George. 

3. Works. 1784—1820. 
Idealism. 

4. Siris. 
Objective. 

5. Essay toivards a New Theory of Vision. 
Outness. Sign. 

6. Theory of Vision Vindicated. 
Sign. 

Catalepsy. Consent (Argument from Universal). Empiric. Expe- 
rimentum Crucis. Idealist. Immaterialism. Nihilism. Notion. 
Psychology. Skepticism. Spiritualism. Suggestion. 
Bernard, de Chartres. (Xllth Cent.) 
Megacosmus et Microcosmus {BIS.) 
Macrocosm and Microcosm. 
Bernier, Prancis (1625-1688.) 

Ahrege de la Philosophic de Gassendi. Lyons. 1678. 7 vols. 12mo. 
A priori and A posteriori. 
Bernoulli, John. (1667—1748.) 
Discourse on Motion. 1727. 

Motion. 

Eeza, Theodore. (1519—1605.) 

Reply to Ochinus on Polygamy. (Tractat. Gen. 1568.) 
Polygamy. 
Bible, The. 

Adoration. Blasphemy. Body. Cardinal Virtues. Certainty. De- 
miurge. Dreaming. Gnome. Proverb. Prudence. Spirit. Mind 
and Soul. Space. Syncretisni. Theocracy. Understanding. 
Wisdom. 
BicHAT, M. E. X. (1771—1802.) 

1. Anatomic Generale appliq. a la Physiologie. Nouv. Ed. 4 vols. 8vo. 

Paris, 1812. 

2. Sur la vie et la Mort. 1802. 
Life. 

BiLFiNGER, G. B. (1693—1750.) See Leibnitz. 

Be Harmonia Prastahilita. 4to. Tubing. 1721 — 1740. 
Automaton. Harmony Pre-established. 
BiRAN, Maine de. (1766—1824.) 

1. (Euvres Philosopihiques {Cousin). 4 vols. Paris. 1841. 
Soul. 

2. Nottv. Considirat. sur le Papport du Physique et du Noral de V Homme. 

{Posthumous. Cousin.) 8vo. Paris. 1834. 
Causality. 

3. L' Influence de Habitude. (Prize Essay of Nat. Institute. 1800.) 
Habit. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 591 

Blackstone, William. (1723—1780.) 

Commentaries on the Laios of England. Oxford. 1765-9. 
Evidence. 
Blackwell, Thomas. (1701—1757.) 

Letters concerning BIytliology, 8vo. Loud. 1748. 
Mythology. 
Blair, Hugh. (1718—1800.) 

1. Sermo7is. 1777—1801. 
Compunction. 

2. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles LettrQs. 1783. 
Genius. 

Blackwood's Magazine. Aug. 1830. 

Theory. 
Blakesley. 

Aristotle in the Encyclop. Metropol. 

Acroamatical. 
Blane, Sir Gilbert. (1749—1834.) 

1. A Lecture on Muscular Ifotion. Lond. 1790. 
Catalepsy. 

2. Elements of Iledical Logic. 1818. 
Experimeutum Crucis. 

Bledsoe, Albert Taylor, LL.D. Prof, of Math, and Astron. in Univ. of Mis- 
sissippi — (now in Univ. of Virginia.) 

1. An Examinaf. of Edwards' Liq. into the Freedom of the Will. Phi- 

ladelphia, 1845. 

2. A Theodicy. Philada. 1855. 
Evil. 

BcEHJf, Jacob. (1575 — 1624.) 

Pneumatology. Theosophism. 
BrERHAAVE, Herman. (1668 — 1738.) 

Life. 
BcETHius, Ancus Manlius. (470 — 526.) 

1. De Gonsolatione Philosophice. {Best Edit, hy Ohharius. Jena, 1843.) 
Idea. Reminiscence. 

2. In Pradicament. Arietotelis. Opera. Basil. 1570. 
Infinite. 

Argument. Intellect and Intelligence. Maxim. Person. Realism. 
Scholastic Philosophy. Theory. 
Boileau-Despreaux. (1636 — 1711.) 

Rationale. 
BoLiNGBROKB, Lord Henry St. John. (1678 — 1751.) 

Works {Mallett, 1754). Philadelphia, 1841. 4 vols. 8vo, 
Archetype. Dualism. Irony. Motion. Reminiscence. 
BoNALD. (1753—1840.) 

Savage and Barbarous. 



592 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

BoNATENTURA. The " Seraphic Doctor." (1221—1274.) 

1. Itinerariuni mentis in Deum. 

2. Opera. [Rome. 1588-96. 7 vols, fol.) 
Ecstasy. 

BONNEL, M. 

De la Controverse de Bossitet et Finelon, sur le Quietisme. 8vo. Jlfacoi), 
1850. . 
Quietism. 
Bonnet, Charles de. (1720—1793.) 

CEuvres. Neufchatel. 1773-83. 8 vols. 4to. 
Continuity. Notion. Perfectibility. 
BoscovicH, R. J. (1741—1787). 

1. See Stay, 
Experience. 

2. Dissertationes diia de viribus vivis. 4to. 1745. 
Force. 

3. De Soil's ae LuncB Defectihiis. Land. 1776. 
Hypothesis. 

Catalepsy. Hylozoism. 
BossuET, J. B. (1627—1704). 

1. CEuvres philosopJit'ques. (Simon.) Contenant : Lihre Arhitre ; De la 

Gonnaissance Dieii et de soi-mP.me ; Traite de la Concupiscence . 
Prescience. 
Faculties of the Mind (Classification of). 

2. CEuvres. 59 vols. 12mo. Paris, 1825. 
Distinction. 

Error. Quietism. 
BoswELL, James (1740—1795). 
Life of Jdhnson. 
Equivocation. 
BotJGEANT, Father (1690—1743). 

A Philosophical Amusement on the Language of Beasts. 1739. 
Instinct. 
BouTiER, Bishop of Mans (b. 1783). 

1. Institutiones philosoptliiccB, logica,metaphysica,et moralis. 1 vol.\2i)to. 

2. Histoire abregee de la philosophic. 2 vols. 8vo. (1844.) 
Art. 

BoTVEN, Francis (b. 1811). 

1. The Principles of Metaphys. and Ethic. Science applied to the Evi- 

dences of Religion. (Loioell Led. 1849.) Ncio Edit., revised and 
annotated. Boston, 1855. 
Appetite and Instinct. 

2. Essays on Specidative Philosophy. Boston, 1842. 
Consciousness. 



AND or PROPER NAMES. 593 

Boyle, Robert, Hon. (1626—1691). 

1. Works. 6 vols. 4to. Lond. 1772. 

2. Enquiry into the vulgarly received Notion of Nature. 12mo, Lond. 

1685. 
Macrocosm. 

BOZZELLI, F. 

De I' Union de la Philosophie avec la Morale. 
Brach. 

Sensation. 
Braue, Tycho (1546—1601). 

Hypothesis. 
Brahma. 

Metempsychosis. 
Breton le Raoul. 

Super Lib. Poster Analyt. 

Intention (First and Second). 
Brewster, D., Sir. 

Letters on Natural Magic, bth Ed. 1842. 
Magic. 
Bridgewater, Earl of. Rev. F. H. Egerton (1756—1829). 

Treatises. Gf. — 1. Chalmers. 2. Kidd. .3. Whewell. 4. Bell. 5. Roget. 
6. Buckland. 7. Kirhy. 8. Prout. (New edit. Bohn.) 
Causes (Final, Doctrine of). Design. 
British Association. 

Phrenology. 
Brougham, Henry, Lord (b. 1778). 

1. Preliminary Discourse. 
Analysis and Synthesis. 

2. Natural Theology. 
Space. 

Browne, Peter, Bishop (d. 1735). 

Human Understanding. 2 Edit. 1729. 
Notion. 
Browne, Thomas, Sir, M. D. (1605—1682). 

1. Works. {Bohn, 1852.) 

2. Pseudodoxia Epidemica ; Enquiries into Vulgar and Common Er- 

rors. {6th Ed. 1672.) 
Metempsychosis, Nature (Course or power of). 
Idiosyncracy. 
Brown, John, Dr. (1736-88). (Brunonian School). 

Temperament. 
Brown, Thomas, M. D. (1778—1820). 

1. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 1820. 

Association. Conceptualism. Credulity. Faculties of the Mind (Clas- 
sification of). Friendship. Identity. Taste. 
51* 2o 



69Jt BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Brown, Thomas. 

2. Observai. on the Nature and Tendency of Hume's Doctrine concerning 

the Relation of Cause and Effect. 1804. 3rf Edit. 1818. 
Causality. 

3. Lectures on Iloral Philosophy. 
Will. 

Analogy and Metaphor. Combination. Fitness. Hypothesis. Physi- 
ology. Power. State. Suggestion. Train of Thought. 
Bkucker, J. J. (1696—1770). 

Tentamen introductionis in historiam doctrinm de ideis. Jena, 1719. 4to. 
Association. 
Buchanan, David. 

Historia Animm Humanm. 

BCCHANAN, J. 

Faith in God and Hod. Atheism compared. 2 vols. 1855. 
Atheism. Certainty. 
BuDDEUs, J. J. (1667—1729). 

Elementa philosophies practices. Halle, 1697. 
Anima Mundi. 
BuFFiER, Claude (1661—1737). 

1. Cotirs general des sciences (Traite des premieres viritea — a. Trea- 

tise of First Truths ; h. Logic). Fol. 1732. 
Design. Principles. Truth. 

2. (Euvres Philosophiques {Bouillier). 1842. 
Relation. Sentiment. 

BuHLE, J. T. (1763—1821). 

Commentatio de Lihria Aristotelis, Exot. et Acroamat. in his Edition of 
the Organ. Rhetor. & Polit. of A. Deux Fonts., 1792. Strasburg, 
1800. 5 vols. Svo. 
Acroamatical. Anticipation. Notion. 

BUNSEN. 

Hippolytns and His Age, 4 vols. Lond. 1852. 
Theodicy. 
Burke, Edmund (1720—1797). 

1. Worhs. 1792—1827. {Bohn, 1857.) 

2. Reflections on the French Revolution. 1790. 
Classification. 

3. Philos. Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Sublime and Beau- 

tiful. 1773. 
Beauty. Sublime (The). Taste. 

4. Letters on a Regicide Peace. 
Analogy and Metaphor. 

5. Defence of Natural Society. 
Irony. 

BURLAMAQUI, J. J. (1694—1748). 

Droit naturel [Principles of Natural Law). 1766-68. 
■ Rule. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 595 

EuBNETT Prize Essays. See Thompson, R. A., and Tulloch. 

Causes, Final (Doctrine of). Design. 
Burton, Robert (1576—1639). 

Anatomy of Melancholy. (1651.) 
Apprehension. 

BUSHNAN, J. S. 

Philosophy of Instinct and Reason. 
Instinct. 
Butler, Joseph (1692—1752). 

1. Fifteen Sermons. 1726. ( Upon Human Nature, or 3£an considered 

as a Moral Agent.) 
Apathy. Benevolence. Conscience. Injury. Nature (Human). System. 

2. Six Sermons, preached on Public Occasions. Appended to 1. in later 

editions. (New York, 1848.) 

3. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution 

and Course of Nature. 1736. 4to. With two Dissertations : a. On 
Personal Identity ; b. On the Nature of Virtue. 
Analogy. Association. Evidence, a. Identity ; h. Fitness. Habit. 
Moral. Natural. Theodicy. 

4. Letters to Clarke. 
Space. 

Butler, Sam. (1612—1680). 
Hudihras. 1663— 1678.' 

Form. Intention (Logical). Physiognomy. 
Butler, Wm. Archer (1814—1848). 

Lect. on the History of Anc. Philosophy, ed. by Thompson. Camb. 1856. 
Philad. 1857. 
Ontology. 
Byron (1788—1824). 

Poetry. Skepticism. 

Cabanis, J. G. (1757—1808). 

Rapports du Physique et da Moral dc I'homme. 1802. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Life. 
Cairns, Wm. 

On 3 f oral Freedom. 1844. 
Originate. 
Cajetan. 

De Norn. Analog. 
Analogy. 
Caldertvood, Hen. 

Philosophy of the Infinite. 1854. 

Absolute. Infinite. Unconditional. 
Calixtus, George (1586—1658), 
Syncretism. 



596 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Calotius, Abr. (1612-86). 

Treatises on the Doctrine of First Principles. 1651. 

Noology. 
Caltinists. 

Metaphysics. 
Cambridge Journal op Philosophy. 

Sophism. 

Campanella, Thorn. (1568—16.39). 

De Sensu Rertim ct 3fagia. 4to. Franc/. 1620. Paris, 1637. 

Magic. 
Campbell, George (1719 — 96). 

1. On the Gospels, Preliminary Dissertations. 
Blasphemy. 

2. Philosophy of Rhetoric. 
Evidence. Wit. AVit and Humour. 

3. Dissertation on 3firacles. 
Miracle. Testimony. 
Psychology. 

Cardaillac, J. J. S. De (b. 1766). 

Etudes Element de Philos. 2 vols. 1830. 
Analysis and Synthesis. 
Carleton, Compton. 

Philos. Univer. de Anima. 
Sensibles. 
Carneades (B. C. 160). 

Academics. 
Carpenter, W. B., Dr. 

Principles of Human Physiology. Lond. 1846. 
Ideational. 
Cartesian. (See Des Cartes.) 

Certainty. Egoism. Form. Notion. Perception. Soul. 
Carus. 

History of Psychology. 8vo. Leipzig, 1808. 
Life, Psychology. 
Casaubon, Meric, D. D. (1599—1671). 

A Treatise concerning Enthusiasm. Lond. 1656. 
Enthusiasm. ^ 

Casmann, Otto. 

Psychologia Anthropologica, eive animcB humancB doctrina. {Hanaii, 1594.) 
Psychology. 
Catholic Philosophy. Lond. 

Choice. 
Chalmers, Thomas, D. D. (1780—1847). AVorks, 25 vols. Glasgow. 
1. Natural Theology. 
Atheism. Holiness. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 597 

Chalmers, Thomas, D. D. 

2. Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosojihi/. 
Emotion. Gratitude. Mental Philosophy. 

3. Bridgcwater Treatise. Adaptat. of External Nature to Moral and 

Intellect. Constit. of Man. Zd Edit. 1834. 
Obligation. 
CiiALYBJsns, H. M., Dr. 

Historical Development of Speculative Philosojoluj, from Kant to Heijc!. 
Traiisl. by E. Ehersheim. Edinhurg. T. & T. Clark. 1854. 
Dogmatism. Notion. 
Charmides. 

Academics. 
Charron, Peter (1541—1613). 
De la Sagesse. Rouen, 1623. 
Nature. 
Chastel, Mods. 

Lea Bationalistes et les Traditionalistes. 12mo. Paris, 1850. 
Reminiscence. 
Chaucer. (1328—1400.) 
Canterbury Tales. 
Prologue. 
Chauvins. (1640—1725.) 

Lexicon Philosoph. 1692. 

Contingent. Essence. Faculty. 
Chretien. 

Essay on Logical Method. 

Conception and Idea. Logic. Realism. 
Christianity. 

Fate. 
Chrysippus. (B. C. IVth Cent.) 

Axiom. Eudemonism. Fatalism. 
CiCKRO, Marcus Tullius. (B. C. 107—43.) Life by Middleton, 1741. 
/. Opera. (Verburgius.) 11 vols. Svo. Amst. 1724, 

1. EinstolcB ad P. Atticum. 
Acroamatical. 

2. De Natiira Deormn. {Tr. by Franchlin, 1775.) 
Anthropomorphism. Anticipation. Consent (Argument from Uni- 
versal). Innate Ideas. Nature. Religion. Society (Desire of). 

3. De Oratore. 

Art. Definition. Idea. Ideal. Memoria technica, or Mnemonics. 
Method. Tradition. 

4. Tusculanarum Disjjutationum. Lib. V. 

Authority. Consent (Argument from Universal). Entelechy. Gym- 
nosophist. Reminiscence. Stoics. 



598 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 

6. De finihua bonorum ei malortim. Lib. V. 

Bonum Summum. Ends. Good (the Chief). Justice. Method. 
Rectitude. Utility. 
6. De Officiis. 

Consent (Argument from Universal). Occasion. Philosophy. So- 
ciety (Desire of). Society (Political, Capacity of). 
?. De Fato. 

Ethics. Fatalism. 

8. De Inventione Rhetorica. 
Faculty. Ideal. Occasion. 

9. ZcbUus seu de Amicitia. {Tr. by Yonge, 1851.) 
Friendship. 

10. De Claris Oratoribus (Brutus.) 
Method. 

11. Paradoxa, 
Paradox. 

12. Academicarum QucBSt. 
Principle. 

13. De Legihus. {Tr. by Barham, 1841.) 
Society (Desire of). 

Argument. Argumentation. Eclecticism. Economics. Essence. Evil. 
Magnanimity. Perception. Scholastic Philosophy. Temperance. 
Clarke, Dr. John. (d. 1759.) 

An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil. [Boyle Lectures.) Land. 
1720-21. 2 vols. 8vo. 
A Priori. Evil. 
Claiike, Samuel, D.D. (1673—1729.) 
/. Works. 4 vols, folio. Lond. 1738. 

1. Sermons. 10 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1730. 
Adjuration. Chance. Deist. 

2. Letter to Dodwell concerning the Immortality of the Said, tvith four 

defences. 6th Edit. 1731. 
Adscititious. 

3. A Demonstration of the Beinrj and Attributes of God, in opposition 

to Hohbes, Spinoza, &c. [Boyle Lect.) 1705. With Butler's Letters 
and Clarke's Ansivers. [XVJ Serm. on the Being and Attrib. of 
God, the Obligat. of Natur. Relig., and the Truth and Certainty of 
the Christ. Revelation.) 
Choice. Eternity of God. Nature (Course or Power of ). Possible. 
Space. Volition. 

4. A Collection of Papers which passed between Leibnitz and Clarke on 

Nat. Philosophy and Religion. With Remarks on a Book entitled, 
A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty. Lond. 1717. 

Kecessity. Sensorium. Space. 

A Priori, Evil. Fitness. Nature of things. 



AND or PROPER NAMES. 599 

Clemens, Alexandrinus. (About A. D. 150 — 120.) 

Opera. {Potter. Oxf. 1715, Venice, 1757. Leipz. 18.31. Siromata, 
Lib. vii.) 
Eclecticism. Metaphj'sics. 
Clitomachus. (B. C. 160.) 

Academics. 
Clodius, Chr. Aq. H. (Born at Altenburg. 1772—1836.) 

De Virtutibus qxtaa Cardinales apjiellant. 4to. Leipz. 1815. 
Cardinal Virtues. 
CoGAN, Thomas, M. D. (1736—1818.) 

1. A Philosoph. Treatise on the Passions. 2d Edit. Bath, 1802. 
Passions (The). 

2. An Ethical Treat, on the Passions, founded on the princiides investi- 

gated in the Philos. Treatise. Part I. On Well-being or Happi- 
ness. 1807. Part II. On Conduct condue. to Ha2)2)iiiess. 1810. 
Bath. 
Admiration. Appetite. Bonevolence. Desire. Ethics. Passions (The). 

3. Theological Disquisitions, a. On Natural Religion, b. On the Jetvish 

Dispensation respiecting Religion and Morals. 1812. 

Monotheism. 
CoLEBROOK, H. T. (1765—1837.) 

Gymnosophist. 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. (1772 — 1834.) 

1. Physiology of Life. Hints toicards the formation of a more compre- 

hensive Theory of Life. Posthum. Edit, by Watson. 1848. 
Analogy, Life. 

2. Aids to Reflection. (1825.) bth Edit. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1843. 
Aphorism. Attention and Thought. Happiness, Instinct. Morality. 

Prudence. Reason and Understanding. Theology. Understand- 
ing. Unity. Well-being. Will (Freedom of). 

3. The Friend. 1809-1810.) Fourth Edit. {H. N. Coleridge.) 3 vols. 

Lond. 1844. 
Apologue. Method. Nature. Reason and Understanding. 

4. Church and State. (1830.) Lond. 1839. 

Conception. Contraries. Form. Sensation and Reception. 

5. Notes on English Divines. (1853.) 

Conception and Idea. Enthusiasm. Person. Understanding. 

6. Works. 7 vols. 8vo. N. Y. 1853. 
Instinct. 

7. Literary Remains. 4 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1836-39. 
Reason (Impersonal). 

8. Biographia Literaria. London, 1847. 
Memory. Transcendent. 

9. On Method. Introduct. to Encyclop. Metropol. ' 
Method. Pspychology. 



600 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. 

10. Lay Sermons. 1. The Statesman's 3fanual, or the Bible the best guide 
to politic, skill, etc. 2. Isaiah 32 : 20. 
Understanding. Unity. 

Causes (final, Doctrine of). Fancy. Talent. Theosophism. 
CoLLARD, Royer. 

CEuvres comjiletes de Reid trad, par- Jovffroy, avec une iiUroduc. notes, 
fragm. de M. Royer-Oollard. 6 vols. 8vo. 1828—1835. 
Consciousness. Induction (Principles of). Rationalism. Sensiblos. 
Space. Time. Virtual. 
Combe. 

Phrenology. 
CoMENius, Amos John. (d. 1671.) 

Anima Mundi. 
Communism. 

Socialism. 
CoMTE, Auguste. (1798.) 

Covers de PMlosophie positive. 1839. 

Fetichism. Force. Observation. Positivism. 
CoMTE, F. C. L. (1782—1837.) 

1. Traite de Legislation, ou exposi des loxs genir. suiv. lesq. les peiipl. 

prosperent, &c. 1826. 4 vols. 8vo. 2d Edit. 1832. 
Method. 

2. ^ee Say, J. B. 
Society. 

CONCEPTUALISTS. 

Conceptualism. Nominalism. 
CoNDiLLAC, L'abbe Etienne Bonnot de (1715 — 1780). 

1. L' Art de raisonner (in vol. VIILof the edition of his Works published 

in 1798). 

2. Traits des Systhnes. 2 vols. 12mo. 1749. (VIII. vol. ed. of 1798). 

3. CEuvres Oompiletes. 23 vols. 8vo. 1821-22. 

Analogy and Experience. Attention. Empiric. Idea. Ideology. 
Memory. Metaphysics. Rationalism. Sensism. Sensualism. 
Soul. Train of Thought. 
CoNDORCET, J. A. DE Caritat, Mai'quis de (1743 — 1794). 

CEuvres Completes. Didot. 12 vols. 8vo. 1847—1849. 
Perfectibility. 
Copernicus. N. (1473—1543). 

Be revolutionibus orhium Cuelestihus. Nuremberg, 1543. 
Hypothesis. Theory. 
CoPLESTON, Edward, D. D., Bp. of LlandafF (1776—1849). 

1. An Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination. In 
four Discourses. 8vo. Lond. 1821. 
Analogy (p. 21). 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. f)01 

CoPLESTON, Edward, D. D., Bp. of Llandaff. 
2. Remains. 8vo. Lond. 1854. 

Certainty (p. 84). Time. Truth. 
Copper, R., M. D. 

Genius. 
Cousin, Victor (1792). 

(Euvres philosophiqiies de. 12 vols. 8vo. (1840-46). 

1. 1st Series. Cows de la Philoeojihie Moderne. 5 vols. 8vo. 1846. 

' 1st vol. Histoire des princip. syst. de PhilosojyJt. 

Causation. 
"^ 2d " Idees du bean, du vrai, et du bien. 

a. Philosophy of the Beautiful. Translated by Daniel. 

New York, 1849. 

b. The True, the Beautiftd, and the Ouod, Lectures on. 

Translated by Wight. New York, 1852. 
Ideal. Sublime (The). 
^ 3d ■' Eeol. sensualiste^ 
' 4th " £!col. Ecossaise. 
' 5th " Ecol. de Kant. 

Infinite. Innate. 

2. lid Series. Cours d'Hist. de la Philos. mod. (1828.) 3 vols. 8vo. 1841. 

Course of Hist, of Modern Philosop)hy. Translated by 
Wight. 0. W. Neiv York, 1852. 
" 1st vol. Introd. a, VHistoire generale de la Philos. 
'2d " Esquisse d'une Hist. gen. de la Phil, au XVIIIe Siec. 

Space. 
' 3d " Exam, du Syst. de Locke — translated by C. S. Henry, D.D. 
4ih Edit. New York, 1856. 
Time. 

Consciousness. Identical Proposition. Ideology. Infinite. 
Monad. Mysticism. Mj'th. Psychology. Reason 
(Spontaneity of ). Reflection. Sentiment. Species. 
Synthesis. 

3. Hid Series. Fragmens Philosophiques. (1826.) 4 vols. 8vo. 1840. 

^ 1st vol. Phil, ancienne. 
'° 2d " " scholastique. 

" 3d " " moderne. 

'"4th " " contemporaine. 

Eclecticism. Scholastic Philosophy. 

4. Abailard d', (Euvres inedites. 4to. Paris, 1836. Do. Opera — Notes, 

&c., adj. V. Cousin, &c. 1849. 
Macrocosm. Nominalism. Scholastic Philosophy. 

5. Ee la Metaphysique d'Aristote — suivi d'un Essai de traduction de 

ler et du 12e livres de Metaph. 2d Edit. 1838. 
Entelechy. 
52 



602 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Cousin, Victor. 

6. OEuvres Completes de Platon, trad, dii grec en franc, accomp. d'argum. 
philos. et de notes histor. et pMlol. 1825 — 1840. 13 vols. 8vo 
Myth. 

Absolute. Apperception. Causality. Empiric. Idea (p. 224). 
Realism. Reason (Impersonal). Succession. 
Cowley, Abraham (1618—1687). 

Works. 12th Edit. 2 vols. 12mo. Lond. 1121. {Hurd. 1112). 
A Discourse concerning the Government of Oliver Cromwell. Works II. 579. 
Sciomachy. 
CoTVPER, Wm. (1731— 1800). 

Taste (Powers of). 
Cracanthoep. 
Logic. 
Notion. 
Craig, John, Dr. (2d part of XVIIth Cent.). 

Testimony. 
Crates (B. C. 328). 

Cynic. 
Creuzer, F. (b. 1771). 

Symholik. Zd Edit. 1836. Trad, par Guigniaut. Par. 1825-36. 

Myth and Mythology. 

Crombie, Alexander, LL.D. (1760—1842.) 

A Defence of Philosophical Necessity. 8vo. 1793. 
Libertarian, 
Cross, J. 

Attempt to establish Phi/siogn. vpon Scientific Principles. Glasg. 1817. 
Physiognomy. 
Crousaz, John Peter de. (1663—1750.) 

1. Trait e de Beau. 
Beauty. 

2. Art of Thinking, (a new treatise of,) concerning the conduct and im- 

provement of the mind. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1724. 
Proprium (The), or Property! 

3. Examen du Pyrrhonisme, anciente et moderne, (against Bayle.) Folio. 

Haye. 1733. 
Skepticism. 
CuDWORTH, Ralph, D.D. (1617—1688.) 

1. The True Intellectual System of the Univ., loherein all the reason and 

philosophy of Atheism is confuted, &c. (Originally pitbl. 1678.) 

Andover, 1837. With Mosheim's Notes. 2d Edit. 1773. Transl. 

by Harrison. 3 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1845. 
Anima Mundi. Archetype. Atheism. Atom. Cosmogony. Deism. 

Design, Ditheism. Fatalism. God. Nature or Force (Plastic). 

Nature of things. Potential. Skepticism. Theism. 



AND or PROPER NAMES. 603 

CuDTVOKTH, Ralph, D. D. 

2. A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable 3Iorality. (1731.)— 
Contained also in all the editions mentioned under 1. 
Certainty. Sympathy. 
CuLTERWELL, Nathaniel. (1650.) 

An eleg. and learn. Discourse of the Light of Nature, {on Prov. 20 : 27.) 
4to. Loud. 1661. 
Nature (Law of). 
Cumberland, Richard, D. D. Bp. of Peterborough. (1632—1718.) 
De Legibus Natures JDisquisitio Philosophica. 4to. Lond. 1672. 
Benevolence. Suggestion. 
Cyrenic School. 
Hedonism. 

Dajiiron, Ph. (_1794.) 

1. Cours d'Esthetique. Svo. Paris, 1842. 
Esthetics. 

2. Essai sur I'Historie de la Philosophic en France an dixneuvienie 

siicle. 2 Tom. 8vo. Par. 1828—1834. 
Eclecticism. Ideology. 
Darwin, Erasmus, M. D. F. R. S. (1731—1802.) 

Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life. 2d Ed. 4 vols. Svo. Edinb. 1801. 
Instinct. Zoonomy. 
Davies, Sir John. (1570—1626.) 

On the Immortality of the Sold. 1599. 
Fancy. Reason. 
Day, Jeremiah, (b. 1773.) 

On the Will {Self-determining Isomer of ). 1S38. 
Ability. Inability (Moral). Power. 
Degerando. 

1. Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophic. 4 vols. 8vo. 1847. 
Method. 

2. Des Signes ct de I' Art de Penser. 4 vols. Svo. 1800. 
Sign. 

Delisle de Salles. 

Philosophie de la Nature. 10 vols. Svo. 1804. 
Naturalism. 
Democritus. (B. C. 460—357.) 

Atheism. Atom. Cosmogony. Criterion. Empiric. Fatalism. Na- 
ture or Force (plastic). Species. 
De Morgan, Augustus, of Trinity Coll., Cambr. 
Formal Logic. 
Logic. 
De Quincey, Thomas. . (1786—1860.) 

1. Sketches, Critical and Prographical. 
Genius and Talent. 



604 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

De Quincey, Thomas. 

2. Cop/essions of an English Opium-eater. 3d Edit. Loud. 1823. 
Memory. 
Derodon, David. (1600—1664.) 
Opera. 1644. 1. Phys. , 
Art. Eorm. 

2. De Pradicam. . 

Cause. Quantity. Space. 

3. De Universalihus. 
Difference. 

4. PrcBin. MetapTiya, 
Metaphysics. 

5. Logiea Restit. 1659. 

Proprium (The), or Property. Species. Universal. Whole. 
De Sales, Francis. (1567—1622.)- 

(Euvi-es Completes. 16 vols. 8vo. Par. 1833. 
Ecstasy. 
Des Cartes, Rene (1696 — 1650) and Cartesians. 

I. (1) a. Opera Omnia. 9 vols. 4to. Amst. 1692—1701—1713. b. Geo- 
metria. Vol. iv. c. EpistolcB. Vol. vi — viii. 
b. Instinct. 
II. (2) 02)era Philosophica. Edit. Quart. Ainst. 1663. 

(3) Meditat. de Prima Philosoph. in quibus Dei exist, et anim. hum. a 

Corp. dist. demon, cum res2)ons. auctoris, et Ejnst. ad Voetium. 
Imagination. Infinite. Objective. Thought and Thinking. 

(4) Principia Philosophias. 

a. De Principiis cognit. Jmman. 

b. De Princip. rerum material. 

Attribute. Essence. Indefinite. Perception. Quality. 

(5) Dissert, de Ilethodo. On Method. 
Error. Method. 

(6) Tractatus de ^passionihim animce. ( Traite des Passions de I'dme. 

Par. 1650.) 
Affection. Passions. 
111.(7) (Euvres par Cousin. 11 vols. 8vo. 1826. 
Life. 
(8) PiegulcB ad directionem ingenii. 
Mathematics. Notion. 

Axiom. Category. Causes (Final, Doctrine of). Causes (Occa- 
sional, Doctrine of). Certainty. Doubt. Empiric. Enthy- 
meme. Extension. Genius. Idea (225). Impression. Matter. 
Mode. Optimism. Perfect. Primary. Psychology. Reason. 
Sensorium. Syncretion. Theology. Virtual. 
Des Maistre, Joseph. 

Soirees de St. Petersbourgh. 2 vols. Svo. 1850, 
Notion. Savage. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 605 

De Tracy, Destutt. 

Elements d' Ideologie. 6 vols. 18mo. 1827. 
Attention. Metaphysics. 
Devey, J. 

Logic. 1854. 

Introduction (Method or Process of). 
D'HoLBACH, Baron P. H. T. (1723-89.) 
Systeme de la Nature. 1770. 
Naturalism. 
DiAGORAs of Melos (or Delos.) (420 B. C.) 

Atheism, 
Dick, Sir Thomas L. 

EsHciy on Taste. Pref. to Price (q. v.) on the Picturesque. Svo. 1842. 
Picturesque. Taste. 
DiCTioNNAiRE des Sciences Philosoph. Paris, 1844-62. 6 vols. Svo. 

Argumentation. Asceticism. Assent. Being. Consciousness (111). 
Contraries. Creation. Determinism. Dogmatism. Entelechy. 
Faculty (186). Modality. Mode. Negation. Notion. Physio- 
logy. Quality. Quantity. Socialism. Spiritualism. Stoics. 
Diogenes (B.C. 413— 324). 

Cynic. Motion. 
Diogenes Laertius (2d Cent. B.C.). 

De vitis dogmatis et ajwphthegmat. eoruni qui in philosophia clamerunt, 
libri X. Gr. et Lat. {Aldohrand, StepJiani, Casauhon, Menagii). 
Folio. Land. 1604. Amst. (2 vols. 4to) 1692. The Lives and Opi- 
nions af Eminent Philosophers. Translated by Yonge. Land. 
Bohn, 1853. 
Anticipation. Axiom. Cynic. Eclecticism. Element. Idea (223). 

DOBRISCH. 

Abstract. 
Donaldson. 

1. New Cratylus. 1839. 
Ethnography. 

2. Varronianus, or Introd. to Latin. 1844. 
Religion. 

Donne, John (1573—1641). 

Biathanatis. A declar. of that paradox or thesis, that self-homicide is 
not so naturally Sin that it may never be otherwise. Lond. 1644, 
1700. 
Suicide. 

DOUBLADO. 

Letters. 
Elements. 
Douglas, John, D. D., Bp. of Salisbury (1721—1807). 
. 1. Select Works. Salisb. 1820. 
52* 



606 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Douglas, John, D.D. 

2. The Criterion ; or, Rules hy whicli the Miracles in the New Test, are 
disting. from the Spurious Miracles of Pagans and Papists. New 
Edit. 1807. ith Edit. 1833, and in his Works, p. 383. 
Miracles. Testimony. 
Dove. 

Theory of Human Progression. 
Political Science. 
Drew, Samuel (1765— 1833).' 

An Orig. Essay on the Immater. and Immortal, of the Hum. Soul, founded 
solely iqion Physic, and Rat. Principles. (1802.) Ath Ed. Land. 
1819. 
Materialism. 
Drummond, William, Sir (d. 1828). 

1. Academical Questions. 1805. 
Idealism. Principle. 

2. CEdipns Judaicus. 8vo. Land. 1811. 
Irony. 

Drusius, John (1550—1616). 

A Collection of Hehrew and Arabic A2)0thegms, 1612. 
Apothegms. 
Dryden, John (1631—1700). 

Works, ed. by Sir Walter Scott. 2d Edit. 18 vols. 8vo. Ediu. 1821. 
Attribute. Genius. Type. 

DUMARSAIS. 

Essay on Abstraction. (Euvres Completes {Duchosal & 3Iillon). 7 vols. 
8vo. 1797. 
Abstraction (10). 
Doff, Rev. W. 

Essays on Original Genius. Land. 1767. 8ro. 
Genius. 
Duns Scotus, John (ab. 1265—1308). 

Opera Omnia. Lvgdun. 1639. 12 vols, fol. 
Scholastic Philosophy. 
DuRANDUs DB, St. Pourcain (d. 1333). 

Species. 
DuTROCHET, R. J. H. (1776—1847). 
Theorie de I'Habitude. 1810. 
Habit. 

DUVAL-JOUVE. 

Logique, Traite de. 1814. 

Language. 

DwiGHT, Timothy (1752—1827). 

Thsology explained and defended, in a Series of Sermons. (1818.) 
4 vols. Svo. Neiv York, 1846. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 607 

Earle, John, Bp. of Saliabury (1601—1665). 
Tabula Rasa. 

ECPHANTUS. 

Atom. 
Eddeesheim. (See Chalyb^us.) 
Edwards, Jonathan, President (1V03 — 1^58). 

1. A careful and strict Inquiry into the jM'evailing Notions of the Freedom 

of the Will, with Remarks on [^Lord /sTames's] Essays on the Prin- 
ciples of Iloraliti) and Natural Religion, in volume I. of his Works. 
Lond. 1834. 
Choice. Motive. Necessity. Will. 

2. A Dissertation on the End for which God created the World. Do. 

3. The Christian Doctrine of Original Sin defended. Do. 
Ellis, John, D. D. 

1. The Knoioledge of Divine Things from Revelation, not from Reason 

or Nature. 1743. Zd Ed. Lond. 1811. 

2. Some Considerations upon Mr. Locke's Hypothesis, that the Idea of 

God is attainable by Ideas of Reflexion. An addition to a book 
entitled, The Knoioledge, &c. Lond. 1743. 
Innate. 
Elyot, Thomas, Sir (1546). 

1. The Governour. 1564. {New ed. by Eliot. 1834.) 
Abstinence. Virtue. 

2. The Castell of Health. (1534). 
Element. 

Empedocles (ab. 442 B. C.) 

Atom. 
ENCYCLOPiEDiA Bhitannica. 1th Edit. 21 vols. 4to. 1842. ?,th Edit, by 
Traill (now publishing). 
The Dissertations [Stewart, MacJcintosh), 9 vols. 4to. 1842. 
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. 50 vols. 4to. 1845. 

Sciences (The Occult). 
Enfield, AVm. (1741—1797). 

2'he Hist, of Philosophy, from the Earliest Times to the Beginn. of the 
Present Cent., draion up from Brucher. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1819. 
Theosophism. 
Epictetus (B. C. 90). 

Enchiridion ( Wolf). Lond. 1670. 
Abstinence. 
Epicurus (ab. 344 B.C. — 271) and Epicurean Philosophy. 

1. Physica et Meteorologica. (Schneider.) Leipiz. 1813. 

2. Fragmenta. (Orellius.) Lei2)z. 1818. 

Anticipation. Atheism. Atom. Certainty (86). Cosmogony. Cri- 
terion. Eclecticism. Epicurean. Endemonism. Fatalism. Idea. 
Logic. Naturalism. Utility. 



608 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Equivocation, 

A Treatise of , from a IIS. loritten ah. 1600. 12mo. Lord. 1851. 
Reservation (Mental). 
Erasmus, Desiderius (1467 — 1536). 

I. (1) Opera Omnia. 10 vols, in 11 fol. Liigd. Bat. 1703. 

(2) Adagiorum Opus. Do.' Vol. II. 

(3) Apothegmatum. 12mo. Basil, 1658. Venice, 1677. {Extracted 

from the Adages.) 
Adage. Apophthegm. 
Essay on Causality, hy an Undergraduate. Lond. 185-i. 

Causality (80). 
Essay on Cause and Effect. 8vo. Land. 1824. 

Causality (78). 
Essays, Cambridge. (1856.) 

Casuistry. 
Etheridge. 

Hebrew Literature. 8vo. Lond. 1856. 
Kabala. 
Ethnological Journal. (1848.) 

Ethnography. 
Euclid (ab. 280 B. C). 

The Elements of Euclid. (Simson.) Ibth Ed. Lond. \%11. 
Intuition. Knowledge. 
Euler, L. (1707-83). 

Lettres d une princesse d'Allemagne (Letters to a German Princess). Pe- 
tersb. 1768-72. 3 vols. 8vo. Paris, 1812. 
Antecedent. 

Fearn, John. 

Essay on Human Consciousness. 1811. 4to. 
Consciousness. 
Feinagle. 

Netp Art of Memory. 1812. 
Memoria Technica. 
Fenelon (1651—1751). 

1. (Euvres Completes. 10 vols. imp. 8vo. Par. 1851. 

2. Ilaximes des Saints. II. 223. 
Maxim. Quietism. 

3. Sur I'cTistence de Dieii. I. 89. 
Prescience. Reason. 

4. Sur le Quietiame. II. 223.— III. 572. 
Evil. Mysticism. Quietism. 

Ferguson, Adam. (1724—1816.) 

1. Essay on the History of Civil Society. 7th Edit. Lond. 1814. 
Art. Civility. Savage and Barbarous. Society. 

2. Moral and Political Science. 2 vols. 4to. Edinb. 1792, 

3. Institutes of 3Ioral Philosophy. 1770. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 609 

Ferrier, James, Prof. 

Iwtitxites of Bletai^hijsics. Edinh. and Lond. 1854. 

Agniology. Contradiction. Epistemology. Essence. Harmony. 
Influx (Physical). Phenomenon. Philosophy. Truth. 
Feuchtersleben. 

1. 3Iedical Paijohology. 8vo. 1847. 
Imagination. Sensation. Temperament. 

2. Dietetics of the Soul. 12mo. iojirf. 1852. 
Temperament. Will. 

FEUKitBACH, L. A. (b. 1804). 

Daa Wesen der Religion. Leipz. ISi^. '> 

Aoosmist. 
FiciNus, Marsilius. (1433—1491.) 

Opera Omnia. 1471. Banl, 1561. Paris, 1641. 
Hermetic Books. 
FicHTE, J. G. (1762—1814.) 

Sdmmtliehe Werke. 8 vol. Berl. ISib — 46. {Ed.hyMsson,J.H.Ficlite.) 
Esthetics. Idealism. Intuition. Nihilism. Objective. Sensism. 
FiGuiER, Louis. 

L' Alchemie et Les Alchemistes. Paris, 1850 — 1856. 
Alchemy. Rosicrucians. 
FiLiANGiERi, Gaetano. (1752—1788.) 

Scicnza della Legislazione. Naples, 1780. 
Society. 
FiscHERUs, John Ilenr. 

Dissertat. de Stoicis Apatlieias falso suspectis. 4to. Leipz. 1716. 
Apathy. 
Fitzgerald. 

Notes to Aristotle's Ethics. 8vo. Dublin, 1850. 

Objective. Quantity. Soul. Spirit. Mind and Occasion. 
Flavel, John. (1627—1691.) 

Discourse of the Occasion, Causes, Nature, Rise, Groioth, and Remedies 
of Ilcntal Errors. London, 1691. 
Fludd, Robert. (1591—1637.) 

Opera. Oppenheim, 1617 — 1638, 6 vols, folio. 
Macrocosm. Theosophism. 
Fontenelle, Bern, le Bov. (1657 — 1757.) 
(Euvres. 11 vols. 12mo. Par. 1667. 
Perfectibility. 
Formey, J. H. S. (1711—1797.) 

Le Philosophe Chretien. 2d Edit. Leide. 1752. 
Psychopannychism. 
Foster, C. J. 

Elements of .Jurisprudence. Post 8vo. Lond. [Walton), 1854. 
Jurisprudence, 

2p 



610 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

FoucHER, Simon. (1644—1696.) 

Dissertat. sur le recJi. de la Virite, ou sur la philosoph. des academic. 
Paris, 1690. 12mo. Dissertat. de Phil. Academ. 12mo. Paris, 
1692. 
Academics. 
Fourier, F. C. M. (1772—1837.) 

1. Theorie des Quat. Mouvem. 1808. 

2. Assoc. Boniest. Agric. 1822. 

3. Noxiveau Monde. 1845. 

4. Pieges et Charlatanism e. 1831. 

5. Fausse Industrie. 1835-36. 2 vols. 12mo. 
Socialism. 

Franck, Adolphe. 1809. 

1. La Kabbale, ou philosophic r^ligieuse des Hebreux. Par. 1843. 8vo. 

(Tr. into Germ, by Gelincle, 1844.) 
Kabala. 

2. Dictionn. des Sc. philos. q. v. 
Franklin, Benjamin. (1706—1790.) 

Works. (Sparks.) New Ed. Philada. 1858. 10 vols. 8vo. 
Experimentum Crucis. 
French. 

Zoological Journal, No. I. 
Instinct. 
Fuller, Thomas. (1608—1661.) 

The History of the Worthies of England. [Niitall.) 3 vols. 8vo. Lond. 
1840. 
Assertory. Dichotomy. 

Gaius. (Xllth Cent.) 

Institutiones (Boecking) Bonn. 1842. 12mo. 
Nature (Law of). 
Galen, Claudius. (131—200.) 

Op>era Omnia, gr. et lat. (Kilhn..) Leijis. 1821-33. 20 vols. 8vo. 
Empiric. Temperament. 
Galileo, Galilei. (1564—1642.) 

Opera. Milan. 1808. 13 vols. 8vo. (An edition designed to be more 
complete than any other teas commenced in 1842, at Florence.) 
Invention. 
Gall,. Fr. Joseph. (1758—1528.) 

Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau et sur celles de chacune de ses parties. 
Paris, 1822-25. 6 vols. 8vo. 
Organ. Phrenology. 
GambiEr, Rev. James E. 

Introduction to the Study of Moral Evidence, Bivington, Lond. 1824. 
8vo. 
Evidence. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 611 

' Garat, D. J. (1749—1833.) 

Analyse de I' Entendement Jiumain. 1794. 
Ideology. 
Garnier, Adolphe. (b. 1801.) 

1. Traits des Facultes de I'Ame. Par. 1852. 3 vols. 8vo, (Crotvned 

by the Fr. Acad, in 1853.) 
Consciousness. 

2. Cf. Diet, des Scien. Philos. 
Judgment. Soul. 

Gassendi, Peter. (1592—1655.) 

1. See Bernier, F. 

2. Opera Omnia. 6 vols. fol. Leyd. 1658. 

3. a. De Vita, iloribxis et Doctrina Epicur. Lyons, 1647. b. Syntag. 

Phil. Epic. 1649. 
Epicurean. 

4. Diaquisit. Jfetaph. sen duhit. et instant, adv. Cartesii Metap>hysicam, 

et resj). Amst. 1644. 
A priori. Atom. Idea (228). Impression. 
Gataker, Thomas. (1574 — 1654.) See Antoninus. 
Dissertatio de Diaciplina Stoica. 
Stoics. 
Gerard, Alex. (1728—1795.) 

1. Essay on Genius. Land. 1767 — 1774. 
Genius. 

2. An Essay on Taste. (Gold medal, 1759.) 1780. 
Taste. 

Gerlach, G. W. (b. 1786.) 

Commentates Exhih. de Prohahilit. Disputat. 4to. Gotiing. 
Gerson, John. (1363—1429.) 

1.(1) Opera Omnia {Du Pin.) 5 vols. fol. ^jito. 1706. 
(2) De Mystica Theologia Speeidativa. Oper. III. 361. 
Ecstasy. 
Geulincx, Arnold. (1625—1669.) 

1. Quastiones Quodlibeticm. 1652. 2. Logiea. 1662. 3. Ethica. 1675. 
4. Compendium Physicm. 1688. 5. Annot. ad Cartesii Principia. 
1690. 6. Annot. JIajora. 1691. 7. Metaphysica. 1691. 
Causes occasional (Doctrine of). 
Gibbon, E. (1737—1794.) 

History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empiire. 12 vols. 8vo. 
Lond. 1815. {3Iilman, 2d Edit. 1846. 3c?. Smith's Notes. 65.J 
Bohn's Ed., loith variorum Notes. 54. 
Asceticism. 
Gibbons, Thomas, D. D. (1720—1785.) 

Sermons, with an hymn to each subject. Lond. 1762. 
Eternity. 



612 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Gillies, John. (1747—1836.) 

1. Transl. of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. 2d Edit. 1804. 

2. Supplement to the Analysis of Aristotle's spec. WorJcs. Sd Edition. 

1813. 
Automaton. Cause (76). Praedicament. Time. 
Glanvill, Joseph. (1636—1680.) 

1. Lux Orientalis / or an enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages 

concerning the pre-existence of souls; being a key to unlock the 
grand mysteries of Providence, in relation to inan's sin and misery. 
1662. 12mo. (Annot. by More, 1682, 8vo.) 
Idiosyncrasy. 

2. The Vanity of Dogmatizing ; a discourse of the shortness and uncer- 

tainty of our hnotcledge and its causes. Lond. 1661, 8vo. 
Immanent. 

3. Scepsis Scientifica, or confessed ignorance the ivay to science ; in an 

Essay on the van. of dogmat. Lond. 1665, 4to. — (A development 
0/2.) 
Scepticism. Transcendent. 
Glasspord, James. 

Essay on the Principles of Evidence. Svo. Edinb. 1820. 
Evidence. 
GocLENius, Rudolph, Sr. (1547—1628). 

Psychologia ; h. e,, de homin. perfectione, anima et imjyrimis ortu ; com- 
mentat. et disputat. theologorr. et pihilosophorr. nostra cBtatis. 
Marb. 1590, 1597. 
Psychology. 
Good, John Mason, M. D. (1764—1827). 

The Book of Nature. 1826. 3 vols. Svo. 
Instinct. 
Goodwin, Thomas, D. D. (1600—1709).^ 
Works. 6 vols. fol. Lond. 1681. 
Causation. 
Green. J. H. (Cf. Coleridge.) 

1. Vital Dynamics. Hunterian Oral. 1840. 

2. Mental Dynamics. Hunterian Orat. 1847. 
Instinct. Will. 

Gregory, John, M. D. (1724—1733). 

1. Observations on the Duties, Office, and Qualifications of a Physician, 

and on the Method of prosecuting Inquiries in Philosophy. Edinb. 
1769. Svo. (French by Verlac. Par. 1787.) 

2. Works. (Tytler.) 1788. Edinb. 4 vols. Svo. 
Hypothesis. 

Grote, George (b. 1794). 

History of Greece. 12 vols. Lond. 1846—1855. 
Dialectics. Fetichism. Myth. Sophism. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 613 

Grotius, Hugo (1583—1645). 

1. Philosopliorum SententicB de Plato. Op. om. theol. III. 379. 
Fatalism. 

2. De Jure belli ao pads. Lib. III. (Oronovii, Barheyrac.) 
Jurisprudence. Law. Nature. 

3. Annot. in IV Evangeliu. Opera Theolog. [Lond. 1679) //. ^ars /. 

Amst. 1720. 
Soul. 
Grove, Henry (1683—1737-8). * 

A System of 3Ioral Philosophy. 2d Ed. 2 vols. Syo. XohcZ. 1749. 
Justice. 

GUERICKE, H. E. F. 

1. XirchengescMchte. 8th Ed. 1854-55. 

2. Symholik. 2d Ed. 1846. 

3. Arch'dologie. 1847. 

4. Einleitimg in das N. T. 1843. 
Supranaturalism. 

GuiGNiATJT, J. D. (b. 1794). 

1. La Theogonie d'HSsiode. Par. 1835. 
Theogony. 

2. Religions de I'Antiquite. Tr. from Creuzer, and developed. 10 vols. 

8vo. Par. 1825—1851. 
GuizoT, F. P. G. (b. 1787). ^ 

1. Meditations et iludes morales. 3d Edit. 1855. 
Belief. Education. 

2. History of Civilization. Tr. hy W. Hazlitt. 3 vols. sm. 8vo. Lond. 

1846. {Hist, gener. de la Civilis. en Eitrope — Givilis. en France. 
(1828—1830.) 
Immateriality. Theocracy. 
GuRNEY, Joseph John (1788—1847). 

Thoughts on Hahit and Discipline. 6th. Ed. 1852. 
Prescience. 

Hale, Sir Mathew (1609—1676). 

1. The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined ac- 

cording to the Light of Nature. Fol. Lond. 1677. 
Law. Ratiocination. 

2. Works'. (Thirlwall.) Zojid 1805. 2 vols. 8vo. 

3. Contemjilations, Moral and Divine: Works, vol. II., Of Afflictions, 

p. 200. 
Verbal. 
Hales, John (1584—1656). 

1. Works {Lord Hailes'). 3 vols. 12mo. 1765. 

2. Golden Remains. (1659. 2d Edit. Lond. 1673.) 
Acroamatical. 

. 53 



614 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Hall, Joseph, D. D., Bp. of Norwich (1574—1656). 

Wo7-ks (Ball). 12 vols. 8vo. Oxford, 1837. Contemplations on tJte 0. 
and N. T. Works I. &. 11. 
Being. 
Haaiilton, Sir William, Prof, of Log. and Metaph., Univ. of Edinb. (1788 
—1856). 

1. Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Ed^icat. and Univ. Reform. 

Chiefly from Ed. Rev. 8vo. Zone?. 1852. 2d Edit. 'bZ. iV. F. 1855, 
with Introd. Essay on Hist, of Phil. Speciil. by Tumbull. 
Absolute. Argument. Causation. Conception. Consciousness. In- 
duction. Infinite. Logic (295). Necessity (Logical). Notions 
(First and Second). Origination. Quality (Occult). Reason (Im- 
personal). Sensism. Subject, Object. Thought and Thinking. 
Understanding. 

2. Works of Reid. Pref. Notes and Stip>plenientary Dissertation by Sir 

Wm. Hamilton. 5th Ed. 1858. Edinb. 
Anticipation. Apperception. A priori. Axiom. Belief. Brocard. 
Category. Cause. Concurring. Concept. Conceptualism. Con- 
sciousness. Definition. Deontology. Determinism. Dichotomy. 
Ego. Egoism. Enthymeme. Faculty. Fancy. Feeling. Form. 
Idea. Ideal. Impression. Intellect and Intelligence. Intuition. 
Knowledge (280 and 284). Logic (294). Matter. Maxim. Mode. 
Motive. Nature. Necessity (Doctrine of). Nihilism. Noology. 
Notion. Objective. Operations (of the Mind). Organon. Parci- 
mony (Law of). Perception. Pneumatology. Power. Primary. 
Quality. Real. Realism. Reason. Retention. Sensation. Sen- 
sibles, Common and Proper. Sensus Communis. Sentiment. Sen- 
timent and Opinion. Species. States of Mind. Subjectivism. 
Subsumption. Suggestion. Thought and Thinking. Transcendent. 
Truth. Truths (First). 

3. Edinburg Review. N. 115, vol. LII. 

Art. Elimination. Ideology. Notions (First and Second). Real- 
ism. 

4. Lectures on Logic (quoted by Dove). 
Science. 

Criterion. Ethology. 
Hampden, Renn Dickson, D. D., Bp. of Hereford. 

1. Litrod. to Mor. Phil. 2d Ed. 1856. 

Analogy and Experience. Causes (Final, Doctrine of). MoraL Ob- 
servation. 

2. Philosophical Evidence of Christianity. 1827. 
Analogy and Induction. 

3. The Scholastic Philosophy consid. in its Relations to Ghr. Theology. 

(Bampton Lect. 1832). Sd Edit. Lond. 1848. 
Element. Obligation. Rationale. Scholastic. Substance. 



AND or PROPER NAMES. 615 

Hancock, Thos. 

Essay on Instinct. 
Innate. Instinct 
Harrington. (See Coleridge.) 
Aids to Reflection. 
Reason. 
Harris, James. (1709—1780.) 
Works. Oxford, 1841. 

1. Philosophical Arrangements. 

Art. Capacity. Common Sense. Element. Genius. Macrocosm. 
Matter. Metaphor. Quality (414, 415, 416). Quantity (Discrete 
and Continuous). Relation. Soul. 

2. Dialogue on Art. 

Art. Cause. Common Sense (the Philosophy of). 

3. Dialogue concerning Happiness. 

Happiness. Passion. Rectitude. Society (Desire of). 

4. Hermes. 

Mind. Reminiscence. 
Harris, John. 

3Ian Primeval. 1849. 
Tabula Rasa. 
Hartley, David, Dr. (1705—57.) ' 

Observat. on Man; his frame, his duty, etc. 3 vols. Lond. 1791. 
Association. Superstition. Theopathy. Train of thought. 
Haywood, F. 

1. Critick of Pure Reason, hy Kant, Tr. with notes, etc. 2d Edition. 

1818. 
Apperception. Cognition. Conception. Dialectic. Practical. Un- 
derstanding. 

2. Explanation of Terms in the Crit. of Pure Reason. [Analysis. 1844.) 
Ostensive. Schema. 

Head, Edmund, Sir. 

Handbook of Painting. 1847. 
Type. 
Hegel (and Hegelians) G. W. F. (1770—1831). 
Works. 18 vols. 8vo. Berlin, 1834-45. 
Aeosmist. Esthetics. Idealism. 
Heineccius. 

Spontaneity. 
Heinsius, Dan. (1580—1655). 

Philosoph. Stoica. 4to. Leyden, 1627. 
Stoics. 
Henderson. 

The Philosophy of Kant. 

Ideal. Noology. Noumenon. Proverbs. 



616 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

HliRACLITUS (E. C. 504). 

Aphorism. Atheism. Criterion. Empiric. Motion. 
Herbart. 

Faculty (190). 
Herbert, Lord, of Cherbury. (1581 — 1648.) 

De Veritate prout distinguitur a revelatione. Edit. Tertia. 1 vol. 
1705. 
Memory. Principles. Tabula Rasa. Truths. 
Herman, Godfrey. 

Myth and Mythology. 
Hermes, or Mercury (and Hermetic). ' 

Hermetic Books. Macrocosm. 
Hermolaus, Barbaras. 

Entelechy. 
Herschel, Sir John. 

On the Study of Nat. Phil. {Lardner's Encyclopcbdia, No. XIV.). 
Experience. Observation. 
Hesiot). 

WotUb, Days, and Theogony. Tranal. by Thomas Cooke. 2 vols. 4to. 
Lond. 1728. 
Cosmogony. Theogony. Theology. 
Heusde, Ph. W. von. (1778—1839.) 

Initio Philosophim Bhetoricae. 3 vols. ?7<rec^.^ 1827— 1836. 2d Edit. 
1 vol. Leyd. 1842. 

Idea. Ideal. ^ 

HiEROCLES. (About A. D. 450.) 

In Aurea Pythagor. Carmina. Ed. Needham. 
Intellect. 
HiLAiRE, St. Barthelemy. 

1. Transl. of the Organon. Preface. 
Art. 

2. Logique : in Diet. d. Scienc. Philos. 
Logic. 

Hippocrates. 

Aphorism. Temperament. 
Hobbes, Thomas (1588—1679). 

Works. 11 vols. 8vo. (Molesworth.) Lond. 1839. 

1. Human Nature. 

Evil. Memory. Reminiscence. Train of Thought. 

2. Phil. Prima. 
Extension. 

3. Of Nan. 

Merit. Sensus Communis. Species. 

4. Opera. Edit, hy Molesworth. 
Factitious. Power, 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 617 

HoBBES, Thomas. 
5. Leviathan 

Train of Thought. 

Atheism. Benevolence. Certainty. Determinism. Idea (228). Justice. 
Law. Self-love. Society (Desire of). 
Holland, Sir H. 

Mental Physiol. 
Attention. 

HOLYOAKE. 

Secularism, 
Homer. 

Cosmogony. Metaphor. Observation. 
Hooker, Richard. (1654—1600.) 

Ecclesiastical Polity. ( Works edited hy Keble. 3 vols. Oxford, 
1841.) 
Law. Rectitude. Theology. Will. 
Horace. (B. C. 65— A. D. 8.) 
EpistolcB (Ars PoeticcE.). 

Justice. Magnanimity. Rationale. 
HoRSLEY, Bp. (1733—1806.) 

Obligation. 
Howell, James. (1594 — 1666.) \ 

Familiar Letters. {Epistolm Ho-Eliance.) lOfA Edition. London, 
166L 
Sciolist. 
Hughes. 

Spenser, {Editor of). 
Taste. 

H UM ANITARI ANISM. 

Socialism. 
Humboldt, Alexander von. 

Cosmos. (Otte.) 4 vols, iojid 1849-52.) 

Observation. Species. 
Hume, David. (1711—66.) 

1. Essays and Treatises on several subjects. 4to. 1758. Embracing 

Essay on Skeptical Philosophy, Inquiry concerning the general 
principles of Morals, Essay on Miracles, Essay on Standard of 
Taste, Concerning Human Understanding. 
Abstraction (Logical, 9, 10). Anthropomorphism. Association. 
Conscience. Miracle. Proof. Quality (Occult). Scepticism. 
Self-love. Taste. Testimony. 

2. Dialogues on Natural History of Religion. 

Beauty. Causality. Consciousness (113). Consent (Argum. from 
Univ.). Empiric. Impression. Nihilism. Power. Psychology. 
Sentiment. Utility. 
53* 



618 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Hunt, Leigh. 

Imagination and Fancy. 12mo. 1844. 

Imagination and Memory. Theosophism. 
HuTCHESON, Francis. (1694 — 1747.) 

1. Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, bth Edit. 1753. Moral good, 

and evil. 
Esthetics. Beauty. Self-love. Senses (Reflex). 

2. Metaphysical Synopsis. 6th Edit. 1774. 

Atheism. Bonum. Certainty. Existence and Essence. Indi- 
vidual. Quality. Quantity. Senses (Reflex). Sign. Subsis- 
tentia. Unity. 
.3. Essay on the Passions. 3cZ Edit. 1769, with ilhistrafions of the Morel 
Sense. 
Desire. Laughter. Passions. 
4. Oratio inauguralis, De naturali hominum socialitate. 4to. Glasg. 
1730. 
Innate ideas. Society (Desire of). 
6. Philosophia Moralis. 1742. 

Senses (Reflex). Sign. 
6. Log. Gompend. 

Benevolence. Sense and idea. Suggestion. 

HUTTNEU. 

De Mythis Platonis. 4to. Lei^iz. 1788. 
Myth and Mythology. 

HUTTONIANS. 

Hypothesis. 
Hyde, Thomas. (1636—1703.) 

Religlnnis Veterum Persarum Historia. 8vo. O.r/ord, 1700, 1760. 
Sabaism. 

Identity, Personal, Review op the Docteines op. Loudon. 1827. 

Identity. 
Ionian School. 

Empiric. 
Iren^us. (d. ah. 202 or 208.) 

WorJcs. Grahe, 1702. Massuet, 1734. Stieren, 1853. 
Tradition. 
Ikons, W. J. (b. 1812.) 

On the whole Doctrine of Final Causes. Land. 1836. 

Cause. Causes final, (Doctrine of). Fact. Faculties of the Mind, 
(Classification of). Theism. 
Irving. 

English Composition. 
Allegory. Metaphor. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 619 

Ikting, Washington. 
Slcetch-Book. 
Imagination. 

Jacobi. 

Providence. 
Jacques, Amadee. 

1. 3Iem. de I'Academ. Roy. (1841.) 
Common Sense. 

2. Ifanuel de Philosopliie. Partie Psyckologique. 
Jamblichus. (IV th Cent.) 

De Mysteriis. Oxou. 1678. 
Esoteric. 
Jardine. 

Gimpoioder Plot. 
Equivocation, 
Jeffrey, Lord. (1773—1850.) 

1. Article "Beauty," in EncycloiJcBdia Britannica. 
Beauty. 

2. Life of Jeffrey, hy Cockburn. 1852. 
Perceptions. 

Jerome. (331—422.) ' 

Opera. 11 vols. fol. VeroncB. 1734. 
Scholastic. 
Job xxi. 26, 27. 

Adoration. 
Johnson, Dr. Sam. (1709—84.) 
Worles. 9 vols. Oxf. 1825. 

Apologue. Assumption. Equivocation. 
JoNSON, Ben. 

English Grammar. 

Fancy. Grammar (Universal.) 
Josephus, Flavins. (A. D. 37 — 93.) 

Antiqiiit. Judaicar. Lihri XX. {Opera. 2 vols, folio. Amsterdam, 
1726.) 
Soul. 

JOWETT. 

Epistles of St. Paid, 
Casuistry. 
JouFFROT, Mons. 

1. Blelanges Philosoph. 1833. 

Eclecticism. Faculty. Good (the Chief). Order, 

2. Droit. Nat. 
Person, Reason, 



62Q BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

JouFFROY, Mons. 

3. Memoire i^ar. de la Legitimite et de la Distinction de la Psychologie 

et de la Physiologic {in his Noiiveaiix Melanges and in Memoires 
de I' Acad, des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Vol. XI. 
Psychology. 

4. Cows Professe d la Faculte des Letires. 1837. 
Soul. 

Journal of Psoychol. Med. 1867. 

Ideation. 
Journal of the London Statistical Society. Vol. I. 1839. 

Statistics. 
Justinian. 

Patidects. 

Equity. 
Juvenal. 

Good (the Chief.) 

Society (Political, Capacity of). 

Kames, Lord. (1696—1782.) 

1. Elements of Criticism. 1762. 

Beauty. Custom. Emotion. Feeling. Mode. 

2. Essay on Liberty and Necessity, 
Motive. 

3. History of Mati. 1774. 
Society. 

Kanada. 

Atom. 
Kant, Immanuel. (1724 — 1804.) (See Henderson, Mansel, Haywood.) 

1. Criticism of Pure Season. {Haywood, Meiklejohn.) Crit. de la 

Raison Pure. 2d Edit. 1848. 
Cognition. Conception. Ideal. Metaphysics. Methodology. Pa- 
■ ralogism of Pure Reason. Reason and Understanding. 

2. Analysis of K. Criticism of Pure Reason, hy the Translator. 8vo. 

Lond. 1844. 
Space. Time. 

3. MHa'phys. des BIceurs. 
Utility. 

Absolute. Abstraction. Esthetics. Amphiboly. Analytics. An- 
thropology. Antinomy. Apodeictic. Apperception. Apprehen- 
sion. A priori. Architectonic. Association. Autonomy. Axiom. 
Belief. Bonum summum. Catalepsy. Category. Causality. 
Causes (Doctrine of final). Certainty. Concept. Contradiction. 
Deist. Demonstration. Dialectic. Dogmatism. Duration. Es- 
sence. Faculties of the Mind (Classification of). Form. Idea. 
Immanent. Imperative (the Categorical). Indiscernibles (Iden- 
tity of). Innate (ideas). Intuition. Matter. Maxim. Modal- 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 621 

Kant, Immanuel. 

ity. Motive. Noogonie. Noologists. Noumenon. Objective. 
Ontology. Outness. Perception. Perfectibility. Postulate. 
Practical. Psychology. Reason. Schema. Sensation. Subject- 
ivism. Sublime (The). Succession. Theodicy. Transcendent. 
Unconditioned. Utility. Virtue. 

IvARSIiAKE. 

Aids to Logic. 

Analogy and Example. Cause. Condition. Demonstration. Sci- 
ence. 
Kepler, John. (1571—1631.) 

Inertia. 
Kernius. 

Dissert, in Epiciiri Prolepsin. Gcett. 1736. 
Anticipation. 

KiDD. 

Principles of Reasoning. 
Truth. 
King, Archbishop. (1650—1729.) 

Essay on Origin of Evil. Translated by Law. ith Edit. Cambridge, 
1758. 
A priori and A posteriori. Evil. Obligation. ^ 

KiRBY, Wm. (1759—1850.) 

Bridgewater Treatise on Histor. habits and instincts of Animals. 2d 
Edit. 1835. 
Instinct. 
KiRCHER, Athanasius. (1601 — 80.) 

GSdipus (Egyp)tiacns. Fol. Bom. 1652. 
Kabala. 

KiRWAN. 

Logic. 
Logic. 
Knight, Payne. 

Enquiry into Principles of Taste. 
Beauty. Taste. 
Knox, Vicesimus. (1752—1821.) 

Essays. ( WorJcs. 7 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1824.) 
Civility. 
Krause, CfcC. F. (1781—1832.) 
Absolute. 

Labarte. 

Hand-book of the 3Iiddle Ages. 
Naturalism. 
Lacoddre. 

Inst. Philos. 

AutotheistE. Factitious. Pantheism. 



622 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Lactantius, L. C. F. (3d and 4th Cent.) 

Bivinae Institutiones. {Opera, Par. 1748.) 
Religion. Society. 
L^Lius and Hortensius ; or, Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste 
and Genitis. Edinh. 1782. 
Genius. 
Lafargk. 

Causes, Occasional (Doctrine of). 
Lambert, J. H. (1728-77.) 
Das Neue Organon. 1763. 
Organon. 
Laplace, P. S. (1749—1827.) 

Essai Phil, sur les Prohabilites. 5th Edit. 

Chances (Theory of). Method. Testimony. Theory. 
Laeomiguiere. 

Attention. 
Latham, Dr. 

Natural History of Varieties of Man. Lond. 1830. 
Anthropology. 
Latjder, T. D., Sir. (1784—1846.) (See Price, Sir Uvedale.) 

Beauty. 
Lavater, J. C. (1741—1801.) 

Physiognomy. {Tr. hy Hunter.) 5 vols. 4to. 1789-98. 
Physiognomy. Temperament. 
Law, Edmund, Bishop. (1703-87.) (See King.) 

Innate. 
Law, Rev. William. (1686—1761.) 

Theosophism. 
Le Brun. 

Genius. 
Le Clerc, John. (1657—1736.) 

Bibliotheque Choisie. 28 vols. Amst. 1703-13. 
Atheism. 
Le Grand. 

Institut. Philosophic. 1675. 
Extension. Individual. 
Leibnitz, Godfrey William. (1646—1716.) 

1. Opera Omnia. 6 vols. 4to. Genev. 1768. 

2. Opera Philosophica. Berlin, 1840. 

3. (Euvres Historiques. Fol. Hanovre, 1843. 

4. OEuvres Mathematiques. Berlin, 1849-50. 

5. (Euvres d'apres les 3ISS. Originaux. Tome Premier. Didot Fr. 

Par. 1859. 
Anticipation. Apperception. Automaton. Cause. Causes (final. 
Doctrine of). Conceiving. Concept. Continuity (Law of). Con- 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 623 

Leibnitz, Godfrey William. 

tradiction. Definition. Determinism. Dynamism. Eclecticism. 
Empiric. Essence. Evil. Force. Harmony. Ilylozoism. Idea. 
Identity (personal). Indefinite. Indiscernibles (Identity of). In- 
dividual. Inertia. Jurisprudence. Knowledge. Monad, Neces- 
sity (Doctrine of). Noogonie. Noology. Notions (intuitive). 
Optimism. Perceptions (obscure). Perfectibility. Prescience. 
Privation. Psychology. Reason (determining). Scientia Media. 
Soul. Space. Spontaneity. SuflBcient Reason (Doctrine of). 
Tabula Rasa. Theodicy. Theology. Truth. Ubiety. Unity, 
Leighton, Robert. (1613-84.) 

Theological Lectures. Translated. Land. 1828. 
Reason. Well-being. 
Leland, John, (1691—1766.) 

View of Beistical Writers. Land. 1837. 
Deists. Theism. 
Lelttt. 

Du Demon de Socrate. 1836. 1850. 
Demon. 
Lemoine, a. . \ 

A Treatise on 3Iiraeles. 8vo. Land. 1747. 
Miracle. 
Lennep. 

Memory. 
Lerminier. 

S>i,r le Droit. 
Jurisprudence. 
Lessing, Q. E. (1729-81.) 

Perfectibility. 
L'Estrange, Sir Roger. (1616—1704.) 

Fables of jEsop and other Eminent Ifythologists. Fol. Land. 1704. 
Fable. 
Leucippus. (Bet. 4th and 5th Cent. B. C.) 

Atheism. Atom. Cosmogony. Criterion. Force. 
Lewes, G. H. 

1. Biographical Hist, of Philosoi^liy. 4 vols. 1845. 
Acosmist. Belief. Idealism. 

2. Cotnte's Philosophy of Sciences. 1vol. 1853. 
Positivism. 

Lewis, Sir G. C. 

1. On the Influence of Authority/ in Matters of Opinion. 
Authority. Fact. Opinion. 

2. Methods of Observation in Politics. 

Custom. Law. Rationale. Science. Species. Statistics. 



624 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

LiNDLET. 

Introduction to Jurisprudence. 
Law. 
LiNGLET, Du Fresnoy. (1674 — 1755.) 

Histoire de la Philosoph. Hermen. 3 vols. 12mo. 1742. 
Hermetic Books. 
LiNN^us, Chas. (1707-78.) 

Life. 
Linus. 

Cosmogony. 
Lipsius, Justus. (1547—1606.) 

llanuductio ad Stoicam Pliilosopli. 4to. Antw. 16(i4. 
Anticipation. Stoics. 
Locke, John. (1632—1704.) 

Worhs. 3 vols. fol. London, 1714. 8(7t Edition, 1777. lOfA Edition, 
1801. 

1. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. {Ibth Edit. 1760.) 
Combination and Connection of Ideas. Combination of Ideas. Con- 
sciousness. Custom. Definition. Enthusiasm. Error. Essence. 
Evidence. Experience. Extension. Faculties of the Mind (Clas- 
sification of). Identical proposition. Identity. Identity (Personal). 
Idealogy. Inference. Innate (Ideag). Intuition. Knowledge. 
Language. Liberty of the Will. Maxim. Memory, Mode. Na- 
tural. Notion. Perception. Power. Prejudice. Probable. Qua- 
lity. Reason. Reflection. Relation. Remembrance. Society (De- 
sire of). Space. Substance. Succession. Suggestion. Syllogism. 
Tabula Rasa. Testimony. Thought. Time. Unity. Universals. 
Volition. Will. Wit. 

2. Thoughts concerning Education. 9th Edit. 1732. 
Education. 

3. A Discourse of Miracles. 
Miracle. 

4. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. 
Theology. 

5. Life ly Lord King. 2d Edit. Land. 1830. 
Obligation. 

Abstraction, logical (p. 10). Analogy. Antipathy. Archetype. 
Association. Axiom. Body. Casuality. Causation. Certainty. 
Choice. Conception and Idea. Conscience. Continuity. Dura- 
tion. Ecstasy. Empiric. Factitious. Idea. Idealist. Illation. 
Noogonie. Noology. Observation. Psychology. Rationalism. 
Sanction. Senses (Reflex). Sensism. Soul. 
LoNGiNus, C. (210—273.) 

Trinon Magicum. 12mo. Francf.Mlb. 
Magic. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 625 

LowMAN, Moses. (1680—1740.) 

Civil Government of the Hebrews. Lond. 1740. 

Theocracy. 
Lucretius, C. T. (b. B. C. 96.) 
De rerum Nafura. 

NaturaL Superstition. 
LuLLY, Raymond (1235 — 1315). 

Kabala. Scholastic. 
Luther. (1483—1546.) 

Psyehopannychisui. 
Lyell, Sir Charles. 

1. 31anual of Elementary Geology. Ath Edit. 1852. 

2. Principles of Geology. Sth Edit. 1850. 
Species. 

Macauxay, T. B. (1800-60). 

Essays. 2d Edit. Lond. 1844. 
Apophthegm. 
Maccall, William. 

Elements of Individualism. 8vo. Zo;tfZ. 1847. 
Individual. 
M'CosH, James. 

1. The 3Iethod of the Divine Government, Physical and 3foraI. Edinb. 

1850. Zd Edit. 1852. 5th Edit. 1856. 
Antimony. Archetype. Art. Constiousness. Innate. Law. Pro- 
vidence. 

2. Typical Forms and Spec. Ends in Great, {by 3T.& Dickie). 2d Ed. 1857. 
Analogue. Chance. Classification. Homologues. Homotypes. Imagi- 
nation and Memory. Moii^hology. Wit and Humour. 

Mackintosh, James, Sir (1765 — 1832). 

1. Miscellaneous Works. 2d Edit. Lond. 1851. 
Observation. 

2. Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy. Encyc. Brit. 

( Whetvell.) 
Emotion. Eudemonism. Natural. Theory. Train of Thought. 

3. A Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations. (Works, 161.) 
Jurisprudence. 

4. On the Philosophical Genius of Bacon and Locke. ( Works, 147.) 
Critick. Understanding. Wisdom. 

Macrobius, A, T. (mid. of Vth Cent.). 
Saturn. 
Custom. 
MacVicar, John 6., D. D. 

1. The Philosophy of the Beautiful. Edinb. 1855. 
vEstbetics. 

2. Enquiry into Human Nature. 8vo. Edinb. 1853. 
Apperception. 

54 2q 



626 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Madan, Martin (1726—1813). 

Thelyj^ihthora ; a Treatise on Female Ruin. 1780. 
Polygamy. 
Magendie. 
Life. 
Magi. 

Duiilism. ' 

Mahomet (510—632). 

Fate. 
Maimonides (1135—1205). 

De More NevocTiim [tr. Buxtorf). Basil, 1629. 
Sabaism. 
Maistre de, Count (1753—1821). 
Du Pape. 
Theocracy. 
Major, Jolin. 

Commentary on the First Booh of the Sentences. 1510. 
Theosopliism. 
Malebranche, Nicolas (1638 — 1715). 

1. De la recherche de la verite. Sept edit. 4 vols. 12mo. Paris, 1721. 

(The Search after Truth, transl. hy Taylor. Oxford, 1694.) 
Antbropomorphism. Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of ). Error. Evil. 
Excluded Middle. Passions. Perfectibility. Prejudice. 

2. Entretiens lletaphysiqiies. 
Optimism. 

3. Traite de Jllorale. Eotterd. 1684. 
Order. 

Psychology. Keason. Spiritualism. 
Mammertus, Claudianus (Flour. 470). 

Immateriality. 
Mandeville, B. (1670—1733). 

Benevolence. 
Manes (Illd Cent. A. D.) and Manicheans. 

A priori. Dualism. Evil. 
Mansel. 

1. Prol. Logic. 

Conceiving. Concept. Definition. Faculties of the Mind (Classifi- 
cation of). Induction. Intuition. Judgment. Law and Form. 
Mutter. Metaphysics. Ontology. Syllogism. Thought. 

2. Aldrich, with Notes. 1849. 
Definition. Intention. 

3. An Examination of 3[r. Maurice's Theory of a fixed st.<ite out of 

time. 
Eternity. 

4. Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant. 
Infinite. Phenomenon. 
Absolute. Abstract. Aeqamist. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 627 

Manuel de Philosophie, a l'usage de Colleges. Paris, 1846. 

Reminiscence. Tiieodicy. Utility. 
Maush. 

Preliminarij Essay to Coleridge's Aids to Reflection. (See Cole- 
ridge). 
Speculation. 
Martin, Saint. 

Pneumatology. Theosophism. 
Martin, T. H. 

Philosophie Spiritualiste de la Nature. 2 torn. Par. 1849. 
Nature (Philosophy of ). 
Martinius. 

Person. 
Matter, J. (b. 1791). 

1. Hist. Critique du Gnosfieisme. 3 Ihm. Paris, 1843. 
Manicheism. 

2. Histoire de la Ph,ilosop)h. dans ses Rapiwrts avec Religion. Paris, 

1854. 
Understanding. 
Maurice. 

Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. 

Acroamatical. Electicism. Entelechy. Eternity. Secundum 
Quid. 
Mayne, Z. 

Notion. 
Mayo, H. (d. 1850). 

Catelepsy. 
Meiklejohn. 

Transl. of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason, with Notes. 
Apperception. Apprehension. Ideal. Opinion. 
Meiners, C. (1747—1810). 
Melanges. 
Apathy. 
Mejerus (1662). 
Noology. 
Melancthon, Philip (1497—1568). 

Opera. ( TFJ'tem. 1601. Bretschneider. 28 vols. 1839 — 1860.) 
Entelechy. 
Melito (ab. 177). 

Anthropomorphism. 
Mendelssohn (1729-86). 

.Esthetics, 
Mercier. 

Be la Perfectihilile Hwnaine. 8vo. Paris, 1842. 
Perfectibility. 



628 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Michael Angelo (1475 — 1564). 
Genius. 

MiCHELET. 

Examen Critique de la Illetaph. d'Aristote. 8vo. Par. 1856. 
MiCKiEWiTZ, Adam. 

Tradition. 
Mill, James (1773—1836). 

Analysis of the Pheyiomena of the Human Mind. Lond. 1829. 
Ideation. Will. 
Mill, John Stuart, Dr. 
— ' ~ 1. A System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive. Zd Ed. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Lond. 1851. 
Attribute. Body. Category. Chance. Classification. Combination. 
Connotative. Copula. Deduction. Definition. Ethnology. Func- 
tion. Induction. Judgment. Law. Mysticism. Norm. Oppo- 
sition (in Logic). Ratiocination. Reasoning. 
2. Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. Lond. 1844. 
Experience. Idea (228). Science. 
Milton, John (1608-74). 

1. Prose WorJcs (St. Johi). 5 vols. Zoiici. 1848-53. 

2. Poetical Works (Brydges). 6 vols. Lond. 1835. 
Antinomy. Capacity. Education. Fancy. Idea. 

MiSHNA (commenced ab. B. C. 30). 

Kabala. 
Moffat. 

Study of Esthetics. Cincinnati. 1856. 
Genius. Poetry. Tact. Talent. 
MoLiERE (1622—1675). 

Femmes Savantes. 1692. 
Reason. 
Molina (1535—1601) and Molinists. 

Apathy. Scientia Media. 
MOLITOR, J. F. 

Philosophic de la Tradition. 8vo. Paris, 1837. 
Tradition. 
Monboddo (1714-79). 

Ancient Metaphysics. 3 vols. Edinh. 1779. 

Being. Capacity. Category. . Cause. Contingent. Discursus. 
Entelechy. Fancy. Form. Habit. Intellect. Matter. Meta- 
physics. Mind. Part. Philosophy. Predicate. Privation. Space. 
Time. Whole. 
2. Origin and Progress of Language. 2d Edit. 6 vols, ^rfwife. 1784. 
Category. Grammar. 
Montaigne (1533—92). 

Laughter. Scepticism. 



AND OF PROPKR NAMES. 629 

MONTEMONT. 

Grammaire General on PhilosopMe des Lancjues. 2 torn. 8vo. Par. 1845. 
Grammar. 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron of (1689 — 1655). 

1. L' Esprit de lois. {CEuvres. 7 vols. AmHerd. 1111.) 

2. Bo. transl. hy Nugent. 2d Edit. Land. 1752. 
Classification. Jurisprudence. Justice. Law. Savage. 

More, Henry, D. D. (1614-87). 

1. Theological Works. Folio. Lond. 1708. 

2. Collection of Philosophical Writings. 4th Edition. Folio. London, 

1712. 

3. Enchiridion cthicum. Arnst. 1695. 
Enthusiasm. 

4. A Brief Discourse of Enthusiasm. (Philos. Writings.) 
Existence. God. 

5. Antidote against Atheism. (Do.) 
Justice. Physiognomy. 

6. Conjectura Gahbalistica. Fol. Lond. Ifi73. (And Philos. Writings.) 
1. Immortality of Soul, as demonstrated from Nature and Reason. (Do.) 

Anima Mundi. Archseus. Causality. Economics. 
More, Thomas, Sir (1480—1535). 
Workes. Folio. 1557. 

Antecedent. Sophism. 
Moore, Thomas (1779—1852). 

Idea. Notion. Proverb. 

MORELL, J. D. 

1. Elements of Psychology. Svo. Lond. 1853. 

Faculties of Mind (Classif. of ). Knowledge. Life. Sensation. 

2. History of Philosophy. 
Identism. 

3. Speculat. Philos. of Europe in \^th Gent. 1846. 
Occasion. Origin. 

4. Philosoph. Tendencies of the Age. Svo. Lond. 1848. 
Philosophy. Positivism. Reason. Tradition. Will. 

6. Philosophy of Religion. 1849. 

Reason and Understanding. 
6. 3Iancliester Papers. 

Imminence. 

Anthropology. Automaton. Dogmatism. Scholastic Philosophy. 
Morgan. 

On the Trinity of Plato. 

Soul. 
Morton, S. G., Dr. 

Grania Americana. Fol. Phil. 1839, 

Species. 

54* 



630 BIBLIOGilAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

MosHEiM, J. L. (1696—1755.) 

Ecclesiastical History. Tr. bi/ Blurdoch. Edit, hy Soames. 4 vols. 8vo. 
Lond. 1841. {Beid, 184S.) 
Rosicrucians. 
MiJLLER, J. G. (Balle). 

Bildung u. Gebrauch d. Wortes Meligio. Slndieii u. Kritileen. 1835. 
Religion. 
MiJLLER, Julius. 

Christian Doctrine of Sin. Tr. by Palesford. Edi iib. 18i)2. 
Speculation. 
MuRiLLO (1618-82). 

Genius. 
Murray, Hugh (1779—1846). 

Enqviries respecting the Character of Nations and tlie Progress of So- 
ciety. Edinb. 1808. 
Savage and barbarous. 

Nemesids. (End of 4th Cent.) 

De Natura Hominis. Antw. 1565. Tr. by Wither. 1636. 
Immateriality. Psychology. 
Neo-Platonicians. (See Alexandria, School of). 
Netvton, Sir Isaac. (1642 — 1727.) 

Opera. (Horsley.) 5 vols. 4to. Lond. 1779-85. 

Analysis. Eternity of God. Genius. Induction. Instinct. In- 
vention. Matter. Sensorium. Space. Synthesis. Theory. 
Nicephorus, Blemmydes. (13th Cent.) 

Science. 
NiEMEIER, J. B. 

Dissert, de Stoic. Apotheia. 4to. Helmse. 1679. 
Apathy. 
Nominalists. 

Conceptualism. Nominalism. Scholastics. 
NoRRis, John. (1657—1711.) 

Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. 2 vols. 
8vo. Lond. 1701-4. 
Instinct. Notion. 
North. 

Plutarch. {Translat.) 
Sophism. 
'Notes and Queries. 1857. 
Reminiscence. 

Occam, William (d. 1347), and Occamists. 
Nominalism. Objective. Species. 
Ocellus, Lucanus. (About 500 B. C.) 

Ilcf)! Totj navroi, 
Entelechy. 



AND OF PROrER NAMES. 631 

OcHiNUS, Bernardus. (1487—1564). 

Polygamy. 
Oldfield. 

Essay towards the Inqrirovement of Reason. 8vo. Loud. 1707. 

Conception and Imagination. Essence. Existence and Essence. 
Innate. Person. Sign. 
Oj:.ympiodorus. (About A. D. 501.) 

Commentavy on the Phasdo of Plato. 
Keminiscence. 

OUGANICISTS. 

Life. 
Origen. (185—254.) 

Contra Celsum. {Spencer.) Gantab. 1668. 
Esoteric. Innate Ideas. 
Orpheus. 

Cosmogony. Theology. 
Oswald, Dr. 

Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of Religion. 
Common Sense. i 

Owen, Prof. 

On the Archetype and Homolorj. of the Vertebr. Skelet. 1848. 
Homologue. Morphology. 
Owen. 

Perfectibility. 
Oxford (English Prize Essays for). 1856. 
Essay on Comparative Mythology. 
Myth. 

Paffe, Mons. 

Siir la Sensibilite. 

Noology. Sensation and Perception. 
Pai.ey, William. (1743—1805.) 

1. Works. 4 vols. 8vo. Loud. 1838. 

2. Natural Theology. Uth Edit. Loud. 1819. 

Automaton. Causes, Final (Doctrine of). Cumulative Argument. 
Design. Instinct. Law. 

3. Principles of Iforal and Political Philosopihy. Uth Edit. 1803. 
Assent. Contract. Divorce. Expediency (Doctrine of). Obliga- 
tion. Person. Polygamy. Sanction. Utility. 

4. Evidences of Christianity. 7th Edit. Lond. 1800. 
Apophthegm. Contract. Cumulative Argument. 

Panckoucke. 

Dictionnaire dca Proverbes. 

Proverbs. 
Paracelsus. (1493 — 1541.) 

Anima mundi. Archseus. Macrocosm. Theosophism. 



632 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Parmenides. (b. ab. 536 B. C.) 

Criterion. Motion. 
Parr, Samuel, Dr. (1747—1825.) 

1. Essay on the Sublime. Worles. 8 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1828. 
Sublime. 

2. Sequel to the ivinted Paper. 2d Edit. Lond. 1792. 
Theory. 

Pascal, Blaise. (1623—1662.) 

Treatise of a Vacuum. GEuvres. (5 vols. 8vo., a la Haye. 1779.) v. 4. 
Perfectibility. 
Pasqualis, Martinez, (d. 1779.) 

Pneumatology. 
Patiucius. 

Translation of Philoponus. , 
Metaphysics. 
Paul. 

Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics. 
Ends. Method. 
Paulicians. 

A priori. 
Payne, George. 

Elements of llental and Iloral Science. 3d Edit. 1845. 
Conscience. 
Peemans. 

Introd. ad Philosojyh. 12mo. Lovan. 1840. 

Analysis and Synthesis. Art. Attribute. Ethics. Existence. 
Philosophy. Whole. 
Pere, Conseils d'un S0R l'Education. 

Education. 
Peripatetics. 

Form. Idea. 
Petersen. 

Testimony. 
Petronius. 

Scholastic. 
Philo Jud^ds. (1st Century.) 

Opera. Mangey. 2 vols. fol. London, 1742. Pfeiffer, 5 vols. 8vo. 
Erl. 1785. 
Ecstasy. Space. Syncretism, 
Thilon. 

Academics. 
Philoponus. (See Patricius.) 

PiCCOLOMINEUS. 

Philosoph. de Morihus, Francof. 1583. 
Chance. Reminiscence. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 633 

Picus, J. Paris. 

GahaUstarum Seleetiora Obscurioraqiie Dogmata. ]2mo. Venet. 1569. 
Kabala. 
PiERRON. (See Zevort.) 

Introd. a la 3Ietaphys. d'Aristote, 1840. 
Contradiction. 
Plato (B. C. 430 — 347) and Platonists. 

Opera. Franc. 1&02. 11 vols. 8vo. Loud. 1826. 10 vols. Stallhaum. 

1. Iie2)ubli'ca sive de justo. 

Criterion. Justice. Method. Myth. Society (Desire of). 

2. Convj'vium sive de amore. 
Demon. 

3. Cratylua, sive de recta nominum ratine. 
Grammar (Universal). 

4. Phoedo, sive de aiiitno. 
Immortality (of the Soul) 

5. TimcBus sive de Natura. 

Life. Myth. Privation. Scholastic Philosophy. Soul, Spirit, Mind 
and Syllogism. 

6. Gorgias, sive de Rhetorica. 
Myth. 

7. Protagoras, sive SophistcB. 
Society (Desire of). 

Academics. ^Esthetics. Anima Mundi. Apology. Atheism. Beauty. 
Cardinal Virtues. Cause. Demiurge. Dichotomy. Eclecticism. 
Empiric. Enthusiasm. Epicurean. Esoteric. Eternity. Evil. 
Form. Idea. Ideal. Metempsychosis. Mind. Morality. Mys- 
ticism. Nature or Force (Plastic). Noology. Notion. Number. 
Passions. Pneumatology. Propriety. Prudence. Reason. Rea- 
son (Impersonal). Reminiscence. Same. Soul. Tabula Rasa. 
Theory. Universal. 
Pleasuees of Literature. 12mo. Lond. 1851. 

Genius. Method. Taste. 
Plethon. 

Cardinal Virtues. 
Pliny. (23—79.) 
, Transl. hy Holland. 2 vols, folio. 1601. 

Gymnosophist. Memoria Technica. Sympathy. 
Plotinus. (205—270.) 

Oper. Philosojih. Omn. Lihr. LTV. Fol. Basil, 15S0. 

j3Estheties. Category. Demiurge. Ecstasy. Hylozoism. 
Plutarch, (d. ab. A. D. 120.) 

1. Opera. 2 vols. fol. Paris, 1624. 

2. The Philosophy commonly called the Iforals. Tr. hy Holland. Lond. 

1657. 



634 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Plutarch. 

3. Dialogue on the Demon of Socrates. 

4. De Fato. 

5. Of Brotherly Love. 

Acroamatical. Apophthegm. Demon. Enthusiasm. Fatalism. Idea. 
Potential. Soul. Syncretism. 
PococK, Edw. (1604—1691.) 

Specimen Hist. Arab. 4to. Oxford, 1649. 
Sabaism. 

PoCOCKE. 

India in Greece. 
Myth. 
PoiRET, Peter. (1646—1719.) 

The Divine CEconomy, written origin, in French. 6 vols. 8vo. Land. 
171.3. 
Mysticism. 
PoLiGNAC, Melchoir de, Cardinal. (1661 — 1741.) 

Anti-Lucretius, sive de Deo et Natura. Lond. 1751. 
Instinct. 
PoLYBius. (B. C. 203—123.) 

Histo7-iarum. 3 vols. 8vo. Leips. 1764. 
Occasion. 
Pope, Alexander. (1688—1744.) 

Works (Roscoe). 8 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1846. 

Apath}'. Genius. Merit. Philanthropy. Rationale. 

PORDAGE. 

Mysticism. 
Porphyry. (233— 304. j 

1. Select Worlis. Transl. by Taylor. Lond. 1823. 

2. Introd. ad Gategor. 

Arbor porphyriana. Difference. Ecstasy. Esoteric. Individual 
Realism. 
PoRTEUs, B. (1731—1808.) 

Works. 6 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1816. 
Apprehension. Immortality. 
Port Royalists. 

Logica sive Ars Cogitandi. E. tertia edit, in Lat. vers. Lond. 1674. 
Academics. Category. Conception and Imagination. Conception 
and Idea. Definition. Division. Extension (Logical). Judg- 
ment. Method. Mode. Quantity. Reasoning. 
PosTE, Edward, M. A. 

Introduc. to Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle. 1850. 
Contradiction. Dialectics. Organon. 
POTAMOS, of Alexandria. 

Eclecticism. . 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 635 

POWNALL. 

Intellectual Physics. 
Space. 
Price, Richard. (1723—1791.) 

1. A Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in 3forals. 4to. 

Lond. 1768. 
Fitness. Impossible. Merit. 

2. Letters on, Ilaterialisin and Philosophical Necessity. 
Argumentation. Beauty. Materialism. Perfectibility. Eectitude. 

Rule. Sensibles. Testimony. 
Price, Sir Uvedale. 

On the Picturesque, loith Essay on Taste by Sir T. L. Diclz. 8vo. 1842. 
Beauty. Picturesque. 
Prichard, Dr. J. C. (1786—1845.) 

Natural History of Man. Zo»t^. 1843. 
Species. 
Priestley, Joseph. (1733—1804.) 

1. Examination of Reid, E'-.attic, and Oswald. Lond. 1775. 
Credulity. Instinct. 

2. Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit ; Three Dissertations on the Doctr. 

of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. Lond. 1778. Birm. 
1782. 
Libertarian. Materialism. Perfectibility. Psychology. Will. 
Priscian. (4th Cent.) 

Scholastic Philosophy. 
Protagoras. 

Certainty. Criterion. Empiric. 
Ptolemy. (Born A. D. 70.) 

Geographim. Lib. XIII. Essend. 1835-44. 
Theory. 
Puffendorf, S. (1631—1694.) 

De officio hominis et Civis. (Johnson.) 2d Edit. Lond. 1737. 
Jurisprudence. Law. Nature. 
Purpose, The, of Existence. 12mo. 1850. 

Soul. Spirit. Mind, etc. 
Pursuit of Knowledge. Weekly Vol. 31. 

Hypothesis. 
Pyrrho. (About 340 B. C.) 

Scepticism. 
Pythagoras. (B. C. 586—506). 

Anima mundi. Cardinal virtues. Categories. Dualism. Eclecti- 
cism. Idea. Intellect. Mathematics. Metempsychosis. Nature 
or Force (Plastic). Number. Philosophy, Psycbism. Reason. 
Soul. 



636 BIBLTOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Pythagoreans. 

Cause. Criterion. Deontology. Entelecby. Esoteric and Exo- 
teric. Justice. Privation. 

QuADius. 

Dispidatio tn'tiim illud Stoic, paradoxon Trepl rrjs aira^eias expendena. 4to. 
Sedini. 1720. 
Apatby. 
QuADRATUs. (About A. D. 125.) 

ApologicB /ra(jmentum. (Grahe Spicileg. II. 125.) 
Apology. 
QuKSNE, Mons. 

Letti-es sur le Psycliiame. 8vo. Paris, 1852. 
Psychism. 
QuiNTiLiAN. (A. D. 42—122.) 

Allegory. Argument. Art. Memoria Teehnica. Perception. 
Scholastic. 

Raleigh, Sir Walter. (1552—1618.) 

Hist, of the World. 1614. {Works. 8 vols. 8vo. 0.)/. 1829.) 

Magic. 
Eamists. 

Argument. 
Ramsey, Allan. (1685—1758.) 

Scots Proverbs. 1736. {Worlcs. 2 vols. 8vo. Zonrf. 1800.) 

Proverb. 
Ramus, Peter. (1515—1572.) 

histittit. Dialectics. Lihr. Duo. Cantab. 1611. 

Dichotomy. 
Raphael. (1483—1520.) 

Genius. 
Rassow, Hermann. 

Arisfotelia de Notionis Definitione Doctrina. Berol. 1, 4.3. 

Intellect. , 

Rationalists. (See Sensationalists, Ancient.) 
Rattray. 

Antipathy. 
Ravaisson, M. Felix. / 

1. Essai sur la Metaphysiqxie d' Aristote. 8vo. Par. 1838. 
Esoteric. Form. 

2. De rUabitude. 8vD. Par. 1838. 
Habit. 

Ray, .John. (1628—1705.) 

Complete Collect, of English Proverbs, also Scotch, &c. {Belfour.) bth 
Edit, Lond. 1813. 
Proverbs. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 637 

Realist. 

Conceptualism. Nominalism. 
Regis, P. S. (1632—1707). 

Systeme de la Philosophie. 3 vols. 4to. Par. 1690. 

Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of). 
Keid, Thomas (1710—1795). 

1. Inquiry into the Human 2Iind on the Principles of Common Sense. 

(1763.) 
Credulity. Ego. Experimentum Crucis. Extension. Idealism. 
Language. Reason. Relation. Sign. Testimony. Truths. 

2. Essays on the Intellectual Powers. (1785.) 

Causation. Common Sense. Conceiving. Conception and Imagina- 
tion. Conceptualism. Conscience. Consent (Argument from Uni- 
versal). Egoism. Extension. Faculty. Feeling. Generalization. 
Grammar (Universal). Grandeur. Habit. Hypothesis. Idea. 
Identity. Immanent. Immaterialism. Impression. Induction. 
Idol. Judgment. Knowledge. Matter. Memory. Novelty. Ope- 
rations (of the Mind). Perception. Prejudice. Principles. Pro- 
bable. Quality (Occult). Reflection. Relation. Sensation. Senti- 
ment and Opinion. Space. Species. States (of Mind). Time. 
Train of Thought. Truths. Universals. 

3. Essays on the Active Powers. (1788.) 

Approbation. Conscience. Credulity. Design. Disposition. Habit. 
Imitation. Impulse. Instinct. Liberty. Macrocosm. Monad. 
Motive. Nature (Course or Power of). Power. Rectitude. Right. 
Scientia (Media). Sufiicient Reason (Doctrine of). Temperament. 
Utility. Will. 

4. Account of Aristotle's Logic. (1774.) 

Definition. Distinction. Division. Praedicate. Proposition. Sophism. 
Soul. Syllogism. 

5. Correspondence. (1764 — 1793.) 

Choice. Immanent. Libertarian. Motive. Power. States (of 
Mind). Univocal Words. Will. 

6. Essay on Quantity. 
Quantity. 

7. Works. Preface, Notes, and Su2)plementary Dissertations, hy Sir 

William Hamilton, (bth Ed. 1858.) 

Abstraction (Psychological). Do. (Logical). Esthetics. Affections. 
Ambition. Apperception. Appetite. Association. Attention. 
Axiom. Beauty. Belief. Benevolence. Capacity. Causality. 
Causes (Final, Doctrine of). Common Sense (the Philosophy of). 
Conception and Idea. Empiric. Entelechy. Petichism. Idealist. 
Imagination. Law. Law and Cause. Notion. Objective. Pri- 
mary. Psychology. Rationalism. Sensation and Perception. 
Subject (Object.) Veracity. 

55 



638 BTBLTOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

E, ELATION ALIST. 

CoDceptualism. 
Reuchlin, or Capnio (1454 — 1622). 

Be Arte Cabalistica. Libri tres. fol. Hagen. 1517. 
Kabala. 
Review, Edinburg. (1844, 1850). 

Absolute (5). Enthymeme. Ethnography. Intention. Observation. 
Opinion. Realism. 
Review, North British (No. 27). 

Conception and Idea. 
Review, Quarterly. 

Consilience. Deduction. Divorce. Induction (Principles of). 
Reynolds, Joshua, Sir (1723-92). 

Discou7-ses on Painting, delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy. 
(1771-82.) Lond. 1839. 
Taste. 
Richterus. 

1. Dissertatio de Ci/nicis. (1701.) 
Cynic. 

2. De Ideis Platonis. 
Idea. 

Ritter, H. (b. 1791). 

1. Geschichte der Philoaophie. 12 vols. 8vo. Hamh. 1836-53. 

2. History of Ancient Philosophy, translated by Morrison. 4 vols. Svo. 

Lond. 1846. 
Esoteric, "Will. 
Rivius. 

Cause. 
RoBiNET, J. B. R. (1735—1820). 
Traite de la Nature. 
Naturalism. 
Robinson. 
Endoxa. 

Apodeictic. 
RoBisoN, John (1739—1805). 

Proofs of a Conspiracy against All Beligiona and Governments of Eii^ 
rope, carried on in Bfeetingsof Free-SIasons, Illuminati, and, Read- 
ing-Societies. Ath Edit. Lond. 1798. 
Illuminati. 
Rochefoucauld (1613-80). 

Moral Reflec. and Maxims. Lond. 170&. 
Benevolence. Maxim. 
Rogers, Samuel (1762—1855). 
Table Talk. Lond, 1856. 
Testimony. 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 639 

ROLLIN, Charles (1661—1741). 
Maxims. 
Maxim. 
Roman law. 
Equity. 
Rousseau, J. J. (1712-78). 

C'ontrat Social. {(Euvres. 27 vols. 8vo. Paris, 1824-28.) 
Sensation. Theocracy. 

ROUSSELOT. 

Etudes de la. Philosophie dans le 3Ioycn A(/e. 3 torn. 8vo. Paris, 1850-2. 
Scholastic. 

ROYER-COLLARD. (See COLLARD.) 

Rush, Benj., Dr. (1745—1813). 

1. Iledical Inquiries. Philad. 1793. 
Association. 

2. Inq. into the Influence of Physic. Causes upon the Moral Faculty {in 

the Sd edit, of his Med. Inq. 4 vols. 8vo.) 1809. 
Conscience. 
RuTHERFORTH, Thom. (1712-71). 

Institutes of Natural Law; Lect. on Grotius' de Jure. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Oamhr. 1754-56. 
Jurisprudence. Utility. 

Saint IIiliare, BarthSlemy. 
De la Logique d'Aristote. 
Organon. 
Saisset, Emile. 

Art. 3Iatiere, in Diet, des Scien. Phil. 
Matter. 
Salyianus (390—484). 

De Guhernat. Dei, et jxtsto ptrcBSentique ej. judicio. Oxon. 1633. Althorp. 
1611. Transl. Lond. 1700. 
Scholastic. 
Sanchez, Fr., or Sanctius (d. 1632). 

Tractatus de mnltum nohili et prima universali scientia, quod nihil 
scitur. 4to. Lyons, 1581. 
Skepticism. 
Sanderson, Rob., Bp. (1587—1662). 

1. De Oblig. Conseientia. Prcelectiones decern. Oxon. 1672. Lond. 1696 

{icith transl. by Wheivell, 1861). 
Obligation. 

2. De Juramenti Ohligatione. Lond. 1696. 
Nature. Obligation. Prsedicate. _ ^ 

Sarnanus. 

Tractatio de secundis Intentionibus secundum doctrinam Scoti. 4to. 
Ursellis. 1622. 
Intention. 



640 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS ■ 

Savaky. 

Sur la Certitude. 1847. 

Certainty. • ■ 

Satigny. 

Systhne des RecTits. 
Law. • 
Say, John Baptist (1767—1832). 

Coura Complet d'Econom Polit. practique. 6 vols. 8vo. 1829. Traiisl. 
hy Prinsep. Zojirf. ,1821. 
Society. 
ScriELLiNG, F. W. T. (b. 1775). 

Positiv. Philosoph. d. Offenharinig. 1842. 

Absolute, j^sthetics. Animamundi. Atheism. Idealism. Identism. 
Iiidifferontism. Intuition. Life. Soul. 
ScHiLLEE, F. (1759—1806). 

Worlcs. 10 vols. Stuttgart, 1844. 
Perfectibility. 
ScHLEGEL, Fred, von (1722—1829). 

Philosophy of Life. (Morrison.) Loud. [Bohu) 1847. 
Theology. 

SCHMID. 

Dictioniiaire pour servir aux ecrita de Kant. (1798). 

Concept. _ ' 

Schmidt, Car. 

Esaai sur les 3/ystiques du Quatorzieme siecle. Strasburrj, 1S36. 
Mysticism. 
Schoolmen. 

Consciousness. Essence. Eternity. 
Schubert, G. H. 

Gfeschichie des Lebcns. 3 vols. Leipz. 1806. 
Soul. 
Sohultz. 

Life. 
Schwegler, Albert. 

History of Philosophy in Epitome, translated hy Seclye. 2d Edition, 
New York, 1856. 
Actual. Metaphysics. Stoics. 
Scott, John (1638—1694). 

1. WorJcs. 6 vols. 8vo. Oxford, 1826. 

2. The Christian Life, from its Beginning to its Consummation in Glory. 

5 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1712. 

Tendency. 
Scott, Waiter (1771—1832"). 

Genius. Reminiscence. 
ScoTisTS. (See Schoolmen.) 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 641 

ScoTus, Joannes Erigena (d. 8S6). 

De divisione NaturcB. Lib. V. Ed. Gale. Oxon. 1681. Fol. 
Scholastic. 
Sedgwick, Prof. Adam. 

Discourse on the Studies of the University. 2d Edit. Cambridge, 1834. 
With add. and prel. disc, bth Edit. 1850. 
Tabula Rasa. 
Seileb. 

The Wisdom of the Streets, or the Cleaning and Use of German Pro- 
verbs. Augsburg, 1816. 
Proverb. 
Selden, John. (1584—1654.) 

De Jure Naturali et gentium, in Opera ( Wilkins. 3 vols. fol. Land. 
1726.) Vol. I. 
Nature. 
Semple. 

Introduction to Jlletajyhysic of Ethics. 
Antinomy. Intuition. Schema. 
Seneca, L. A. (b. B. C. 1.) 

1. EpistolcB. 

Consent (Argument from Universal). Ideal. 

2. De dementia. In Opera. Par. 1607. 
Society. 

Authority. Cause. Enthusiasm. Evil. Idea. 
Senior, N. W. 

Four Lectures on Political Economy. 1852. 

Observation. 
Sensationalists (Ancient.) See Rationalists. 

Criterion. 
Sensationalists (Modern.) 

Certainty. 
Sepher Tetsira. 

Kabala. 
Sergeant, J. 

Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the Idealists. 1697. 

Notion. 
Sewell, Wm. 

Christian Ilorals. 4 vols. Loud. 1841. 

Assent. Association. Experience. Morality. Person. Syncretism. 
Understanding. 
Sextus Empiricus. (ab. A. D. 200.) 

Hypothesis. Criterion. 

55* 2iR 



642 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Shaftesbury, A. A. C, Earl of. (1671—1713.) 

■ 1. Cliaracteris . of Man, Manners, Opinione, and Times. 3 vols. Lond. 1749. 
Esthetics. 

2. Letters concerning JEnthusiasm. (1708.) Charac. Vol. I. 
Enthusiasm. 

3. Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit. Do. Vol. IT. 
Atheism. Dsemonist. Enthusiasm. Polytheism. Theism. 

4. lifiscellaneous Rejiectioms. Do. Vol. III. 
Apologue. Dogmatism. 

6. Tlte Moralists ; a Rhajosody {Deity and Providence.) Do. II. 

Gratitude. Sense. Theism. 
6. Sensus Communis; Essay on freedom of Wit and Humour. Do. I. 

Wit and Humour. 
Shakspeaee, Wm. (1564—1616.) 

1. Macbeth. 
Compunction. 

2. Hamlet. 

Equivocation. Metaphysics. 

3. Merchant of Venice. 

Fancy. Harmony of the Spheres. 
Genius. Imagination. Observation. 
Sharp. 

Dissertation on Genius. Lond. 1756. 
Genius. 
Shelley, P. B. (1792—1822.) 
Works. Lond. 1836, 1847. 
Imagination and Memory. 
Sheppard. 

Characters of Theophrastus, Gr. with notes. 8vo. Lond. 1852. 
Sophism. 
Sherlock, Wm. (1641—1707.) 

1. The Happiness of Good Men, &c.; or a Discourse of the Immortality 

of the Soul. 4:th Edit. 8vo. Lond. 1726. 
Immortality. Innate. 

2. Divine Providence, 5th Edit. Lond. 1715. 
Providence. 

SiMONiDES. (Vlth Cent. B. C.) 

Memoria Technica. 
SiMPLicius. (Vlth Cent.) 

Ad Oategor. Aristotelis. Ven. 1499. 

Acroamatical. 
Smart, B. H. 

1. Manual of Logic. 1849. 
Being. 

2. Sematology. 8v0o Lond. 1839. 
Sign. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 643 

SiMEDLEY. 

Moral Evidence. 1850. 
Evidence. 
Smellie, Wui. (1740-95). 

Philosophy of Natural History. 1790-99. 
Instinct. 
Smith, Adam. (1723-90.) 

Complete Works [Dugald Stewart). 5 vols. 8vo. Edinh. 1812. 

1. Theory of the Moral Sentiments. — To which is added, a Dissertat. on 

the Oriijin of Languages, l^th Edit. 2 vols. 8vo. Load. 1804. 
Apathy. Beauty. Benevolence. Conscience. Epicurean. Propriety. 
Sentiment. Sign. Sympathy. 

2. Essays on Philosophical Subjects. 4to. Lond. 1795. 
Externality. Idea. 

3. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 

(1776). 8vo. Lond. 1826. M'Culloch, 1846. 
Ends. Ontology. Standard of Virtue. 
Smith, John. (1618—1652.) 
Posthumous Tracts. 1660. 
Reason. 
Smith, Dr. Southwood. 

The Philosophy of Health; or, an Exposition of the Physical and Mental 
Constitution of Man. 3d Edit. Lond. 1847. 
Organ. 
Smith, Sydney. (1777—1845.) 

Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy, delivered 1804-5-6. 2d Edit. 
Lond. 1850. 
Abstraction (10). Metaphysics. 
Socrates. (B. C. 469—396.) 

Apology. Cardinal virtues. Causes, final (Doctrine of). Cynics. 
Demiurge. Demon. Dialectics. Empiric. Idea. Individual. 
Induction (Method of ). Invention. Pneumatology. Psychology. 
Reason. Reminiscence. Species. 
Solly, Thomas. 

Syllabus of Logic. 8vo. 1839. 
Distribution. Syllogism. 
Somatopsychonologia. 

Nature (Course or power of). 

SOPATER. 

On Hermogenes. apud Rhet. GrcBC. Ed. Walz. 
Science. 
Sophists. 

Idea. Irony. 
South, Robert. (1633—1716.) 

Sermons. 12 vols. 1704-44. Lond. 2 vols. 8vo. 1850. 
Autocracy. Miracle. Phenomena. Velleity. Will. 



644 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

SouTHEY, Robert. (1774—1843.) 

/Sir Thorn. Moore, or Colloquies on the Progress and Prospects of Societi/. 
2d Edit. Loud. 1831. 
Consent. 
Spalding. 
Logic. 

Dichotomy. Distribution. Inference. Specification (Process of). 
Sparrotv, Bp. Anthony, (d. 1685). 

A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer. London) 1657 — 1668. 
Oxford, 1839. 
Rationale. 
Spectator. 8 vols. Loud. 1712. 

Continuity. Instinct. Laughter. 
Spencer, John. (1630—1695.) 

Be legibiis Hehrmornm. 2 vols. fol. Cambridge, 1727. {Pfaff. Tubing. 
1732.) 
Sabaism. 
Spenser, Edmund. (155.3—1598.) 

Works. (Todd.) 8 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1805. 
Idea. 
Speusipptjs. 

Academics. 
Spinoza, Benedict de. (1632—1677.) 

1. Ethica ordin. Oeometrica demons, {02)era. Vol. I.) 
Acosmist. Immanent. 

2. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. (Opera. Vol. III.) 
Rationalism. 

3. Opera Omnia. Ed. Bruder. 3 vols. 18mo. Lips. 1843. 
Atheism. Hylozoism. Objective. Pantheism. 

Spurzheim. 

Phrenology. Physiognomy. 
Stael, Madame de. (1766—1817.) 

1. Germany. 
Enthusiasm. 

2. Reflexions snr le Suicide. 
Empiric. Suicide. 

Staudlin, C. F. 

1. History and Sjnrit of Scepticism. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1794-5. 
Scepticism. 

2. Hist, des Opiinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide. 8vo. Gcett. 1824. 
Suicide. 

Stahl. 

Anima mundi. Life. Perceptions. 
Stallo, J. B., A. M. 

General Principles of Philosophy of Nature. Lond. 1848. 
Nature (Philosophy of). 



AND OP PROPER NAMES. 645 

Stay. 

De Si/stemate. Boscovich. 
Experience. 
Stewart, Dugald. (1753—1828.) 

1. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 3find. 1792—1814, 1843. 
Conception. Fancy. Generalization. Identity (Personal). Idio- 
syncrasy. Imagination and Conception. Imitation. - Impression. 
Induction. Induction (Principle of). Intuition. Law (Physi- 
cal, etc.). Memory. Observation. Phenomenon. Postulate. 
Principles. Probable. Remembrance. . Sensus Communis. Taste. 
Train of thought. Truth. 

2. Active and Moral Powers, Philosophy of. 2 vols. 8vo. 1828. 
Conscience. Credulity. Deontology. Design. Evil. Intellect. 

Matter. Optimism. Reason. Reminiscence. Space. Will. 

3. Outlines of 3Ioral Philosophy. 7th Edit. 1844. 
Consciousness. Matter. 

4. On the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy, &c. Prelim. 

Dissertat. to Eneyc. Brit. 1815. 
Continuity (Law of). Egotism. Factitious. Idealist. Monad. 
Suggestion. 

5. Philosopihical Essays. Sd Edit. 1818. With Preliminary Disser- 

tation. 
Abstraction (Logical). Force. Idea. Ideology. Mysticism. Out- 
ness. Picturesque. Primary. Psychology. Sensation. Sensi- 
bles. Sentiment. Soul, Spirit, Mind, etc. Sublime. Taste. 
Time. 

6. Dissertations on Reid. 

Abstraction (Psychological). Action. Ambition. Analogy. Anal- 
ysis and Synthesis. Ajipetite. Art. Association. Atom. Au- 
tomatism. Axiom. Btauty. Casuistry. Causation. Conception 
and Idea. Consciousness. Necessity (Logical). Notion. Rea- 
soning. State. Transcendent. Truth. 
Stillingfleet, Edward. (1635 — 1699.) 
Works. 6 vols. fol. Land. 1710. 
Notion. 
Stoddart, Sir John. 

Univ. Grammar, or Science of Language, in Encyclop. Jiletropol. 
Conception and Idea. 
Stoics. 

Anima mundi. Anticipation. Apathy. Axiom. Category. Causes, 
final (Doctrine of). Common Sense (the Philosophy of). Cynic. 
Eclecticism. Element. Fate. Hylozoism. Idea. Ideal. Im- 
pression. Species. Stoics. Suicide. Virtue. Will. 
Story, Joseph. (1779—1845.) 

Cotyimeiit. on Equity Juris2}rud. 
Equity. 



646 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OP AUTHORS 

Strabo. (d. ab. 25 A. D.) 

Rer. GeogrcqMc. Lihri XVII. (Falconer.) 2 vols. fol. Oron. 1807. 
Acroamatical. 
Straton (of Lampsacus). 

Aniiiia mundi. Atheism. Hj'lozoisiu. Nature or Force (Plastic). 
Strauss, D. F. 

Life of Jesus. From 4th German Edit. 3 vols. Loud. 1840. 
Rationalism. 
SuARBZ, Franc. (1548—1617.) 
De Legibns. 1570. 
Cause. Law. 
Sumner, J. B., Abp. of Canterbury. 

A Treatise on the Records of Creation, and on the j\Ioral Attributes of 
the Creator, ith Edit. Lond. 1825. 
Quietism. 
SwEDENBORG, Emanuel. (1688 — 1772.) 

Mysticism. Pneumatology. 
Swift, Jonathan, Dean. (1667 — 1745.) 

Works. 19 vols. 8vo. {Scott.) Edinh. 1819. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1853. 
Immaterialism. 
Sydenham, T. (1624-89.) 

Plato. 
Sylvius, F. D. (1614-72.) 
Life. 

Tacitus, (b. A. D. 56.) 

Opera. Erncsti. Lips. 1772. 
Occasion. 
Tappan, H. p. 

1. Doctrine of the Will hy an Appeal tg Consciousness. 3 vols. 12mo. 
Choice. Consciousness. Definition. 

2. Logic {Elements of). iV^. F. 1856. 
Function. Subject. 

Tatham, Edward. (1749—92.) 

The Chart and Scale of Truth by which to find the Cause of Error. 
{Bampton Lect. 1789.) Grenfield. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1840. 
Axiom. Intuition. 
Taylor, Henry, (d. 1785.) 

Apology of Ben. Ifordacai to his friends for embracing Christia7iity. 
2d Edit. Lond. 1784. 
Person. 
Taylor, Isaac. 

1. Elements of Thought, or Concise Explanations of the p>rinci2}al terms 
of Intellectual Philosophy. 8th Edit. Lond. 1846. 2d American 
from 9th Lond. 1851. 
Active. Analogy. Association. Attention. Classification. Com- 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 647 

Taylor, Isaac. 

plex. Conception. Cpnclusion. Contingent. Data. Design. 
Distribution. Division. Doubt. Essence. Extension. Faculties 
of the Mind (Classification of). Identity (Personal). Inference. 
Intuition. Method. Mode. Prejudice. Primary. Reason. Re- 
lation. Sophism. 
2. Natural History of Enthusiasm. Sth Edit. Land. 1842. 
Enthusiasm. 
Taylor, Jeremy, Bp. (1613 — 77.) 

Works (Heber) Sd Edit. 15 vols. 8vo. lond. 1839. 

Belief. Brocard. Philanthropy. Tendency. Tradition. Type. 
Virtual. 
Taylor, William. (1765—1836.) 

English Synonyms discriminated. 1850. 

Action and Act. Adage. Afiirmation. Archetype. Choice. Cos- 
mogony. Custom. Dialectic. Distinction. Equity. Imagination 
and Fancy. Intellect. Mind. Optimism- Remembrance. Sen- 
timent. Talent. Wit and Humour. 
Tellez. 

Summa Philos. Arist. Paris, 1645. 
Species. Universals. 
Temple, Sir W. (162S— 1700.) 

Apathy. Wisdom. 
Iennemann. 

1. Grundriss. 

2. Histor. of Philos. Trans, by Johnson. Ed. by Morell, 1852. 
Reason. Scholastic Philosophy. 

Terminists. See Occamists. 
Tertullian, Q. S. F. (Ild Cent.) 

De Anima ( Opera, fol. Paris, 1695. 
Immateriality. Suggestion. 
Thales. (b. 656 B. C.) 

Atheism. 
Themistius. |,fl. 362 A. D.) 

Contraries. Paraphrase. 
Tholuck, F. a. D. (b. 1799.) 

Szufismus et Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica. 8vo. Berlin. 1821. 
A23p. 1838. 
Supra-naturalism. 
Thomists. See Schoolmen. 
Thomson, Wm. 

1. Outline of the Necessary Laics of Thought. 2d Edit. 1849. 

Classification. Colligation of Facts. Conception and Imagination. 
Conceptualism. Excluded Middle. Form. Function. Identical 
Proposition. Induction. Judgment. Logic. Method. Notion. 



648 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Thompson, Wm. 

Realism. Sensation and Perception. Species. Sufficient. Truth. 
Universals. 

2. Princi2}les of Necessary and Contingent Truth. Bampton Edit. 185.3. 
Conception and Imagination. 

3. Christian Theism. 

Originate. Person. Reason. Will. 

Abstraction (Logical) 6, 7. Analogy. A priori. Art. Attribute. 
Thoth, or Taaut. 

Hermetic Books. 
Thurot. 

De V Entendement. 

Cardinal Virtues. Habit. Perception. Sensation. 
TiBERGHiEN, William. 

Essai des Connaissances Humaines. 1844. 

Absolute Certainty. Existence. Harmony. Idea. Knowledge. Law. 
Macrocosm. Perceptions. Tradition. 
TiNDAL, Matthew. (1657—173.3.) 

Christianity as old as the Creation. Lond. 1730. 
Theism. 

TlSSOT, J. 

Manie du Suicide. 1840. 
Suicide. 
TooKn, John Home. (1736—1812.) 

The Diversions of Parley . (Taylor). 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1829. 1 vol. 
1867. 
Soul. Spirit Mind, 
TowNSEND, Dr. 

CEdi2}ns Romanus. 
Irony. 
Tracv (Ant. L. C. L. Destutt de.) 1754—1836. 
Elements d'Ideologie. 1801—1805. 
Ideology. 
Trench, Richard 0. 

1. The Study of Words. Lond. 1851. 
Apprehend and Comprehend. Invention. 

2. Notes on the P arables of our Lord. Lond. 1841, 
Gnome. Myth. Parable. 

Trendelenburg. 

1. NotcB in Arist. 
Assumption. 

2. Be Ideis Platonis Lineamenta. 8vo. Berol. 1842, 
Idea (228). 

3. E/ementa Log. Arist. 8vo. Basil. 1842. 
Logic. Objective. Science. Theory. 

Sophism. , 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 649 

Truslkr, Dr. John. (1735— 1S20.) 

The difference hetioeen words esteemed synonym, in the Engl Lang. 1766. 
Intellect and Intelligence. Wit and Humour. 
Truth, Guesses at. 

Second Series, 1848. 

Eclecticism. Education. Ideal. 
Tucker, Abraham. (1705—74.) 

Light of Nature 2>ur8ued. 7 vols. 8vo. 1805. 2 vols. 1837. 

Bonum Summum. Esoteric. Fate. Ratiocination. Transference. 
TuLLOCH, Dr. J. 

Theism. Burnett Prize. Essay. 
Retention. 
TuRGOT, A. R. J. (1727-81). 

1. ^e Encyclopedie Franqaise. 
Existence and Essence. 

2. GEuvres. 9 vols. 8vo. 1808-11. 
Innate. Perfectibility, 

TuRNBDLL, Dr. George, (d. 1752.) 

1. Translation of Leibnitz. 
Spontaneity. 

2. Christian Philosophy. {Second part of the Principi. of Moral Phi- 

losophy. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1740. 
Will. 
TURNBULL, Wm. B. 

Nature and Origin of Laios. 
Self love. 
Tyrannion (1st Cent. B. C). 

Metaphysics. 
Tyrell. 

On the Law of Nature. 
iSTature. Sanction. 

Ubaghs, J. 0. 

TheodicecB Elementa. 
Theism. 
UPHAjr, Thos. C. 

Life of Madame Guyon — leith History of Fenelon. N. Y. 1847. 
Quietism. 

Van Helmont (1577—1644). 

Anima mundi. Archa3us. Macrocosm. Mysticism. Theosophism. 
Van Mildert, Wm. (1765—1836). 

Pampton Lectures for ISU. {Theolog. Works. 6 vob. Svo. Oa;/. 1838. 
Vol. TV.) 
Deist. 
56 



650 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Van de Veyer. 

Truths. 
Varro (B. C. 116—27). 

Custom. Good (The Chief). 
Vaughan, Dr. 

1. Hours loith the l/i/atics. 
Theosophism. 

2. Essai/s. 
IndiiFerentism, 
Mysticism. 

Vedas. 

Mysticism. 
ViNCENTius LiRiNENSis (d. ab. 450). 
Commonitorium. Oxf. 1836. 

Authority (The Argument from). 
ViNET, A. 

Essais de Philoao2}Ji. Morale et de Morale Religieuse. Paris, 1S47. 
Individual. 

ViREY. 

De la Pliyaiologie dans sea Rapports avcc la Philosophie. 1843. 

Instinct. 
Virgil (B. C. 70— 18). 

Custom. 
VoLNEY, Constantine Chassebceuf, Count (1757 — 1820). 

1. CEuvrea. 8 vols. 8vo. Par. 1820-26. 

2. Le loi naturelle, ou Catechiame du citoyen franqaise (Par. 1793), after- 

wards known as "Principes pJn/siques de la morale." 
Ideology. 
Von Hildebrandt. 

Temperament. 
VossiDS, Gerard John (1577—1649). 

Opera. 6 vols. fol. Amst. 1701. Vol. I. : Etymolor/icon llngiice Lat'nics. 
Absurd. Alcliemj'. Certainty. Condition. Soul (477). 

Wagnerus. (1670.) 

Noology. 
Walch, J. G. (1693—1775.) 

Sireitiglceiten. (Introduction to Controversies of the Lutheran Chnrcli.) 
2d Edit. 1733—1739. 
Syncretism. 
Wallis, John (1616—1703). 

Institutio Logicm. Edit, quint. Oxon. 1729.) 
Induction. Postulate. Syllogism. 
AVarburton, Wm. (1698—1779). 

The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated. ( WorJcs. 12 vols. 8vo. 
Lond.lSlt. Vol. I.— VL) 
Esoteric and E.xoterie. Obligation. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. _ 651 

Waudlaw, Ralph (1779—1853). 

Christian Ethics ; or, 3[oral Philosophy on the Principles of Divine 
Revelation. Zd Edit. Loud. 1837. 
Fitness. 
Waterland, Daniel (1683—1740). 

Works. 11 vols, in 12. Svo. Oxford, 1823-28. 6 vols. 1843. 
Necessity. Pantheism. Ratio. Real. 
Watson, Richard (1737—1816). 

An Apolvcjij for the Bible. 2d Edit. Lond. 119G. 
Authentic. 
Watson, Thomas, Rev, 

Intimations and Evidences of a Future State. Loud. 1792. 
Immortality (of the Soul). 
Watt, James (1736-1819). 

Invention. 
AVatts, Isaac (1674—1748). 

1. Logic, or the Might Use of Reason. ( Wovlcs. 9 vols. Svo. London, 

1812. Vol. Vn. 311.) 
Argumentation. Negation. Privation. Syllogism. Universal Words. 

2. Scheme of Ontology j or, the Science of Being in General. Do. 

Vol. VIIL 485. 
Ontology. 

3. Philosophical Essays. Do. Vol. VIIL 331. 
Truths. 

Passions. 
Weigelius, Valentine (1533-88). 

Theosophism. 
Wernerians. 

Hypothesis. 
Wesley, Chas. 

Guide to Syllogism. Bohn. 

Distribution. 
Whately, Richard, Archbishop. 

1. Elements of Logic. 9th Edit. 1850. 

Conclusion. Connotative. Conversion. Copula. Distribution. Gene- 
ralization. Genus. Impossible. Individual. Induction. Infer- 
ence. Intention (Logical). Knowledge. Logic. Metaphor. Pos- 
sible. Proof. Proprium. Reason. Reasoning. Reduction. 
Same. Sincerity. Term. Truth. Universal. Verbal. Why ? 

2. Elements of Rhetoric. 7th Edit. 1850. 
Fable. Fact. 

3. Tract on Instinct. 
Instinct. 

4. Historic Douhta relat. to Nap. Bonaparte. Idth Edit. 1850. 
Irony. 



652 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS 

Whateley, Richard. 

5. LeKsons on Morals. 
Moral. Selfish. Self-love. 

6. On Bacon. Essays. Ath Edit. 1868. 
Selfish. Superstition. 

Abscissio Infiniti. Abstraction (7). Do. (Logical) (8). Accident. 
Analogue. Analogy. Antecedent. Apprehension. Argument. 
Assertion. Authority. Categorematic. Certainty. Classification. 
Definition. Difference. Discursus. Division. Equity. Experi- 
ence. 
Wheavell, Wm. 

1. Philosophy of the Inchictive Sciences. 2d Ed. 1847. 

Etiology. Art. Colligation of Facts. Conception and Idea. Con- 
silience. Deduction. Fact. Induction. Type. 

2. Elements of lloralitij, including Polity. 2d Ed. 1S2S. 
Conscience. Happiness. Intellect. Jurisprudence. Morality. Na- 
ture. Obligation. Right. Understanding. 

3. Preface to llackintosh's Prel. Dissert. 
Deontology. Eudemonism. 

4. On the Intellectual Powers ace. to Plato. Camhr. Philos. Trans. 1855. 
Dialectics. Reason. 

5. On Induction. 
Fact. 

6. Sujipleyneuial Volume. 
Homologue. Mythology. 

7. Astronomy and General Physics, considered with ref. to Natur. Theolog. 

Bridfjw. Treatise. 1th Edit. 1839. 
Law. 

8. On the Foundations of Alorals. Four Sermons hef. Univ. of Oambr. 

1837. 2d Ed. Camhr. 
Obligation. 

9. Lectures on Systematic 3Iorality. 8vo. 1846. 
WniTKHEAD. 

On BTaterialism. 
Materialism. 
WiLKiNS, John, Bp. (1614-72). 

Of the Princijiles and Duties of Natural Religion. 5th Edit. London, 
1704. 
Evil. Immutability. 

WiLLM. 

Hist, de la Philosophic Allemande, depids Kant Jusqu'd Hegel. 4 vols. 8vo. 
1848. 
Motive. Noumenon. Postulate. Space. 
WissowATius, A. (1608—78). 
Unity. 



AND OF PROPER NAMES. 653 

WoLPP, Christian. (1679—1754.) 

1. Philosophia liationalis a. logic, method, scientljicu pertrac. Frcft. and 

Lei2}z. 1722, 1732. 4to. 

2. Psyckologia Umpirica. Frcft. and Leipz. 1732. 4to. 

3. Opera Omnia. Halis. 1744. XXVI. 4to. 

Esthetics. Cause (76). Equity. Experience. Knowledge. 
WoLLASTON, Win. (1659—1724.) 

Religion of Nature delineated. Lond. 1725. Ith Edit. 1750. 
Agent. 
WoPDSwoRTH, Wm. (1770—1850.) 

Poems. New Edit. Land. 1850. / 

Duty. Fancy. Imagination. Imagination and Memory. 

Xenocrates. (B. C. 400—314.) 

Academics. 
Xenophanes. (Fl. bet. 540 and 500 B. C.) 

Atlicism. ■• 

Xenophon. (B. C. 450—360.) 

1. 3Iemorahilia if Socrata.] Both in Opera. 10 vols. Edinb. ISIO. 

2. (Economics. 1 {Paris, 1661.) 

Apology. Cardinal virtues. Causes, final (Doctrine of). Design. 
Dialectics. Economics. 

Young, Edward, Dr. (1684—1705.) 

Night Thoughts. {Works. 5 vols. Lond. ill\.) 
Reason. 
Young, John. 

Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy. {Cairns.) 1834. 
Impossible. Memory. 

Zeidleros. (1680.) 

Neology. 
Zeno. (Ab. B. C. 250.) 

Cynic. Epicurean. Fate. Idea. Motion. Propriety. Stoics. 
Zevort. (See Pieuron.) 

Contradiction. 
Zimmerman, J. G. (1728—1795.) 

Solitude cons, xoith respect to its influence upon the Alind and Heart. 
Tr. by Mercier. 2d Edit. lond. 1792. 

Temperament. 
ZoHAR, The. 

Kabala. 
ZoROASTEii. (B. C. 589—513.) 

Zend-Avesta. Trad, par Du Pierron, 2 vols, in 3, 4to. Par, 1771. 

Dualism. Emanation. 

.5(3 * 



INDEX OF TERMS. 



Abduction Page 1 

Ability (Natunil and Moral) 1 

Abscissio Infinid 2 

Absolute 2 

Abstinence 5 

Abstract, Abstraction 5 

Abstractive and Intuitive 10 

Absurd 10 

Academics 10 

Academy 11 

Acatalepsy 11 

Accident ...,, 11 

Accidental 12 

Acosmist 13 

Acroamatical 13 

Act and Action 14 

Active 16 

Activity, v. Will. 

Actual 16 

Actus Primus 16 

Secundus 16 

Adage 16 

Adjuration 17 

Admiration 17 

Adoration 17 

Adscititious 17 

iEsthetics 17 

Aetiology 18 

Affection 18 

Affinity 18 

Affirmation 18 

A Fortiori 19 

Agent 19 

Agnoiology 19 

Alchemy 19 

Allegory 19 

Ambition 20 

Amphibology 20 

Amphiboly 20 

Analogue .. 20 

Analogy 20 

■ and Metaphor 24 



Analogy and Example Page 25 

and Experience 25 

and Induction 26 

Analysis and Synthesis 26 

Analytics 28 

Angelology 28 

Anima Mundi 28 

Animism 28 

Antecedent 29 

Anthropology 29 

Anthropomorphism 30 

Anticipation 31 

Antinomy 32 

Antipathy 33 

A Parte Ante, A Parte Post 34 

Apathy 34 

Aphorism 35 

Apodeictic 36 

Apologue 36 

Apology 37 

Apophthegm 37 

Apperception 38 

Appetite 38 

Apprehension 40 

Apprehend and Comprehend 40 

Approbation (Moral) 41 

A Priori and A Posteriori 41 

Arbor Porphyriana 43 

Archaeus 44 

Archelogy 44 

Archetype 44 

Architoctonick 45 

Argument — 45 

(Indirect) 46 

Argumentation 47 

Art 48 

Asceticism 50 

Assent 51 

Assertion 51 

Assertory 51 

Association 52 

Assumption 53 

(665) 



656 



INDEX OP TERMS, 



Atheism 64 

Atom, Atomism 56 

Attention , 56 

Attribute 57 

Authentic , 68 

Authority (Principle of) 58 

Autocrasy 59 

Automaton and Automatic.. 59 

Automatism 60 

Autonomy 60 

Autothoists 61 

Axiom 61 

Beauty 62 

Being 63 

Belief.... 64 

Benevolence 66 

Blasphemy 66 

Body 67 

Bonum 67 

, Morale 68 

, Sumuium 68 

Brocard 69 

Caanesthesis 69 

Capacity 69 

Cardinal Virtues 70 

Casuistry 71 

Catalepsy 72 

Categorematio 72 

Categorical, v. Proposition. 

Category 73 

Causality 77 

Causation 80 

Cause 75 

Causes (Final) 81 

(Occasional) ■ 83 

Certainty, Certitude 84 

Chance 87 

Chances (Theory of) 89 

Charity 89 

Chastity 89 

Choice 89 

Chrematistics 90 

Civility, Courteousness 90 

Classification 91 

Cognition 92 

Colligation of Facts 93 

Combination and Connection of 

Ideas 93 

Common Sense 95 

(Philosophy of ) 95 

Common, v. Term. 

Compact 97 

Comparison 97 

Compassion, v. Sympathy. 

Com'ilex 97 



Comprehension ,, 93 

Compunction , 93 

Conceiving and Apprehending... 98 

Concept 99 

Conception 100 

and Imagination ,...,.. 101 

and Idea 103 

Conceptualism 104 

Conclusion 105 

Concrete 105 

Con dignity, v. Merit. 

Condition 105 

Conditional, v. Proposition. 

Congruity 106 

Conjugate 107 

Connotative 107 

Consanguinity 107 

Conscience 107 

Consciousness 109 

and Feeling 113 

Consent 114 

(Universal) 114 

Consequent, v. Antecedent. 

Consilience of Inductions 114 

Constitutive 1J5 

Contemplation 115 

Continence 115 

Contingent 115 

Continuity (Law of) 117 

Contract 118 

Contradiction (Principle of) 119 

Contraries 120 

Conversion 121 

Copula 121 

Cosmogony 121 

Cosmology, v. Metaphysics. 
Craniologj', v. Phrenology. 
Cranioscopy, v. Organ. 

Creation 122 

Credulity 122 

Criterion 122 

Critick, Criticism, Critique 123 

Cumulative (The Argument) 124 

Custom 124 

Cynic 125 

Daemonist 126 

Data 126 

Deduction 126 

De Facto, De Jure 127 

Definition 127 

Deist ,. 130 

Demiurge 130 

Demon 131 

Demonstration 131 

Denomination (External), v. Mode. 

Deontology 132 



INDEX OP TERMS. 



G5 



Design 133 

Desire 134 

Destiny 135 

Determinism 135 

Dialectic..... 136 

Dialectics 136 

Dianoiology, v. Noology. 

Dichotomy 137 

Dictum de Omni et Nullo 138 

Simpliciter 138 

Difference 138 

Dilemma 139 

Discovery, v. Invention. 

Discursus 140 

Disjunctive, v. Proposition. 

Disposition 140 

Distinction 141 

Distribution _ 142 

Ditheism 143 

Division 143 

Divorce 145 

Dogmatism 145 

Doubt 146 

Dreaming 147 

Dualism, Duality 147 

Duration 148 

Duty 148 

Dynamism 148 

Eclecticism 148 

Economics 150 

Ecstacy 161 

Ectype, V. Type. 

Education J51 

Effect 152 

Ego 152 

Egoism, Egoist 153 

Election 153 

Element 154 

Elementology, v. Methodology. 

Elicit 155 

Elimination 155 

Emanation 155 

Eminently, v. Virtual. 

Emotion 156 

Empiric, Empiricism 157 

Emulation 158 

Ends 158 

Ens 169 

Entelechy 169 

Enthusiasm 161 

Enthymeme 161 

Entity 162 

Enunciation ] 62 

Epicheirema 162 

Epicurean 163 

Epislemology 163 



Episyllogism 163 

Equanimity, v. Magnanimity. 

Equity 163 

Equivocal 164 

Equivocation 165 

Error 166 

Esoteric and Exoteric 167 

Essence 168 

Eternity 170 

of God 171 

Ethics 171 

Ethnography ... 172 

Ethnology 172 

Ethology 172 

Eudemonism 172 

Euretic or Euristic, v. Ostensive. 

Evidence 172 

Evil 174 

Example, v. Analogy. 

Excluded Middle ..'..... 175 

Existence 175 

Exoteric, v. Esoteric. 

Expediency {Doctrine of) 176 

Experience 176 

Experiment, v. Observation. 

Experimentum Crucis ISO 

Extension 181 

Externality or Outness 183 

Fable 183 

Eact 1&3 

Factitious 184 

Faculty • 184 

Faculties of theMind 188 

Faith, V. Belief. 

Fall.acy... 191 

Fallacia ^quivocationis 191 

AmphiboliEB 191 

Compositionis 191 

Divisionis 191 

Accentus 191 

Figurse Dictionis 191 

■ Accidentis 191 

A Dicto Secundum quid 

ad Dictum Simpliciter.. 192 

Ignorantionis Elenchi 192 

A non Causa pro Causa... 192 

Consequentis 192 

Petitionis Principii 192 

Plurium Intcrrogationum. 192 

False, Falsity 193 

Fancy 193 

Fashion, v. Custom. 

Fatalism, Fate 195 

Fear 196 

Feeling 196 

Fctichism... 193 

S 



65S 



INDEX OF TERMS. 



Figure, v. Syllogism. 

Fitness and Unfitness 199 

Force 200 

Form 201 

Formal)}', v. Real, Virtuul, Action. 

Fortitude 204 

Free AVill, v. Libert}', Necessity. 

Friendship 204 

Function 204 

Generalization 205 

General Term, v. Term. 

Genius 206 

Genuine, v. Authentic. 

Genus 208 

Gnome 209 

God 209 

Good (The Chief) 210 

Grammar (Universal) 210 

Grandeur 211 

Gratitude 212 

Gymnosophist 212 

Habit 212 

Happiness 215 

Haruiony (Pre-established) 216 

of the Spheres 217 

Hatred, v. Love. 

Hedonism 218 

Hermetic Books 218 

Heuristic, v. Ostensive. 

Holiness 218 

Homologue 218 

Homonymous, v. Equivocal. 

Homotype 219 

Humour 219 

Hylozoism 219 

Hypostasis, v. Subsistentia. 

Hypothesis 220 

Hypothetical, v. Proposition. 

I. V. Ego, Subject. 

Idea 222 

Ideal 228 

Idealism 231 

Idealist 232 

Ideation and Identional 232 

Identical Proposition 233 

Identism or Identity 233 

Identity 234 

(Personal) 234 

(Principle of ) 236 

Ideology or Idealogy 236 

Idiosyncrasy 237 

Idol 237 

Ignorance 238 

Illation 238 



Illuminati 239 

Imagination 239 

and Fancy 240 

and Conception 242 

and Memory 242 

Iniitation 242 

Immanence 243 

Immanent 243 

Immaterialism 244 

Immateriality ,. 245 

Immortality (of the Soul) 245 

Immutability 245 

Impenetrability.. 245 

Imperate, v. Elicit, Act. 

Imperative 245 

Impossible 246 

Impression 246 

Impulse and Impulsive..... 247 

Imputation..... 248 

Inclination 248 

Indefinite 248 

Indifference (Liberty of) 248 

Indifferent Action 249 

IndifFerentism or Identism 249 

Indiscernibles (Identity of) 249 

Individual 250 

Individualism 250 

Individuality 251 

Individuation 251 

Induction (Process of) 252 

(Principle of ) 254 

Inertia 265 

In Esse, In Pos e 255 

Inference 255 

and Proof 256 

Infinite 256 

Influx (Physical) 258 

Injury 259 

Innate Ideas 259 

Instinct 263 

Intellect 265 

Intellection 266 

Intelligence 267 

Intelleotus, Patiens, Agens 267 

Intent or Intention 368 

Intention (First and Second) 269 

Interpretation of Nature , 270 

Intuition 270 

Invention 273 

Irony 273 

Judgment 274 

Jurisprudence 276 

Justice 279 

Kabala 279 

Knowledge 280 



INDEX OF TERMS. 



659 



Language 284 

Laughter 284 

Law 285 

(Empirical) 288 

Lemma 289 

Libertarian 289 

Liberty of Will 289 

Life 291 

Logic 293 

Love and Hatred 296 

Macrocosm and Microcosm 296 

Magic 297 

Magnanimity and Equanimity... 297 

Manicheism 298 

Materialism 299 

Mathematics 299 

Matter 300 

and Form 301 

Maxim 302 

Memory 302 

MemoriaTechnica or Mnemonics. 307 

Mental Philosophy 308 

Merit 308 

Metaphor 309 

Metaphysics 310 

Metempsychosis 315 

Method 316 

Methodology 319 

Metonymy, v. Intention. 
Microcosm, v. Macrocosm. 

Mind 319 

Miracle 320 

Mnemonics, i\ Memoria Tcchnica. 

Modality 320 

Mode 321 

Molecule 322 

Monad 323 

Monadology.. 323 

Monogamy 324 

Monotheism 324 

Mood, V. Syllogism. 

Moral 324 

— Faculty, v. Conscience. 

Morality 325 

Moral Philosophy 326 

Moral Sense, v. Senses (Reflex). 

Morphology 327 

Motion ....". 328 

Motive ■ 328 

Mj'sticisni 332 

Mystery 332 

Myth and Mythology 334 

Nntura. v. Nnlure. 

Malunil 335 

Naturalis-m 336 



Nature 336 

(Course of) 338 

(Plastic) 339 

(Philosophy of) 339 

(Lawof) 339 

(of Things) 340 

(Human) 342 

Necessity 342 

(Doctrine of) 343 

Negation 345 

Nihilism 345 

Nihilum or Nothing 346 

Nominalism 346 

Non-contradiction, v. Contradiction. 

Non Sequitur 347 

Noogonie 347 

Noology 347 

Norm 348 

Notion 348 

Notioues Communes 352 

Noumenon 352 

Novelty 353 

Number 354 

Oath 354 

Object, V. Subject. 

Objective 354 

Obligation 355 

Observation ..., 358 

Occasion 361 

Occasional Causes, v. Cause. 
Occult Qualities, v. Quality. 
Occult Sciences, v. Sciences. 
One, V. Unity. 
Oneiromancy, v. Dreaming. 

Ontology 362 

Operations of the Mind 363 

Opinion 364 

Opposed, Opposition 364 

Optimism 365 

Order 366 

Organ 367 

Organon or Organum 368 

Origin 369 

Origination ..., 369 

Ostonsive 369 

Oughtness. v. Duly. 

Outness... 369 

Pact, V. Contract, Promise. 
Palingenesia, v. Perfectibility. 

Pantheism 370 

Parable 370 

Paradox 370 

Paralogism 371 

Parcimonj' (Law of) 371 

Paronymous, v. Conjugate. 



660 



INDEX OP TERMS. 



Part 371 

Passion 372 

Passions (The) 372 

Perception , , 373 

Perceptions (Obscure) 374 

Perfect, Perfection 376 

Perfectibility 377 

Peripatetic 378 

Person, Personality 378 

Petitio Principii 380 

Phantasni, v. Idea, 
phenomenology, i'. Nature. . 

phenomenon 380 

philanthropy 381 

philosophy 383 

phrenology 384 

physiognomy 385 

physiology and Physics 387 

picturesque 387 

Pneumatics 388 

Pneumatology 388 

Poetry or Poesy 389 

Pollicitation, v. Promise. 

Polygamy 390 

Polytheism 390 

Positive, V. Moral, Term. 

Positivism 390 

Possible 391 

Postulate 392 

Potential 393 

Potentiality, v. Capacity. 

Power 393 

Practical 396 

Prasdicate 396 

Praedicable 396 

Praedicament 397 

Pra)-Pra3dicainenta 397 

Prejudice 397 

Premiss 398 

Prescience 398 

Presentative, v. Knowledge. 

Primary 398 

Principia Essendi 399 

Principle 399 

Principles of Knowledge 399 

Express or Operative 400 

of Action 401 

Privation 402 

Probability, v. Chances. 

Probable 403 

Problem 404 

Progress, v. Perfectibility. 

Promise and Pollicitation 404 

Proof 405 

Property 406 

Proposition 406 

Propriety 408 



Proprium 408 

Prosyllogism, v. Epicheirema. 
Protype, v. Type. 

Proverb 408 

Providence 409 

Prudence 410 

Pscyhism :. 411 

Pscyhology 411 

Psycbopannychism , 414 

Pyrrhonism, I). Academics, Scepticism. 

Quadrivium, v. Trivium. 

Quality 414 

(Occult) 416 

Quantity 416 

Discrete, etc 417 

Quiddity 418 

Quietism 419 

Race, V. Species. 

Ratio 419 

Ratiocination 419 

Rationale 420 

Rationalism 420 

Rationalists 421 

Real 421 

Realism 422 

Reason 422 

(Spontaneity of) 424 

and Understanding 424 

(Impersonal) 428 

(Determining) 431 

Reasoning 431 

Recollection, v. pLemembrance. 

Rectitude 432 

Redintegration, v. Train of Thought. 

Reduction in Logic 434 

Reflection 435 

Reflex Senses, v. Senses (Reflex). 

Regulative 436 

Relation 436- 

Relative 438 

Religion 438 

Remembrance 439 

Reminiscence 440 

Representative, v. Knowledge. 

Reservation or Restriction 443 

Pv.etention 444 

Right 444 

Rosicruoians 446 

Rule 447 

Sabaism 448 

Same 448 

Sanction 448 

Savage and Barbarous 449 

Scepticism 450 



INDEX or TERMS. 



661 



Schema 451 

Scholastic 451 

Scholastic Philosophy 452 

Science..... 45.3 

Sciences (Occiilt) 455 

Scientia (Media) 455 

Sciolist ..• 455 

Sciomachy 455 

Seculaiism 456 

Secundum Quid 456 

Self-consciousness, v. Apperception. 

Selfishness 456 

Self-love 457 

Sematology 458 

Sensation 459 

and Perceptiim 460 

Sense 462 

Senses (Reflex) 462 

Sensibility or Sensitivity....- 463 

Seusibles, Common and Proper... 463 
Sensism, Sensualism, Sensuisui... 464 

Sensoriuin 464 

Sensus Communis 465 

Sentiment 465 

and Opinion 467 

Sign 468 

Signiflcates, r. Term. 
Simile, v. Metaphor. 
Sin, V. Evil. 

Sincerity 469 

Signiflcates, v. Term (Common). 
Singular, v. Term. 

Socialism 469 

Society (Desire of).! 470 

(Political Capacity of)... 471 

Somatology, v. Nature. 

Sophism, Sophister, Sophistical.. 471 

Sorites 472 

Soul 473 

, Spirit, Mind 477 

of theWorldjU.Anima Mniuli. 

Space 478 

Species 481 

in Perception 483 

Specification (Principle of) 485 

Speculation 485 

Spirit, v. Soul. 

Spiritualism , 486 

Spontaneity 486 

Spontaneous 487 

Standard of Virtue 487 

States of Mind 487 

Statistics 489 

Stoics 490 

Subject, Object 491 

Subjectivism 492 

Sublime (The) 493 

57- 



Subsistentia 493 

Substance 494 

(Principle of) 495 

Subsumption 495 

Succession 496 

Sufficient Reason 496 

Suggestion 497 

Suicide 498 

Superstition 498 

"Supra-Naturalism 499 

Syllogism 499 

Symbol, v. Myth. 

Sympathy 502 

Syncategorematic, v. Categoreuiatio. 

Syncretism 502 

Synderesis 504 

Syneidesis 604 

Synteresis 604 

Synthesis 504 

System ; 505 

, Economy 505 

Tabula Rasa 607 

Tact 608 

Talent 508 

Taste 608 

Teleology 510 

Temperament 610 

Temperance 612 

Tendency 512 

Term 512 

(Absolute) 513 

(Abstract) 613 

(Common) 513 

(Compatihlo) 613 

(Complex) 613 

(Concrete) 513 

(Contradictory) 613 

(Contrary) 614 

(Definite) 614 

(Indefinite) 614 

(Negative) 514 

(Opposite) 514 

(Positive) 514 

(Privative) 514 

(Relative) 514 

(Simple) 614 

(Singular) 615 

Terminists, v. Nominalism. 

Testimony 515 

Theism 516 

Theocracy 517 

Theodicy 619 

Theogony 520 

Theology 620 

^Natural 521 

Theopathy 522 



662 



INDEX OF TERMS. 



Theory •••• 

Theosophism ,Theosophy 
Thesis ^ 

Thouo-ht and Thinking .. 



522 
524 
525 
525 
526 



528 



'imie ^""V "• 

Topologj^ V. Memoria Technica, 

Tradition „ 

Train of Thought °-d 

Transcendent ^^" 

Transcendental l^i 

Transference, TransLation Ji6Z 

Transmigration, v. Metempsychosis. 
Transposition, v. Conversion. 

Trivium 

Truth 

Truths (First) 

Type 



Universals ^f^ 

Univocal Words 64.5 

Usage, V. Custom. 

Utiltty 546 



547 
547 
547 



Ubiety 

Unconditioned 

Understanding ... 

Unification 

Unitarian 

Unity or Oneness. 



533 
536 

538 

539 
539 
539 
542 
642 
542 



Velleity 

Veracity 

Verbal 

Veritas Entis, 

Coguitionis, 

Signi, 



V. Truth. 



Virtual . 
Virtue.. 
Volition 



Well-being 

Whole 

Why? 

Will 

Wisdom ... 

Wit 

Wit and Humour. 



Zoonomy. 



548 
548 
549 

550 
551 
552 
553 
557 
. 557 
. 559 

560 



THE K N D . 



